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[83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id e10-20020adffd0a000000b003334675634bsm18528215wrr.29.2023.12.15.03.07.09 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:10 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v5 1/6] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:28 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-2-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 DCP is capable of performing AES with two hardware-bound keys: - The one-time programmable (OTP) key which is burnt via on-chip fuses - The unique key (UK) which is derived from the OTP key In addition to the two hardware-bound keys, DCP also supports storing keys in 4 dedicated key slots within its secure memory area (internal SRAM). These keys are not stored in main memory and are therefore not directly accessible by the operating system. To use them for AES operations, a one-byte key reference has to supplied with the DCP operation descriptor in the control register. This adds support for using any of these 6 keys through the crypto API via their key reference after they have been set up. The main purpose is to add support for DCP-backed trusted keys. Other use cases are possible too (see similar existing paes implementations), but these should carefully be evaluated as e.g. enabling AF_ALG will give userspace full access to use keys. In scenarios with untrustworthy userspace, this will enable en-/decryption oracles. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/soc/fsl/dcp.h | 17 +++++++ 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/dcp.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index f6b7bce0e656..2dc664fb2faf 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct dcp_async_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher *fallback; unsigned int key_len; uint8_t key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + bool key_referenced; }; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx { @@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM (1 << 13) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT (1 << 12) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY (1 << 11) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY (1 << 10) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT (1 << 9) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH (1 << 6) @@ -168,6 +171,8 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_ECB (0 << 4) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_SELECT_AES128 (0 << 0) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT 8 + static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) { int dma_err; @@ -224,13 +229,16 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + bool key_referenced = actx->key_referenced; int ret; - key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, - 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (!key_referenced) { + key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); + if (ret) + return ret; + } src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); @@ -255,8 +263,12 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT | MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER; - /* Payload contains the key. */ - desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + if (key_referenced) + /* Set OTP key bit to select the key via KEY_SELECT. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY; + else + /* Payload contains the key. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; if (rctx->enc) desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; @@ -270,6 +282,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, else desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + if (key_referenced) + desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT; + desc->next_cmd_addr = 0; desc->source = src_phys; desc->destination = dst_phys; @@ -284,9 +299,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, err_dst: dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); err_src: - dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - + if (!key_referenced) + dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); return ret; } @@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb) struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); int ret; - if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) + if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && !actx->key_referenced)) return mxs_dcp_block_fallback(req, enc); rctx->enc = enc; @@ -500,6 +515,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, * there can still be an operation in progress. */ actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = false; if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { memcpy(actx->key, key, len); return 0; @@ -516,6 +532,32 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, return crypto_skcipher_setkey(actx->fallback, key, len); } +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (key[0]) { + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP: + memcpy(actx->key, key, len); + actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = true; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static int mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); @@ -539,6 +581,13 @@ static void mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) crypto_free_skcipher(actx->fallback); } +static int mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct dcp_aes_req_ctx)); + + return 0; +} + /* * Hashing (SHA1/SHA256) */ @@ -889,6 +938,39 @@ static struct skcipher_alg dcp_aes_algs[] = { .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .init = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm, .exit = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_decrypt, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_decrypt, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, }, }; diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cda89e260c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#ifndef MXS_DCP_H +#define MXS_DCP_H + +#define DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE 1 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0 0x00 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1 0x01 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2 0x02 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3 0x03 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE 0xfe +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP 0xff + +#endif /* MXS_DCP_H */ From patchwork Fri Dec 15 11:06:29 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 754438 Received: from mail-wr1-f51.google.com (mail-wr1-f51.google.com [209.85.221.51]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D491124B5E for ; 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[83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id p8-20020a05600c358800b0040b40468c98sm30050771wmq.10.2023.12.15.03.07.11 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:12 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 2/6] KEYS: trusted: improve scalability of trust source config Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:29 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-3-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Checking if at least one valid trust source is selected does not scale and becomes hard to read. This improves this in preparation for the DCP trust source. Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index dbfdd8536468..553dc117f385 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + bool + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS @@ -9,6 +12,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, @@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted key backend. @@ -29,10 +34,11 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM -comment "No trust source selected!" +if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + comment "No trust source selected!" endif From patchwork Fri Dec 15 11:06:30 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 754939 Received: from mail-wr1-f49.google.com (mail-wr1-f49.google.com [209.85.221.49]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B64D324B30 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 11:07:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b="qW9rkUP+" Received: by mail-wr1-f49.google.com with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-3364b049467so415390f8f.1 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:15 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1702638434; x=1703243234; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=tAr8tX/pVVuCyHSrOrPWbun59gctmncxIGMLiMwO5Os=; b=qW9rkUP+WfOLTdDXxS7eOZo0SXLBkCd1SndDcEiGxLdbP7l4Qefyc0VO03t+LMHTFd MfSPFSBJgCQyLUOAf1N54z/AHxmpOwcUSB1m+oAM8o+tVrT4kB1nGpiwIiUWjiTtF+6/ zkrTGhtPJwoAADA1Lar3yeVC5K0zNIysNYunee3L+i8oZqqpfdvL1kflbacqq3/nTDNX 5xT5MlMjaF0/wJnjATglMf3Xxsypi3Dq9T0rgwFofoocnb+bhBBxEyZDv7ggrVbzRS4V AEx0YsliefuBQbf0K8orBteylPYbxNsXYodHnDHtzY/ubAZyNOEDcnQ/COC3g5ENd3Ev NVFg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1702638434; x=1703243234; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=tAr8tX/pVVuCyHSrOrPWbun59gctmncxIGMLiMwO5Os=; b=SnD6ws2bWRSL+gqKbvXhP0cy5R5zCXOt+OhxFIlCBkZhT90nrL8sjwY/6er2IGwHS/ uKOH3GYbHNq+4Wqi5BuUD1gk9gOiYH/k2h8j01ATEh5lmDtAPlXy45mDkwUMUOJYRnRw SQWqnHVzHoZhioPMtMwi4FdR0wbGBchBg5BijlAaNVhF2LxqMADnpv2HnEF98H+p/DPM vDCDLtZU6ZIhgQvXcTqVUjVvpJfrI1CGfqFb2JAmvbo2Ahm3R88DhkViCvwtVPpDTce4 wC3TTcbAjGytlFGtqpBtH8FeBJbi0pO0Zxml2iY1CyyWbVWc1oa+rGBtc7laba6vUfIu vw1A== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yy8Ux8dubTjdPJkY68RwQwC8sb1lAY1s1FwoRxCV0hW5A7AzvRY 0tCdvXbLkunZc9Acp0JwHwcPtQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IF/XG7G1YsdLXmsGTGm2ndWh2sLa7Jy82EQizwUy7J5f/zZEcHCAyABR+Zchc2h9hq2ZaJBxw== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:4a50:0:b0:336:4b3e:e0bc with SMTP id v16-20020a5d4a50000000b003364b3ee0bcmr1181539wrs.27.1702638433923; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (clnet-p106-198.ikbnet.co.at. [83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id v4-20020a5d4a44000000b003342e0745absm18391737wrs.93.2023.12.15.03.07.12 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:13 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v5 3/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:30 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-4-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP. Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel). The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce. The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique or OTP key. The DCP trusted key blob format is: /* * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. * * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. * * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. */ struct dcp_blob_fmt { __u8 fmt_version; __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __le32 payload_len; __u8 payload[]; } __packed; By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as well via the use_otp_key module parameter. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- include/keys/trusted_dcp.h | 11 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 8 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 311 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 337 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9aaa42075b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H + +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 553dc117f385..1fb8aa001995 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP + bool "DCP-based trusted keys" + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + help + Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. + if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS comment "No trust source selected!" endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 735aa0bc08ef..f0f3b27f688b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o + +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index c6fc50d67214..8af0988be850 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)"); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam or dcp)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) + { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8d19b92fe976 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 + +/** + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1. + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN. + */ +struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[]; +} __packed; + +static bool use_otp_key; +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing"); + +static bool skip_zk_test; +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed"); + +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len) +{ + return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN; +} + +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool is_encrypt) +{ + int res = 0; + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE]; + + if (use_otp_key) + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP; + else + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + res = PTR_ERR(tfm); + pr_err("Unable to request DCP pAES-ECB cipher: %i\n", res); + tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key)); + if (res < 0) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128, + NULL); + + if (is_encrypt) + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + else + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); + +out: + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + + return res; +} + +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce, + bool is_encrypt) +{ + struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + int ret; + + aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(aead); + pr_err("Unable to request AES-GCM cipher: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; + } + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_aead; + } + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len); + if (is_encrypt) { + /* + * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag. + */ + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len); + } + + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, + NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_req; + } + + if (is_encrypt) + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + else + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + +free_req: + aead_request_free(aead_req); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(aead); +out: + return ret; +} + +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false); +} + +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true); +} + +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION; + get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + + ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key, + b->nonce, true); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len); + p->blob_len = blen; + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n", + b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len); + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen != p->blob_len) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen, + p->blob_len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN, + b->blob_key, b->nonce, false); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + +static int test_for_zero_key(void) +{ + static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f}; + void *buf = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (skip_zk_test) + goto out; + + buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (use_otp_key) + pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n"); + + ret = test_for_zero_key(); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret); + + return -EINVAL; + } + + return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = { + .exit = trusted_dcp_exit, + .init = trusted_dcp_init, + .seal = trusted_dcp_seal, + .unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal, + .migratable = 0, +}; From patchwork Fri Dec 15 11:06:31 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; 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[83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id fc7-20020a05600c524700b0040c44cb251dsm21151352wmb.46.2023.12.15.03.07.14 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:15 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 4/6] MAINTAINERS: add entry for DCP-based trusted keys Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:31 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-5-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 This covers trusted keys backed by NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) chip found in smaller i.MX SoCs. Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- MAINTAINERS | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 90f13281d297..988d01226131 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -11647,6 +11647,15 @@ S: Maintained F: include/keys/trusted_caam.h F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP +M: David Gstir +R: sigma star Kernel Team +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: include/keys/trusted_dcp.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE M: Sumit Garg L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From patchwork Fri Dec 15 11:06:32 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 754938 Received: from mail-wm1-f41.google.com (mail-wm1-f41.google.com [209.85.128.41]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0FBC82C861 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 11:07:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b="H6hP073X" Received: by mail-wm1-f41.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-40c2db2ee28so6539195e9.2 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:18 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1702638437; x=1703243237; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=zKvuKpR6kDazmh6thDgnN9OKi8VRnTOS23Ea0LWxTCY=; b=H6hP073XdI8sNYFqrRvki+deJElHiGxj+CjtcHdau2MbjA90dsmQFVJebe8CoI2D0t S3HKMJjvlCDR6P/UJvMj/XYVglDo/AN0E3iFvxaMTd8d3p+/ztSK/CR9e67kPHJLB1PW J/XgShDuTf9P/H4AWVJXmnvlhe56YQLt17Azl8j6PaC+xecA99P2nvObAFqKvvyoGYEp PE+CpnEv166LbhC1/bR3nE/DuwdKZjyKYUbpey2Iyv5hytvM7VR4KrVRQvqheKUVNfK1 Yofh3ss1JfVzsYjHyEU5HYo53njLQfi3B2YiMW385X66esUg92SCjNOPc5ZJVdDuhvZY aWFw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1702638437; x=1703243237; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=zKvuKpR6kDazmh6thDgnN9OKi8VRnTOS23Ea0LWxTCY=; b=W2VCyk0nJmjKKRflsEqcEtssyfjXkLBth6fxNCEx/1qXWLooYKbZWmJkac0x8v9YGF RYPj6iy8WyRZFbDtbyL7rt+twKcy/8PJIS0nvUkuhsa389G40Ujhh1ipEIrNmJ2aXLMF UDqlwepJRoULN7aWsppm7ivpX/L6sEavRkBOL+Oei2pqc//mUelAJpsOAwuoNYEhOoN8 B75dAZeaP3aU9N6HCufru5Ou8WhybruG3ayBaYQdGulzZxNr3msdIxIQBW8YTk9qLTi+ Wd+e/gCJE43039kHndybHTZGTTX2hTxbUaYU9PJHwdd64QkfvkybfzHvUjbUgc1ooF+a 0tPg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yy3/CG39rGC4M17NHVrYU+JXvA432YlOUTUSbGvnNisK+Drz8Bj IPbm4/SQ39Edha1BnqkM6qe7Xg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHKXg688Frx+810+en2elPMPMkwlMfj9F36utkLlJhj2Iam2iGNSmuxb5m8+dXfSkWtYdMqRg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:6743:b0:40c:3e98:56aa with SMTP id ea3-20020a05600c674300b0040c3e9856aamr6248633wmb.129.1702638437141; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (clnet-p106-198.ikbnet.co.at. [83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id t9-20020a05600c198900b0040c490db950sm18462328wmq.47.2023.12.15.03.07.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:16 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v5 5/6] docs: document DCP-backed trusted keys kernel params Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:32 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-6-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Document the kernel parameters trusted.dcp_use_otp_key and trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test for DCP-backed trusted keys. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 0a1731a0f0ef..c11eda8b38e0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6566,6 +6566,7 @@ - "tpm" - "tee" - "caam" + - "dcp" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized @@ -6581,6 +6582,18 @@ If not specified, "default" is used. In this case, the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source. + trusted.dcp_use_otp_key + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will select the DCP OTP key + instead of the DCP UNIQUE key blob encryption. + + trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will disable the check if all + the blob key is zero'ed. This is helpful for situations where + having this key zero'ed is acceptable. E.g. in testing + scenarios. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this From patchwork Fri Dec 15 11:06:33 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 754436 Received: from mail-wr1-f50.google.com (mail-wr1-f50.google.com [209.85.221.50]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7256A2D791 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 11:07:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b="pOH/51at" Received: by mail-wr1-f50.google.com with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-32f8441dfb5so421525f8f.0 for ; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:20 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1702638439; x=1703243239; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=+qntkmutwprS+2oQeQzgmaP97TAaIsTbzLeg5qvDo3I=; b=pOH/51atVr7BH/rvGzASIsdokLdrAh2KwL9LKfemqSGyhegKt84LLc2UQhHeBIXUzr 8gBYidiYO3kRkSpcxsP9v4H7JK0VVzhbfOf9CDWg+nsRjP5BV+k/TQmXKUnEFDEeG3X1 SRV98hI1ayMXWeSD0Cob33njgMyP4vNEAREaAovbmG3/Nm/RjHkjXvf2ckfgSZIcZf2+ Gbj2MR1DgFqd3S07LV4KJ+MOqfxGZQQHmhKdEvCS8W7Sn8bnDlBNn7kFEpJkUDSnQRBD oc58EBbgVcklglvPtrXeEL+F9t7wMxkTN5ZDH0Oxnlfr5ZNc5Lg5O/GfyLgxTS/ByOC1 sOfw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1702638439; x=1703243239; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=+qntkmutwprS+2oQeQzgmaP97TAaIsTbzLeg5qvDo3I=; b=HQBQWLEnVKV/LEskYT0ApQRjKmEW8lqEmlZzZSuIXy3vafr57vilBKkv6PAf4d9wgc ucnaDSkZePaAW7ajwWxcq5FvS6SmsvgQMwnEIqwiJ0bJoxmuXuhrvTB1yGQFuLZbD/Vc uzfYyBXbb1LKbZWBG0xnwOiQf/MHa69EiV2rYhxI9svozAg+moL+eAHAJjdxDyOQl8ro egZjelOhZjB4MhEKaiD5Oyo2Aa8iKosYwB2Q7JupUutOc78ucsEkxjie0lJxoPPQ/gL/ NzNTrMtH6PNp1tNxI1/00o56cbNEGJvsNODKlUJB/oyxIp987FQ+XzJ9/CxkXibXUVCd B6mA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxZNf8CK8NZ1xsOd7xpIKQdW4kIMKhVDFa6PPPE7ZBT1hTt/wUL HtDyeYZC/8tggBmy3TKtNkv1cg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IELSxWyakYU5tmDr1VXLpSIS8du+8Ca/Qhvys+9ED2/licpi1Hnfyj3ePT+IUVtn4Xva0PsAw== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:4590:0:b0:336:4bac:f9a5 with SMTP id p16-20020a5d4590000000b003364bacf9a5mr978164wrq.64.1702638438773; Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (clnet-p106-198.ikbnet.co.at. [83.175.106.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id e18-20020a056000121200b00333404e9935sm18384464wrx.54.2023.12.15.03.07.17 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Dec 2023 03:07:18 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v5 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 12:06:33 +0100 Message-ID: <20231215110639.45522-7-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20231215110639.45522-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 9bc9db8ec651..4452070afbe9 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + (4) DCP + + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs for platform integrity. + (4) DCP + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for + platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. Interface is specific to silicon vendor. + (4) DCP + + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. + * Threat model The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device is probed. + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled + to back the kernel RNG. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: DCP +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- @@ -426,3 +470,44 @@ string length. privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed string length. + +DCP Blob Format +--------------- + +The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its +AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. +To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define +our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing +key stored in the key blob. + +Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit +blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to +encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. + +The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES +encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, +BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together +with a version number, payload length and authentication tag:: + + /* + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[]; + } __packed;