From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:01 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561066 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF9D9C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239092AbiDMVNe (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:34 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55194 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S238993AbiDMVNE (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:04 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A01C403DD; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884242; x=1681420242; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=fKeqV9OhsFkZzAX2CopH1igNxBxdaal5g6aQT65f0Nw=; b=lafseR6v1xAWP2Ku7UCYwOxSGXZVL+XIphsBFbdNMn9NeHyRZfpp5bEa ZZ+5Zxw4Nd8OlLpgwvgSzz3ib54UuumVK7m7lBeRJoMK8zVOXZyLWFlIq ptRcEYTOtAh8XffnnQ7oD9uH/nI83YS0rrkqmaBPrTBfbsWv2KfS/7FIN 4CrirKxjzoPmZd00TqOspWN9OqNbydNhjfS5tYF8eafvF3KRwcr1/UH7i fju+CFi4QaTC3BSEG0xMuZdBUbwhgWYRn0VmA6ON2Et+9o4SmbbSC8vlJ +FsObdKFLGFy2GU2ivoefOcrg2Q3NjYxqYjv+hmnn9D5MrOjIZl+00KD8 A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323218994" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323218994" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:40 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054237" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:40 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 01/31] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:01 -0700 Message-Id: <3fcf803810ad9aed3913843d98b979db404bf917.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The SGX ENCLS instruction uses EAX to specify an SGX function and may require additional registers, depending on the SGX function. ENCLS invokes the specified privileged SGX function for managing and debugging enclaves. Macros are used to wrap the ENCLS functionality and several wrappers are used to wrap the macros to make the different SGX functions accessible in the code. The wrappers of the supported SGX functions are cryptic. Add short descriptions of each as a comment. Suggested-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Fix commit message and subject to not refer to descriptions as "changelog descriptions" or "shortlog descriptions" (Jarkko). - Improve all descriptions with guidance from Jarkko. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index fa04a73daf9c..0e22fa8f77c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -136,57 +136,71 @@ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret) ret; \ }) +/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */ static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs) { return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs); } +/* Hash a 256 byte region of an enclave page to SECS:MRENCLAVE. */ static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr) { return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr); } +/* + * Associate an EPC page to an enclave either as a REG or TCS page + * populated with the provided data. + */ static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr) { return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr); } +/* Finalize enclave build, initialize enclave for user code execution. */ static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs) { return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token); } +/* Disassociate EPC page from its enclave and mark it as unused. */ static inline int __eremove(void *addr) { return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr); } +/* Copy data to an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */ static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data) { return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr); } +/* Copy data from an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */ static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data) { return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr); } +/* Track that software has completed the required TLB address clears. */ static inline int __etrack(void *addr) { return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr); } +/* Load, verify, and unblock an EPC page. */ static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, void *va) { return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va); } +/* Make EPC page inaccessible to enclave, ready to be written to memory. */ static inline int __eblock(void *addr) { return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr); } +/* Initialize an EPC page into a Version Array (VA) page. */ static inline int __epa(void *addr) { unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA; @@ -194,6 +208,7 @@ static inline int __epa(void *addr) return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr); } +/* Invalidate an EPC page and write it out to main memory. */ static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, void *va) { From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:02 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561068 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74371C43219 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238916AbiDMVNa (ORCPT ); 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323218996" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323218996" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:40 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054240" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:40 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 02/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:02 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a wrapper for the EMODPR ENCLS leaf function used to restrict enclave page permissions as maintained in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). EMODPR: 1) Updates the EPCM permissions of an enclave page by treating the new permissions as a mask. Supplying a value that attempts to relax EPCM permissions has no effect on EPCM permissions (PR bit, see below, is changed). 2) Sets the PR bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page to indicate that permission restriction is in progress. The bit is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY. The enclave may access the page throughout the entire process if conforming to the EPCM permissions for the enclave page. After performing the permission restriction by issuing EMODPR the kernel needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that all logical processors sees the new restricted permissions. This is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed and is accomplished with the ETRACK flow. Expand enum sgx_return_code with the possible EMODPR return values. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V2: - Add detail to changelog that PR bit is set when EPCM permissions not changed when relaxing of permissions using EMODPR attempted. Changes since V1: - Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko). - Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as the calling conditions (Jarkko). - Make short description more specific to which permissions (EPCM permissions) the function modifies. arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h index 3f9334ef67cd..d67810b50a81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h @@ -65,17 +65,22 @@ enum sgx_encls_function { /** * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV + * %SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT: Page is being written by other ENCLS function. * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not * been completed yet. * %SGX_CHILD_PRESENT SECS has child pages present in the EPC. * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. + * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE: The EPC page cannot be modified because it + * is in the PENDING or MODIFIED state. * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received */ enum sgx_return_code { + SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT = 7, SGX_NOT_TRACKED = 11, SGX_CHILD_PRESENT = 13, SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16, + SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE = 20, SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128, }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index 0e22fa8f77c5..2b091912f038 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -215,4 +215,10 @@ static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va); } +/* Restrict the EPCM permissions of an EPC page. */ +static inline int __emodpr(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_2(EMODPR, secinfo, addr); +} + #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */ From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:03 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561353 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B88EC4167E for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239063AbiDMVNt (ORCPT ); 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219000" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219000" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054243" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:40 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 03/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:03 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a wrapper for the EMODT ENCLS leaf function used to change the type of an enclave page as maintained in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). EMODT: 1) Updates the EPCM page type of the enclave page. 2) Sets the MODIFIED bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page. This bit is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY. Access from within the enclave to the enclave page is not possible while the MODIFIED bit is set. After changing the enclave page type by issuing EMODT the kernel needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that no logical processor continues to hold a reference to the changed page. This is required to ensure no required security checks are circumvented and is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed. Ensuring that no references to the changed page remain is accomplished with the ETRACK flow. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko). - Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as the calling conditions (Jarkko). arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index 2b091912f038..7a1ecf704ec1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -221,4 +221,10 @@ static inline int __emodpr(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr) return __encls_ret_2(EMODPR, secinfo, addr); } +/* Change the type of an EPC page. */ +static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_2(EMODT, secinfo, addr); +} + #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */ From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:04 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561067 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E621C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239088AbiDMVNc (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55230 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239005AbiDMVNG (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:06 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4327F3A5C1; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884243; x=1681420243; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yhqYq03R1gOWee2UyUVLupzCQlollDEDnN5WKIJtgE8=; b=H3ZOpCI2gzjHrJlqWE3JJBoLkZojelprf/KvIeouAA9ma8zBpE9UUzZI eQaa3HgL6PIbIGdQL0JuvBKgNIRKXu/MuMVbsbiGUhLyQNiMw42s1arvz /MIbIXLgvD2AJjWmkP+/hiUSekG9kQtSAWzHbEl5rlTNmE/VUJSwgFVnW A2F6GTm/xnwCWnRNMzGGu/VNKBsH1W4RqDwzcCtjLmncU+tOuI8N6FSf/ pucpEzwusAj9alvnpcqC1QtrWNx7PdxJY+WtYvS2mhyQAA+IL/3bp3ynU x41qj5nYt5dSdi8oL+RGD09GdR013KCl8wkGCxPN5I+epR1T4fb8YOpth g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219003" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219003" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054246" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 04/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:04 -0700 Message-Id: <62915f9ff84ae41f363a3a67a5a86ee4e0f6cc7e.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a wrapper for the EAUG ENCLS leaf function used to add a page to an initialized enclave. EAUG: 1) Stores all properties of the new enclave page in the SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). 2) Sets the PENDING bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page. This bit is cleared by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY. Access from within the enclave to the new enclave page is not possible until the PENDING bit is cleared. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Split original patch ("x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions") in three to introduce the SGX2 functions separately (Jarkko). - Rewrite commit message to include how the EPCM within the hardware is changed by the SGX2 function as well as any calling conditions (Jarkko). arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index 7a1ecf704ec1..99004b02e2ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -227,4 +227,10 @@ static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr) return __encls_ret_2(EMODT, secinfo, addr); } +/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */ +static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr); +} + #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */ From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:05 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561354 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FF79C433F5 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239104AbiDMVNs (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:48 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55220 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239001AbiDMVNF (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:05 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55D9D3BBD4; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884243; x=1681420243; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=SIjeYNQYehkFATZl0iOzYFq+nO0jvY7dqq8z3tcfXBA=; b=ENjpTPRFGZ5429HTVW+UDY6KwL6XtulC2Z67Q5jBIIgJcjkgABCDY/Lf CnOI7YoUssJNpDxo7Z77N9+Oar9OWH1Td9S7aGQAgl/e4hT+OZaYazM53 +GLpf1bSe2BiFv46+d1z7w8qXy5bVwbVTUYWjcCNXOdcDNwxJe7XD9B5H l6sJRrBxfCaGdjRjVNN7hxl+WcQ5vQ4l3zDhVmNmWRawJjP4M2/uJzgVf p6LGfyqWiK92QSDmtjaRXwb2qaDUd6NCDEmSij5wJdmNlI+/V9AOXI8N/ VNswEBZpRk6TnTHTpcv2MIABbIlFGSoJ+MgK0tDlJ+2bka6crI9zagYIw Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219007" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219007" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054250" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 05/31] x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:05 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org sgx_encl_load_page() is used to find and load an enclave page into enclave (EPC) memory, potentially loading it from the backing storage. Both usages of sgx_encl_load_page() are during an access to the enclave page from a VMA and thus the permissions of the VMA are considered before the enclave page is loaded. SGX2 functions operating on enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave requiring the page to be in EPC. It is thus required to support loading enclave pages into the EPC independent from a VMA. Split the current sgx_encl_load_page() to support the two usages: A new call, sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(), behaves exactly like the current sgx_encl_load_page() that takes VMA permissions into account, while sgx_encl_load_page() just loads an enclave page into EPC. VMA, PTE, and EPCM permissions continue to dictate whether the pages can be accessed from within an enclave. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V2: - New patch arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 7c63a1911fae..05ae1168391c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -131,25 +131,10 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, return epc_page; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long addr, - unsigned long vm_flags) +static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_encl_page *entry) { - unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; - struct sgx_encl_page *entry; - - entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); - if (!entry) - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); - - /* - * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time - * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ, - * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags). - */ - if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits) - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); /* Entry successfully located. */ if (entry->epc_page) { @@ -175,6 +160,40 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, return entry; } +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); + if (!entry) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* + * Verify that the page has equal or higher build time + * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ, + * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags). + */ + if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry); +} + +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); + if (!entry) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry); +} + static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address; @@ -196,7 +215,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) mutex_lock(&encl->lock); - entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); + entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); if (IS_ERR(entry)) { mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); @@ -344,7 +363,7 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, for ( ; ; ) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); - entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags); + entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vm_flags); if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY) break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index fec43ca65065..6b34efba1602 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -116,5 +116,7 @@ unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset); bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr); #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:06 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561361 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29426C433EF for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239087AbiDMVNc (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55236 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239009AbiDMVNG (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:06 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 220DD403DD; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884244; x=1681420244; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=OVpW57f0JPSi3l14pKO3uZ+LvPLL5HT/p5s+fNnodKQ=; b=d/klvdb26Bxb7c7NLR59iaXB7OUWZ2r2MwHYS5fjrMy98q8GbXdWdgHY GrmdWlk1nCGibrmTM7AB9r8ouFHbv0twcUgCGmDVsB26ZrIb8eK75e/rQ PEFtVYA5OK/aKVH8kajTOEFCClf/aOyj8AwKT/9GqOLjWOUKQsMkSrzDE TdtgmWl/2qgEB3DTn9fQrvsdPgEJbSMWohXE8l71T0KXxgiHb/FnCDIUF XCb5t9ynAk1sIKMgMSQOWZqpv4qeL2JcekumEMzk5wulDFm39aq8fAnth +pzU5V9PHtVSk2kiEeXaUKj+xAASYWe3cEbEbuseXkU3oOMtdAJcq2cM2 g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219009" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219009" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054253" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 06/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:06 -0700 Message-Id: <3091b3111f63c7aa5b206edd816d47aa5110dedb.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Using sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to learn which CPUs might have executed an enclave is useful to ensure that TLBs are cleared when changes are made to enclave pages. sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used within the reclaimer when an enclave page is evicted. The upcoming SGX2 support enables changes to be made to enclave pages and will require TLBs to not refer to the changed pages and thus will be needing sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(). Relocate sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to be with the rest of the enclave code in encl.c now that it is no longer unique to the reclaimer. Take care to ensure that any future usage maintains the current context requirement that ETRACK has been called first. Expand the existing comments to highlight this while moving them to a more prominent location before the function. No functional change. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - New patch split from original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko). - Change subject line (Jarkko). - Fixup kernel-doc to use brackets in function name. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 29 --------------- 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 05ae1168391c..c6525eba74e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -613,6 +613,73 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) return 0; } +/** + * sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave + * @encl: the enclave + * + * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address + * mappings are present before they can succeed. For example, ENCLS[EWB] + * copies a page from the enclave page cache to regular main memory but + * it fails if it cannot ensure that there are no cached + * linear-to-physical address mappings referring to the page. + * + * SGX hardware flushes all cached linear-to-physical mappings on a CPU + * when an enclave is exited via ENCLU[EEXIT] or an Asynchronous Enclave + * Exit (AEX). Exiting an enclave will thus ensure cached linear-to-physical + * address mappings are cleared but coordination with the tracking done within + * the SGX hardware is needed to support the SGX functions that depend on this + * cache clearing. + * + * When the ENCLS[ETRACK] function is issued on an enclave the hardware + * tracks threads operating inside the enclave at that time. The SGX + * hardware tracking require that all the identified threads must have + * exited the enclave in order to flush the mappings before a function such + * as ENCLS[EWB] will be permitted + * + * The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that + * no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present: + * 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking. + * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be + * accessing the enclave. + * 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and + * thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings. + * 4) Execute SGX function. + * + * Context: It is required to call this function after ENCLS[ETRACK]. + * This will ensure that if any new mm appears (racing with + * sgx_encl_mm_add()) then the new mm will enter into the + * enclave with fresh linear-to-physical address mappings. + * + * It is required that all IPIs are completed before a new + * ENCLS[ETRACK] is issued so be sure to protect steps 1 to 3 + * of the above flow with the enclave's mutex. + * + * Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl + */ +const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + int idx; + + cpumask_clear(cpumask); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm)); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + return cpumask; +} + static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, pgoff_t index) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 6b34efba1602..d2acb4debde5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref); int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm); +const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl); int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, struct sgx_backing *backing); void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 8e4bc6453d26..2de85f459492 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -203,35 +203,6 @@ static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info) { } -static const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) -{ - cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask; - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; - int idx; - - /* - * Can race with sgx_encl_mm_add(), but ETRACK has already been - * executed, which means that the CPUs running in the new mm will enter - * into the enclave with a fresh epoch. - */ - cpumask_clear(cpumask); - - idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { - if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) - continue; - - cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm)); - - mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); - } - - srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); - - return cpumask; -} - /* * Swap page to the regular memory transformed to the blocked state by using * EBLOCK, which means that it can no longer be referenced (no new TLB entries). From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:07 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561061 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D630C4167E for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237326AbiDMVNp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:45 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55238 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239008AbiDMVNG (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:06 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7B59E3AA77; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884244; x=1681420244; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=vm/5BkZzLoJzZZYcikqynXdEi6cbf77oNCUexZRAFeY=; b=J9RnOJTNj7kurFy8y9cFmbKh3f3DfdH5je3j79d6jzR5YZFgFzn5IChs 99lqNjn9cJFIGMI2MOmvX8wN/g8O7DssbbJ7Uvm0N0lYP5obEUgBhgXk3 Kvi7kPgeUjMPvisIsCBhjXcX7PnUq9/ffIu/LoDGLgFbMm7hjvn4AhR/8 zHdx8IGmlIhY+paIKoWOTRHtFTdSNi3RPYz9l/6M7veDBU9srbc2HoheQ Uji+DsKz2TN48uWvKzgiyidYTfHkNonAIW/nQ1nilRB0Fpise5XPMZr7q EPa6O8C8Az+Wb6fezegqY1LjTvqMORa6b1jCke0+IOjWvLsBZcqg2KqB0 w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219012" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219012" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054256" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:41 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 07/31] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:07 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is no longer unique to the reclaimer where it is used during the EWB ENCLS leaf function when EPC pages are written out to main memory and sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used to learn which CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs are cleared. Upcoming SGX2 enabling will use sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() during the EMODPR and EMODT ENCLS leaf functions that make changes to enclave pages. The function is needed for the same reason it is used now: to learn which CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs no longer point to the changed pages. Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to sgx_encl_cpumask() to reflect the broader usage. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - New patch split from original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko). arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index c6525eba74e8..8de9bebc4d81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) } /** - * sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave + * sgx_encl_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave * @encl: the enclave * * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) * The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that * no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present: * 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking. - * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be + * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be * accessing the enclave. * 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and * thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings. @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) * * Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl */ -const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) +const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) { cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask; struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index d2acb4debde5..e59c2cbf71e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref); int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm); -const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl); +const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl); int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, struct sgx_backing *backing); void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 2de85f459492..fa33922879bf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, * miss cpus that entered the enclave between * generating the mask and incrementing epoch. */ - on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(encl), + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1); ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); } From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:08 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561074 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C81BAC433EF for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:10:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235360AbiDMVNS (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:18 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55254 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239012AbiDMVNH (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:07 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2EB03BBD4; 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d="scan'208";a="725054259" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 08/31] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:08 -0700 Message-Id: <381906499e0063731c3ec01560f869188549c582.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The SGX reclaimer removes page table entries pointing to pages that are moved to swap. SGX2 enables changes to pages belonging to an initialized enclave, thus enclave pages may have their permission or type changed while the page is being accessed by an enclave. Supporting SGX2 requires page table entries to be removed so that any cached mappings to changed pages are removed. For example, with the ability to change enclave page types a regular enclave page may be changed to a Thread Control Structure (TCS) page that may not be accessed by an enclave. Factor out the code removing page table entries to a separate function sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(), fixing accuracy of comments in the process, and make it available to the upcoming SGX2 code. Place sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() with the rest of the enclave code in encl.c interacting with the page table since this code is no longer unique to the reclaimer. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Elaborate why SGX2 needs this ability (Jarkko). - More specific subject. - Fix kernel-doc to have brackets in function name. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 31 ++--------------------- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 8de9bebc4d81..c77a62432862 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock); list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list); - /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_reclaimer_block(). */ + /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). */ smp_wmb(); encl->mm_list_version++; spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock); @@ -792,6 +792,49 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, return ret; } +/** + * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave + * @encl: the enclave + * @addr: page aligned pointer to single page for which PTEs will be removed + * + * Multiple VMAs may have an enclave page mapped. Remove the PTE mapping + * @addr from each VMA. Ensure that page fault handler is ready to handle + * new mappings of @addr before calling this function. + */ +void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned long mm_list_version; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int idx, ret; + + do { + mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version; + + /* Pairs with smp_wmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */ + smp_rmb(); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); + + ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma); + if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data) + zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE); + + mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version)); +} + /** * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index e59c2cbf71e2..1b15d22f6757 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sgx_encl_page *page); - +void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index fa33922879bf..ce9e87d5f8ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -137,36 +137,9 @@ static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner; unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK; struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; - unsigned long mm_list_version; - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - int idx, ret; - - do { - mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version; - - /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */ - smp_rmb(); - - idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { - if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) - continue; - - mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); - - ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma); - if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data) - zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE); - - mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); - - mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); - } + int ret; - srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); - } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version)); + sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr); mutex_lock(&encl->lock); From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:09 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561064 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF1C0C43217 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238967AbiDMVNk (ORCPT ); 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219017" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219017" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054262" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 09/31] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:09 -0700 Message-Id: <41e34a579bd81ea4085e27ae4bf16c73914340ca.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The ETRACK function followed by an IPI to all CPUs within an enclave is a common pattern with more frequent use in support of SGX2. Make the (empty) IPI callback function available internally in preparation for usage by SGX2. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Replace "for more usages" by "for usage by SGX2" (Jarkko) arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index ce9e87d5f8ec..6e2cb7564080 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot, return ret; } -static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info) +void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 0f17def9fe6f..b30cee4de903 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim); +void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM int __init sgx_vepc_init(void); #else From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:10 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561365 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58AC3C433FE for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239064AbiDMVNZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55266 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239016AbiDMVNI (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:08 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA20B44A33; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884245; x=1681420245; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=AG6HQ4kB97od1maoqQHJCA/lJ05JBa4Z0R1kc99zw8s=; b=QPxH4aI0LgVTwK6eQeTMdv2ITsWPgS7cdFRo5FDAzvizLFC7dMLBiBKO 4k1tm7tuavb9wMFei5XuZxoBlxpKu/HSlvvZTp8Ji4IeitEwXAHcSd3UJ sYJiTgmEC0lISe/32d6ocy0+f2xhWz9KkPkf/K2qbdYXGMkEsU2ZrjLrO FvXX+SoRQcVrYxRxNOEjj+n9C6VoM42VTfL9/aVusdMXHf/mMH7L/DvDz OgeQT43g8b87TKNDOilN92y9VS0N/mcvEB7RE8oevObK198CDV3HWka1i heLxpijH2aMBZ0Par9PNGVqwauKR2yielsr2Pn+PVYbO4aGRcBbjyrTnH w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219018" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219018" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054265" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 10/31] x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:10 -0700 Message-Id: <4db3422a6b6f04191a50584a9ae5de0a2dd96b4f.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org User provided offset and length is validated when parsing the parameters of the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES ioctl(). Extract this validation (with consistent use of IS_ALIGNED) into a utility that can be used by the SGX2 ioctl()s that will also provide these values. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. - Consistently use IS_ALIGNED(). (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - New patch arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 83df20e3e633..a66795e0b685 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -372,6 +372,26 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, return ret; } +/* + * Ensure user provided offset and length values are valid for + * an enclave. + */ +static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + unsigned long length) +{ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!length || !IS_ALIGNED(length, PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (offset + length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + /** * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES * @encl: an enclave pointer @@ -425,14 +445,10 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.offset, PAGE_SIZE) || - !IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!add_arg.length || add_arg.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) return -EINVAL; - if (add_arg.offset + add_arg.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, add_arg.offset, add_arg.length)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo, From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:11 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561364 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CF36C4167E for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239075AbiDMVN1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:27 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55270 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239018AbiDMVNI (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:08 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 219153AA77; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884246; x=1681420246; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Dr0rPmNIvTEmoBEEvtFon9uc0xlRJ5V7ke7jaykZJQc=; b=CXcRqgq4Wf/aejcCn+Bec67lNYvProiRBSSnB8nvA6kEqUc9xkody6Xm xQHkJPWHR/bMenE3qw9nfnXAg1FUw60p1CIUxc1DpIDqy2+Oa5T6v3V8Y HuhvSt/bwM0mXrLHfzvCR1IVjO/wjUWp30+UvRAItQPsmprm+cJZbQQub 2tphb1widd1qkQU4bx9GBjgrGcTGYAiMs8B/VZggr0GYSUyhvzpDutzdP PmVSWTJrfztc5ePKvwsckHlnBUsTsjlkyF5uNBuQw2bGqHP5lJMAiPGov 84noDycp4pnVTy+/v84HbEICO0tPiiDios0UAvV3kt4SVcHEg+SMeUfmh w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219021" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219021" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054270" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:42 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 11/31] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:11 -0700 Message-Id: <9978af37f51fa45c8878a3c05ceaf44f35806bb8.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org SGX2 functions are not allowed on all page types. For example, ENCLS[EMODPR] is only allowed on regular SGX enclave pages and ENCLS[EMODPT] is only allowed on TCS and regular pages. If these functions are attempted on another type of page the hardware would trigger a fault. Keep a record of the SGX page type so that there is more certainty whether an SGX2 instruction can succeed and faults can be treated as real failures. The page type is a property of struct sgx_encl_page and thus does not cover the VA page type. VA pages are maintained in separate structures and their type can be determined in a different way. The SGX2 instructions needing the page type do not operate on VA pages and this is thus not a scenario needing to be covered at this time. struct sgx_encl_page hosting this information is maintained for each enclave page so the space consumed by the struct is important. The existing sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits is already unsigned long while only using three bits. Transition to a bitfield for the two members to support the additional information without increasing the space consumed by the struct. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V2: - Update changelog to motivate transition to bitfield that was previously done when (now removed) vm_run_prot_bits was added. Changes since V1: - Add Acked-by from Jarkko. arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h index d67810b50a81..eae20fa52b93 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h @@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ struct sgx_pageinfo { * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state + * + * Make sure when making changes to this enum that its values can still fit + * in the bitfield within &struct sgx_encl_page */ enum sgx_page_type { SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 1b15d22f6757..07abfc70c8e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct sgx_encl_page { unsigned long desc; - unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits; + unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8; + enum sgx_page_type type:16; struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; struct sgx_encl *encl; struct sgx_va_page *va_page; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index a66795e0b685..21078c6643f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags); encl->secs.encl = encl; + encl->secs.type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS; encl->base = secs->base; encl->size = secs->size; encl->attributes = secs->attributes; @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, */ encl_page->encl = encl; encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl_page->type = (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) >> 8; encl->secs_child_cnt++; if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) { From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:12 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561070 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DC60C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237765AbiDMVN1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:27 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55268 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239017AbiDMVNI (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:08 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29007403DD; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884246; x=1681420246; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=jmqAQwuCUmDetLsAl9v02bXs5ro0p8fy3L9oNgVQF4E=; b=IBM8ULSiXI5RifXlZCrJo1RZj7azTBjLLqrc0QsiiRBWJFYlTi6P+VwN 5KJ7+aY+1bNk6axsQ9nWoXxEv55zJC2FMEinsAacr2T4AWmIYh+oj0vQW ntVv81JTSiY8EDU8MzQFvCdTII9yOb/opYWByZJdptMEt6qIUY5/R+HGg 4KL9/pP7JGR65NYO0kVVVRpAwaCWLBz0+a2a3ANaHLWz1GoB34WgHi7Ce YxibFtT3npa+SU+py+FdjHLRi6bIxg2RPO03FaCWEoWwisfh/ocz9FKPw L4s05hB7qDs8CfRmnrLicFPHAa/WeLAiKzFFNDmiOqK6ShThLBUWYoIWP Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219024" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219024" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054273" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 12/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:12 -0700 Message-Id: <8d33cff2a2c4e23ff9745dd78935582fd0053cd8.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org In order to use sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() in the page augmentation code located in encl.c, export these functions. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V2: - New patch. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 07abfc70c8e3..9d673d9531f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -120,5 +120,7 @@ bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); +struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl); +void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page); #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 21078c6643f7..2df27dd8b30d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" -static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) +struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) { struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL; void *err; @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) return va_page; } -static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page) { encl->page_cnt--; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:13 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561069 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62172C3526F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238934AbiDMVN2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:28 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55290 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239021AbiDMVNI (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:08 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9E303A5C1; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884246; x=1681420246; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=2QeKF7uBH8LKmya6UOwD9E8IOWVV1+CcDsY7OQxbP+8=; b=Op3Y+D91M8cDHqMKbBC2243WOcSigM4SSVO1OXjZZ6SkNnrPvAoDZORo Z3VoDY80jirap7odeq2IlKvuoufSKyYfCVnTCprXzMx6H7AXSzU0JBlB9 b5qKagFSgP8LHO0O5vG+TJj9H8bdBa0sX3ZtejJoPxnFBPHJZ3ZbgNLvz u0Z5rRE6/3m1AsksogCuwes/JG05ajOwOolWedV7wevrCli6rhOI5ZNR4 1Sin2aBkpZhkF5drFfBi6by3Bu0/1EL3fKAPv1w658mvMxXjMKKbttHKr 1zDLrwvYBWERiLstdwJWJe7YyGAAA8OkyEI/kkstZ1VUIC620R31w/m1l g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219028" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219028" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054276" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 13/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:13 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Jarkko Sakkinen Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be used in the implementation for support of adding pages to initialized enclaves, which requires to allocate new enclave pages. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- No changes since V3. Changes since V2: - New patch Originally submitted at: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220308112833.262805-3-jarkko@kernel.org/ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 32 -------------------------------- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index c77a62432862..546423753e4c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -792,6 +792,38 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, return ret; } +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + return encl_page; +} + /** * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave * @encl: the enclave diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 9d673d9531f0..253ebdd1c5be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sgx_encl_page *page); +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags); void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 2df27dd8b30d..bb8cdb2ad0d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -169,38 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long offset, - u64 secinfo_flags) -{ - struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; - unsigned long prot; - - encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encl_page) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; - encl_page->encl = encl; - - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); - - /* - * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO - * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided - * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. - */ - if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) - prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - - /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ - encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); - - return encl_page; -} - static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) { u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:14 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561072 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5B3DC4167B for ; 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219031" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219031" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054280" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:43 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 14/31] x86/sgx: Support VA page allocation without reclaiming Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:14 -0700 Message-Id: <0ab32196f5056b25c34fb89fcc4dc28a5d875d2e.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org struct sgx_encl should be protected with the mutex sgx_encl->lock. One exception is sgx_encl->page_cnt that is incremented (in sgx_encl_grow()) when an enclave page is added to the enclave. The reason the mutex is not held is to allow the reclaimer to be called directly if there are no EPC pages (in support of a new VA page) available at the time. Incrementing sgx_encl->page_cnt without sgc_encl->lock held is currently (before SGX2) safe from concurrent updates because all paths in which sgx_encl_grow() is called occur before enclave initialization and are protected with an atomic operation on SGX_ENCL_IOCTL. SGX2 includes support for dynamically adding pages after enclave initialization where the protection of SGX_ENCL_IOCTL is not available. Make direct reclaim of EPC pages optional when new VA pages are added to the enclave. Essentially the existing "reclaim" flag used when regular EPC pages are added to an enclave becomes available to the caller when used to allocate VA pages instead of always being "true". When adding pages without invoking the reclaimer it is possible to do so with sgx_encl->lock held, gaining its protection against concurrent updates to sgx_encl->page_cnt after enclave initialization. No functional change. Reported-by: Haitao Huang Tested-by: Haitao Huang Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes since V3: - New patch prompted by Haitao encountering the WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT) within sgx_encl_grow() during his SGX2 multi-threaded unit tests. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 546423753e4c..92516aeca405 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr) /** * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page + * @reclaim: Reclaim EPC pages directly if none available. Enclave + * mutex should not be held if this is set. * * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page. * @@ -876,12 +878,12 @@ void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr) * a VA page, * -errno otherwise */ -struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void) +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(bool reclaim) { struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; int ret; - epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, true); + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, reclaim); if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) return ERR_CAST(epc_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 253ebdd1c5be..66adb8faec45 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset, u64 secinfo_flags); void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); -struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(bool reclaim); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset); bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); -struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl); +struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool reclaim); void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page); #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index bb8cdb2ad0d1..5d41aa204761 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" -struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) +struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool reclaim) { struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL; void *err; @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) if (!va_page) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(); + va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(reclaim); if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) { err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page); kfree(va_page); @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) struct file *backing; long ret; - va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true); if (IS_ERR(va_page)) return PTR_ERR(va_page); else if (va_page) @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, return PTR_ERR(epc_page); } - va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true); if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { ret = PTR_ERR(va_page); goto err_out_free; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:15 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561367 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D90DBC433F5 for ; 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219034" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219034" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054284" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 15/31] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:15 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be relocated need to always have RWX permissions. SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave. Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the EPCM permissions to be applied to all pages in the provided range. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed pages remain. It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any page within the provided range, either with an error encountered by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code. The page table entry permissions are not impacted by the EPCM permission changes. VMAs and PTEs will continue to allow the maximum vetted permissions determined at the time the pages are added to the enclave. The SGX error code in a page fault will indicate if it was an EPCM permission check that prevented an access attempt. No checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without the kernel knowing. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will be ignored by the hardware. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes since V3: - User provides only new permissions, replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Expand comments of sgx_enclave_etrack() to document the context in which the function is safe to use. Changes since V2: - Include the sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready() utility that previously was in "x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions" that is removed from the next version. - Few renames requested by Jarkko: struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions sgx_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions() sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions() - Make EPCM permissions independent from kernel view of permissions. (Jarkko) - Remove attempt at runtime tracking of EPCM permissions (sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits). - Do not flush page table entries - they are no longer impacted by EPCM permission changes. - Modify changelog to reflect new architecture. - Ensure at least PROT_READ is requested - enclave requires read access to the page for commands like EMODPE and EACCEPT. (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave). - Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave). - Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave). - Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS) and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS) (Jarkko). - In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been changed: struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_perm() - ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of page permissions only (Jarkko). - Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name. - Create and use utility for the ETRACK flow. - Fixups in comments - Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst. - Remove redundant comment. - Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm are for output (Dave). arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 21 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 216 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 237 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index f4b81587e90b..82648c006470 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision) #define SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL \ _IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -76,6 +78,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision { __u64 fd; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions - parameters for ioctl + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS + * @offset: starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base + * address defined in SECS) + * @length: length of memory (multiple of the page size) + * @permissions:new permission bits for pages in range described by @offset + * and @length + * @result: (output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function + * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size) + */ +struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions { + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 permissions; + __u64 result; + __u64 count; +}; + struct sgx_enclave_run; /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d41aa204761..395b4e58a295 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -660,6 +660,218 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd); } +/* + * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked + * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized + * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it. + */ +static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2))) + return -ENODEV; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address + * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with + * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached + * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of + * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details. + * + * Must be called with enclave's mutex held from the time the + * SGX function requiring that no cached linear-to-physical mappings + * are present is executed until this ETRACK flow is complete. + */ +static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + void *epc_virt; + int ret; + + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + ret = __etrack(epc_virt); + if (ret) { + /* + * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For + * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without + * completed IPI between. + */ + pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret); + /* + * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and + * try ETRACK again. + */ + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1); + ret = __etrack(epc_virt); + if (ret) { + pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)", + ret, ret); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions() - Restrict EPCM permissions + * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong. + * @modp: Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying and + * their new permissions. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -errno: Otherwise. + */ +static long +sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long c; + void *epc_virt; + int ret; + + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + secinfo.flags = modp->permissions & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; + + for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular + * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will + * result in #PF. + */ + if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * Apart from ensuring that read-access remains, do not verify + * the permission bits requested. Kernel has no control over + * how EPCM permissions can be relaxed from within the enclave. + * ENCLS[EMODPR] can only remove existing EPCM permissions, + * attempting to set new permissions will be ignored by the + * hardware. + */ + + /* Change EPCM permissions. */ + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page); + ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt); + if (encls_faulted(ret)) { + /* + * All possible faults should be avoidable: + * parameters have been checked, will only change + * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent + * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these + * are protected with mutex. + */ + pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception %d\n", + ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret)); + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + if (encls_failed(ret)) { + modp->result = ret; + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl); + if (ret) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + ret = 0; + goto out; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +out: + modp->count = c; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions() - handler for + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions + * instance + * + * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page + * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages + * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT). + * + * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the enclave + * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions ENCLS[EMODPR] + * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this call + * will be ignored by the hardware. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success + * - -errno: Otherwise + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl, + void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions params; + long ret; + + ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params.permissions & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Read access is required for the enclave to be able to use the page. + * SGX instructions like ENCLU[EMODPE] and ENCLU[EACCEPT] require + * read access. + */ + if (!(params.permissions & SGX_SECINFO_R)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params.result || params.count) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, ¶ms); + + if (copy_to_user(arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -681,6 +893,10 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, + (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:16 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561065 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1384C43217 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238898AbiDMVNh (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55310 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239028AbiDMVNK (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:10 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B812E403DD; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884247; x=1681420247; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yK22RGe3nO+0ZgGZg7W5iqsFblwZqguGvabrtl7H49E=; b=G+N8TzcD1mH+rx9q6knkUUdoKpiekmWgh1CLcrZCYQ5jsa4iVgOeGfS7 W1Jq2eeLFOAL1OP5S8a6bdQaKlb4bDYUCPpkIN1JNBDHL/dD3lZTulj8O y+oDYF+ObIoYqpfwD0tpBxm672wjQFaeA4eCxbG53dSsup3tOYV7lUmtq 5QYtxBjK7EpjXmGG1vDF83Af8iFG7gY7aQM0pNlHsDWrDsoWrZ6oXzCFQ B3l6a7zLV+PwRnLWhOAH+6iRHC2Fxi9ueZJZXgAfqVsp98FlH7oL2D56H dBiA1whoZOyn1ScSIHA2jneR6ct665vM6R8jtCWdM6SdspdTxGvRqMfBK g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219036" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219036" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054287" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 16/31] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:16 -0700 Message-Id: <2293bdca025ce54bd2996783e187e209f9c0f5f2.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available. The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful. If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address. Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. - Add Jarkko's Tested-by tag. - Call sgx_encl_grow() with sgx_encl->lock held as made possible with change to sgx_encl_grow() making calling of reclaimer optional. Changes since V2: - Remove runtime tracking of EPCM permissions (sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits) (Jarkko). - Move export of sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() to separate patch. (Jarkko) - Use sgx_encl_page_alloc(). (Jarkko) - Set max allowed permissions to be RWX (Jarkko). Update changelog to indicate the change and use comment in code as created by Jarkko in: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220306053211.135762-4-jarkko@kernel.org - Do not set protection bits but let it be inherited by VMA (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - Fix subject line "to initialized" -> "to an initialized" (Jarkko). - Move text about hardware's PENDING state to the patch that introduces the ENCLS[EAUG] wrapper (Jarkko). - Ensure kernel-doc uses brackets when referring to function. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 117 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 92516aeca405..7ccda6fe1f8f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -194,6 +194,112 @@ struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry); } +/** + * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave + * @vma: VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed + * @encl: enclave accessing the page + * @addr: address that triggered the page fault + * + * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page + * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2 + * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction. + * + * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed + * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise. + */ +static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0}; + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + unsigned long phys_addr; + u64 secinfo_flags; + vm_fault_t vmret; + int ret; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + + /* + * Ignore internal permission checking for dynamically added pages. + * They matter only for data added during the pre-initialization + * phase. The enclave decides the permissions by the means of + * EACCEPT, EACCEPTCOPY and EMODPE. + */ + secinfo_flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X; + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr - encl->base, secinfo_flags); + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) + return VM_FAULT_OOM; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { + kfree(encl_page); + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, false); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(va_page); + goto err_out_unlock; + } + + if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); + /* + * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while + * running without encl->lock + */ + if (ret) + goto err_out_shrink; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.metadata = 0; + + ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page); + + phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page); + /* + * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF + * would find page ready for a PTE. + */ + vmret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr)); + if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + +err_out: + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_shrink: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); +err_out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page); + kfree(encl_page); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; +} + static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address; @@ -213,6 +319,17 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (unlikely(!encl)) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + /* + * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they + * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and + * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add + * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized + * enclave that will be checked for right away. + */ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) && + (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)))) + return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:17 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561355 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22E48C43217 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238985AbiDMVNr (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:47 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55320 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239032AbiDMVNK (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:10 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD82344A33; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884247; x=1681420247; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=TtQBkc71W/eE9bza27771JItHGMI7ZHCR/obhz2nAK0=; b=Cr7xtMr76CVXDf1v69X7XjR6DImUkVj1yV16N+OC13sYeUcE08xgZ1ND MdNrAPPUyVNd6bPrj9wlt4CCrGr3DBEgIN1JhT/2e99JJy9Q09dhURNZp YRybhxJLwHkdAVK9T8xHMOxKqHyfTwbyWrpaDwNH5JpS8SiNWeeAnjPXN ff7fPlR8X4t+O7o7rAcSW9VNUMBotB1M39jkeK6yvclzLi9WkskQ8xAE7 60THUbJq2fMu6qqr4XfExlbwnaGB8JvUIwCy02jYz++vCx6OlmY0o0+QJ dyruq7/XDPlaPQHvlXilpDWRMSqeKV0sPEuFba+m+KaRKVWXa6SMlSnCf A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219039" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219039" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054290" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 17/31] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:17 -0700 Message-Id: <1eaa05cc46a09728036060b209deb2cf0351eb62.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Before an enclave is initialized the enclave's memory range is unknown. The enclave's memory range is learned at the time it is created via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl() where the provided memory range is obtained from an earlier mmap() of /dev/sgx_enclave. After an enclave is initialized its memory can be mapped into user space (mmap()) from where it can be entered at its defined entry points. With the enclave's memory range known after it is initialized there is no reason why it should be possible to map memory outside this range. Lock down access to the initialized enclave's memory range by denying any attempt to map memory outside its memory range. Locking down the memory range also makes adding pages to an initialized enclave more efficient. Pages are added to an initialized enclave by accessing memory that belongs to the enclave's memory range but not yet backed by an enclave page. If it is possible for user space to map memory that does not form part of the enclave then an access to this memory would eventually fail. Failures range from a prompt general protection fault if the access was an ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave, or a page fault via the vDSO if it was another access from within the enclave, or a SIGBUS (also resulting from a page fault) if the access was from outside the enclave. Disallowing invalid memory to be mapped in the first place avoids preventable failures. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. Changes since V1: - Add comment (Jarkko). arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 7ccda6fe1f8f..11f97fdcac1e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -402,6 +402,11 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start)); + /* Disallow mapping outside enclave's address range. */ + if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) && + (start < encl->base || end > encl->base + encl->size)) + return -EACCES; + /* * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might * conflict with the enclave page permissions. From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:18 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561356 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84DC8C41535 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239094AbiDMVNo (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:44 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55332 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239036AbiDMVNL (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:11 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A0C063A5C1; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884248; x=1681420248; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=F8b7P8OJqPH4ahg0MtAEokKjriaMg1rgYIqoxz3/QyI=; b=LUCRXbX1s9ehXrEzcwejAldQuR7YnKMuWWd1KLeBykm9K+ryvxP/Lgcx 78CFW9EKZ1Q29LRU+xWyHOeCNPd60K66wQJxRAdFIZo3i/sBA/LLRHUDM JkDfQDf7X3zei3ZvJU8cpWPjIoh75Cqiuy9L1ZOR0AZc70IX60EW4aa9Y O2KMQVex72rKPsK+vc/73fUL5j6NFNfsodIZ0ChgT9Ujx7agv1pFaxPFr B1Wg1KJChiz2NS2fzjP09UpVDev7Pq8Cu4Qk1dOHJePIUyTmEW1wjF5RC g8X36G2Xw4fZNcSEhTe15XJQ9M31WwI33j7mBYjSucLlQnZdkE8o2IbU0 w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219044" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219044" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054293" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:44 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 18/31] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:18 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Every enclave contains one or more Thread Control Structures (TCS). The TCS contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with enough TCSs to support the largest number of threads expecting to use the enclave and enough enclave pages to meet all its anticipated memory demands. In SGX1 all pages remain in the enclave until the enclave is unloaded. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EMODT], that is used to change the type of an enclave page from a regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) enclave page to a TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) page or change the type from a regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) or TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) page to a trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) page (setting it up for later removal). With the existing support of dynamically adding regular enclave pages to an initialized enclave and changing the page type to TCS it is possible to dynamically increase the number of threads supported by an enclave. Changing the enclave page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM is the first step of dynamically removing pages from an initialized enclave. The complete page removal flow is: 1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM using the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl() introduced here. 2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave. 3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl() introduced in the following patch. Add ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES to support changing SGX enclave page types within an initialized enclave. With SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES the user specifies a page range and the enclave page type to be applied to all pages in the provided range. The ioctl() itself can return an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel. It is also possible for SGX specific failures to be encountered. Add a result output parameter to communicate the SGX return code. It is possible for the enclave page type change request to fail on any page within the provided range. Support partial success by returning the number of pages that were successfully changed. After the page type is changed the page continues to be accessible from the kernel perspective with page table entries and internal state. The page may be moved to swap. Any access until ENCLU[EACCEPT] will encounter a page fault with SGX flag set in error code. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Rename ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type, replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) Changes since V2: - Adjust ioctl number after removal of SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS. - Remove attempt at runtime tracking of EPCM permissions (sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits). (Jarkko) - Change names to follow guidance of using detailed names (Jarkko): struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type sgx_enclave_modt() -> sgx_enclave_modify_type() sgx_ioc_enclave_modt() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type() Changes since V1: - Remove the "Earlier changes ..." paragraph (Jarkko). - Change "new ioctl" text to "Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MOD_TYPE" (Jarkko). - Discussion about EPCM interaction and the EPCM MODIFIED bit is moved to new patch that introduces the ENCLS[EMODT] wrapper while keeping the higher level discussion on page accessibility in this commit log (Jarkko). - Rename SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT ioctl() to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (Jarkko). - Rename struct sgx_page_modt to struct sgx_enclave_modt in support of ioctl() rename. - Rename sgx_page_modt() to sgx_enclave_modt() and sgx_ioc_page_modt() to sgx_ioc_enclave_modt() in support of ioctl() rename. - Provide secinfo as parameter to ioctl() instead of just page type (Jarkko). - Update comments to refer to new ioctl() names. - Use new SGX2 checking helper(). - Use ETRACK flow utility. - Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst. - Remove redundant comment. - Use offset/length validation utility. - Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_modt are for output (Dave). arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 19 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 220 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index 82648c006470..de4d1af628d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04) #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_modify_type) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -97,6 +99,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions { __u64 count; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_modify_type - parameters for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES + * @offset: starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base + * address defined in SECS) + * @length: length of memory (multiple of the page size) + * @page_type: new type for pages in range described by @offset and @length + * @result: (output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODT] function + * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size) + */ +struct sgx_enclave_modify_type { + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 page_type; + __u64 result; + __u64 count; +}; + struct sgx_enclave_run; /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 395b4e58a295..8709f131ae40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -872,6 +872,204 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl, return ret; } +/** + * sgx_enclave_modify_type() - Modify type of SGX enclave pages + * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong. + * @modt: Checked parameters from user about which pages need modifying + * and their new page type. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success + * - -errno: Otherwise + */ +static long sgx_enclave_modify_type(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type *modt) +{ + unsigned long max_prot_restore; + enum sgx_page_type page_type; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long prot; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long c; + void *epc_virt; + int ret; + + page_type = modt->page_type & SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; + + /* + * The only new page types allowed by hardware are PT_TCS and PT_TRIM. + */ + if (page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS && page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) + return -EINVAL; + + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + secinfo.flags = page_type << 8; + + for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * Borrow the logic from the Intel SDM. Regular pages + * (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) can change type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS + * or SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM but TCS pages can only be trimmed. + * CET pages not supported yet. + */ + if (!(entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG || + (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS && + page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM))) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } + + max_prot_restore = entry->vm_max_prot_bits; + + /* + * Once a regular page becomes a TCS page it cannot be + * changed back. So the maximum allowed protection reflects + * the TCS page that is always RW from kernel perspective but + * will be inaccessible from within enclave. Before doing + * so, do make sure that the new page type continues to + * respect the originally vetted page permissions. + */ + if (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG && + page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) { + if (~entry->vm_max_prot_bits & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_unlock; + } + prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + entry->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + /* + * Prevent page from being reclaimed while mutex + * is released. + */ + if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) { + ret = -EAGAIN; + goto out_entry_changed; + } + + /* + * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on + * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). + */ + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page); + } + + /* Change EPC type */ + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page); + ret = __emodt(&secinfo, epc_virt); + if (encls_faulted(ret)) { + /* + * All possible faults should be avoidable: + * parameters have been checked, will only change + * valid page types, and no concurrent + * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these are + * protected with mutex. + */ + pr_err_once("EMODT encountered exception %d\n", + ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret)); + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_entry_changed; + } + if (encls_failed(ret)) { + modt->result = ret; + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_entry_changed; + } + + ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl); + if (ret) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + entry->type = page_type; + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + ret = 0; + goto out; + +out_entry_changed: + entry->vm_max_prot_bits = max_prot_restore; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +out: + modt->count = c; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_modify_type instance + * + * Ability to change the enclave page type supports the following use cases: + * + * * It is possible to add TCS pages to an enclave by changing the type of + * regular pages (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) to TCS (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) pages. + * With this support the number of threads supported by an initialized + * enclave can be increased dynamically. + * + * * Regular or TCS pages can dynamically be removed from an initialized + * enclave by changing the page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM. Changing the + * page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM marks the page for removal with actual + * removal done by handler of %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() called + * after ENCLU[EACCEPT] is run on %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page from within the + * enclave. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success + * - -errno: Otherwise + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type params; + long ret; + + ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params.page_type & ~SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params.result || params.count) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sgx_enclave_modify_type(encl, ¶ms); + + if (copy_to_user(arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -897,6 +1095,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:19 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561071 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 935E7C433EF for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238977AbiDMVNX (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:23 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55336 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239038AbiDMVNL (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:11 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D64893BBD4; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884249; x=1681420249; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=eLr5re2T/viyxP0posCVPiYzzqhEHZM6ilr1tybEJq8=; b=aGmiv5z2rC0U6wTkq4tEesdwVU59gKjJHz6ANzLgSMhKE0WNoDbBPnic g9cffcjGSQQlEFLVslVZ966djrB2MOOyDiMf+CCUyg+QPiJJ/BFdbgVs2 y/nyuRdMg9KwGLDrpZxIzJ6QExR5fSnA4D6njP45aIyMANULfZAEJ6XEq OuEGselKsSKgIwUr5ENC7qdDBLw6YkA6KdDqMOVYBis8ia5L4KD84Zc3X Z7Ri2u3ukr6z8/nD9HpqNZNOnxSsUlaWZ0+VmPLqrB65B3SJtY4v8EJTT Ur74jlMj9kRtEPSiXlqcn62fK9fSO8kNSSRhqE/lSJdWmm0FU/9xoBikO Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219047" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219047" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054296" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 19/31] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:19 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The SGX2 page removal flow was introduced in previous patch and is as follows: 1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM using the ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES introduced in previous patch. 2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave. 3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES introduced here. Support the final step of the SGX2 page removal flow with ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES. With this ioctl() the user specifies a page range that should be removed. All pages in the provided range should have the SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page type and the request will fail with EPERM (Operation not permitted) if a page that does not have the correct type is encountered. Page removal can fail on any page within the provided range. Support partial success by returning the number of pages that were successfully removed. Since actual page removal will succeed even if ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run from within the enclave the ENCLU[EMODPR] instruction with RWX permissions is used as a no-op mechanism to ensure ENCLU[EACCEPT] was successfully run from within the enclave before the enclave page is removed. If the user omits running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES the pages will still be removed when the enclave is unloaded. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Reviewed-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) Changes since V2: - Adjust ioctl number since removal of SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS. Changes since V1: - Update comments to refer to new ioctl() names SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE. - Fix kernel-doc to have () as part of function name. - Change name of ioctl(): SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES (Jarkko). - With the above name change the page removal ioctl() has its name aligned with existing SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES ioctl(). Also align naming of struct and functions: struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages sgx_page_remove() -> sgx_encl_remove_pages() sgx_ioc_page_remove() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages() - Use new SGX2 checking helper. - When loading enclave page, make error code consistent with other instances to help user distinguish between permanent and temporary failures. - Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for Documentation/x86/sgx.rst. - Remove redundant comment. - Use offset/length validation utility. - Make explicit which member of struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages is for output (Dave). arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 21 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 166 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index de4d1af628d5..ec708bd30528 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions) #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES \ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x06, struct sgx_enclave_modify_type) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x07, struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -116,6 +118,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_modify_type { __u64 count; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages - %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES parameters + * @offset: starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base + * address defined in SECS) + * @length: length of memory (multiple of the page size) + * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size) + * + * Regular (PT_REG) or TCS (PT_TCS) can be removed from an initialized + * enclave if the system supports SGX2. First, the %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES + * ioctl() should be used to change the page type to PT_TRIM. After that + * succeeds ENCLU[EACCEPT] should be run from within the enclave and then + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES can be used to complete the page removal. + */ +struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages { + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 count; +}; + struct sgx_enclave_run; /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 8709f131ae40..f9a1654a49b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,148 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } +/** + * sgx_encl_remove_pages() - Remove trimmed pages from SGX enclave + * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong + * @params: Checked parameters from user on which pages need to be removed + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -errno: Otherwise. + */ +static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages *params) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long c; + void *epc_virt; + int ret; + + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + secinfo.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X; + + for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + addr = encl->base + params->offset + c; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * ENCLS[EMODPR] is a no-op instruction used to inform if + * ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. If + * ENCLS[EMODPR] is run with RWX on a trimmed page that is + * not yet accepted then it will return + * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE, after the trimmed page is + * accepted the instruction will encounter a page fault. + */ + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page); + ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt); + if (!encls_faulted(ret) || ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) { + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out_unlock; + } + + /* + * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on + * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). + */ + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_encl_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + entry->epc_page = NULL; + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(entry->desc)); + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, NULL); + kfree(entry); + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + ret = 0; + goto out; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +out: + params->count = c; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to &struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages instance + * + * Final step of the flow removing pages from an initialized enclave. The + * complete flow is: + * + * 1) User changes the type of the pages to be removed to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM + * using the %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(). + * 2) User approves the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within + * the enclave. + * 3) User initiates actual page removal using the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() that is handled here. + * + * First remove any page table entries pointing to the page and then proceed + * with the actual removal of the enclave page and data in support of it. + * + * VA pages are not affected by this removal. It is thus possible that the + * enclave may end up with more VA pages than needed to support all its + * pages. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success + * - -errno: Otherwise + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, + void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages params; + long ret; + + ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params.count) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sgx_encl_remove_pages(encl, ¶ms); + + if (copy_to_user(arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -1098,6 +1240,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:20 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561359 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FA3BC433EF for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238826AbiDMVNi (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55352 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239041AbiDMVNL (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:11 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 57455403DD; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884249; x=1681420249; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=EXCxTzS8QRMUlezOFvEemdragzbqEBeovAke5UNC638=; b=TJVYuMUUrMZVT6VPV+24wtOz06Wt/QZusfdRzhjam1H1Dg4icA/WkMkM 6MKMsQ3X9E3DuUVQg1MPurhZBbEbib9cc74KEhHF17EvzB+0bbhJuQFBK LfKQIOU95+AjGe/RxXf881ikJL/wSkANuuFWNHDs71/4T886qL7jmXze+ acwc5w1wxCe9AZjnGQTFMHCdqFQ9wM9UVQJdKN/ufS87NrPmOerpZ0V+h ADpJ20SgdPCtfe6kXalTLvUWbvWdYMd9yuycxvTK80klCaKPjZcHG7gsB RfgJVl0oS4s4aVsM53x6wdhgoad4I4IJbgxA6EQJfBVwjgjGTP0FV/15k A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219049" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219049" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054299" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 20/31] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:20 -0700 Message-Id: <0cf06e239fbc6e09b23936cf83a6c65271734d0b.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The page reclaimer ensures availability of EPC pages across all enclaves. In support of this it runs independently from the individual enclaves in order to take locks from the different enclaves as it writes pages to swap. When needing to load a page from swap an EPC page needs to be available for its contents to be loaded into. Loading an existing enclave page from swap does not reclaim EPC pages directly if none are available, instead the reclaimer is woken when the available EPC pages are found to be below a watermark. When iterating over a large number of pages in an oversubscribed environment there is a race between the reclaimer woken up and EPC pages reclaimed fast enough for the page operations to proceed. Ensure there are EPC pages available before attempting to load a page that may potentially be pulled from swap into an available EPC page. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename sgx_direct_reclaim() to sgx_reclaim_direct(). (Jarkko) - Add Dave's provided comments to sgx_reclaim_direct(). (Dave) Changes since v1: - Reword commit message. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index f9a1654a49b7..83674d054c13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -745,6 +745,8 @@ sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl, for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c; + sgx_reclaim_direct(); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); @@ -910,6 +912,8 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_type(struct sgx_encl *encl, for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c; + sgx_reclaim_direct(); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); @@ -1095,6 +1099,8 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { addr = encl->base + params->offset + c; + sgx_reclaim_direct(); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 6e2cb7564080..0e8741a80cf3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -370,6 +370,17 @@ static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark) !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list); } +/* + * sgx_reclaim_direct() should be called (without enclave's mutex held) + * in locations where SGX memory resources might be low and might be + * needed in order to make forward progress. + */ +void sgx_reclaim_direct(void) +{ + if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES)) + sgx_reclaim_pages(); +} + static int ksgxd(void *p) { set_freezable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index b30cee4de903..0f2020653fba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void); void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +void sgx_reclaim_direct(void); void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim); From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:21 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561358 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E107C4167B for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238886AbiDMVNl (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:41 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55350 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239040AbiDMVNL (ORCPT ); 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13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054303" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 21/31] Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:21 -0700 Message-Id: <21b97a8e9275706f14d6bc652a0f2cfdd5d9648e.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Enclave runtime management is introduced following the pattern of the section describing enclave building. Provide a brief summary of enclave runtime management, pointing to the functions implementing the ioctl()s that will contain details within their kernel-doc. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- No changes since V3. Changes since V2: - Remove references to ioctl() to relax permissions and update to reflect function renaming sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(). - Rename sgx_ioc_enclave_modt -> sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - New patch. Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst index 265568a9292c..10287c558485 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst @@ -100,6 +100,21 @@ pages and establish enclave page permissions. sgx_ioc_enclave_init sgx_ioc_enclave_provision +Enclave runtime management +-------------------------- + +Systems supporting SGX2 additionally support changes to initialized +enclaves: modifying enclave page permissions and type, and dynamically +adding and removing of enclave pages. When an enclave accesses an address +within its address range that does not have a backing page then a new +regular page will be dynamically added to the enclave. The enclave is +still required to run EACCEPT on the new page before it can be used. + +.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c + :functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions + sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_type + sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages + Enclave vDSO ------------ From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:22 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561360 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7A82C433F5 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238120AbiDMVNg (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55368 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239045AbiDMVNM (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:12 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2844D4757B; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884250; x=1681420250; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=X9uIYJfbQsSkIE7LUGHv8YHCdP2Irp3KtR7vZwz4Y78=; b=iWgcOjusLf5k3xd1Hbxdw/7RimQmKQIeO7BpU1EYVVmnoWNIZCMICRj6 CZDlZb1jSSxT3yV0o10JyJ3HruUKLuvM/7cx9xWQ4KJKZFL3Zbg4hHsvx Li6wwSkhCHcvj9PBTdQlaoGiQN6UXFTkmSalmZEq+Rh45rqpOm/GEcPjg 59eUrUobPDXnd5879zqpmNV7R8y1vMx794MimrJRDd97PFpim/iZwPpR9 1rsRxYAFKIbv3MifI+29Z0QGe0LVtaBAoWNIclb2qAOCuLpvFegC5Ppfr PvfGlTnnktHUO3pjpiJgtoUv2DbRcOS+Bg7/pL7ZfSKjoTw//IuXIAKOZ A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219053" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219053" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054307" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 22/31] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:22 -0700 Message-Id: <64e8cf67aa564b317f4028aee9b3e77f3c1ce326.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org EPCM permission changes could be made from within (to relax permissions) or out (to restrict permissions) the enclave. Kernel support is needed when permissions are restricted to be able to call the privileged ENCLS[EMODPR] instruction. EPCM permissions can be relaxed via ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave but the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the needed permissions. Add a test that exercises a few of the enclave page permission flows: 1) Test starts with a RW (from enclave and kernel perspective) enclave page that is mapped via a RW VMA. 2) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to restrict the enclave (EPCM) page permissions to read-only. 3) Run ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave to accept the new page permissions. 4) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should fail with a page fault on the EPCM permissions since the page table entry continues to allow RW access. 5) Restore EPCM permissions to RW by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave. 6) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this should succeed since both EPCM and PTE permissions allow this access. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - User provides only new permissions in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Use SGX page permission bits instead of VMA protection bits. Changes since V2: - Modify test to support separation between EPCM and PTE/VMA permissions - Fix changelog and comments to reflect new relationship between EPCM and PTE/VMA permissions. - With EPCM permissions controlling access instead of PTE permissions, check for SGX error code now encountered in page fault. - Stop calling SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and ensure that only calling ENCLU[EMODPE] from within enclave is necessary to restore access to the enclave page. - Update to use new struct name struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions. (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - Adapt test to the kernel interface changes: the ioctl() name change and providing entire secinfo as parameter. - Remove the ENCLU[EACCEPT] call after permissions are relaxed since the new flow no longer results in the EPCM PR bit being set. - Rewrite error path to reduce line lengths. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 15 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 38 +++++ 3 files changed, 267 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h index 02d775789ea7..b638eb98c80c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ enum encl_op_type { ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS, ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS, ENCL_OP_NOP, + ENCL_OP_EACCEPT, + ENCL_OP_EMODPE, ENCL_OP_MAX, }; @@ -53,4 +55,17 @@ struct encl_op_get_from_addr { uint64_t addr; }; +struct encl_op_eaccept { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t epc_addr; + uint64_t flags; + uint64_t ret; +}; + +struct encl_op_emodpe { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t epc_addr; + uint64_t flags; +}; + #endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index dd74fa42302e..46eac09cd955 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -25,6 +25,18 @@ static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL; static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL; vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; +/* + * Security Information (SECINFO) data structure needed by a few SGX + * instructions (eg. ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EMODPE]) holds meta-data + * about an enclave page. &enum sgx_secinfo_page_state specifies the + * secinfo flags used for page state. + */ +enum sgx_secinfo_page_state { + SGX_SECINFO_PENDING = (1 << 3), + SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED = (1 << 4), + SGX_SECINFO_PR = (1 << 5), +}; + struct vdso_symtab { Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab; const char *elf_symstrtab; @@ -555,4 +567,206 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Enclave page permission test. + * + * Modify and restore enclave page's EPCM (enclave) permissions from + * outside enclave (ENCLS[EMODPR] via kernel) as well as from within + * enclave (via ENCLU[EMODPE]). Check for page fault if + * VMA allows access but EPCM permissions do not. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions restrict_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct encl_op_emodpe emodpe_op; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed + * commands. + */ + memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc)); + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, + &restrict_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* ret == -1 */ + if (errno_save == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()"); + else if (errno_save == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + + /* + * Page that will have its permissions changed is the second data + * page in the .data segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer + * within the enclave. + * + * At start of test @data_start should have EPCM as well as PTE and + * VMA permissions of RW. + */ + + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before making + * any changes to page permissions. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that + * page is writable. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Change EPCM permissions to read-only. Kernel still considers + * the page writable. + */ + memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc)); + + restrict_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + restrict_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + restrict_ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, + &restrict_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * EPCM permissions changed from kernel, need to EACCEPT from enclave. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PR; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * EPCM permissions of page is now read-only, expect #PF + * on EPCM when attempting to write to page from within enclave. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Received AEX but cannot return to enclave at same entrypoint, + * need different TCS from where EPCM permission can be made writable + * again. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Enter enclave at new TCS to change EPCM permissions to be + * writable again and thus fix the page fault that triggered the + * AEX. + */ + + emodpe_op.epc_addr = data_start; + emodpe_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W; + emodpe_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EMODPE; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&emodpe_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Attempt to return to main TCS to resume execution at faulting + * instruction, PTE should continue to allow writing to the page. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Wrong page permissions that caused original fault has + * now been fixed via EPCM permissions. + * Resume execution in main TCS to re-attempt the memory access. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0, + ERESUME, 0, 0, + &self->run), + 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c index 4fca01cfd898..5b6c65331527 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -11,6 +11,42 @@ */ static uint8_t encl_buffer[8192] = { 1 }; +enum sgx_enclu_function { + EACCEPT = 0x5, + EMODPE = 0x6, +}; + +static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op) +{ + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0}; + struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op; + + secinfo.flags = op->flags; + + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7" + : + : "a" (EMODPE), + "b" (&secinfo), + "c" (op->epc_addr)); +} + +static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op) +{ + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0}; + struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op; + int rax; + + secinfo.flags = op->flags; + + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7" + : "=a" (rax) + : "a" (EACCEPT), + "b" (&secinfo), + "c" (op->epc_addr)); + + op->ret = rax; +} + static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) { size_t i; @@ -62,6 +98,8 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) do_encl_op_put_to_addr, do_encl_op_get_from_addr, do_encl_op_nop, + do_encl_eaccept, + do_encl_emodpe, }; struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi; From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:23 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561366 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A1A7C433FE for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238939AbiDMVNX (ORCPT ); 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219058" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219058" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054311" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 23/31] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:23 -0700 Message-Id: <05a85a9b05ded9f0b077ce6eb2bfba01f7dfd067.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Kernel should not allow permission changes on TCS pages. Add test to confirm this behavior. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - User provides only new permissions in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Use SGX page permission bits instead of VMA protection bits. Changes since V2: - Update to use new struct name struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions. (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - Adapt test to the kernel interface changes: the ioctl() name change and providing entire secinfo as parameter. - Rewrite error path to reduce line lengths. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 46eac09cd955..016ae3e5f398 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -121,6 +121,24 @@ static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name) return NULL; } +/* + * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found. + * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS. + */ +static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) + return seg->offset; + } + + return -1; +} + /* * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found. * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the @@ -567,6 +585,59 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions ioc; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + + /* + * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed + * commands. + */ + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* ret == -1 */ + if (errno_save == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()"); + else if (errno_save == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + + /* + * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and + * should be prevented by the kernel. + */ + ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl); + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0); +} + /* * Enclave page permission test. * From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:24 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561362 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E507C3527C for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238976AbiDMVNb (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:31 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55388 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239053AbiDMVNN (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:13 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D174F3AA77; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884250; x=1681420250; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=sxq966+xZyMYitBOA86N/a7FaFDLT1i/4vX3fRZkrPk=; b=Kx1b53Yhsim3iIJDVuwk23yMYAzsYE4WcoO6yfrV0kEq96RWMKMZaRfp eKtjqaRSLNt/WL5wVwwIXMJ+9bKGiPdEZcEhKLdNHoJheBLKRhZTceJxg ZGNmcn1veXdBcq457K/0tduuBQgOe9+IgWJsQaU4X1DDcvaufx3SkotaX xXhIU3An3Qr4JL72BYVVs8YhnrFwP0hj+HQiM8iwpdf8pA2pM6mCL3CMq Fye/T0DTfMJPboc0mIZZnjALnt/uQMxn3TbRHM/wnvksYLxEb6Fzw7O+h D+AU+gAfvfQWTp3v2Ywla2gJnT/RNj+2B8u+/7S05ONOmrhnHW22puwtM w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219062" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219062" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054314" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:45 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 24/31] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:24 -0700 Message-Id: <10d3e6a962d03fc4fa41864b26b7aaed0409dbd0.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Enclave pages can be added to an initialized enclave when an address belonging to the enclave but without a backing page is accessed from within the enclave. Accessing memory without a backing enclave page from within an enclave can be in different ways: 1) Pre-emptively run ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Since the addition of a page always needs to be accepted by the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT] this flow is efficient since the first execution of ENCLU[EACCEPT] triggers the addition of the page and when execution returns to the same instruction the second execution would be successful as an acceptance of the page. 2) A direct read or write. The flow where a direct read or write triggers the page addition execution cannot resume from the instruction (read/write) that triggered the fault but instead the enclave needs to be entered at a different entry point to run needed ENCLU[EACCEPT] before execution can return to the original entry point and the read/write instruction that faulted. Add tests for both flows. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. Changes since V2: - Add inline comment to the mmap() call used in both EAUG tests to explain why the mmap() is expected to succeed. (Jarkko) Changes since V1: - Replace __cpuid() definition and usage with __cpuid_count(). (Reinette) - Fix accuracy of comments. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 250 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 016ae3e5f398..79c08e347112 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -86,6 +86,15 @@ static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab) return true; } +static inline int sgx2_supported(void) +{ + unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); + + return eax & 0x2; +} + static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name) { unsigned long h = 0, high; @@ -840,4 +849,245 @@ TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); } +/* + * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to + * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added + * during enclave creation. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, augment) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + void *addr; + int i; + + if (!sgx2_supported()) + SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes + * and test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New + * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing + * mappings. + * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it + * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed + * by existing enclave pages. + */ + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, + MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave. + * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave. + * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the + * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the + * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible + * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the + * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set, + * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr); + + if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) { + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE; + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0, + ERESUME, 0, 0, + &self->run), + 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a + * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + void *addr; + int i; + + if (!sgx2_supported()) + SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while + * test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic + * EPC page. + * + * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it + * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed + * by existing enclave pages. + */ + + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, + self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again + * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 && + self->run.exception_error_code == 4 && + self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) { + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to + * write to it. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:25 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561363 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB678C433FE for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239083AbiDMVN3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:29 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55390 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239054AbiDMVNN (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:13 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 70FD83BBD4; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884251; x=1681420251; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=wuTlewmQK70KDihztEJudq9AVH8Fb8wzxHOAdBGQCNU=; b=JPDkBIF8juKUqiujJ8x3qjju488DCD9NWfNMcS/cUv/a6t0ZPKdEYtgD LCG+B2wQTt6xC5C4s539VmdYLAoam/PsbezkSY4WaOfvcJLkk2CQUgRis HIWO4CzaxtOGJrHZn8RcXvO3xWntA/w0t+gyHIYsr6fe9NbjiNwDinzN3 EiozWq6j2XvIbUkDi5pcG9JLdvUe5iX2FgDGjMbgMbI2sCLykqi7XdJJK kYg0YCC6eAlPptzmS0AW1GzevtNn2t8foPcPV/ws39UP4v0tpjjfvuns0 4AClwW7RAxMebDQRTkYnsH6HSedMvKX+4uSyclsycu90wUmaRgIInvi9v A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219065" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219065" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054318" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 25/31] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:25 -0700 Message-Id: <9916be3aecbd1ec6fd78f4804ee3b84bcee3adb5.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The test enclave (test_encl.elf) is built with two initialized Thread Control Structures (TCS) included in the binary. Both TCS are initialized with the same entry point, encl_entry, that correctly computes the absolute address of the stack based on the stack of each TCS that is also built into the binary. A new TCS can be added dynamically to the enclave and requires to be initialized with an entry point used to enter the enclave. Since the existing entry point, encl_entry, assumes that the TCS and its stack exists at particular offsets within the binary it is not able to handle a dynamically added TCS and its stack. Introduce a new entry point, encl_dyn_entry, that initializes the absolute address of that thread's stack to the address immediately preceding the TCS itself. It is now possible to dynamically add a contiguous memory region to the enclave with the new stack preceding the new TCS. With the new TCS initialized with encl_dyn_entry as entry point the absolute address of the stack is computed correctly on entry. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S index 82fb0dfcbd23..03ae0f57e29d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S @@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ encl_entry: # TCS #2. By adding the value of encl_stack to it, we get # the absolute address for the stack. lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax + jmp encl_entry_core +encl_dyn_entry: + # Entry point for dynamically created TCS page expected to follow + # its stack directly. + lea -1(%rbx), %rax +encl_entry_core: xchg %rsp, %rax push %rax From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:26 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561063 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2067C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238927AbiDMVNm (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:42 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55392 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239056AbiDMVNN (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:13 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 930E53A5C1; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884251; x=1681420251; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=vNBikG4gYkUyvIo7XiITqm12yzQ/ap2t7cXvNNbhqNA=; b=KPdP5ShMTuOTGKswzy+mEq7hWnAY6zY4+QZ+xrP/trFaD14zZpmJSUv3 Q1t7tuPmDo8obAAqVrxXzr6mypVw6zlX9H4dg1bKvWT9DWhcXSOOw1Dk/ wpUjKLjP2qE4yM4krGnho8TKvlTODYECHB8pj9DNIIsa7PqCcSh5MZn13 9tgtJ+pcGJfEZcZZZ+lfKyUArMOO9I34xXG47g2taMgsL8kmCQY5210C8 YG+7zxNqWja32uzRk+Qc70iBmYiT6y2lkJp6B3caKw+Hdbe3LoO8IVkg1 rBqZ1FFV4XX2QdT8+y7qk78ebOugqSXw//WozpsnJS3GvF7Hl1WbuG68O g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219067" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219067" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054321" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 26/31] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:26 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The Thread Control Structure (TCS) contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. A TCS can be added to an initialized enclave by first adding a new regular enclave page, initializing the content of the new page from within the enclave, and then changing that page's type to a TCS. Support the initialization of a TCS from within the enclave. The variable information needed that should be provided from outside the enclave is the address of the TCS, address of the State Save Area (SSA), and the entry point that the thread should use to enter the enclave. With this information provided all needed fields of a TCS can be initialized. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 8 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h index b638eb98c80c..d8587c971941 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum encl_op_type { ENCL_OP_NOP, ENCL_OP_EACCEPT, ENCL_OP_EMODPE, + ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE, ENCL_OP_MAX, }; @@ -68,4 +69,11 @@ struct encl_op_emodpe { uint64_t flags; }; +struct encl_op_init_tcs_page { + struct encl_op_header header; + uint64_t tcs_page; + uint64_t ssa; + uint64_t entry; +}; + #endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c index 5b6c65331527..c0d6397295e3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -57,6 +57,35 @@ static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) return dest; } +static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = c; + + return dest; +} + +static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op) +{ + struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op; + void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page; + uint32_t val_32; + + memset(tcs, 0, 16); /* STATE and FLAGS */ + memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8); /* OSSA */ + memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4); /* CSSA */ + val_32 = 1; + memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4); /* NSSA */ + memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8); /* OENTRY */ + memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24); /* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */ + val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF; + memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4); /* FSLIMIT */ + memcpy(tcs + 68, &val_32, 4); /* GSLIMIT */ + memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024); /* Reserved */ +} + static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op) { struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op; @@ -100,6 +129,7 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) do_encl_op_nop, do_encl_eaccept, do_encl_emodpe, + do_encl_init_tcs_page, }; struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi; 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13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 27/31] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:27 -0700 Message-Id: <67cb2605f016157219f35c9ff0be7bac0064ba6c.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Support for changing an enclave page's type enables an initialized enclave to be expanded with support for more threads by changing the type of a regular enclave page to that of a Thread Control Structure (TCS). Additionally, being able to change a TCS or regular enclave page's type to be trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) initiates the removal of the page from the enclave. Test changing page type to TCS as well as page removal flows in two phases: In the first phase support for a new thread is dynamically added to an initialized enclave and in the second phase the pages associated with the new thread are removed from the enclave. As an additional sanity check after the second phase the page used as a TCS page during the first phase is added back as a regular page and ensured that it can be written to (which is not possible if it was a TCS page). Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Let the SKIP() call involving SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES span two lines to address checkpatch.pl warning triggered by new longer name. Changes since V2: - Rename struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko). - Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change: SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko). - Use ioctl() instead of ioctl (Dave). tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 41 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 385 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c index 006b464c8fc9..94bdeac1cf04 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c @@ -130,6 +130,47 @@ static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg) return true; } +/* + * Parse the enclave code's symbol table to locate and return address of + * the provided symbol + */ +uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol) +{ + Elf64_Shdr *sections; + Elf64_Sym *symtab; + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr; + char *sym_names; + int num_sym; + int i; + + ehdr = encl->bin; + sections = encl->bin + ehdr->e_shoff; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) { + symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)((char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset); + num_sym = sections[i].sh_size / sections[i].sh_entsize; + break; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_STRTAB) { + sym_names = (char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset; + break; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sym; i++) { + Elf64_Sym *sym = &symtab[i]; + + if (!strcmp(symbol, sym_names + sym->st_name)) + return (uint64_t)sym->st_value; + } + + return 0; +} + bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size) { const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave"; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 79c08e347112..a3f22b15a4f8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1090,4 +1090,347 @@ TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); } +/* + * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases: + * Phase 1: + * Create a new TCS, consisting out of three new pages (stack page with regular + * page type, SSA page with regular page type, and TCS page with TCS page + * type) in an initialized enclave and run a simple workload within it. + * Phase 2: + * Remove the three pages added in phase 1, add a new regular page at the + * same address that previously hosted the TCS page and verify that it can + * be modified. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create) +{ + struct encl_op_init_tcs_page init_tcs_page_op; + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type modt_ioc; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_buf_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_buf_op; + void *addr, *tcs, *stack_end, *ssa; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + uint64_t val_64; + int errno_save; + int ret, i; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, + _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Add three regular pages via EAUG: one will be the TCS stack, one + * will be the TCS SSA, and one will be the new TCS. The stack and + * SSA will remain as regular pages, the TCS page will need its + * type changed after populated with needed data. + */ + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded + * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while + * test_encl does not consume it all. + */ + EXPECT_LT(total_size + 3 * PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size); + + /* + * mmap() three pages at end of existing enclave to be used for the + * three new pages. + */ + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, + self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + stack_end = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size; + tcs = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + PAGE_SIZE; + ssa = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Run EACCEPT on each new page to trigger the + * EACCEPT->(#PF)->EAUG->EACCEPT(again without a #PF) flow. + */ + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 && + self->run.exception_error_code == 4 && + self->run.exception_addr == (unsigned long)stack_end) { + munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * Three new pages added to enclave. Now populate the TCS page with + * needed data. This should be done from within enclave. Provide + * the function that will do the actual data population with needed + * data. + */ + + /* + * New TCS will use the "encl_dyn_entry" entrypoint that expects + * stack to begin in page before TCS page. + */ + val_64 = encl_get_entry(&self->encl, "encl_dyn_entry"); + EXPECT_NE(val_64, 0); + + init_tcs_page_op.tcs_page = (unsigned long)tcs; + init_tcs_page_op.ssa = (unsigned long)total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + init_tcs_page_op.entry = val_64; + init_tcs_page_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&init_tcs_page_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Change TCS page type to TCS. */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + + modt_ioc.offset = total_size + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* EACCEPT new TCS page from enclave. */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Run workload from new TCS. */ + self->run.tcs = (unsigned long)tcs; + + /* + * Simple workload to write to data buffer and read value back. + */ + put_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER; + put_buf_op.value = MAGIC; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + get_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER; + get_buf_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_buf_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Phase 2 of test: + * Remove pages associated with new TCS, create a regular page + * where TCS page used to be and verify it can be used as a regular + * page. + */ + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + + modt_ioc.offset = total_size; + modt_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending + * EACCEPT for each of three removed pages. + */ + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal. */ + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = total_size; + remove_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and access location where TCS #3 was to + * trigger dynamic add of regular page at that location. + */ + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* + * New page should be accessible from within enclave - write to it. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h index b45c52ec7ab3..fc585be97e2f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx); bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size); bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl); bool encl_build(struct encl *encl); +uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol); int sgx_enter_enclave(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 function, void *r8, void *r9, struct sgx_enclave_run *run); From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:28 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561062 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 408F6C433FE for ; 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X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="323219072" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="323219072" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054329" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 28/31] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:28 -0700 Message-Id: <8ba0555325ff7bb9bf58b618161e9425bb075a81.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: first the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via an ioctl(), on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction needs to be run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, finally the user requests page removal to be completed via an ioctl(). Only after acceptance (ENCLU[EACCEPT]) from within the enclave can the kernel remove the page from a running enclave. Test the behavior when the user's request to change the page type succeeds, but the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is not run before the ioctl() requesting page removal is run. This should not be permitted. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Let the SKIP() call involving SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES span two lines to address checkpatch.pl warning triggered by new longer name. Changes since V2: - Rename struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko). - Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change: SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko). - Use ioctl() instead of ioctl in text (Dave). tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index a3f22b15a4f8..fc72b04ce2a8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1433,4 +1433,118 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create) munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE); } +/* + * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run + * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal + * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail + * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type modt_ioc; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + + modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* Skip EACCEPT */ + + /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */ + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + /* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:29 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561073 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDC0DC43219 for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:10:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238825AbiDMVNU (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:20 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55334 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239037AbiDMVNL (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:11 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com (mga03.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8D0A93AA77; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884247; x=1681420247; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ZYHEMka8E4H3+hY9bhcuLbq8/wml3VQyZ4r1k3WQEg4=; b=TcxTutafjVYt/TDNG4eoXJ2miIjTuXcNBBjSDmytdgENzPdy1yesHKvo w4ogX1oMcUNilnk4TAA15Fknubeyu9m1L8fREOLpSwIRvGBNsqIzbt3GG 95rcZ8BAXk/YMtwIa/LiUqglMtwOg8d+E16L9f/9ys9trZtyoQgQKow3n iNpvqlxJyzM9IBkWq5yz5xURUH4D5c3HjQa87iK+kUM/1O8W7iD0Zksf8 L7ZdUyHMp3Ao4kwr+g7ILF3cySLu55JKrkcg3xw/LGg+v9iylrsMUFBAL A6osC13xFmkN7m1ftZF6yHxPQci58IL00fobSo6cf7y+fc/N2V0Oeidum A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="262526961" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="262526961" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054337" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:46 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 29/31] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:29 -0700 Message-Id: <53e211d35427ec96277d189dafc1fa5766eae53d.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: (1) the user requests changing the page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), (2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal, (3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). Test two possible invalid accesses during the page removal flow: * Test the behavior when a request to remove the page by changing its type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM completes successfully but instead of executing ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave the enclave attempts to read from the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code. * Test the behavior when the page type is changed successfully and ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. The final ioctl(), SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, is omitted and replaced with an attempt to access the page. Even though the page is accessible from the page table entries its type is SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM and thus not accessible according to SGX. The expected behavior is a page fault with the SGX flag set in the error code. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Let the SKIP() call involving SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES span two lines to address checkpatch.pl warning triggered by new longer name. Changes since V2: - Rename struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko). - Use ioctl() instead of ioctl (Dave). tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 243 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index fc72b04ce2a8..ba1c6c4b5ff2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1547,4 +1547,247 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept) EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0); } +/* + * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with + * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type ioc; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + + ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * Read from page that was just removed. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + /* + * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the + * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is + * expected. + */ + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); +} + +/* + * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with + * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt + * to removed page is made from within the enclave. + */ +TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type ioc; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* + * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data + * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the + * enclave. + */ + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before + * removing it. + * + * Start by writing MAGIC to test page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = data_start; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data + * previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = data_start; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */ + memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc)); + + ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096); + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + /* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */ + + /* + * Read from page that was just removed. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + /* + * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the + * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is + * expected. + */ + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:30 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561059 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF0FDC4167B for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:11:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238834AbiDMVNs (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:48 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55362 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239044AbiDMVNM (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:12 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com (mga03.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A25C4839E; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884250; x=1681420250; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=wXIKJ/gA7dbxe/ScZO2F8hK1bnpCh/Mcj1zKIqtRlSk=; b=BNKelsz+PkPiDWSv6MBXzD6orJD0Rsic6p/oZxWBFxecCfpNewBTfAWV cJumh46WxitxGO1DMQkPmZBK0gOeivPneJ7fTBZziy4kH8+/D0aC8Hk0T wxuVERW7IQYBleUbPQwlRYFDOrcw6aPqKoWgjlIYHlLmNoCDHjfbyCt3g fWFIhcNZoUIDuEuCU5DX/Nlko1dCWnUZQhZNq+0Mmd4NQoyGt+wu/BGDm dS62fy4ibGO9ae7b/UWSQbDSNOqgpKiua/qAabArUBGWD6RzpHNxd2ECn CVq+DWo7PGiW3mzqbfl5nNoJL/+t5IARI8Debg9lk1JXCwB15J3H2HU9R A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="262526965" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="262526965" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054342" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 30/31] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:30 -0700 Message-Id: <4236f10ec1e7254af4e1964e4d17bf5ed0e4b356.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Removing a page from an initialized enclave involves three steps: (1) the user requests changing the page type to PT_TRIM via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl() (2) on success the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction is run from within the enclave to accept the page removal (3) the user initiates the actual removal of the page via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). Remove a page that has never been accessed. This means that when the first ioctl() requesting page removal arrives, there will be no page table entry, yet a valid page table entry needs to exist for the ENCLU[EACCEPT] function to succeed. In this test it is verified that a page table entry can still be installed for a page that is in the process of being removed. Suggested-by: Haitao Huang Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Let the SKIP() call involving SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES span two lines to address checkpatch.pl warning triggered by new longer name. Changes since V2: - Rename struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - Update to support ioctl() name change (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter instead of just page type (Jarkko). - Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change: SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko). - Ensure test is skipped when SGX2 not supported by kernel. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index ba1c6c4b5ff2..d49fce1a8df9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -1790,4 +1790,84 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept) EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start); } +TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type modt_ioc; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + unsigned long data_start; + int ret, errno_save; + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */ + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + data_start = self->encl.encl_base + + encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + + modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096); + + /* + * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending + * EACCEPT for removed page. + */ + + eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start; + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE; + remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE; + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From patchwork Wed Apr 13 21:10:31 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 561368 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 347C3C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:10:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236490AbiDMVNS (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:18 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55378 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239048AbiDMVNM (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:13:12 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com (mga03.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 81B213A5C1; Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649884250; x=1681420250; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=9T2ihn0LMBJKrJXn0LFSLOwtWvN2vfg/tBsS0Rgq/6U=; b=el0nJr5oMVqA2ndrxZ9Hv0wwje74mlHALldMLLToG3kUn7Ul/vcv3v2l dpmXnHdILy6qm2dlCZjJOjp9P6uNRRUkUf6DCSYRirrg4AGxByf68NWbJ 4AL4HP8ZFawsXw3J7wkchOtAInIMfcubwkyIPs+8ZxJsD7+VlYqelZmpa 2uAkqnWX8CkzHBygGJA6jIDaAEA6irMp9KkH+KJiuLKbmsrqNbttMgHXv RSTRLc0e+RzzSqX5Jq5/hJoM64ku7VN+dWCgFswwSJZ1ngg+zSPsx0eea 1d25HNRNN6r0Gj+QL6DSJkX5P6+cYRIb8Y+peuMCM+fCQf9RTKlP+p3+X w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10316"; a="262526970" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="262526970" Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,257,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="725054346" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Apr 2022 14:10:47 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 31/31] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:31 -0700 Message-Id: <51e5952805fb5faadcdcd6fa69d3a2b492ba4750.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Create enclave with additional heap that consumes all physical SGX memory and then remove it. Depending on the available SGX memory this test could take a significant time to run (several minutes) as it (1) creates the enclave, (2) changes the type of every page to be trimmed, (3) enters the enclave once per page to run EACCEPT, before (4) the pages are finally removed. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Changes since V3: - Add Jarkko's Acked-by tag. - Rename SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES. (Jarkko) - User provides just page type to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl(), replacing secinfo. (Jarkko) - Let the SKIP() call involving SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES span two lines to address checkpatch.pl warning triggered by new longer name. Changes since V2: - Rename struct sgx_enclave_modt -> struct sgx_enclave_modify_type Changes since V1: - Exit test completely on first failure of EACCEPT of a removed page. Since this is an oversubscribed test the number of pages on which this is attempted can be significant and in case of failure the per-page error logging would overwhelm the system. - Update test to call renamed ioctl() (SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT -> SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE) and provide secinfo as parameter (Jarkko). - Fixup definitions to be reverse xmas tree. - Update test to reflect page removal ioctl() and struct name change: SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE->SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, struct sgx_page_remove -> struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages (Jarkko). - Ensure test is skipped when SGX2 not supported by kernel. - Cleanup comments. tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 120 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index d49fce1a8df9..7ad88117f3f7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -378,7 +378,127 @@ TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed) EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC); EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0); +} + +TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc; + struct sgx_enclave_modify_type modt_ioc; + struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op; + struct encl_segment *heap; + unsigned long total_mem; + int ret, errno_save; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long i; + + /* + * Create enclave with additional heap that is as big as all + * available physical SGX memory. + */ + total_mem = get_total_epc_mem(); + ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0); + TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...", + total_mem); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata)); + + /* + * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start + * with check that test has a chance of succeeding. + */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + + if (ret == -1) { + if (errno == ENOTTY) + SKIP(return, + "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()"); + else if (errno == ENODEV) + SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2"); + } + + /* + * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check, + * expect command to fail. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + + /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */ + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + heap = &self->encl.segment_tbl[self->encl.nr_segments - 1]; + + put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER; + put_op.value = MAGIC; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0); + + get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER; + get_op.value = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0); + /* Trim entire heap. */ + memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc)); + + modt_ioc.offset = heap->offset; + modt_ioc.length = heap->size; + modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM; + + TH_LOG("Changing type of %zd bytes to trimmed may take a while ...", + heap->size); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, heap->size); + + /* EACCEPT all removed pages. */ + addr = self->encl.encl_base + heap->offset; + + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + TH_LOG("Entering enclave to run EACCEPT for each page of %zd bytes may take a while ...", + heap->size); + for (i = 0; i < heap->size; i += 4096) { + eaccept_op.epc_addr = addr + i; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT); + } + + /* Complete page removal. */ + memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc)); + + remove_ioc.offset = heap->offset; + remove_ioc.length = heap->size; + + TH_LOG("Removing %zd bytes from enclave may take a while ...", + heap->size); + ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc); + errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0; + + EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, heap->size); } TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)