From patchwork Wed Mar 23 04:11:23 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 553806 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2CA2C433F5 for ; Wed, 23 Mar 2022 04:11:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241098AbiCWEM7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Mar 2022 00:12:59 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55512 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229446AbiCWEM7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Mar 2022 00:12:59 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80C1C55BD6; Tue, 22 Mar 2022 21:11:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 24A1D61585; Wed, 23 Mar 2022 04:11:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D52D9C340E8; Wed, 23 Mar 2022 04:11:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="eFkXpepl" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1648008686; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Tmx+SMJ8klnka/a+PxgQZA13oU4YxVuHKjh55SA6rJI=; b=eFkXpepl82R3E7G6qgCYbO2N/529W0VVhuoKMXWp0mXsiorZoJfqxSqX19PlI6y8cmCzzt 2B4mXKBqhnDf4h9JyuTK+SY+8bQ723mP7Ca1LcIKx9PL6h13YRLG0FdtehoYhFSY3pVmjE pKiR6h4RQfC9CROhWz8qB8ev44ECZ8I= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 3da1f10b (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Wed, 23 Mar 2022 04:11:26 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Dominik Brodowski , Theodore Ts'o , Graham Christensen Subject: [PATCH] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 22:11:23 -0600 Message-Id: <20220323041123.146459-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND. But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting `random.trust_cpu=0/1` on the kernel command line. This allows system builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil hatters. (Or vice versa.) CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds the corresponding `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` toggle. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Graham Christensen Link: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7b7f5e6596c2..c8974e5f57e1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -948,11 +948,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force) **********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg) +{ + return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader); +} early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); +early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); /* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts @@ -1160,7 +1166,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); */ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) + if (trust_bootloader) add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); else add_device_randomness(buf, size);