From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:24 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 331673 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75760C6379D for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 209952078E for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="FSGzKsFm" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728024AbgKWJzF (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:05 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58276 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725843AbgKWJzE (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:04 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3D3C1208DB; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:54:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125304; bh=OLkQOPwpPNkO447yVMVm5zd/5Ppg8ePwSShqZnVfuJg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FSGzKsFmiZYAMKqZKNgXIKyaN0EUMpKiutJhWcdYefpp+oRcZGia0ON78QlYObyy1 IjS0kDsbFwJAvYH7zotHBVuhwosJ2pBq/RauLsID8uQmy7LTLxavcwr+cGLZJnJVPg 804MLop53U23PnecEkbskdxtT9JtC5cXK4Y+ft84= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 1/9] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-2-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well. Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand --- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c index 26d5dcd2d69e..0f109eb16196 100644 --- a/fs/dax.c +++ b/fs/dax.c @@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size) #define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1) #define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) - static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES]; static int __init init_dax_wait_table(void) @@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry) static unsigned int dax_entry_order(void *entry) { if (xa_to_value(entry) & DAX_PMD) - return PMD_ORDER; + return PMD_PAGE_ORDER; return 0; } @@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, { struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; - XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_ORDER); + XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK; bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; bool sync; @@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, * entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_ORDER); + entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); if (xa_is_internal(entry)) { result = xa_to_internal(entry); goto fallback; @@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order) if (order == 0) ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE); #endif else diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h index 71125a4676c4..7f718b8dc789 100644 --- a/include/linux/pgtable.h +++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ #define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL #endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + /* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] * From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:25 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 330862 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29844C64E69 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD1D320639 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="AoCVlWo6" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728224AbgKWJzP (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:15 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58398 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728078AbgKWJzP (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:15 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9A7BC2100A; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125314; bh=gq/nxZiYj8wSo5fHYvxwQbeui4caUA+z/EhI20F60d0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=AoCVlWo6FE+J2uh0dQUn5boY0sAhrm4aF+R4TSQGvs4Wb63j7z5K2qqRR9Z6mvGNi LxRiQXZF7WCs+UJ+Juwz9/R6iKQ1IsABYDHTdKPyPMWouwkXaSm2rNcKNoUiRIcdHV aqPrFyGXn7IJjKvOY3dvPTLTIQShd/1CEjlSYp54= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 2/9] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-3-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index c43ccdddb0f6..ae146a260b14 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma) extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page); extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len); + /* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g., diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 61f72b09d990..c481f088bd50 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1348,9 +1348,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, - unsigned long flags, - unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len) { unsigned long locked, lock_limit; From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:26 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 331672 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61C8BC8300E for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C80D2078E for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Hwbq3KQT" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727849AbgKWJz1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:27 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58692 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728341AbgKWJz0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:26 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0E80B208DB; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125325; bh=+GdNX4mpKaMhhrniqkQ4cEGIr10edWa8YuyfI902ajQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Hwbq3KQTxmmYLa6PA+9hMrPuOgqEd7PwhuHJlk+3cW4gdKYyMlCDxfQIKwukJjAjr rjmFqXjYdygxk4J1Ocw7MBYoamZK529KfxmkQYj4p7lnkVVgBrA4rtHfgo8vGXwluQ lKnDc95JCkpJTift/xexrgi6cMiQxF6w2PEpVoe0= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 3/9] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:26 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-4-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once. Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Catalin Marinas # arm64 --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h index 45217f21f1fe..d3598419a284 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); #include diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 92eccaf595c8..b53ef37bf95a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable) __pgprot(PTE_VALID)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask = __pgprot(0), .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID), }; + unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, (unsigned long)page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE), .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY), }; + unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, (unsigned long)page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h index d690b08dff2a..92b9bb26bf5e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } #endif -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c index 87ba5a68bbb8..0454f2d052c4 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c @@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) return __set_memory(addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), __pgprot(_PAGE_EXEC)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { int ret; unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages; struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask = __pgprot(0), .clear_mask = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT) @@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) return ret; } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { int ret; unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages; struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask = PAGE_KERNEL, .clear_mask = __pgprot(0) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index 4352f08bfbb5..6224cb291f6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages); int set_pages_ro(struct page *page, int numpages); int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); extern int kernel_set_to_readonly; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 16f878c26667..d157fd617c99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages) return __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { - return __set_pages_np(page, 1); + return __set_pages_np(page, numpages); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { - return __set_pages_p(page, 1); + return __set_pages_p(page, numpages); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h index fe1aa4e54680..c650f82db813 100644 --- a/include/linux/set_memory.h +++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h @@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP -static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { return 0; } -static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 069576704c57..d40bb6666735 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page, int enable) * changes and this will no longer be the case. */ if (enable) - ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); else - ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page); + ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); if (ret) { pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n"); diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index d7075ad340aa..7e903524e002 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -2179,13 +2179,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) } static inline void set_area_direct_map(const struct vm_struct *area, - int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page)) + int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page, + int numpages)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) if (page_address(area->pages[i])) - set_direct_map(area->pages[i]); + set_direct_map(area->pages[i], 1); } /* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */ From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:27 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 330861 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97110C6379D for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 492AA207FF for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Rhc/J8CI" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728341AbgKWJzj (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:39 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58826 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727108AbgKWJzh (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:37 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C4CB72158C; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125335; bh=ulLJqwfyq9mwLMEFSGWvRb0daGbwqhmmvyRqmRPnUn8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Rhc/J8CI1n5QHE96JEig8ib3RZv1Kez6yd5RyNtpQN9aSTxBco+/hfxvrfiH7/dS4 QkoY0JVOkEkQjGv/B3sIb6BXRNd36kU3/jFckCAXz6YDB1m0CMAW3fzqeB5RoCoW6z PIr4X29hq44vLVkb/3ZQNXvCfDTQW0lRVVIFxzIE= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer Subject: [PATCH v10 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:27 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-5-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file descriptor. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses. Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed. Currently there are two protection modes: * exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it is present only in the page tables of the owning mm. * uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached. The "exclusive" mode is enabled implicitly and it is the default mode for memfd_secret(). The "uncached" mode requires architecture support and an architecture should opt-in for this mode using HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED configuration option. For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer --- arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 24 +++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 ++ mm/secretmem.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 340 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index e175529bfb12..0b54b9d8a21f 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1041,6 +1041,13 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID bool +config HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED + bool + help + An architecture can select this if its semantics of non-cached + mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads and it is + useful for secret protection. + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig" diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 34d5fb82f674..907e24ae7698 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..70e7db9f94fe --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h @@ -97,5 +97,6 @@ #define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d /* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d /* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h b/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7cf9492c70d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +/* secretmem operation modes */ +#define SECRETMEM_UNCACHED 0x1 + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 2dd6cbb8cabc..805fd7a668be 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret); /* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index c89c5444924b..d8d170fa5210 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -884,4 +884,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + endmenu diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index 6eeb4b29efb8..dfda14c48a75 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 5ec98de1e5de..71164fa83114 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -793,6 +794,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL }; struct page *page; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return NULL; + page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx); if (ctx.pgmap) put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap); @@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) return -EFAULT; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return -EFAULT; + if (write) { if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE)) @@ -2196,6 +2203,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte))); page = pte_page(pte); + if (page_is_secretmem(page)) + goto pte_unmap; + head = try_grab_compound_head(page, 1, flags); if (!head) goto pte_unmap; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4be4c9ecac45 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2020 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt + +/* + * Secret memory areas are always exclusive to owning mm and they are + * removed from the direct map. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED +#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (SECRETMEM_UNCACHED) +#else +#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0) +#endif + +#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK + +struct secretmem_ctx { + unsigned int mode; +}; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp) +{ + /* + * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map + * fragmentation + */ + return alloc_page(gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; + vm_fault_t ret = 0; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); + + page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); + if (!page) { + + page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask); + if (!page) + return vmf_error(-ENOMEM); + + err = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); + if (unlikely(err)) + goto err_put_page; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); + if (err) + goto err_del_page_cache; + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); + + __SetPageUptodate(page); + + ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; + } + + vmf->page = page; + return ret; + +err_del_page_cache: + delete_from_page_cache(page); +err_put_page: + put_page(page); + return vmf_error(err); +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; + unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len)) + return -EAGAIN; + + if (ctx->mode & SECRETMEM_UNCACHED) + vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot); + + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED; + + return 0; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops; +} + +static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .mmap = secretmem_mmap, +}; + +static bool secretmem_isolate_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode) +{ + return false; +} + +static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, + struct page *newpage, struct page *page, + enum migrate_mode mode) +{ + return -EBUSY; +} + +static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) +{ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); + clear_highpage(page); +} + +static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { + .freepage = secretmem_freepage, + .migratepage = secretmem_migratepage, + .isolate_page = secretmem_isolate_page, +}; + +bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page); + + if (!mapping) + return false; + + return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops; +} + +static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt; + +static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) +{ + struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx; + struct inode *inode; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return ERR_CAST(inode); + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto err_free_inode; + + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", + O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + goto err_free_ctx; + + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + + inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; + + /* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */ + inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; + inode->i_size = 0; + + file->private_data = ctx; + + ctx->mode = flags & SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK; + + return file; + +err_free_ctx: + kfree(ctx); +err_free_inode: + iput(inode); + return file; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) +{ + struct file *file; + int fd, err; + + /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC); + + if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) + return -EINVAL; + + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + file = secretmem_file_create(flags); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(file); + goto err_put_fd; + } + + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; + + fd_install(fd, file); + return fd; + +err_put_fd: + put_unused_fd(fd); + return err; +} + +static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private; + + truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); + clear_inode(inode); + kfree(ctx); +} + +static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = { + .evict_inode = secretmem_evict_inode, +}; + +static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC); + + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops; + + return 0; +} + +static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { + .name = "secretmem", + .init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context, + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, +}; + +static int secretmem_init(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs); + if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt)) + ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt); + + return ret; +} +fs_initcall(secretmem_init); From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:28 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 331671 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A02CC64E69 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EBF572078E for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="zYEyDFb1" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727108AbgKWJzt (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:49 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59026 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728440AbgKWJzs (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:48 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 793E221534; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125346; bh=t8+CG9uImG+jx42xaZW3Lx0tl2DbM1OgovkRrtLhfSs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=zYEyDFb1qQEwryqM6DG8eRYpzAo2OhOaudhqY6AsyoJF/3pNdmGHUGfIow81VhQhp mL1B9QfkQAi96BGPEzc0nyB3z69a6fSaam3gJS4qIYj/SaHMvWTQIov8q6zu8IRJHW WRFpBNMHP+lsxPdVWVMgGF0Z9/6VkwTNHc+ONGTA= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 5/9] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:28 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-6-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings. Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages. As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages. The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- mm/Kconfig | 2 + mm/secretmem.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index d8d170fa5210..e0e789398421 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -886,5 +886,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS config SECRETMEM def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + select CMA endmenu diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 4be4c9ecac45..d4c44fc568a4 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -41,25 +44,80 @@ #define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK struct secretmem_ctx { + struct gen_pool *pool; unsigned int mode; }; -static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp) +static struct cma *secretmem_cma; + +static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) { + unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER); + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + page = cma_alloc(secretmem_cma, nr_pages, PMD_SIZE, gfp & __GFP_NOWARN); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + if (err) + goto err_cma_release; + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (err) + goto err_set_direct_map; + + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PMD_SIZE); + + return 0; + +err_set_direct_map: /* - * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map - * fragmentation + * If a split of PUD-size page was required, it already happened + * when we marked the pages invalid which guarantees that this call + * won't fail */ - return alloc_page(gfp); + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); +err_cma_release: + cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); + return err; +} + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (gen_pool_avail(pool) < PAGE_SIZE) { + err = secretmem_pool_increase(ctx, gfp); + if (err) + return NULL; + } + + addr = gen_pool_alloc(pool, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!addr) + return NULL; + + page = virt_to_page(addr); + get_page(page); + + return page; } static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data; struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; vm_fault_t ret = 0; - unsigned long addr; struct page *page; int err; @@ -68,8 +126,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); if (!page) { - - page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask); + page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask); if (!page) return vmf_error(-ENOMEM); @@ -77,14 +134,8 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (unlikely(err)) goto err_put_page; - err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); - if (err) - goto err_del_page_cache; - - addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); - __SetPageUptodate(page); + set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ctx); ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; } @@ -92,8 +143,6 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vmf->page = page; return ret; -err_del_page_cache: - delete_from_page_cache(page); err_put_page: put_page(page); return vmf_error(err); @@ -146,8 +195,11 @@ static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) { - set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); - clear_highpage(page); + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = (struct secretmem_ctx *)page_private(page); + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + + gen_pool_free(pool, addr, PAGE_SIZE); } static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { @@ -182,13 +234,18 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) if (!ctx) goto err_free_inode; + ctx->pool = gen_pool_create(PAGE_SHIFT, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (!ctx->pool) + goto err_free_ctx; + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); if (IS_ERR(file)) - goto err_free_ctx; + goto err_free_pool; mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + inode->i_private = ctx; inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; @@ -202,6 +259,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) return file; +err_free_pool: + gen_pool_destroy(ctx->pool); err_free_ctx: kfree(ctx); err_free_inode: @@ -220,6 +279,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) return -EINVAL; + if (!secretmem_cma) + return -ENOMEM; + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return fd; @@ -240,11 +302,37 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) return err; } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, void *data) +{ + unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; + unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + struct page *page = virt_to_page(start); + unsigned long nr_pages = (end - start + 1) / PAGE_SIZE; + int i; + + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) + clear_highpage(page + i); + + cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); +} + +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + + gen_pool_for_each_chunk(pool, secretmem_cleanup_chunk, ctx); + gen_pool_destroy(pool); +} + static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) { struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private; truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); + secretmem_cleanup_pool(ctx); clear_inode(inode); kfree(ctx); } @@ -281,3 +369,29 @@ static int secretmem_init(void) return ret; } fs_initcall(secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str) +{ + phys_addr_t align = PMD_SIZE; + unsigned long reserved_size; + int err; + + reserved_size = memparse(str, NULL); + if (!reserved_size) + return 0; + + if (reserved_size * 2 > PUD_SIZE) + align = PUD_SIZE; + + err = cma_declare_contiguous(0, reserved_size, 0, align, 0, false, + "secretmem", &secretmem_cma); + if (err) { + pr_err("failed to create CMA: %d\n", err); + return err; + } + + pr_info("reserved %luM\n", reserved_size >> 20); + + return 0; +} +__setup("secretmem=", secretmem_setup); From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 330860 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNWANTED_LANGUAGE_BODY, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC69CC64E7D for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D2FA206F7 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="K2BGire3" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728467AbgKWJz6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:58 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59256 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728440AbgKWJz5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:55:57 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E6B282137B; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125356; bh=hHQsvSXgjq1UTvsq2JjzieNolTT2VcqV3LBfkOfkKg8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=K2BGire3Rs/AgPTlFeaIixT2cmL/Uxh/jj9C2VP/zl/w5ZODtmQkMQqJPkVVwPlkq 4GDf4+ju5DdyFZ12lAehHnmt9zgkEemZKT97uRhikD6AhrDzx0Et7CmXAhmNdPwtfI 6Ncxhw4o27Hlbga+ASCo7My0AEmsnOX8acsiQ+48= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 6/9] secretmem: add memcg accounting Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:29 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-7-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Roman Gushchin --- mm/filemap.c | 3 ++- mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 249cf489f5df..cf7f1dc9f4b8 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page, page->mapping = mapping; page->index = offset; - if (!huge) { + if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) { error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp); if (error) goto error; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index d4c44fc568a4..abf6ecdf70cb 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -50,6 +51,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx { static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order) +{ + int err; + + err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order); + if (err) + return err; + + /* + * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat + * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes + */ + mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, + PAGE_SIZE << order); + + return 0; +} + +static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order) +{ + + mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, + -PAGE_SIZE << order); + memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order); +} + static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) { unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER); @@ -62,10 +89,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); if (err) goto err_cma_release; + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + if (err) + goto err_memcg_uncharge; + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE); if (err) @@ -82,6 +113,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) * won't fail */ set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); +err_memcg_uncharge: + secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); err_cma_release: cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); return err; @@ -312,6 +345,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, int i; set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); + secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) clear_highpage(page + i); From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:30 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 331670 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42F78C8300C for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06F4D207FF for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="e4Ew5z4M" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728507AbgKWJ4J (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:09 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59506 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728493AbgKWJ4I (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:08 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 62152208DB; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:55:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125367; bh=x9rsWynUSj92xJxzciKz2wcsB6wApkMO1t2A4HXerbs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=e4Ew5z4MgueMaSbcUhMrw9rF1X02/V4jDf+Y5PgvaJadcmM6PDhrV5w/HKj+ZwLXE 06Jbng4H5og2FBoK/OcryaIcLzQEj6UQnLW3QfGnMCFj0Lty4rsA2W3W5QCk1GicuE 1tnp3Q6tL8d1GhnvQmbjW2qKIPYMh4lgs8aL2AzI= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 7/9] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:30 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-8-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h index 70e7db9f94fe..907a6734059c 100644 --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page); +bool secretmem_active(void); #else @@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "power.h" @@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void) bool hibernation_available(void) { - return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); + return nohibernate == 0 && + !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) && + !secretmem_active(); } /** diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index abf6ecdf70cb..14ef439841c9 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx { static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users); +} + static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order) { int err; @@ -185,6 +192,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + atomic_dec(&secretmem_users); + return 0; +} + static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; @@ -211,6 +224,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, }; @@ -328,6 +342,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; fd_install(fd, file); + atomic_inc(&secretmem_users); return fd; err_put_fd: From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:31 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 330859 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1A42C56202 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6070E207FF for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="EIpjWtdb" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728523AbgKWJ4T (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:19 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60000 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726948AbgKWJ4T (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:19 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D68832173E; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125378; bh=64/nnNkWaw37auo1/WFU5MJoRfuZyG65K2HxiqGfNR8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=EIpjWtdbRzUsk5HBSixDRxGxiD1QD7x1saJnHy0lZc5KZ5En9HMwD8F68J37fqkH8 X+Y628u+8TWaqF+j7YYOeO4sR69NF6tMo2cKo7AZvfYOqdDx+hl42HQMOCMyIWA5PU USfgrMV9wHHBWwxeNwWpSY13mAc+t/p1fX1rQEmM= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, Palmer Dabbelt Subject: [PATCH v10 8/9] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-9-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann --- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h @@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ #define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT #define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index c52ab1c4a755..109e6681b8fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -446,3 +446,4 @@ 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 i386 watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index f3270a9ef467..742cf17d7725 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 common watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 6d55324363ab..f9d93fbf9b69 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags); asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned int at_flags, int watch_fd, int watch_id); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned long flags); /* * Architecture-specific system calls diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h index 5df46517260e..51151888f330 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h @@ -861,9 +861,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise) #define __NR_watch_mount 441 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 442 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 442 +#define __NR_syscalls 443 /* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different diff --git a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755 --- a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh +++ b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */ From patchwork Mon Nov 23 09:54:32 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 331669 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A690AC56202 for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:57:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 534FA2137B for ; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:57:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="aR4fzhNo" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728550AbgKWJ4b (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:31 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60238 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728541AbgKWJ4b (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:56:31 -0500 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 938AD21D46; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 09:56:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606125388; bh=GcYHmVpON//HgfC+Q9fSTKhraRbGw/gcP2/N7E5anYQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aR4fzhNoTb490aKdn0Dyuo9ZoJPlX7Bp+QnWNTe2eTgZV70d5N7mFf/a2NzKZj5Um lgD+2qAvfCMTVuxxpbEVGOMaiYm7VlijTiiTapM7vP1iPtKQrYDw0vCj7hOcdSjt7F 1xKCxbpDlj9Xr906uXb7RtUrjxedK3oA7Vm7fHsA= From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 9/9] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:54:32 +0200 Message-Id: <20201123095432.5860-10-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore index 9a35c3f6a557..c8deddc81e7a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore @@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.* diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile index 62fb15f286ee..9ab98946fbf2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79578dfd13e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2020 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "../kselftest.h" + +#define fail(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_fail(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define pass(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_pass(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define skip(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_skip(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +#ifdef __NR_memfd_secret + +#include + +#define PATTERN 0x55 + +static const int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; +static const int mode = MAP_SHARED; + +static unsigned long page_size; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_cur; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_max; + +static int memfd_secret(unsigned long flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, flags); +} + +static void test_file_apis(int fd) +{ + char buf[64]; + + if ((read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (pread(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0) || + (pwrite(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0)) + fail("unexpected file IO\n"); + else + pass("file IO is blocked as expected\n"); +} + +static void test_mlock_limit(int fd) +{ + size_t len; + char *mem; + + len = mlock_limit_cur; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + munmap(mem, len); + + len = mlock_limit_max * 2; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem != MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unexpected mlock limit violation\n"); + munmap(mem, len); + return; + } + + pass("mlock limit is respected\n"); +} + +static void try_process_vm_read(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + struct iovec liov, riov; + char buf[64]; + char *mem; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + liov.iov_len = riov.iov_len = sizeof(buf); + liov.iov_base = buf; + riov.iov_base = mem; + + if (process_vm_readv(getppid(), &liov, 1, &riov, 1, 0) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + exit(KSFT_SKIP); + exit(KSFT_PASS); + } + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void try_ptrace(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + pid_t ppid = getppid(); + int status; + char *mem; + long ret; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + perror("pipe write"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ppid, 0, 0); + if (ret) { + perror("ptrace_attach"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = waitpid(ppid, &status, WUNTRACED); + if ((ret != ppid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) { + fprintf(stderr, "weird waitppid result %ld stat %x\n", + ret, status); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + if (ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, ppid, mem, 0)) + exit(KSFT_PASS); + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void check_child_status(pid_t pid, const char *name) +{ + int status; + + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + + if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_SKIP) { + skip("%s is not supported\n", name); + return; + } + + if ((WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_PASS) || + WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + pass("%s is blocked as expected\n", name); + return; + } + + fail("%s: unexpected memory access\n", name); +} + +static void test_remote_access(int fd, const char *name, + void (*func)(int fd, int pipefd[2])) +{ + int pipefd[2]; + pid_t pid; + char *mem; + + if (pipe(pipefd)) { + fail("pipe failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + fail("fork failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + if (pid == 0) { + func(fd, pipefd); + return; + } + + mem = mmap(NULL, page_size, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("Unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + + ftruncate(fd, page_size); + memset(mem, PATTERN, page_size); + + if (write(pipefd[1], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + check_child_status(pid, name); +} + +static void test_process_vm_read(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "process_vm_read", try_process_vm_read); +} + +static void test_ptrace(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "ptrace", try_ptrace); +} + +static int set_cap_limits(rlim_t max) +{ + struct rlimit new; + cap_t cap = cap_init(); + + new.rlim_cur = max; + new.rlim_max = max; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &new)) { + perror("setrlimit() returns error"); + return -1; + } + + /* drop capabilities including CAP_IPC_LOCK */ + if (cap_set_proc(cap)) { + perror("cap_set_proc() returns error"); + return -2; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void prepare(void) +{ + struct rlimit rlim; + + page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); + if (!page_size) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Failed to get page size %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to detect mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + mlock_limit_cur = rlim.rlim_cur; + mlock_limit_max = rlim.rlim_max; + + printf("page_size: %ld, mlock.soft: %ld, mlock.hard: %ld\n", + page_size, mlock_limit_cur, mlock_limit_max); + + if (page_size > mlock_limit_cur) + mlock_limit_cur = page_size; + if (page_size > mlock_limit_max) + mlock_limit_max = page_size; + + if (set_cap_limits(mlock_limit_max)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to set mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); +} + +#define NUM_TESTS 4 + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int fd; + + prepare(); + + ksft_print_header(); + ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS); + + fd = memfd_secret(0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + ksft_exit_skip("memfd_secret is not supported\n"); + else + ksft_exit_fail_msg("memfd_secret failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + } + + test_mlock_limit(fd); + test_file_apis(fd); + test_process_vm_read(fd); + test_ptrace(fd); + + close(fd); + + ksft_exit(!ksft_get_fail_cnt()); +} + +#else /* __NR_memfd_secret */ + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("skip: skipping memfd_secret test (missing __NR_memfd_secret)\n"); + return KSFT_SKIP; +} + +#endif /* __NR_memfd_secret */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests index e953f3cd9664..95a67382f132 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests @@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode