From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:16 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522616 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ED52C433F5 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232591AbhLHLlh (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:37 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57408 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232589AbhLHLle (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:34 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x535.google.com (mail-ed1-x535.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::535]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E028CC061D5E; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:00 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x535.google.com with SMTP id y13so7240372edd.13; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:00 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=A2H5pkMkCn0DCcNGGHExB4Qyu3rL9yW2bx5CTJv5Jrg=; b=o7JRzF1LgL1lxjetcGsADcWB66zIwR8caaeM6/C59XJdWzV0/sUEcW16bgfMOACe3p tDF2QB6aiy3NgST4hJqEWM90Gc00DhSWgUXXZ4ooOKZlSCKNwQ66RTqmz1LRz58PxKs/ XlNMqgAtZ+PfcsaSMORIk+GoJNb1b39z3Ga+dJ+ETtVn+VeiGR6Aq/J64SB1OgSK7T70 4v/x1acpWyk+bEs6mozKXG12FyQXd9pSF/fJiV0DUDoUHQrZk2hwbHwj3BoDPMZuXOMr 3WNFa4Gl3lD7Ek0XNTMlHMQb+6c9vhMd76v5o+wTH8LhudukQ/atvY6sXiv9UKibEpWm S24A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=A2H5pkMkCn0DCcNGGHExB4Qyu3rL9yW2bx5CTJv5Jrg=; b=Bufn0Puq5Y85uVHZ07Vi09Rrc1KuKW9vMScaBFqWO7Y+8jNZwWMN6bgEsVvXXcKvwH 0HLotFxPZtYt5wghTrTszy1Jgud5ngfNenRTxw+8ru0C6WG+tSA9kUbxos6CzucUHAYz jk96sHMDHO/GP42oXtwhc2pbvKrqaqAMFtm5l5IW+uDtYR+w7x/eu7FRepKJLx2Xpecc YjDXxSs46TftWYI61xk+0lEmGcn17dgzC65i17U3qpYilGzqklZakIDgm6Y+p3vqxk+d CaAmawA850oD9faBMTCyo5hta+nB4X8j/q5+eUN9RATB46DyC0h+TU31QchceX2dlK0M +TvA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531ohV1/PlM83qjuOMIX2X6h+Ez9TzWPUsO4TyqRKHxXrsHxLNdS eHlIHrPzKk94gHuVAxkdVrU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz65kk9OEtJG72f6jsqYdzCcBnSZC+mupsykYw6Y557Ir8+K7X7+KIS2ERnKI+VVE/83zYsnw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:ecac:: with SMTP id qh12mr6601799ejb.377.1638963479347; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:37:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.37.57 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:37:58 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 01/18] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:16 +0200 Message-Id: <209a0770c1c9c4645a687c04d8fb5e32e3466bb6.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This commit adds support to add and remove keys but does not use them further. Similar to tcp md5 a single pointer to a struct tcp_authopt_info* struct is added to struct tcp_sock, this avoids increasing memory usage. The data structures related to tcp_authopt are initialized on setsockopt and only freed on socket close. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 9 ++ include/net/tcp.h | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 76 +++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 81 ++++++++++++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 ++ net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 30 +++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 263 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 + 9 files changed, 477 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 78b91bb92f0d..497604176119 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -140,10 +140,12 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; } +struct tcp_authopt_info; + struct tcp_sock { /* inet_connection_sock has to be the first member of tcp_sock */ struct inet_connection_sock inet_conn; u16 tcp_header_len; /* Bytes of tcp header to send */ u16 gso_segs; /* Max number of segs per GSO packet */ @@ -403,10 +405,14 @@ struct tcp_sock { /* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */ struct tcp_md5sig_info __rcu *md5sig_info; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info __rcu *authopt_info; +#endif + /* TCP fastopen related information */ struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen_req; /* fastopen_rsk points to request_sock that resulted in this big * socket. Used to retransmit SYNACKs etc. */ @@ -453,10 +459,13 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock { int tw_ts_recent_stamp; u32 tw_tx_delay; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG struct tcp_md5sig_key *tw_md5_key; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *tw_authopt_info; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk) { return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk; diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 44e442bf23f9..6cc2eeb45deb 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo); #define TCPOPT_WINDOW 3 /* Window scaling */ #define TCPOPT_SACK_PERM 4 /* SACK Permitted */ #define TCPOPT_SACK 5 /* SACK Block */ #define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP 8 /* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */ #define TCPOPT_MD5SIG 19 /* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */ +#define TCPOPT_AUTHOPT 29 /* Auth Option (RFC5925) */ #define TCPOPT_MPTCP 30 /* Multipath TCP (RFC6824) */ #define TCPOPT_FASTOPEN 34 /* Fast open (RFC7413) */ #define TCPOPT_EXP 254 /* Experimental */ /* Magic number to be after the option value for sharing TCP * experimental options. See draft-ietf-tcpm-experimental-options-00.txt diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..42ad764e98c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H +#define _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H + +#include + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925 + * + * Key structure lifetime is only protected by RCU so readers needs to hold a + * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key_info { + /** @node: node in &tcp_authopt_info.head list */ + struct hlist_node node; + /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */ + struct rcu_head rcu; + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */ + u32 flags; + /** @send_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.send_id */ + u8 send_id; + /** @recv_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.recv_id */ + u8 recv_id; + /** @alg_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.alg */ + u8 alg_id; + /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ + u8 keylen; + /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ + u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ + struct sockaddr_storage addr; +}; + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt + * + * This is lazy-initialized in order to avoid increasing memory usage for + * regular TCP sockets. Once created it is only destroyed on socket close. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_info { + /** @head: List of tcp_authopt_key_info */ + struct hlist_head head; + /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */ + struct rcu_head rcu; + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */ + u32 flags; + /** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */ + u32 src_isn; + /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ + u32 dst_isn; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); +int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); +int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +#else +static inline int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} +static inline int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) +{ +} +static inline int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} +#endif + +#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 8fc09e8638b3..76d7be6b27f4 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ enum { #define TCP_INQ 36 /* Notify bytes available to read as a cmsg on read */ #define TCP_CM_INQ TCP_INQ #define TCP_TX_DELAY 37 /* delay outgoing packets by XX usec */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT 38 /* TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925) */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY 39 /* TCP Authentication Option Key (RFC5925) */ #define TCP_REPAIR_ON 1 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF 0 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF_NO_WP -1 /* Turn off without window probes */ @@ -340,10 +342,89 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig { __u16 tcpm_keylen; __be32 tcpm_addr[4]; __u8 tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN]; }; +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` + */ +enum tcp_authopt_flag { + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: + * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no + * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept + * such connections. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED = (1 << 2), +}; + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option + */ +struct tcp_authopt { + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ + __u32 flags; +}; + +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` + * + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + */ +enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), +}; + +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option + */ +enum tcp_authopt_alg { + /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96: HMAC-SHA-1-96 as described in RFC5926 */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96 = 1, + /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96: AES-128-CMAC-96 as described in RFC5926 */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 = 2, +}; + +/* for TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY socket option */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN 80 + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_key - TCP Authentication KEY + * + * Key are identified by the combination of: + * - send_id + * - recv_id + * - addr (iff TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + * + * RFC5925 requires that key ids must not overlap for the same TCP connection. + * This is not enforced by linux. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key { + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */ + __u32 flags; + /** @send_id: keyid value for send */ + __u8 send_id; + /** @recv_id: keyid value for receive */ + __u8 recv_id; + /** @alg: One of &enum tcp_authopt_alg */ + __u8 alg; + /** @keylen: Length of the key buffer */ + __u8 keylen; + /** @key: Secret key */ + __u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** + * @addr: Key is only valid for this address + * + * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set + */ + struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; +}; + /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 struct tcp_zerocopy_receive { __u64 address; /* in: address of mapping */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig index 87983e70f03f..6459f4ea6f1d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig @@ -740,5 +740,19 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG RFC2385 specifies a method of giving MD5 protection to TCP sessions. Its main (only?) use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers on the Internet. If unsure, say N. + +config TCP_AUTHOPT + bool "TCP: Authentication Option support (RFC5925)" + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CMAC + help + RFC5925 specifies a new method of giving protection to TCP sessions. + Its intended use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers + on the Internet. It obsoletes TCP MD5 (RFC2385) but is incompatible. + + If unsure, say N. diff --git a/net/ipv4/Makefile b/net/ipv4/Makefile index bbdd9c44f14e..d336f32ce177 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Makefile +++ b/net/ipv4/Makefile @@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV) += tcp_nv.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO) += tcp_veno.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE) += tcp_scalable.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP) += tcp_lp.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH) += tcp_yeah.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS) += tcp_illinois.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) += tcp_authopt.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += tcp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += udp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += cipso_ipv4.o obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm4_policy.o xfrm4_state.o xfrm4_input.o \ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 20054618c87e..022811dd705d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -270,10 +270,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -3602,10 +3603,16 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, case TCP_MD5SIG: case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT: err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); break; #endif + case TCP_AUTHOPT: + err = tcp_set_authopt(sk, optval, optlen); + break; + case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY: + err = tcp_set_authopt_key(sk, optval, optlen); + break; case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT: /* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window * before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection. */ if (val < 0) @@ -4251,10 +4258,33 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, if (!err && copy_to_user(optval, &zc, len)) err = -EFAULT; return err; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCP_AUTHOPT: { + struct tcp_authopt info; + int err; + + if (get_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + + lock_sock(sk); + err = tcp_get_authopt_val(sk, &info); + release_sock(sk); + + if (err) + return err; + len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(info)); + if (put_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, len)) + return -EFAULT; + return 0; + } +#endif + default: return -ENOPROTOOPT; } if (put_user(len, optlen)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e6740ef29a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ +static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, + struct sockaddr_storage *a2) +{ + if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET && + (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr != + ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr)) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET6 && + !ipv6_addr_equal(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a1)->sin6_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a2)->sin6_addr)) + return false; + return true; +} + +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key *key) +{ + if (info->send_id != key->send_id) + return false; + if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) + return false; + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key_info, &info->head, node, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)) + if (tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(key_info, ukey)) + return key_info; + + return NULL; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (info) + return info; + + info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + sk_gso_disable(sk); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&info->head); + rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info); + + return info; +} + +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) + +/* Like copy_from_sockopt except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons + * + * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is + * filled with zeros. + * + * If the dst is shorter then src is from a newer userspace and we only accept + * if the rest of the option is all zeros. + * + * This allows sockopts to grow as long as for new fields zeros has no effect. + */ +static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, + unsigned int dstlen, + sockptr_t src, + unsigned int srclen) +{ + int err; + + /* If userspace optlen is too short fill the rest with zeros */ + if (srclen > dstlen) { + if (sockptr_is_kernel(src)) + return -EINVAL; + err = check_zeroed_user(src.user + dstlen, srclen - dstlen); + if (err < 0) + return err; + if (err == 0) + return -EINVAL; + } + err = copy_from_sockptr(dst, src, min(srclen, dstlen)); + if (err) + return err; + if (srclen < dstlen) + memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen); + + return err; +} + +int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct tcp_authopt opt; + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + + err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); + if (err) + return err; + + if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS) + return -EINVAL; + + info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); + if (IS_ERR(info)) + return PTR_ERR(info); + + info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + + return 0; +} + +int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return -ENOENT; + + opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + + return 0; +} + +/* Free key nicely, for living sockets */ +static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); + kfree_rcu(key, rcu); +} + +/* Free info and keys. + * Don't touch tp->authopt_info, it might not even be assigned yes. + */ +void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info) +{ + struct hlist_node *n; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &info->head, node) { + /* sk is NULL for timewait case + * struct timewait_sock doesn't track sk_omem_alloc + */ + if (sk) + atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); + hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + kfree_rcu(key, rcu); + } + kfree_rcu(info, rcu); +} + +/* free everything and clear tcp_sock.authopt_info to NULL */ +void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (info) { + tcp_authopt_free(sk, info); + tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info = NULL; + } +} + +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + +int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key opt; + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; + int err; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + + err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); + if (err) + return err; + + if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS) + return -EINVAL; + + if (opt.keylen > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Delete is a special case: */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) { + info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return -ENOENT; + key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, info, &opt); + if (!key_info) + return -ENOENT; + tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, key_info); + return 0; + } + + /* check key family */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family) + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ + info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); + if (IS_ERR(info)) + return PTR_ERR(info); + + key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!key_info) + return -ENOMEM; + /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace. + * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any. + */ + old_key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, info, &opt); + if (old_key_info) + tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, old_key_info); + key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS; + key_info->send_id = opt.send_id; + key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id; + key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; + key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; + memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); + memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 3dd19a2bf06c..0aa5122b29e0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -60,10 +60,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -2276,10 +2277,11 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) tcp_clear_md5_list(sk); kfree_rcu(rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, 1), rcu); tp->md5sig_info = NULL; } #endif + tcp_authopt_clear(sk); /* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */ if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash) inet_put_port(sk); From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:17 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522312 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FBE4C43217 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232702AbhLHLlr (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:47 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57420 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229747AbhLHLlh (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:37 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52a.google.com (mail-ed1-x52a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6CDE0C0698D1; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:02 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52a.google.com with SMTP id g14so7307822edb.8; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:02 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=xTuLF9iVakUmuqWJrh4h5lRJip3NOmzubsD/v0KQcZA=; b=KIfVSl/0ggPg/bXLh4ZZRzQW73Rnp7fzeTUKk1TxyW1y9EsIgRoAsUIT+zNW1n/M5P Fb9RG5geL+Xuc0RDNCmvEOkdfwILkpGW+jC9+jTY3ma7zq8EtrlLtb9o/4aKGBbUPCnK 2uTiPYsZ2OHoOM0cXRpd2gPqPysdcZFiFSZGbI60mC2xSyjna2PZQnA3Mpppe5L4JCB0 a2TqrJFMz8fbIqlu6E2smxpjlC7KHMPlIisFodAD8SSKqR5lYbJ9G1hKqfH50KvSVr83 XaBJHs2xcNxyAl/Mlt+dkyhnC0fDI1HQltku6chU+dwGNHDtpGh8K3iwoVq+MiWZ3X/j IKqA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=xTuLF9iVakUmuqWJrh4h5lRJip3NOmzubsD/v0KQcZA=; b=jO8qqoF4VOe6qn4t249g31YFPr+2NiPADOENegOUQFx6jV8sKCfZ4SkL0yHQjK6Wyg egQ1Ef5pRlgELEp8RzFZ8gw2V15hy/ZEqGUOw0FxNYnw7XSlrJOUAIfPbwTvof3Xwve/ XCbGtKoegNYqU4h2p/cUK5lHn5Zzdi/YJz8/7QTNeBTbW0KWipTZ4S2AI4TsONUhkKGe c71sGjJeOyfZdACztTiK4f4jvJYqgsYOTIpTU76pYLUjXDKj9Gs52WOjIFtXuavW2dAi wzBL+c4cbeBeWT2bpJepwfOK7DlnYknmgpG72mY6wDbRm3vo6+tcRdw/9mKt56kZz+8r vcYg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531fIBVoAOXrSkJsGkbSY5S+a9ajXM9dTasiJltY5sO88zArN5sa Nrv1x8TCrDqi9SiG+DJOl3I= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyhRgpHRFpduR3FDN2QSQ40EB4LNJfuphjQc+fRsVQhe4ljyVhRXsXKcnOkuhcGjTX7cqMjMQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:3d88:: with SMTP id he8mr6750259ejc.565.1638963480952; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.37.59 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:00 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 02/18] docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:17 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The .rst documentation contains a brief description of the user interface and includes kernel-doc generated from uapi header. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst diff --git a/Documentation/networking/index.rst b/Documentation/networking/index.rst index 58bc8cd367c6..f5c324a060d8 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/index.rst @@ -100,10 +100,11 @@ Contents: strparser switchdev sysfs-tagging tc-actions-env-rules tcp-thin + tcp_authopt team timestamping tipc tproxy tuntap diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..484f66f41ad5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========================= +TCP Authentication Option +========================= + +The TCP Authentication option specified by RFC5925 replaces the TCP MD5 +Signature option. It similar in goals but not compatible in either wire formats +or ABI. + +Interface +========= + +Individual keys can be added to or removed from a TCP socket by using +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY setsockopt and a ``struct tcp_authopt_key``. There is no +support for reading back keys and updates always replace the old key. These +structures represent "Master Key Tuples (MKTs)" as described by the RFC. + +Per-socket options can set or read using the TCP_AUTHOPT sockopt and a ``struct +tcp_authopt``. This is optional: doing setsockopt TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY is +sufficient to enable the feature. + +Configuration associated with TCP Authentication is indepedently attached to +each TCP socket. After listen and accept the newly returned socket gets an +independent copy of relevant settings from the listen socket. + +Key binding +----------- + +Keys can be bound to remote addresses in a way that is similar to TCP_MD5. + + * The full address must match (/32 or /128) + * Ports are ignored + * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses + +RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) +overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result +in packet drops and lost connections. + +ABI Reference +============= + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h + :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:18 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522614 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18094C433F5 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232684AbhLHLlq (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:46 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57458 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232545AbhLHLlh (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:37 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52c.google.com (mail-ed1-x52c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52c]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 132ADC0617A1; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:04 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52c.google.com with SMTP id o20so7315617eds.10; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RFw2RQjkTFDoBaa82P8+bnSrEcpG6WIvemEsOajZP3k=; b=ltCI6OHobpahrmB4ku0odAN9yfTkO6TRmS9ckIjlouMrngD+IFhrOqQHj9pOF66QME MnVi9Pfjzws308bxGaIeFsqpzMUxGxduOVpK4TZ7sKHCXNuhtrdJqEUQSoMAyYanEz/y elxHTunZwMER1AO2y0+LmZRooY2rEBzGpvuwYghY85YDZ50/dsb94dyjqxrW1r531UV/ zY92pxoYvRJRficWSIDliFJq5cf3P0Bq1Uxgt3pVg5o7BZDEOHab8Ra6N2VMrpO97ICd pbAHSw7Ox17ofKN3kH6jyFKk1BSgptczH5OcBAM07Cr1SWRXLksQoNC1JLERvODnsFP3 obSg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RFw2RQjkTFDoBaa82P8+bnSrEcpG6WIvemEsOajZP3k=; b=ZTdZqFbaz+dsQmiC46QSzgyawuD/tVeezyfPaFwVw50J3VWxnVPsvUbfbDH6kkLamI yNUmjagB6co/vWIL/SPFyyf3kZvXHMhVHQK8531nz++byFErvzdeusw/HGMGaSXgFwbP pU5qK8BOSvrqvhEa5sxixHTjkFhs/0/N078eH5dYJv6D6OxA0Z5Qu//SBJMAPP0CUpKh lgBc4W3XsaPn/lTlf+ly9bz6dyioqYP49SRfpzOJjN0sPVbbqeSNBfXX8IN4S+rbkoLD t/2NuVaB2GUqTv62GgJS2PLAP48Yp3pck9hToty6Ij2qPjZ7MWHK6uswCkbVFrRuYYXi A+5w== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530r00CFLnqUjrDre6RLwpA+czrifH2mzWnmj4jUtHZk9YtcW6wl QJ4arXSOMTy3Bnc6KVUUPBs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxHW9Mg1vngFawSOz3rnVyHEg/j9692rU0zHHAA9zds/d001sGEVDA9cGAXFKzI9s6a5YSF7g== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:3481:: with SMTP id v1mr19060285edc.337.1638963482620; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:02 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 03/18] tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:18 +0200 Message-Id: <4b46ef74e1504c2377e9d7c22b2882e3424dfbd8.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The crypto_shash API is used in order to compute packet signatures. The API comes with several unfortunate limitations: 1) Allocating a crypto_shash can sleep and must be done in user context. 2) Packet signatures must be computed in softirq context 3) Packet signatures use dynamic "traffic keys" which require exclusive access to crypto_shash for crypto_setkey. The solution is to allocate one crypto_shash for each possible cpu for each algorithm at setsockopt time. The per-cpu tfm is then borrowed from softirq context, signatures are computed and the tfm is returned. The pool for each algorithm is allocated on first use. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 16 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 182 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 42ad764e98c2..5217b6c7c900 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -2,10 +2,24 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H #define _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H #include +/* According to RFC5925 the length of the authentication option varies based on + * the signature algorithm. Linux only implements the algorithms defined in + * RFC5926 which have a constant length of 16. + * + * This is used in stack allocation of tcp option buffers for output. It is + * shorter than the length of the MD5 option. + * + * Input packets can have authentication options of different lengths but they + * will always be flagged as invalid (since no such algorithms are supported). + */ +#define TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT 16 + +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp; + /** * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925 * * Key structure lifetime is only protected by RCU so readers needs to hold a * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key. @@ -27,10 +41,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; + /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; /** * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt * diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index e6740ef29a84..478969d53094 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -3,10 +3,164 @@ #include #include #include #include +/* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF 20 +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN 20 +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN 12 + +/* Constant data with per-algorithm information from RFC5926 + * The "KDF" and "MAC" happen to be the same for both algorithms. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp { + /* Name of algorithm in crypto-api */ + const char *alg_name; + /* One of the TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_* constants from uapi */ + u8 alg_id; + /* Length of traffic key */ + u8 traffic_key_len; + + /* shared crypto_shash */ + struct mutex init_mutex; + bool init_done; + struct crypto_shash * __percpu *tfms; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp tcp_authopt_alg_list[] = { + { + .alg_id = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96, + .alg_name = "hmac(sha1)", + .traffic_key_len = 20, + .init_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tcp_authopt_alg_list[0].init_mutex), + }, + { + .alg_id = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96, + .alg_name = "cmac(aes)", + .traffic_key_len = 16, + .init_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tcp_authopt_alg_list[1].init_mutex), + }, +}; + +/* get a pointer to the tcp_authopt_alg instance or NULL if id invalid */ +static inline struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *tcp_authopt_alg_get(int alg_num) +{ + if (alg_num <= 0 || alg_num > 2) + return NULL; + return &tcp_authopt_alg_list[alg_num - 1]; +} + +static void __tcp_authopt_alg_free(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + int cpu; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + + if (!alg->tfms) + return; + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu); + if (tfm) { + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu) = NULL; + } + } + free_percpu(alg->tfms); + alg->tfms = NULL; +} + +static int __tcp_authopt_alg_init(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int cpu; + int err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF < TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(alg->traffic_key_len > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN)) + return -ENOBUFS; + + alg->tfms = alloc_percpu(struct crypto_shash *); + if (!alg->tfms) + return -ENOMEM; + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(alg->alg_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + err = PTR_ERR(tfm); + goto out_err; + } + + /* sanity checks: */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) != alg->traffic_key_len)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + + *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu) = tfm; + } + return 0; + +out_err: + __tcp_authopt_alg_free(alg); + return err; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_alg_require(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + int err = 0; + + mutex_lock(&alg->init_mutex); + if (alg->init_done) + goto out; + err = __tcp_authopt_alg_init(alg); + if (err) + goto out; + pr_info("initialized tcp-ao algorithm %s", alg->alg_name); + alg->init_done = true; + +out: + mutex_unlock(&alg->init_mutex); + return err; +} + +static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + local_bh_disable(); + return *this_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, struct crypto_shash *tfm) +{ + WARN_ON(tfm != *this_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms)); + local_bh_enable(); +} + +static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_get_kdf_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(key->alg); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_put_kdf_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct crypto_shash *tfm) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(key->alg, tfm); +} + +static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_get_mac_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(key->alg); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_put_mac_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct crypto_shash *tfm) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(key->alg, tfm); +} + /* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, struct sockaddr_storage *a2) { if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family) @@ -202,10 +356,11 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); @@ -239,10 +394,20 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); + /* check the algorithm */ + alg = tcp_authopt_alg_get(opt.alg); + if (!alg) + return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(alg->alg_id != opt.alg)) + return -EINVAL; + err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); + if (err) + return err; + key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace. * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any. @@ -252,10 +417,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, old_key_info); key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS; key_info->send_id = opt.send_id; key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id; key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; + key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:19 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522615 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DFC1C433EF for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232656AbhLHLlo (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:44 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57432 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232603AbhLHLlh (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:37 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA278C061D5F; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id x6so7417574edr.5; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:05 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Zwg/3jXbHrDqLr7GxjKESPVOjZiPbN+/TXSEuiw/m4o=; b=DRIfx9VyPx3PPierHsehZT72JONUdDPL6xMnNNdoxd8QZrsg4nggfqYrqmXierk5Sw wOw2DrrpTnEUr+368nYhKM1RADiZxeZBF/ieodEcdPoxyixBjGt6SRdJfIWcU3bC4SgZ bJk39M3qfeeArcHKHr+J4kITgLieRgEKi/4aPhWkinDjvlrzJWvmcpRgA2VBK26chgHS 8RTq3nr1IKEsN5jACdGOxvCHwaOFkQudxIbcJDkJC0G/3NqPFzAUUsT2AaGdY12cBUO9 s4WqiseykcNSV3+jHkhFRAd1rUrN7H1Fnprk8eZf2m3ZfWmMB3pPtbE9UrZ/Vg7CgJ9H zK6A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Zwg/3jXbHrDqLr7GxjKESPVOjZiPbN+/TXSEuiw/m4o=; b=IlDk5x7hmx9w3PLskPG3YU3gurP+70a219v8LwvK3BT+ATEIVOmnQRNHjWHusBNoub WNQgbE3VsmShJ+Wx5VZVlPGX6iSipHr81cmdyqP5s70qLsNq+h7Kiy4WqB1dV9vg8dL8 LU1qkzSVIkZ0sUjomTUTEwm7ACoGldILUpiJFb2bXPm+r7lc4AY1cn2TTld/L6/4Z37S 1uwBGZIZeJD74N/crTZQqlcPFvz3LuP/TUghaPzGkVa1VTxBE0+/5nrWWgRe5bERldtF HkknQJ4CHS4CeIf2SUvq/eKVRiRYi6QfaE11rtc3Mw4OGyTMpvZ9FxTVbQQ8ZyXA2LjE bLtw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532tkfIAjFXO0jualC6vlhfO6yf3MiQty/gzNzKhkt0W0U1L+BJV VpA0/0ZqdCAq1RbwN//5t4Q= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwt63BDI/tVWBgZiJuF8Ge5LwXsx0bVbHMtuJ4w0nreBd7GDWTDG/6V0lSNlXAsX/p8KnUUHQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:2026:: with SMTP id ay6mr18499488edb.202.1638963484371; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:04 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:03 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 04/18] tcp: md5: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:19 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This chunk of code is identical between the implementation of TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO so rename and refactor Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 6cc2eeb45deb..1a0513b0ead0 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1688,11 +1688,11 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void); static inline void tcp_put_md5sig_pool(void) { local_bh_enable(); } -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *, const struct sk_buff *, +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(struct ahash_request *, const struct sk_buff *, unsigned int header_len); int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key); /* From tcp_fastopen.c */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 022811dd705d..8e6cbb5a1da7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4400,16 +4400,31 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void) local_bh_enable(); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_md5sig_pool); -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, +int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) +{ + u8 keylen = READ_ONCE(key->keylen); /* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ + struct scatterlist sg; + + sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen); + ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL, keylen); + + /* We use data_race() because tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */ + return data_race(crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); +#endif /* CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(struct ahash_request *req, const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int header_len) { struct scatterlist sg; const struct tcphdr *tp = tcp_hdr(skb); - struct ahash_request *req = hp->md5_req; unsigned int i; const unsigned int head_data_len = skb_headlen(skb) > header_len ? skb_headlen(skb) - header_len : 0; const struct skb_shared_info *shi = skb_shinfo(skb); struct sk_buff *frag_iter; @@ -4432,31 +4447,18 @@ int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, if (crypto_ahash_update(req)) return 1; } skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, frag_iter, 0)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(req, frag_iter, 0)) return 1; return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_sig_hash_skb_data); -int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) -{ - u8 keylen = READ_ONCE(key->keylen); /* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ - struct scatterlist sg; - - sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen); - ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL, keylen); - - /* We use data_race() because tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */ - return data_race(crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); - -#endif +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) */ void tcp_done(struct sock *sk) { struct request_sock *req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 0aa5122b29e0..91cad11db32e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1381,11 +1381,11 @@ int tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, if (crypto_ahash_init(req)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_v4_md5_hash_headers(hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff << 2)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key)) goto clear_hash; ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, md5_hash, 0); if (crypto_ahash_final(req)) diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 3b7d6ede1364..e98fc6f12c61 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -750,11 +750,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, if (crypto_ahash_init(req)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_v6_md5_hash_headers(hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff << 2)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key)) goto clear_hash; ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, md5_hash, 0); if (crypto_ahash_final(req)) From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:20 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522311 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1695C433EF for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232810AbhLHLl5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:57 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57508 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232621AbhLHLlj (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:39 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9319AC061746; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:07 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id o20so7316320eds.10; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:07 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=dAbVM5/BoNe1vEnajlCw7z2bI1EoKRGeD7c1mrofev8=; b=oSh+lp9sTNDFS8q+zY7PI5caeiVP7hAZwiP+LY/nAwlo/KLI70xjh3VPA02LndKhPD cKPELX7WJSxlRYYZ0D5aYMtUNrfedOTFG8yG+fncEoAIx+Wtv94dk4wSZQpOrNq5J4gL b7aF4RddS9b0hre6wOpyO3g1QVPbR0jTHX1/F/OkRU7vqvQBMpKSRA+dSOZowLIF9Jkw DZsUyzPXUImvNZ9QlTAJgShqMRPM2vZENTWwFOTAG6za6MT4brN4DhTYROCJWCnBK1Zx l0A3BUe0GRXGuRvRUxhSJoGFHxx/AbifNTvVREBhy/Dk2uYrcHoG0vy5rfVCDR1Xwi2k X21A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=dAbVM5/BoNe1vEnajlCw7z2bI1EoKRGeD7c1mrofev8=; b=vZg0eD5xTderIz4QV229Jh4epDQOtmNwsOCp34THVE3t2m0nAWXSnnd0Vp/S1M6Fjz guTsaDqtqxHofVFOzm/ct0wDDpCy94h87w6dkGSG00sZcPMg12nkvzKcygMxDvVwq17g VkENoq/qwjQ210u7z1tEedDPv22D03DtbbLx91ZWcZ7cPVUEheBBMD48r1519d21uU9o uY7z915Bpewk5e97FF+DaHLEgfGEHLNMIn+mFquPDNpMrMxxss91oyZZMH0z7hXN1aUd lT1z1S6XhMlpl94D683WDBf153VONQKuwW66ftbfTyrsgYBIdDipBn3ixuG8WbUWC0Dd M7IA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5322xuNaLJSK3avncsBiL7lYrRhdlB+LaOtMMjySUT8b1Inc8zjT GH5LaX/40f4a1MxdRC00mzk= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwjsdkrVPRokAvTNVLX/0JFVRO72E4TK6EFb+Xr+xwOovf4AzOMfMIqfGe/g3kWJ9erZ8obNw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:34f:: with SMTP id r15mr18452841edw.80.1638963486124; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:05 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 05/18] tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:20 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Computing tcp authopt packet signatures is a two step process: * traffic key is computed based on tcp 4-tuple, initial sequence numbers and the secret key. * packet mac is computed based on traffic key and content of individual packets. The traffic key could be cached for established sockets but it is not. A single code path exists for ipv4/ipv6 and input/output. This keeps the code short but slightly slower due to lots of conditionals. On output we read remote IP address from socket members on output, we can't use skb network header because it's computed after TCP options. On input we read remote IP address from skb network headers, we can't use socket binding members because those are not available for SYN. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 9 + net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 537 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 5217b6c7c900..ce005f7ce797 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -64,10 +64,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 src_isn; /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; }; +/* TCP authopt as found in header */ +struct tcphdr_authopt { + u8 num; + u8 len; + u8 keyid; + u8 rnextkeyid; + u8 mac[0]; +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 478969d53094..29524ed56733 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -8,10 +8,15 @@ /* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF 20 #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN 20 #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN 12 +struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool { + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; + struct ahash_request *req; +}; + /* Constant data with per-algorithm information from RFC5926 * The "KDF" and "MAC" happen to be the same for both algorithms. */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp { /* Name of algorithm in crypto-api */ @@ -19,14 +24,14 @@ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp { /* One of the TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_* constants from uapi */ u8 alg_id; /* Length of traffic key */ u8 traffic_key_len; - /* shared crypto_shash */ + /* shared crypto_ahash */ struct mutex init_mutex; bool init_done; - struct crypto_shash * __percpu *tfms; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool __percpu *pool; }; static struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp tcp_authopt_alg_list[] = { { .alg_id = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96, @@ -48,59 +53,77 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *tcp_authopt_alg_get(int alg_num) if (alg_num <= 0 || alg_num > 2) return NULL; return &tcp_authopt_alg_list[alg_num - 1]; } +static int tcp_authopt_alg_pool_init(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + pool->tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(pool->tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(pool->tfm); + + pool->req = ahash_request_alloc(pool->tfm, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (IS_ERR(pool->req)) + return PTR_ERR(pool->req); + ahash_request_set_callback(pool->req, 0, NULL, NULL); + + return 0; +} + +static void tcp_authopt_alg_pool_free(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + ahash_request_free(pool->req); + pool->req = NULL; + crypto_free_ahash(pool->tfm); + pool->tfm = NULL; +} + static void __tcp_authopt_alg_free(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) { int cpu; - struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; - if (!alg->tfms) + if (!alg->pool) return; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu); - if (tfm) { - crypto_free_shash(tfm); - *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu) = NULL; - } + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); + tcp_authopt_alg_pool_free(pool); } - free_percpu(alg->tfms); - alg->tfms = NULL; + free_percpu(alg->pool); + alg->pool = NULL; } static int __tcp_authopt_alg_init(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) { - struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; int cpu; int err; BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF < TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(alg->traffic_key_len > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN)) return -ENOBUFS; - alg->tfms = alloc_percpu(struct crypto_shash *); - if (!alg->tfms) + alg->pool = alloc_percpu(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool); + if (!alg->pool) return -ENOMEM; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(alg->alg_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { - err = PTR_ERR(tfm); + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); + err = tcp_authopt_alg_pool_init(alg, pool); + if (err) goto out_err; - } + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); /* sanity checks: */ - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) != alg->traffic_key_len)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) != alg->traffic_key_len)) { err = -EINVAL; goto out_err; } - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF)) { err = -EINVAL; goto out_err; } - - *per_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms, cpu) = tfm; } return 0; out_err: __tcp_authopt_alg_free(alg); @@ -123,42 +146,43 @@ static int tcp_authopt_alg_require(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) out: mutex_unlock(&alg->init_mutex); return err; } -static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) { local_bh_disable(); - return *this_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms); + return this_cpu_ptr(alg->pool); } -static void tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, struct crypto_shash *tfm) +static void tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) { - WARN_ON(tfm != *this_cpu_ptr(alg->tfms)); + WARN_ON(pool != this_cpu_ptr(alg->pool)); local_bh_enable(); } -static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_get_kdf_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { - return tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(key->alg); + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); } -static void tcp_authopt_put_kdf_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, - struct crypto_shash *tfm) +static void tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) { - return tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(key->alg, tfm); + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); } -static struct crypto_shash *tcp_authopt_get_mac_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { - return tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm(key->alg); + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); } -static void tcp_authopt_put_mac_shash(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, - struct crypto_shash *tfm) +static void tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) { - return tcp_authopt_alg_put_tfm(key->alg, tfm); + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); } /* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, struct sockaddr_storage *a2) @@ -425,5 +449,446 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); return 0; } + +static int tcp_authopt_get_isn(struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int input, + __be32 *sisn, + __be32 *disn) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + + /* Special cases for SYN and SYN/ACK */ + if (th->syn && !th->ack) { + *sisn = th->seq; + *disn = 0; + return 0; + } + if (th->syn && th->ack) { + *sisn = th->seq; + *disn = htonl(ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1); + return 0; + } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk = (struct tcp_request_sock *)sk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(!input, "Caller passed wrong socket")) + return -EINVAL; + *sisn = htonl(rsk->rcv_isn); + *disn = htonl(rsk->snt_isn); + return 0; + } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + /* Signature computation for non-syn packet on a listen + * socket is not possible because we lack the initial + * sequence numbers. + * + * Input segments that are not matched by any request, + * established or timewait socket will get here. These + * are not normally sent by peers. + * + * Their signature might be valid but we don't have + * enough state to determine that. TCP-MD5 can attempt + * to validate and reply with a signed RST because it + * doesn't care about ISNs. + * + * Reporting an error from signature code causes the + * packet to be discarded which is good. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(!input, "Caller passed wrong socket")) + return -EINVAL; + *sisn = 0; + *disn = 0; + return 0; + } + if (WARN_ONCE(!info, "caller did not pass tcp_authopt_info\n")) + return -EINVAL; + /* Initial sequence numbers for ESTABLISHED connections from info */ + if (input) { + *sisn = htonl(info->dst_isn); + *disn = htonl(info->src_isn); + } else { + *sisn = htonl(info->src_isn); + *disn = htonl(info->dst_isn); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Feed one buffer into ahash + * The buffer is assumed to be DMA-able + */ +static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) +{ + struct scatterlist sg; + + sg_init_one(&sg, buf, len); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len); + + return crypto_ahash_update(req); +} + +/* feed traffic key into ahash */ +static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + bool ipv6) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + int err; + __be32 sisn, disn; + __be16 digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8); + + // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Addresses from packet on input and from sk_common on output + * This is because on output MAC is computed before prepending IP header + */ + if (input) { + if (ipv6) + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, 32); + else + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, 8); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + if (ipv6) { + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, 16); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_daddr, 16); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_rcv_saddr, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_daddr, 4); + if (err) + return err; + } + } + + /* TCP ports from header */ + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&th->source, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = tcp_authopt_get_isn(sk, info, skb, input, &sisn, &disn); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sisn, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&disn, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&digestbits, 2); + if (err) + return err; + + return 0; +} + +/* Convert a variable-length key to a 16-byte fixed-length key for AES-CMAC + * This is described in RFC5926 section 3.1.1.2 + */ +static int aes_setkey_derived(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, struct ahash_request *req, + u8 *key, size_t keylen) +{ + static const u8 zeros[16] = {0}; + struct scatterlist sg; + u8 derived_key[16]; + int err; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) != sizeof(derived_key))) + return -EINVAL; + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, zeros, sizeof(zeros)); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_init(req); + if (err) + return err; + sg_init_one(&sg, key, keylen); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, derived_key, keylen); + err = crypto_ahash_digest(req); + if (err) + return err; + return crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key)); +} + +static int tcp_authopt_setkey(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + if (key->alg_id == TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 && key->keylen != 16) + return aes_setkey_derived(pool->tfm, pool->req, key->key, key->keylen); + else + return crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, key->key, key->keylen); +} + +static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + bool ipv6, + u8 *traffic_key) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + int err; + + pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + + err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(pool, sk, skb, info, input, ipv6); + if (err) + goto out; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); + return err; +} + +static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len) +{ + u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0}; + int buflen, err; + + /* In practice this is always called with len exactly 12. + * Even on input we drop unusual signature sizes early. + */ + while (len) { + buflen = min_t(int, len, sizeof(zeros)); + err = crypto_ahash_buf(req, zeros, buflen); + if (err) + return err; + len -= buflen; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + int nbytes) +{ + struct tcp4_pseudohdr phdr = { + .saddr = saddr, + .daddr = daddr, + .pad = 0, + .protocol = IPPROTO_TCP, + .len = htons(nbytes) + }; + return crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&phdr, sizeof(phdr)); +} + +static int tcp_authopt_hash_tcp6_pseudoheader(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct in6_addr *saddr, + struct in6_addr *daddr, + u32 plen) +{ + int err; + __be32 buf[2]; + + buf[0] = htonl(plen); + buf[1] = htonl(IPPROTO_TCP); + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)saddr, sizeof(*saddr)); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)daddr, sizeof(*daddr)); + if (err) + return err; + return crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +/** Hash tcphdr options. + * + * If include_options is false then only the TCPOPT_AUTHOPT option itself is hashed + * Point to AO inside TH is passed by the caller + */ +static int tcp_authopt_hash_opts(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct tcphdr *th, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + bool include_options) +{ + int err; + /* start of options */ + u8 *tcp_opts = (u8 *)(th + 1); + /* start of options */ + u8 *aobuf = (u8 *)aoptr; + u8 aolen = aoptr->len; + + if (WARN_ONCE(aoptr->num != TCPOPT_AUTHOPT, "Bad aoptr\n")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (include_options) { + /* end of options */ + u8 *tcp_data = ((u8 *)th) + th->doff * 4; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, tcp_opts, aobuf - tcp_opts + 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf_zero(pool->req, aolen - 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, aobuf + aolen, tcp_data - (aobuf + aolen)); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, aobuf, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf_zero(pool->req, aolen - 4); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + bool input, + bool ipv6, + bool include_options, + u8 *macbuf) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + int err; + + /* NOTE: SNE unimplemented */ + __be32 sne = 0; + + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4); + if (err) + return err; + + if (ipv6) { + struct in6_addr *saddr; + struct in6_addr *daddr; + + if (input) { + saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; + daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; + } else { + saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr; + daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr; + } + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp6_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, skb->len); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; + + if (input) { + saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; + daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr; + } else { + saddr = sk->sk_rcv_saddr; + daddr = sk->sk_daddr; + } + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, skb->len); + if (err) + return err; + } + + // TCP header with checksum set to zero + { + struct tcphdr hashed_th = *th; + + hashed_th.check = 0; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&hashed_th, sizeof(hashed_th)); + if (err) + return err; + } + + // TCP options + err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, aoptr, include_options); + if (err) + return err; + + // Rest of SKB->data + err = tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(pool->req, skb, th->doff << 2); + if (err) + return err; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0); + return crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); +} + +/* __tcp_authopt_calc_mac - Compute packet MAC using key + * + * The macbuf output buffer must be large enough to fit the digestsize of the + * underlying transform before truncation. + * This means TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF, not TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN + */ +static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + char *macbuf) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *mac_pool; + u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; + int err; + bool ipv6 = (sk->sk_family != AF_INET); + + if (sk->sk_family != AF_INET && sk->sk_family != AF_INET6) + return -EINVAL; + + err = tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(sk, skb, key, info, input, ipv6, traffic_key); + if (err) + return err; + + mac_pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(mac_pool)) + return PTR_ERR(mac_pool); + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(mac_pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(mac_pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = tcp_authopt_hash_packet(mac_pool, + sk, + skb, + aoptr, + input, + ipv6, + !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS), + macbuf); + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, mac_pool); + return err; +} From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:21 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522613 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31260C4332F for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232911AbhLHLmD (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:03 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57518 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232640AbhLHLll (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:41 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52d.google.com (mail-ed1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CDD8CC0617A1; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:09 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id e3so7426853edu.4; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:09 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=YZNyChfBjToCr3PKbP7XSduxKfzTp3KJ+feqHq2+354=; b=XBe9rlSA9Viyqn09a2brlN2ZHv+bc5XJUBb9zZ8qTu0ENs5/NVarvA0C9BYRF0UzU4 x/OHVde/ctXAYxWdlPCXjDRQuHqN7t9tsC3p5Kz8Cn4t3eB5HQciqxvOUiqdAT+gxYDd U6tS8wLG7mQ1L/SijIFV8cMGlV4JmYsgBSLbyaqEsxcYQcxXm4rbi1i6uYh6cfesLQGF lZz6Ad2Q02Mq3TFYpAWg9A340Fog3Mu10E4Bm/ORUWRMQWmSs1GQRlJqkpY2M3X9nzh9 c72rBBWLaIZKj5NUmD5V7ut3zP2PBvHivPXsBE487zgUP+y4Hn3NVSgXG9DjW56OfK1C FmuQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=YZNyChfBjToCr3PKbP7XSduxKfzTp3KJ+feqHq2+354=; b=IeWRRya+ZvuqvehSWbfRAapvkjjG3+E18XUGS4bZPWVcVn9Q+17B/SBY87XdiPIam4 aBONBB9DT8XQNk5sFr23XAuqj92uaZquKs/2mEyWtdFudNbr6KkXieqo28Nrgj2rLThK RCF13WOEmOPgW42OYQO0roW4/+ByvRCPGvtgJ58dZ/oz9sxxcDjV2pbwVD4y5mR+iMkA tCGZZ/TvBejLj0D+VKdUn4r1FLBJ2370xINqgFbN3362l0Uv+2ZJeypIJWkjStWuuONJ y7osyatr29RD1Uk2UJP6+PZE7gWqNPNqDFeEZb2YMs41enpBe0foWHgQ6a9/RNIFFpcn z/Hg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533k2hXvY58yqfcRm9gXCEtADWiHLpkSm+4Hap8uDzgoZUSK40G6 hq1pXzAGdjn2sjBU1PtFMwQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxHZnroQFqzRJTwyyGPDH7rJx4mTjRCTp7OJXI6iTQUnBNAL9JBhTsss19Krt2DHdcWjPeu1g== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:348c:: with SMTP id v12mr18498622edc.170.1638963487932; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:07 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 06/18] tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:21 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The tcp_authopt features exposes a minimal interface to the rest of the TCP stack. Only a few functions are exposed and if the feature is disabled they return neutral values, avoiding ifdefs in the rest of the code. This approach is different from MD5. There very few interactions with MD5 but tcp_parse_md5sig_option was modifed to parse AO and MD5 simultaneously. If both are present the packet is droppped as required by RFC5925. Add calls into tcp authopt from send, receive and accept code. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp.h | 24 +++- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 135 ++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 293 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 40 ++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 50 ++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 12 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 85 ++++++++++- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 49 ++++++- 10 files changed, 665 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 1a0513b0ead0..eed4bbfdca78 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -422,11 +422,33 @@ int tcp_mmap(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, struct vm_area_struct *vma); #endif void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx, int estab, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc); -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th); +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) +int tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, + const u8 **md5ptr, + const u8 **aoptr); +#else +static inline int tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, + const u8 **md5ptr, + const u8 **aoptr) +{ + aoptr = NULL; + md5ptr = NULL; + return 0; +} +#endif +static inline const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th) +{ + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(th, &md5, &ao); + + return (md5 && !ao && !ret) ? md5 : NULL; +} /* * BPF SKB-less helpers */ u16 tcp_v4_get_syncookie(struct sock *sk, struct iphdr *iph, diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index ce005f7ce797..fb07394de261 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -74,28 +74,163 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { u8 rnextkeyid; u8 mac[0]; }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); +#define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) + +void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key( + const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + u8 *rnextkeyid); +static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( + const struct sock *sk, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info **info, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); + + if (*info) + return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid); + } + return NULL; +} +int tcp_authopt_hash( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req); +static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq( + struct sock *newsk, + const struct sock *oldsk, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + if (!rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(oldsk)->authopt_info)) + return 0; + else + return __tcp_authopt_openreq(newsk, oldsk, req); +} +void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info); +static inline void tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(sk, skb, info); + } +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( + struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, + struct tcp_sock *tp) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + /* Transfer ownership of authopt_info to the twsk + * This requires no other users of the origin sock. + */ + sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp); + tcptw->tw_authopt_info = tp->authopt_info; + tp->authopt_info = NULL; + } else { + tcptw->tw_authopt_info = NULL; + } +} +/** tcp_authopt_inbound_check - check for valid TCP-AO signature. + * + * Return negative ERRNO on error, 0 if not present and 1 if present and valid. + * + * If the AO signature is present and valid then caller skips MD5 check. + */ +int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check( + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const u8 *opt); +static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *opt) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + struct tcp_authopt_info *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); + + if (info) + return __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(sk, skb, info, opt); + } + return 0; +} +static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *skb, + const u8 *opt) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + struct sock *lsk = req->rsk_listener; + struct tcp_authopt_info *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(lsk)->authopt_info); + + if (info) + return __tcp_authopt_inbound_check((struct sock *)req, skb, info, opt); + } + return 0; +} #else static inline int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { return -ENOPROTOOPT; } static inline int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key) { return -ENOPROTOOPT; } +static inline void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info) +{ +} static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) { } static inline int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { return -ENOPROTOOPT; } +static inline int tcp_authopt_hash( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_key *info, + struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, + const struct sock *oldsk, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( + struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, + struct tcp_sock *tp) +{ +} +static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *opt) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(struct request_sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + const u8 *opt) +{ + return 0; +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h index 904909d020e2..1d96030889a1 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h @@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ enum LINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH, /* TCPDuplicateDataRehash */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS, /* TCPDSACKRecvSegs */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS, /* TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS, /* TCPMigrateReqSuccess */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE, /* TCPMigrateReqFailure */ + LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE, /* TCPAuthOptFailure */ __LINUX_MIB_MAX }; /* linux Xfrm mib definitions */ enum diff --git a/net/ipv4/proc.c b/net/ipv4/proc.c index f30273afb539..70f7a8a47045 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/proc.c +++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c @@ -295,10 +295,11 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_list[] = { SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TcpDuplicateDataRehash", LINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPDSACKRecvSegs", LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious", LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPMigrateReqSuccess", LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPMigrateReqFailure", LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPAuthOptFailure", LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE), SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL }; static void icmpmsg_put_line(struct seq_file *seq, unsigned long *vals, unsigned short *type, int count) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 29524ed56733..dd9b89b1f137 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -3,10 +3,14 @@ #include #include #include #include +/* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); + /* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF 20 #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN 20 #define TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN 12 @@ -214,10 +218,55 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, return false; return true; } +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; + struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + + if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) { + struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + + return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) { + struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + + return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + } + + /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses + * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. + */ + return false; +} + +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + const struct sock *addr_sk) +{ + u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; + + /* This probably can't happen even with ipv4-mapped-ipv6 */ + if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) + return false; + + if (keyaf == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + + return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + + return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + } + + return false; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; @@ -227,10 +276,50 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + int send_id) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { + if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) + continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) + continue; + if (result && net_ratelimit()) + pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); + result = key; + } + + return result; +} + +/** + * __tcp_authopt_select_key - select key for sending + * + * @sk: socket + * @info: socket's tcp_authopt_info + * @addr_sk: socket used for address lookup. Same as sk except for synack case + * @rnextkeyid: value of rnextkeyid caller should write in packet + * + * Result is protected by RCU and can't be stored, it may only be passed to + * tcp_authopt_hash and only under a single rcu_read_lock. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); +} + static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -240,10 +329,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); if (!info) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + /* Never released: */ + static_branch_inc(&tcp_authopt_needed_key); sk_gso_disable(sk); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&info->head); rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info); return info; @@ -528,10 +619,71 @@ static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len); return crypto_ahash_update(req); } +static int tcp_authopt_clone_keys(struct sock *newsk, + const struct sock *oldsk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *new_info, + struct tcp_authopt_info *old_info) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old_key; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *new_key; + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(old_key, &old_info->head, node, lockdep_sock_is_held(oldsk)) { + new_key = sock_kmalloc(newsk, sizeof(*new_key), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_key) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(new_key, old_key, sizeof(*new_key)); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&new_key->node, &new_info->head); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Called to create accepted sockets. + * + * Need to copy authopt info from listen socket. + */ +int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *old_info; + struct tcp_authopt_info *new_info; + int err; + + old_info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(oldsk)->authopt_info); + if (!old_info) + return 0; + + /* Clear value copies from oldsk: */ + rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_sk(newsk)->authopt_info, NULL); + + new_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_info), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_info) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_info->src_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn; + new_info->dst_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn; + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&new_info->head); + err = tcp_authopt_clone_keys(newsk, oldsk, new_info, old_info); + if (err) { + tcp_authopt_free(newsk, new_info); + return err; + } + sk_gso_disable(newsk); + rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_sk(newsk)->authopt_info, new_info); + + return 0; +} + +void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info) +{ + info->src_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->ack_seq) - 1; + info->dst_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->seq); +} + /* feed traffic key into ahash */ static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, @@ -768,10 +920,11 @@ static int tcp_authopt_hash_opts(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, bool input, bool ipv6, bool include_options, u8 *macbuf) { @@ -881,14 +1034,154 @@ static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, err = tcp_authopt_hash_packet(mac_pool, sk, skb, aoptr, + info, input, ipv6, !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS), macbuf); out: tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, mac_pool); return err; } + +/* tcp_authopt_hash - fill in the mac + * + * The key must come from tcp_authopt_select_key. + */ +int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + /* MAC inside option is truncated to 12 bytes but crypto API needs output + * buffer to be large enough so we use a buffer on the stack. + */ + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + int err; + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr = (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4); + + err = __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(sk, skb, aoptr, key, info, false, macbuf); + if (err) + goto fail; + memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + + return 0; + +fail: + /* If mac calculation fails and caller doesn't handle the error + * try to make it obvious inside the packet. + */ + memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + return err; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + int recv_id, + bool *anykey) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + *anykey = false; + /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && + !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) + continue; + *anykey = true; + if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) + continue; + if (!result) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); + } + + return result; +} + +/* Show a rate-limited message for authentication fail */ +static void print_tcpao_notice(const char *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)skb_transport_header(skb); + + if (iph->version == 4) { + net_info_ratelimited("%s (%pI4, %d)->(%pI4, %d)\n", msg, + &iph->saddr, ntohs(th->source), + &iph->daddr, ntohs(th->dest)); + } else if (iph->version == 6) { + struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + + net_info_ratelimited("%s (%pI6, %d)->(%pI6, %d)\n", msg, + &ip6h->saddr, ntohs(th->source), + &ip6h->daddr, ntohs(th->dest)); + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "%s unknown IP version\n", msg); + } +} + +int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const u8 *_opt) +{ + struct tcphdr_authopt *opt = (struct tcphdr_authopt *)_opt; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + bool anykey; + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + int err; + + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(sk, skb, info, opt ? opt->keyid : -1, &anykey); + + /* nothing found or expected */ + if (!opt && !key) + return 0; + if (!opt && key) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Missing", skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (opt && !anykey) { + /* RFC5925 Section 7.3: + * A TCP-AO implementation MUST allow for configuration of the behavior + * of segments with TCP-AO but that do not match an MKT. The initial + * default of this configuration SHOULD be to silently accept such + * connections. + */ + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Rejected", skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Accepted", skb); + return 0; + } + if (opt && !key) { + /* Keys are configured for peer but with different keyid than packet */ + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* bad inbound key len */ + if (opt->len != TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT) + return -EINVAL; + + err = __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(sk, skb, opt, key, info, true, macbuf); + if (err) + return err; + + if (memcmp(macbuf, opt->mac, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN)) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 3658b9c3dd2b..4c9e403971fb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -4173,43 +4174,60 @@ static bool tcp_fast_parse_options(const struct net *net, tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tp->tsoffset; return true; } -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) /* - * Parse MD5 Signature option + * Parse MD5 and AO options + * + * md5ptr: pointer to content of MD5 option (16-byte hash) + * aoptr: pointer to start of AO option (variable length) */ -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th) +int tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, const u8 **md5ptr, const u8 **aoptr) { int length = (th->doff << 2) - sizeof(*th); const u8 *ptr = (const u8 *)(th + 1); + *md5ptr = NULL; + *aoptr = NULL; + /* If not enough data remaining, we can short cut */ - while (length >= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) { + while (length >= 4) { int opcode = *ptr++; int opsize; switch (opcode) { case TCPOPT_EOL: - return NULL; + goto out; case TCPOPT_NOP: length--; continue; default: opsize = *ptr++; if (opsize < 2 || opsize > length) - return NULL; - if (opcode == TCPOPT_MD5SIG) - return opsize == TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ? ptr : NULL; + goto out; + if (opcode == TCPOPT_MD5SIG && opsize == TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) + *md5ptr = ptr; + if (opcode == TCPOPT_AUTHOPT) + *aoptr = ptr - 2; } ptr += opsize - 2; length -= opsize; } - return NULL; + +out: + /* RFC5925 2.2: An endpoint MUST NOT use TCP-AO for the same connection + * in which TCP MD5 is used. When both options appear, TCP MUST silently + * discard the segment. + */ + if (*md5ptr && *aoptr) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_parse_md5sig_option); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_parse_sig_options); #endif /* Sorry, PAWS as specified is broken wrt. pure-ACKs -DaveM * * It is not fatal. If this ACK does _not_ change critical state (seqs, window) @@ -5992,10 +6010,12 @@ void tcp_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = tcp_jiffies32; + tcp_authopt_finish_connect(sk, skb); + if (skb) { icsk->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set(sk, skb); security_inet_conn_established(sk, skb); sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 91cad11db32e..b16f263c3121 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1405,22 +1405,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb); #endif /* Called with rcu_read_lock() */ static bool tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, - int dif, int sdif) + int dif, int sdif, + const u8 *hash_location) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG /* - * This gets called for each TCP segment that arrives - * so we want to be efficient. * We have 3 drop cases: * o No MD5 hash and one expected. * o MD5 hash and we're not expecting one. * o MD5 hash and its wrong. */ - const __u8 *hash_location = NULL; struct tcp_md5sig_key *hash_expected; const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); const union tcp_md5_addr *addr; unsigned char newhash[16]; @@ -1431,11 +1429,10 @@ static bool tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, */ l3index = sdif ? dif : 0; addr = (union tcp_md5_addr *)&iph->saddr; hash_expected = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, l3index, addr, AF_INET); - hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); /* We've parsed the options - do we have a hash? */ if (!hash_expected && !hash_location) return false; @@ -1954,10 +1951,49 @@ static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0; TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp = skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp; } +static int tcp_v4_sig_check(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int dif, + int sdif) +{ + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = tcp_authopt_inbound_check(sk, skb, ao); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 1) + return 0; + return tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif, md5); +} + +static int tcp_v4_sig_check_req(struct request_sock *req, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int dif, + int sdif) +{ + struct sock *lsk = req->rsk_listener; + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(req, skb, ao); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 1) + return 0; + return tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(lsk, skb, dif, sdif, md5); +} + /* * From tcp_input.c */ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -2011,11 +2047,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); bool req_stolen = false; struct sock *nsk; sk = req->rsk_listener; - if (unlikely(tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif))) { + if (unlikely(tcp_v4_sig_check_req(req, skb, dif, sdif))) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { @@ -2081,11 +2117,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) } if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; - if (tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif)) + if (tcp_v4_sig_check(sk, skb, dif, sdif)) goto discard_and_relse; nf_reset_ct(skb); if (tcp_filter(sk, skb)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index cf913a66df17..19f749b60231 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -18,10 +18,11 @@ * Arnt Gulbrandsen, * Jorge Cwik, */ #include +#include #include #include static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win) { @@ -300,10 +301,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo) BUG_ON(tcptw->tw_md5_key && !tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool()); } } } while (0); #endif + tcp_authopt_time_wait(tcptw, tcp_sk(sk)); /* Get the TIME_WAIT timeout firing. */ if (timeo < rto) timeo = rto; @@ -342,10 +344,19 @@ void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk) if (twsk->tw_md5_key) kfree_rcu(twsk->tw_md5_key, rcu); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + struct tcp_timewait_sock *twsk = tcp_twsk(sk); + + /* twsk only contains sock_common so pass NULL as sk. */ + if (twsk->tw_authopt_info) + tcp_authopt_free(NULL, twsk->tw_authopt_info); + } +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor); /* Warning : This function is called without sk_listener being locked. * Be sure to read socket fields once, as their value could change under us. @@ -532,10 +543,11 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk, #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG newtp->md5sig_info = NULL; /*XXX*/ if (newtp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, newsk)) newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; #endif + tcp_authopt_openreq(newsk, sk, req); if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len) newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len; newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss; tcp_ecn_openreq_child(newtp, req); newtp->fastopen_req = NULL; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 5079832af5c1..b959e8b949b6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "TCP: " fmt #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -410,10 +411,11 @@ static inline bool tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp) #define OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE BIT(0) #define OPTION_TS BIT(1) #define OPTION_MD5 BIT(2) #define OPTION_WSCALE BIT(3) +#define OPTION_AUTHOPT BIT(4) #define OPTION_FAST_OPEN_COOKIE BIT(8) #define OPTION_SMC BIT(9) #define OPTION_MPTCP BIT(10) static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options) @@ -434,16 +436,22 @@ static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options) struct tcp_out_options { u16 options; /* bit field of OPTION_* */ u16 mss; /* 0 to disable */ u8 ws; /* window scale, 0 to disable */ u8 num_sack_blocks; /* number of SACK blocks to include */ - u8 hash_size; /* bytes in hash_location */ u8 bpf_opt_len; /* length of BPF hdr option */ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + u8 authopt_rnextkeyid; /* rnextkey */ +#endif __u8 *hash_location; /* temporary pointer, overloaded */ __u32 tsval, tsecr; /* need to include OPTION_TS */ struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *fastopen_cookie; /* Fast open cookie */ struct mptcp_out_options mptcp; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *authopt_info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *authopt_key; +#endif }; static void mptcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, const struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_out_options *opts) { @@ -616,10 +624,25 @@ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp, /* overload cookie hash location */ opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)ptr; ptr += 4; } +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (unlikely(OPTION_AUTHOPT & options)) { + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = opts->authopt_key; + + WARN_ON(!key); + *ptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | + (key->send_id << 8) | + opts->authopt_rnextkeyid); + /* overload cookie hash location */ + opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)(ptr + 1); + ptr += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT / 4; + } +#endif + if (unlikely(opts->mss)) { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_MSS << 24) | (TCPOLEN_MSS << 16) | opts->mss); } @@ -751,10 +774,28 @@ static void mptcp_set_option_cond(const struct request_sock *req, } } } } +static int tcp_authopt_init_options(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + struct tcp_out_options *opts) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + key = tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, addr_sk, &opts->authopt_info, &opts->authopt_rnextkeyid); + if (key) { + opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT; + opts->authopt_key = key; + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + /* Compute TCP options for SYN packets. This is not the final * network wire format yet. */ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_out_options *opts, @@ -763,12 +804,15 @@ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); unsigned int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen = tp->fastopen_req; *md5 = NULL; + + remaining -= tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, sk, opts); #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed) && + !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT) && rcu_access_pointer(tp->md5sig_info)) { *md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk); if (*md5) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; remaining -= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; @@ -847,12 +891,13 @@ static unsigned int tcp_synack_options(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *syn_skb) { struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); unsigned int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; + remaining -= tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, req_to_sk(req), opts); #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG - if (md5) { + if (md5 && !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT)) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; remaining -= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; /* We can't fit any SACK blocks in a packet with MD5 + TS * options. There was discussion about disabling SACK @@ -918,13 +963,15 @@ static unsigned int tcp_established_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb unsigned int size = 0; unsigned int eff_sacks; opts->options = 0; + size += tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, sk, opts); *md5 = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed) && + !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT) && rcu_access_pointer(tp->md5sig_info)) { *md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk); if (*md5) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; size += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; @@ -1274,10 +1321,14 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, inet = inet_sk(sk); tcb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb); memset(&opts, 0, sizeof(opts)); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* for tcp_authopt_init_options inside tcp_syn_options or tcp_established_options */ + rcu_read_lock(); +#endif if (unlikely(tcb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) { tcp_options_size = tcp_syn_options(sk, skb, &opts, &md5); } else { tcp_options_size = tcp_established_options(sk, skb, &opts, &md5); @@ -1362,10 +1413,17 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, sk_gso_disable(sk); tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, sk, skb); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (opts.authopt_key) { + sk_gso_disable(sk); + tcp_authopt_hash(opts.hash_location, opts.authopt_key, opts.authopt_info, sk, skb); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif /* BPF prog is the last one writing header option */ bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt(sk, skb, NULL, NULL, 0, &opts); INDIRECT_CALL_INET(icsk->icsk_af_ops->send_check, @@ -1831,12 +1889,21 @@ unsigned int tcp_current_mss(struct sock *sk) u32 mtu = dst_mtu(dst); if (mtu != inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie) mss_now = tcp_sync_mss(sk, mtu); } +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Even if the result is not used rcu_read_lock is required when scanning for + * tcp authentication keys. Otherwise lockdep will complain. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); +#endif header_len = tcp_established_options(sk, NULL, &opts, &md5) + sizeof(struct tcphdr); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif /* The mss_cache is sized based on tp->tcp_header_len, which assumes * some common options. If this is an odd packet (because we have SACK * blocks etc) then our calculated header_len will be different, and * we have to adjust mss_now correspondingly */ if (header_len != tp->tcp_header_len) { @@ -3551,10 +3618,14 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, } #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG rcu_read_lock(); md5 = tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->req_md5_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req)); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* for tcp_authopt_init_options inside tcp_synack_options */ + rcu_read_lock(); #endif skb_set_hash(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->txhash, PKT_HASH_TYPE_L4); /* bpf program will be interested in the tcp_flags */ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_ACK; tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(sk, req, mss, skb, &opts, md5, @@ -3588,10 +3659,20 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, if (md5) tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, req_to_sk(req), skb); rcu_read_unlock(); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* If signature fails we do nothing */ + if (opts.authopt_key) + tcp_authopt_hash(opts.hash_location, + opts.authopt_key, + opts.authopt_info, + req_to_sk(req), + skb); + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt((struct sock *)sk, skb, req, syn_skb, synack_type, &opts); skb->skb_mstamp_ns = now; diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index e98fc6f12c61..3105a367d6b5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -772,14 +773,14 @@ static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, #endif static bool tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, - int dif, int sdif) + int dif, int sdif, + const u8 *hash_location) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG - const __u8 *hash_location = NULL; struct tcp_md5sig_key *hash_expected; const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); int genhash, l3index; u8 newhash[16]; @@ -788,11 +789,10 @@ static bool tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, * in an L3 domain and dif is set to the l3mdev */ l3index = sdif ? dif : 0; hash_expected = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &ip6h->saddr, l3index); - hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); /* We've parsed the options - do we have a hash? */ if (!hash_expected && !hash_location) return false; @@ -1619,10 +1619,49 @@ static void tcp_v6_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct ipv6hdr *hdr, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0; TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp = skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp; } +static int tcp_v6_sig_check(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int dif, + int sdif) +{ + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = tcp_authopt_inbound_check(sk, skb, ao); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 1) + return 0; + return tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif, md5); +} + +static int tcp_v6_sig_check_req(struct request_sock *req, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int dif, + int sdif) +{ + struct sock *lsk = req->rsk_listener; + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(req, skb, ao); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 1) + return 0; + return tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(lsk, skb, dif, sdif, md5); +} + INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { int sdif = inet6_sdif(skb); int dif = inet6_iif(skb); const struct tcphdr *th; @@ -1671,11 +1710,11 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); bool req_stolen = false; struct sock *nsk; sk = req->rsk_listener; - if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif)) { + if (tcp_v6_sig_check_req(req, skb, dif, sdif)) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { @@ -1738,11 +1777,11 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) } if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; - if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, dif, sdif)) + if (tcp_v6_sig_check(sk, skb, dif, sdif)) goto discard_and_relse; if (tcp_filter(sk, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:22 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522310 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6446AC433F5 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:38:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231303AbhLHLmN (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:13 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57578 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232793AbhLHLl5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:41:57 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x529.google.com (mail-ed1-x529.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::529]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BBC60C061B38; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:11 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x529.google.com with SMTP id g14so7309798edb.8; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:11 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=/nKtrVl1ulxtM0X5OR++FSx2yZEXv1NekgqTYAyFFhY=; b=ILngOXr0KdkP7LyAG3WEg39yGNt/nULfis1G4xzdFE7tFqTBgBD0Y+OoZ1kDYZmQjm WFTxQS4IZ99RXC6xjFYAX06lbEf1PSHtgBrn614xFA3YTKF6Wla/lvW9OY90FDmwp6jv 7YH9j45ZkYEkVbFnOv0+8VHM6TJSXzB4gESGRMq6dyG7jV5++luImRvVD+xYFA+EkoIt ZckbW6qlHU9AZmNobgWWJ87hmnwQTvrsL9OYCjgwoDoeBnEgvkqHaQ3kRQtN81JjrkUO k5hcwgvtt4+SwNJpZeY2zZb4WjNiYFuPAHKQWlREEqQeDZ4RHLcqLYfE8865AaX8pZqf ZzuQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=/nKtrVl1ulxtM0X5OR++FSx2yZEXv1NekgqTYAyFFhY=; b=hR83xZQi6L2W2c04axMYJBuAjeZkjl0vKJAYML1PKlK26vd8ui0fiZ/DyVfNoHsH5v 9tcKkP/m4G4HmrS+7iN/zQu0IjKBkkmdCUkh9nAtEloT9ZT14MvSqP8zwTbro95YqVqd 0ivPdIbCbxJbuqKEIDxS4nUmIyDCsriI5SgWlhO6zvd91DmaF8iJwp5V+K/cJpFA9k8y w5bSNgu3P1pa8U8/ZDkUqPb5pd82X+IOGAjUnDxEFSdDjQhfgaOvYJbSrbgS2gN6qf8V x+3YA8F85nNzK+4umcnbfVr8tRCJbLpHRhxN4TRyI3opVY1gr9eSio1OpOk6JpNr3mwW nCaQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531c4WNW+/2/oI3bzaje8dZ4kvSZtoUy+IUtuSUxdfptik58rmOQ aBbgpOGBR167FOnE5DpHnds= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxWCXjRfdIb7v0Axle9f9T77b39WBPK5r3AYcnFU9McnjCmb+0QqRPRcLCXlzlFIo8Bu9U9Wg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:81cb:: with SMTP id e11mr6651123ejx.186.1638963489694; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:09 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 07/18] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:22 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. Enforcement is only at the setsockopt level, this should be enough to ensure that the tcp_authopt_needed static key never turns on. No effort is made to handle disabling when the feature is already in use. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 ++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index c04431144f7a..2fa992ef4e02 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -987,10 +987,16 @@ tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks) Default: 1000 +tcp_authopt - BOOLEAN + Enable the TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925), a replacement for TCP + MD5 Signatures (RFC2835). + + Default: 0 + UDP variables ============= udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index fb07394de261..4e872af7b180 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -76,10 +76,11 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +extern int sysctl_tcp_authopt; void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 97eb54774924..07de2666314c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include static int two = 2; static int three __maybe_unused = 3; static int four = 4; static int thousand = 1000; @@ -472,10 +473,37 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int proc_tcp_authopt(struct ctl_table *ctl, + int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int val = sysctl_tcp_authopt; + struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .mode = ctl->mode, + .maxlen = sizeof(val), + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }; + int err; + + err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err) + return err; + if (sysctl_tcp_authopt && !val) { + net_warn_ratelimited("Enabling TCP Authentication Option is permanent\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + sysctl_tcp_authopt = val; + return 0; +} +#endif + static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { { .procname = "tcp_max_orphans", .data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, .maxlen = sizeof(int), @@ -583,10 +611,21 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min, .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + { + .procname = "tcp_authopt", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_tcp_authopt, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif { } }; static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index dd9b89b1f137..85de430d3326 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -3,10 +3,15 @@ #include #include #include #include +/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through + * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. + */ +int sysctl_tcp_authopt; + /* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); /* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ @@ -377,17 +382,30 @@ static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen); return err; } +static int check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(void) +{ + if (!sysctl_tcp_authopt) { + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Option disabled by sysctl.\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + return 0; +} + int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err; @@ -405,14 +423,18 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; - memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; @@ -475,10 +497,13 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err; From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:23 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522309 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC056C433FE for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:39:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233007AbhLHLnA (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:00 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57668 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232771AbhLHLmN (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:13 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32CA3C0698D0; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:13 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id g14so7310284edb.8; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:13 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=MMLAmFX0zEOyfm3B5C4FVgHVXF9ulUP9xOResbDzMxs=; b=JcXIGu0jItBLL9jwJaqdd1BlVgVjDbviQe8fgGbOubMHo55L7Dmo98LsEb6WQUYlTq ni7EI3rVb4/6fIviXspLkZdgyqWmIzmfk4ho2hpLRNzoukc6B6TSd3dYtZ8YW5O+HFbO kTJ1Et+Vn2BO57p2CaIp707MJ/zMLWZlrB7Ju7ubF+QidN12CNucXIJ/JduNMcHXjeFh 7p3XRroJL8T1tzp86dlhKcmhlUa/KmbiJSjENKuqN9SMCequ48A9WXqpLoM/L9sD23OS fd1J9MMdNKfNflMEwYPXy8KjgxpgqHEiMI06FltUillb4QqmuhgRUnogPiUw7o+Gwok/ fkaw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=MMLAmFX0zEOyfm3B5C4FVgHVXF9ulUP9xOResbDzMxs=; b=sG11ulTdrLzuQvjuCTeL14qph+uwtYb3NT7pSLoOjcvk9gTKPc0fg1vX1EMfdOPZu0 1WjJfC08rpnXwu14mRfMvWXbkyuSotcn9qlsFKFYRE/09hrspQyIEMtBksHzTzZXX/cn QA+kIFH8lVdLAvLLOLxyTV3WCJhZefHRyXInkqz3hn3ZySII1kbWg3wzA6tjg27Gf8f8 WP9RFY8avmW2Z+tAqEdqb9PFdL82pF7BOIE8U5BEpjqxABDdpqlK8mTnrBDLlvjPbAoP TK9s+lwx5waufAjdAwWpCijVgylF797deOfgQaVPry5scNOz1Rgjt6Wk5BscgNZRFA6o mupg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532lIh+bRO7eiJ8vJGjLmbv35sU5/LcJpC2MXSRmpcnYfjIPuFs0 kQzQdF93vE2UPPVhPSoBZUM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzStl2OBhC00FlAZ2tBb2qIsP9wGdHxEGtVs4kZETN43gyyWFYpyK+ZHXNBhqxXxEXLayGpJQ== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:dd53:: with SMTP id o19mr17888137edw.369.1638963491360; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.09 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:10 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 08/18] tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:23 +0200 Message-Id: <54fb10bbeb0b4b301c40eef215b18f041e141c0f.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add a compute_sne function which finds the value of SNE for a certain SEQ given an already known "recent" SNE/SEQ. This is implemented using the standard tcp before/after macro and will work for SEQ values that are without 2^31 of the SEQ for which we know the SNE. For updating we advance the value for rcv_sne at the same time as rcv_nxt and for snd_sne at the same time as snd_nxt. We could track other values (for example snd_una) but this is good enough and works very easily for timewait socket. This implementation is different from RFC suggestions and doesn't require additional flags. It does pass tests from this draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-touch-sne/ Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 34 ++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 4e872af7b180..d5d344d599f7 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -62,10 +62,14 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 flags; /** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */ u32 src_isn; /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; + /** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ + u32 rcv_sne; + /** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ + u32 snd_sne; }; /* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt { u8 num; @@ -180,10 +184,34 @@ static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(struct request_sock *req, struct if (info) return __tcp_authopt_inbound_check((struct sock *)req, skb, info, opt); } return 0; } +void __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(tp, info, seq); + } +} +void __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(tp, info, seq); + } +} #else static inline int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { return -ENOPROTOOPT; } @@ -230,8 +258,14 @@ static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(struct request_sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *opt) { return 0; } +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 85de430d3326..05234923cb9f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -631,10 +631,97 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_isn(struct sock *sk, *disn = htonl(info->dst_isn); } return 0; } +/* compute_sne - Calculate Sequence Number Extension + * + * Give old upper/lower 32bit values and a new lower 32bit value determine the + * new value of the upper 32 bit. The new sequence number can be 2^31 before or + * after prev_seq but TCP window scaling should limit this further. + * + * For correct accounting the stored SNE value should be only updated together + * with the SEQ. + */ +static u32 compute_sne(u32 sne, u32 prev_seq, u32 seq) +{ + if (before(seq, prev_seq)) { + if (seq > prev_seq) + --sne; + } else { + if (seq < prev_seq) + ++sne; + } + + return sne; +} + +/* Update rcv_sne, must be called immediately before rcv_nxt update */ +void __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq) +{ + info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(info->rcv_sne, tp->rcv_nxt, seq); +} + +/* Update snd_sne, must be called immediately before snd_nxt update */ +void __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq) +{ + info->snd_sne = compute_sne(info->snd_sne, tp->snd_nxt, seq); +} + +/* Compute SNE for a specific packet (by seq). */ +static int compute_packet_sne(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + u32 seq, bool input, __be32 *sne) +{ + u32 rcv_nxt, snd_nxt; + + // For TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV we have no tcp_authopt_info but tcp_request_sock holds ISN. + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)sk); + + if (input) + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(0, rsk->rcv_isn, seq)); + else + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(0, rsk->snt_isn, seq)); + return 0; + } + + /* TCP_LISTEN only receives SYN */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && input) + return 0; + + /* TCP_SYN_SENT only sends SYN and receives SYN/ACK + * For the input case rcv_nxt is initialized after the packet is + * validated so tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt is not initialized. + */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) + return 0; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { + rcv_nxt = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_rcv_nxt; + snd_nxt = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_snd_nxt; + } else { + if (WARN_ONCE(!sk_fullsock(sk), + "unexpected minisock sk=%p state=%d", sk, + sk->sk_state)) + return -EINVAL; + rcv_nxt = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt; + snd_nxt = tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt; + } + + if (WARN_ONCE(!info, "unexpected missing info for sk=%p sk_state=%d", sk, sk->sk_state)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (input) + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(info->rcv_sne, rcv_nxt, seq)); + else + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(info->snd_sne, snd_nxt, seq)); + + return 0; +} + /* Feed one buffer into ahash * The buffer is assumed to be DMA-able */ static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) { @@ -686,10 +773,13 @@ int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct r if (!new_info) return -ENOMEM; new_info->src_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn; new_info->dst_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn; + /* Caller is tcp_create_openreq_child and already initializes snd_nxt/rcv_nxt */ + new_info->snd_sne = compute_sne(0, new_info->src_isn, tcp_sk(newsk)->snd_nxt); + new_info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(0, new_info->dst_isn, tcp_sk(newsk)->rcv_nxt); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&new_info->head); err = tcp_authopt_clone_keys(newsk, oldsk, new_info, old_info); if (err) { tcp_authopt_free(newsk, new_info); return err; @@ -703,10 +793,12 @@ int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct r void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info) { info->src_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->ack_seq) - 1; info->dst_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->seq); + info->snd_sne = compute_sne(0, info->src_isn, tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt); + info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(0, info->dst_isn, tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt); } /* feed traffic key into ahash */ static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct sock *sk, @@ -952,14 +1044,16 @@ static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, bool ipv6, bool include_options, u8 *macbuf) { struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + __be32 sne = 0; int err; - /* NOTE: SNE unimplemented */ - __be32 sne = 0; + err = compute_packet_sne(sk, info, ntohl(th->seq), input, &sne); + if (err) + return err; err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); if (err) return err; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 4c9e403971fb..bc0a90c72391 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3517,10 +3517,11 @@ static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack) static void tcp_rcv_nxt_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) { u32 delta = seq - tp->rcv_nxt; sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp); + tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(tp, seq); tp->bytes_received += delta; WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq); } /* Update our send window. diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index b959e8b949b6..6a6024a0b9e9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -67,10 +67,11 @@ static void tcp_event_new_data_sent(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); unsigned int prior_packets = tp->packets_out; + tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq); WRITE_ONCE(tp->snd_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq); __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_write_queue); tcp_rbtree_insert(&sk->tcp_rtx_queue, skb); From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:24 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522612 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C22F2C43217 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:39:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233028AbhLHLnB (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:01 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57600 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232779AbhLHLmN (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:13 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 72AF6C0698D7; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:14 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id l25so7269246eda.11; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:14 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=i2Xy/53y4dXqLZswi6r2h86/iHNvMywouKpA+caLINQ=; b=dhH8mw0TFHcfbQUjSngMmBoFjaFEclnWp7jnpljmtCDEmSkk5ydez63ZWCgot+t6Fx wJ7QMIYnNCwAoGMp23slAqONtOIM9Qp5jzfxctpo+/wUJzt2ySwDNhL68OHRZO+6Q0LO MGDVb4rFFaG8zHaqdpzKS+RYCx2jK5Vk4tBM0yGeqmWv8EX0Z9yHRU2pRz5+GLnNXfpC HiDwxp2gYxYu6/xkMVvKdXQTtAeC/TQE+2s/X5bIoCnot/8nkVk1psj/iHYl42DMdeyB iOH3CofsavUvzv2jqNFVgrP12iGdAYkNrfmyC625LHm/jA+NWjZhwUfcTGYxsfwUlbru b/Mg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=i2Xy/53y4dXqLZswi6r2h86/iHNvMywouKpA+caLINQ=; b=DcQxV0HvxnVLT05d1vKsg8Pa820XeGz2sGo1d/l6/U8BbNORti31/ROHYflJC1+Kl4 cHwpMF2wHtdVNXm08I/hcpHpQScabYgkGJFWyfEv01/FjchZclDuHnxCNkY/4EJBYeaR SxFFkCscxFvuph4zKRs1IIh9j5FHfTIjQZT2HKJbuz4NfEAdyeFrFMF3MD5xBvQUj35h uz0REjrcn9WzivGURqo3/EIPFeIiCffvg19Q47MSpNBtYIsqgFH9O3upWZDsbUOXD6g2 JsNiVdF+rx+bHARYqyaVKpSab/Ow+SS2K/0lYTNQKDARcM2gtV6SbGltJF4/Pp+I9gso bxMQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533uA7krleELEZjM7Df6D9T3gknQvQknrP2gn+ZbPe8UTo4B8v4q 7jz5V7yWsMQwQk55np5ZDyM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz5zzWNO5geIPBgCL8eiLxQHZ/Fqn2m5LfK8V5ugd1d/FNJAF9LOKp3y59VLRUXFdT+IQ3lIg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:4311:: with SMTP id m17mr18492477edc.103.1638963493018; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.11 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:12 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 09/18] tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:24 +0200 Message-Id: <0df999535ac5c76b75abcf8a0b0f40fa64c27a7f.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is a special code path for acks and resets outside of normal connection establishment and closing. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 05234923cb9f..f1213c7db63b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -320,10 +320,11 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *addr_sk, u8 *rnextkeyid) { return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_select_key); static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1195,10 +1196,11 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, * try to make it obvious inside the packet. */ memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); return err; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash); static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, int recv_id, diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 3105a367d6b5..cd8544d08a36 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -886,10 +886,48 @@ const struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops = { .init_seq = tcp_v6_init_seq, .init_ts_off = tcp_v6_init_ts_off, .send_synack = tcp_v6_send_synack, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info **info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info **key, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + /* Key lookup before SKB allocation */ + if (!(tcp_authopt_needed && sk)) + return 0; + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + *info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; + else + *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); + if (!*info) + return 0; + *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid); + if (*key) + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + return 0; +} + +static void tcp_v6_send_response_sign_authopt(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *ptr, + u8 rnextkeyid) +{ + if (!(tcp_authopt_needed && key)) + return; + ptr->num = TCPOPT_AUTHOPT; + ptr->len = TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + ptr->keyid = key->send_id; + ptr->rnextkeyid = rnextkeyid; + tcp_authopt_hash(ptr->mac, key, info, (struct sock *)sk, skb); +} +#endif + static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack, u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr, int oif, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, int rst, u8 tclass, __be32 label, u32 priority) { @@ -901,13 +939,28 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 struct sock *ctl_sk = net->ipv6.tcp_sk; unsigned int tot_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr); __be32 mrst = 0, *topt; struct dst_entry *dst; __u32 mark = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *aoinfo; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *aokey; + u8 aornextkeyid; + int aolen; +#endif if (tsecr) tot_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Key lookup before SKB allocation */ + aolen = tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(sk, &aoinfo, &aokey, &aornextkeyid); + if (aolen) { + tot_len += aolen; + /* Don't use MD5 */ + key = NULL; + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; #endif @@ -960,10 +1013,14 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *)topt, key, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, t1); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + tcp_v6_send_response_sign_authopt(sk, aoinfo, aokey, buff, + (struct tcphdr_authopt *)topt, aornextkeyid); +#endif memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); fl6.daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; fl6.saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; fl6.flowlabel = label; From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:25 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522611 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CB78C433EF for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:39:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232823AbhLHLnT (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:19 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57652 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232630AbhLHLm5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:57 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52b.google.com (mail-ed1-x52b.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52b]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC096C0698DB; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:16 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52b.google.com with SMTP id g14so7310824edb.8; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:16 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=YFVlragDCWioyuewm1BB0pdEY6+OlUg53bCND+dh3mU=; b=gfg4Q0F/fDMd0HDGtyy8TlqTl0nrd7f8zQZjzHKcVfiveQJgcZZsE+x1Z5D2GBFpMI XNkFiaBug/mKWDqMPY0GbP3F2SP3cXVN1QrClYd6wds26h9QkFgatxHjzTNTtp+TqP6d oMMqIrJR42CP4pjEwo4YlUd+SVX70MZ6OxyGc098i7v5FqVdUZRvdNsXhbZPXdNS9OzM /LNsJMT0hh/yXLNjcMV4CtcFUJjSSng0VVV/96P08vjhGB/7LBt8CWqqjvXBQZmV4C6X FU7PZVar3+1F9xXIyfua74yHCUKDq6V/Eq+njNn662CBNlbjJe5Q5Rsjo7qLrYvI4wrI 12Fw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=YFVlragDCWioyuewm1BB0pdEY6+OlUg53bCND+dh3mU=; b=eiLrmglL3Hd/y8/Fl8nq1ktZHE4Igbn462v4uXsIZEGMeAVB1pTfEVnQPZhI285g1Z G6ApnIt4AqH/F/zNdj7PQJolTTkht19F8IAE3uhamXOqmbeLtqVHGI7L822LpPazqxw9 Det2jNwuxWnT37FneZj6BuaWZfGMamY7UeoJ/irXQRTkH7LUUqhS0eTjwhzar4biWzod ROQAI/SeyZVy+Gg23NJeifdg21CzhVnRGujiarPy/pMTDIY+VK1a246Nlo0LT738cOoO NyhDdvmFShlE1JL473bW2Ed6TyOnlPVAMeqbRMb2y+OYIcsXRQpjTNyESU5XqHr60+qk 6FkQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530NLRAGiTk1iAmEvS/2ffkOWhbF6HkRNPpenPTcCKhEfiCfnGXY t0QEN7E7adREeIIZ1r713UQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyPvDZrcSj4nEQnvkmOcVWAX1Fj9Uh03KjVeqY2DFbLLSfTsW9BzJSCp2XQQKiOy96xBH3vxQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:51c6:: with SMTP id r6mr18414342edd.365.1638963494643; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.13 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:14 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 10/18] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:25 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt. Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 7 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index d5d344d599f7..411e7a0bdd43 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -111,10 +111,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th); int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req); static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq( struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index f1213c7db63b..a4f3eac20b29 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -935,10 +935,72 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk, out: tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); return err; } +struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data { + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; + __be16 sport; + __be16 dport; + __be32 sisn; + __be32 disn; + __be16 digestbits; +} __packed; + +static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, + __be16 dport, + __be32 sisn, + __be32 disn, + u8 *traffic_key) +{ + int err; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22); + + pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + + err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + + // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 + // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + if (err) + return err; + data.saddr = saddr; + data.daddr = daddr; + data.sport = sport; + data.dport = dport; + data.sisn = sisn; + data.disn = disn; + data.digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8); + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&data, sizeof(data)); + if (err) + goto out; + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); + return err; +} + static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len) { u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0}; int buflen, err; @@ -1198,10 +1260,92 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash); +/** + * tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply - Hash tcp+ipv4 header without SKB + * + * @hash_location: output buffer + * @info: sending socket's tcp_authopt_info + * @key: signing key, from tcp_authopt_select_key. + * @saddr: source address + * @daddr: destination address + * @th: Pointer to TCP header and options + */ +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; + __be32 sne = 0; + int err; + + /* Call special code path for computing traffic key without skb + * This can be called from tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack so caching would be + * difficult here. + */ + err = tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(key, saddr, daddr, + th->source, th->dest, + htonl(info->src_isn), htonl(info->dst_isn), + traffic_key); + if (err) + goto out_err_traffic_key; + + /* Init mac shash */ + pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len); + if (err) + goto out_err; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4); + if (err) + return err; + + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, th->doff * 4); + if (err) + return err; + + // TCP header with checksum set to zero. Caller ensures this. + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(th->check != 0)) + goto out_err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)th, sizeof(*th)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + // TCP options + err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4), + !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out_err; + memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool); + return 0; + +out_err: + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool); +out_err_traffic_key: + memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + return err; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, int recv_id, bool *anykey) From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:26 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522308 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C88EC433FE for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:39:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232916AbhLHLnT (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:19 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57850 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232717AbhLHLm5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:57 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x533.google.com (mail-ed1-x533.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::533]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A61E7C0698DC; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:17 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x533.google.com with SMTP id e3so7428602edu.4; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:17 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=AJTBnZaHKpgW0NytQ0nJpi5GqwKnimL/f3sQ0WLcrBg=; b=Kq4/pRpb+hwNsJaHRGqVurEcMLv/VX1Z1v2TFyqgWrmWyWez+qPdOXpmHzesUNLKls OgGZrTA8IMyQcZ0FBjlp/QtJ49TAzie0HRTRP1tPMnrKEOdzBq84/6xltYp/XP48smUr yi4TAAf7bH9YpY4xieaQzb1fmNEpwMvHjGcnz9lv5s8xcKV3bxXcZnVmDMMibWAYX066 rXdfulsPvxLMC3P+MEwxddm7v0RkULA2BDtcswArxcmPRy+/+Aq3wi8PIC9Bxo4UXGTt ptjU6+Q3qVd1q0SVTA/4UK2RXMOlzjyMkdIhdhyfXvgaJxcfEAMHQIfjSKF5o1usbXep ZMCw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=AJTBnZaHKpgW0NytQ0nJpi5GqwKnimL/f3sQ0WLcrBg=; b=SWBD9n6e7odgcVFbE6qgpOiLab5ntVhVte78h5Ayeya3I7ZZKq86onAvkTZWXJH3ew Ai8LoK8sGES1313MmUq4Q2Gm1D/v5C/IaaTI61C4TKPjHm3FM9M26Rqz0/d4J+oC+gGD 6uydBMq9/rMd/HlPtr2kl661d6CpNFYrXDoXJQw2nXjehOsJJaitfYBmrJUzyKF7QohD U29WaC9xrXTZ5fd2ZrpchEOL1xce5LWg3/OXMHrvu7B0IT8XKnc6bi7rjUWNTSDiLhZR 75BDNzNxftSzE7IXXeMUKeOtTBccZ+LDBkvevgOH3sm6FwP9W8oiZcdzPGLNjO44FKoy 3CpA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532loJJ57ToHLhUy2/rB0/ytxLGDpYjH2dVPeSt78WRHpNceypRf OJX1MibEIUWYoRVWPntijz8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzNhzIIEFFc3ZDuEwW+u0TBmFkg22/xH2v2wA5rFAKInjRKB0FeV4HmWMhK6OSGqVM67aV8jg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:98f6:: with SMTP id ke22mr6799984ejc.500.1638963496241; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:16 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.14 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:15 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 11/18] tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:26 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The code in tcp_v4_send_ack and tcp_v4_send_reset does not allocate a full skb so special handling is required for tcp-authopt handling. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index b16f263c3121..be531e2f52ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -644,10 +644,50 @@ void tcp_v4_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) __tcp_v4_send_check(skb, inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_daddr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +/** tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply - Insert TCPOPT_AUTHOPT if required + * + * returns number of bytes (always aligned to 4) or zero + */ +static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + __be32 *optptr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; + u8 rnextkeyid; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; + else + info = tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info; + if (!info) + return 0; + key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + if (!key_info) + return 0; + *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | + (key_info->send_id << 8) | + (rnextkeyid)); + /* must update doff before signature computation */ + th->doff += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT / 4; + tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply((char *)(optptr + 1), + info, + key_info, + ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, + ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, + th); + + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; +} +#endif + /* * This routine will send an RST to the other tcp. * * Someone asks: why I NEVER use socket parameters (TOS, TTL etc.) * for reset. @@ -659,10 +699,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); * Exception: precedence violation. We do not implement it in any case. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG #define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED +#elif defined(OPTION_BYTES_TCP_AUTHOPT) +#define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT #else #define OPTION_BYTES sizeof(__be32) #endif static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -712,12 +754,29 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg)); arg.iov[0].iov_base = (unsigned char *)&rep; arg.iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(rep.th); net = sk ? sock_net(sk) : dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_lock(); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Unlike TCP-MD5 the signatures for TCP-AO depend on initial sequence + * numbers so we can only handle established and time-wait sockets. + */ + if (tcp_authopt_needed && sk && + sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV && + sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) { + int tcp_authopt_ret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, rep.opt, &rep.th); + + if (tcp_authopt_ret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += tcp_authopt_ret; + goto skip_md5sig; + } + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk)) { const union tcp_md5_addr *addr; int l3index; @@ -755,11 +814,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) addr = (union tcp_md5_addr *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; key = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk1, l3index, addr, AF_INET); if (!key) goto out; - genhash = tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(newhash, key, NULL, skb); if (genhash || memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0) goto out; } @@ -775,10 +833,13 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *) &rep.opt[1], key, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &rep.th); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +skip_md5sig: #endif /* Can't co-exist with TCPMD5, hence check rep.opt[0] */ if (rep.opt[0] == 0) { __be32 mrst = mptcp_reset_option(skb); @@ -828,12 +889,14 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ctl_sk->sk_mark = 0; __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS); __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS); local_bh_enable(); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) out: +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_unlock(); #endif } /* The code following below sending ACKs in SYN-RECV and TIME-WAIT states @@ -850,10 +913,12 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct { struct tcphdr th; __be32 opt[(TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED >> 2) #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + (TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED >> 2) +#elif defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT >> 2) #endif ]; } rep; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct ip_reply_arg arg; @@ -881,10 +946,21 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, rep.th.seq = htonl(seq); rep.th.ack_seq = htonl(ack); rep.th.ack = 1; rep.th.window = htons(win); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + int aoret, offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; + + aoret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, &rep.opt[offset], &rep.th); + if (aoret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += aoret; + key = NULL; + } + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) { int offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; rep.opt[offset++] = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:27 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522610 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99726C43217 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:39:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231593AbhLHLnU (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:20 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57862 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232747AbhLHLm6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:58 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x533.google.com (mail-ed1-x533.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::533]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 994DCC0698E2; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x533.google.com with SMTP id y13so7244486edd.13; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=qxgktrIUTM8QyczhN/39pTFVAuvJLMoi6Vfh/H8OMyE=; b=qtCXOLE70Mo22867iNKghJMhAhtfaeMv8jlEBgh+zXTwwhXGmJRDlk7TnZKLOFObfe m8isTBg1bQ+mgrUIvYD4f5w0BllQ1/+YC9jFnrv8DyR2BXu7ttUPJkuQGLoqzbWSMjQj p7Ysbodlfztc0buJdlE2w603aQKtLI5DZNnpK+5ltH2/zxh8LPqryw/ksv8p+UC6z98e RRFSefZX3Y6Hwrh/MQGnjWMjwdgAELuudiOAc4wuBl3h/Hps5WK0fH/rtt8uLJJlqIq4 n41defQFryuOu89sdcq1dz3XZcuNFdUfjsQ4EMiKSN9AefoawJ9QgfSX4da7auz6/3Z7 PGVA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=qxgktrIUTM8QyczhN/39pTFVAuvJLMoi6Vfh/H8OMyE=; b=sHztBPqU6LIV2wPen511ShFpH60C+zR2zW+rZ6J91ny2sJ9P1h5AfBj4+aEw+37WAt MElDD32sci1jpPDSaYqrvo9cpoVTtrJtBxv2WlhwE9rEcArOY934PLJIm+U5s+ytL4XR 92fT5AZmoP5bDgFczCmwe5Oo1ON/mZX3cYLhZmqt/ZuRF2q8FwxoI9k0SOVHhcNWrS18 cCnRwTPvG1agSVM74QDk7U0H5zRH9hei0q5/nI6gwW0VBGd8/7Px9/rmeoTo/gb3kXDp 3nQ7Si0PQ6ixKrCJxXjrTCh8SdXXQtF37EPmlsMTpEQtapD3kd8FA0C0+iffL4DGfemi FKoQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533qFTU+5+sk9wOvjvJM1sLHAJv8qz6oxtzRS27kU7mWeE9aZcFx APEcCjPMDxmk4Dc1YfTJWL8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJycAY4JeQ9p7anv2WlKQx2bjRAFCLm8oHpBbUZdLaRGCzzvSTpgcnUAQOWBCoYjC9omu4Q5tw== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:cc82:: with SMTP id p2mr17940206edt.201.1638963497940; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:17 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 12/18] tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:27 +0200 Message-Id: <131df4e36874ba12e77fda4387ef79317eeb4a79.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The RFC requires that TCP can report the keyid and rnextkeyid values being sent or received, implement this via getsockopt values. The RFC also requires that user can select the sending key and that the sending key is automatically switched based on rnextkeyid. These requirements can conflict so we implement both and add a flag which specifies if user or peer request takes priority. Also add an option to control rnextkeyid explicitly from userspace. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 25 ++++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 38 ++++++++- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 31 ++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 484f66f41ad5..cded87a70d05 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -35,10 +35,35 @@ Keys can be bound to remote addresses in a way that is similar to TCP_MD5. RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. +Key selection +------------- + +On getsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT) information is provided about keyid/rnextkeyid in +the last send packet and about the keyid/rnextkeyd in the last valid received +packet. + +By default the sending keyid is selected to match the "rnextkeyid" value sent +by the remote side. If that keyid is not available (or for new connections) a +random matching key is selected. + +If the `TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_KEYID` is set then the sending key is selected by the +`tcp_authopt.send_local_id` field and rnextkeyid is ignored. If no key with +local_id == send_local_id is configured then a random matching key is +selected. + +The current sending key is cached in the socket and will not change unless +requested by remote rnextkeyid or by setsockopt. + +The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current +key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in +`tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send +instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch +its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 411e7a0bdd43..020637265ce9 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -66,10 +66,43 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 dst_isn; /** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ u32 rcv_sne; /** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ u32 snd_sne; + + /** + * @send_keyid: keyid currently being sent + * + * This is controlled by userspace by userspace if + * TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID, otherwise we try to match recv_rnextkeyid + */ + u8 send_keyid; + /** + * @send_rnextkeyid: rnextkeyid currently being sent + * + * This is controlled by userspace if TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is set + */ + u8 send_rnextkeyid; + /** + * @recv_keyid: last keyid received from remote + * + * This is reported to userspace but has no other special behavior attached. + */ + u8 recv_keyid; + /** + * @recv_rnextkeyid: last rnextkeyid received from remote + * + * Linux tries to honor this unless TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID is set + */ + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; + + /** + * @send_key: Current key used for sending, cached. + * + * Once a key is found it only changes by user or remote request. + */ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *send_key; }; /* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt { u8 num; @@ -91,22 +124,23 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key( const struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, - u8 *rnextkeyid); + u8 *rnextkeyid, + bool locked); static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *addr_sk, struct tcp_authopt_info **info, u8 *rnextkeyid) { if (tcp_authopt_needed) { *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); if (*info) - return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid); + return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid, true); } return NULL; } int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 76d7be6b27f4..e02176390519 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -346,10 +346,24 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig { /** * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` */ enum tcp_authopt_flag { + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID: keyid controlled by sockopt + * + * If this is set `tcp_authopt.send_keyid` is used to determined sending + * key. Otherwise a key with send_id == recv_rnextkeyid is preferred. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID = (1 << 0), + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID: Override rnextkeyid from userspace + * + * If this is set then `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is sent on outbound + * packets. Other the recv_id of the current sending key is sent. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID = (1 << 1), /** * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept * such connections. @@ -361,10 +375,27 @@ enum tcp_authopt_flag { * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option */ struct tcp_authopt { /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ __u32 flags; + /** + * @send_keyid: `tcp_authopt_key.send_id` of preferred send key + * + * This is only used if `TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID` is set. + */ + __u8 send_keyid; + /** + * @send_rnextkeyid: The rnextkeyid to send in packets + * + * This is controlled by the user iff TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is + * set. Otherwise rnextkeyid is the recv_id of the current key. + */ + __u8 send_rnextkeyid; + /** @recv_keyid: A recently-received keyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_keyid; + /** @recv_rnextkeyid: A recently-received rnextkeyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_rnextkeyid; }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index a4f3eac20b29..a8950c9a7e84 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -309,20 +309,76 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_i * * @sk: socket * @info: socket's tcp_authopt_info * @addr_sk: socket used for address lookup. Same as sk except for synack case * @rnextkeyid: value of rnextkeyid caller should write in packet + * @locked: If we're holding the socket lock. This is false for some timewait and reset cases * * Result is protected by RCU and can't be stored, it may only be passed to * tcp_authopt_hash and only under a single rcu_read_lock. */ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, - u8 *rnextkeyid) + u8 *rnextkeyid, + bool locked) { - return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; + + /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try + * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + int send_keyid = -1; + + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) + send_keyid = info->send_keyid; + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, send_keyid); + if (key) + *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; + + return key; + } + + if (locked) + key = rcu_dereference_protected(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + else + key = rcu_dereference(info->send_key); + + /* Try to keep the same sending key unless user or peer requires a different key + * User request (via TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) always overrides peer request. + */ + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) { + int send_keyid = info->send_keyid; + + if (!key || key->send_id != send_keyid) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, send_keyid); + } else { + if (!key || key->send_id != info->recv_rnextkeyid) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, info->recv_rnextkeyid); + } + /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ + if (!key && !new_key) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); + + /* Update current key only if we hold the socket lock, otherwise we might + * store a pointer that goes stale + */ + if (new_key && key != new_key) { + key = new_key; + if (locked) + rcu_assign_pointer(info->send_key, key); + } + + if (key) { + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + else + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; + } + + return key; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_select_key); static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { @@ -345,10 +401,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk return info; } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) /* Like copy_from_sockopt except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons * * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is @@ -416,18 +474,23 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) + info->send_keyid = opt.send_keyid; + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + info->send_rnextkeyid = opt.send_rnextkeyid; return 0; } int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *send_key; int err; memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); @@ -437,10 +500,22 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + /* These keyids might be undefined, for example before connect. + * Reporting zero is not strictly correct because there are no reserved + * values. + */ + send_key = rcu_dereference_check(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (send_key) + opt->send_keyid = send_key->send_id; + else + opt->send_keyid = 0; + opt->send_rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + opt->recv_keyid = info->recv_keyid; + opt->recv_rnextkeyid = info->recv_rnextkeyid; return 0; } /* Free key nicely, for living sockets */ @@ -448,10 +523,12 @@ static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { sock_owned_by_me(sk); hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + if (rcu_dereference_protected(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)) == key) + rcu_assign_pointer(info->send_key, NULL); atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); kfree_rcu(key, rcu); } /* Free info and keys. @@ -1422,11 +1499,11 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Rejected", skb); return -EINVAL; } print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Accepted", skb); - return 0; + goto accept; } if (opt && !key) { /* Keys are configured for peer but with different keyid than packet */ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); @@ -1445,8 +1522,23 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); return -EINVAL; } +accept: + /* Doing this for all valid packets will results in keyids temporarily + * flipping back and forth if packets are reordered or retransmitted + * but keys should eventually stabilize. + * + * This is connection-specific so don't store for listen sockets. + * + * We could store rnextkeyid from SYN in a request sock and use it for + * the SYNACK but we don't. + */ + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) { + info->recv_keyid = opt->keyid; + info->recv_rnextkeyid = opt->rnextkeyid; + } + return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index be531e2f52ae..edfb76f76485 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -664,11 +664,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; else info = tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info; if (!info) return 0; - key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid, false); if (!key_info) return 0; *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | (key_info->send_id << 8) | diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index cd8544d08a36..6ed13f8f489f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -901,11 +901,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(const struct sock *sk, *info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; else *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); if (!*info) return 0; - *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid); + *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid, false); if (*key) return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; return 0; } From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522607 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B0A9C433EF for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232769AbhLHLnj (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:39 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57662 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231559AbhLHLm7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:59 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 017BFC0698E3; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:21 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id e3so7429347edu.4; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:20 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yw3fTZf8XX+3QBd+JmTUy72JwQy6opSFVeOafl9MHOw=; b=gPO0hj/HtWlhV/Ot5NuhMTZPsnYAHaee8JvFqMeZIME7DcDaIfrx71c3gD5NLKhA25 J/16LTFgQnbvJTH0WgwnBHaE8e08nc6wwsukHUV4OBx2Jykpu3kvbQWeEMCESewKG77y u6COj2SHOUTFlWPfyw2a39Sm7SUGurj5kObFDQlW+UsTPkCDlPwwyk3Ip5LBRMvejLcP eonImO8Qfs21J9T5sJFShLsrrir/7+lGdj7aW2NKGP01WHr96fIggLbp/qtniMRljrUe KVPHhbruDK0h9Lzu0O8uzbotN1IATcncQqtLESEkoThwV2n/qMJN0zkZQvP/hVW/JBn2 XlYQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yw3fTZf8XX+3QBd+JmTUy72JwQy6opSFVeOafl9MHOw=; b=NVn0/MEM/1karWe4GdPflxDdi/kluRrKHZBw6z4h30cLYFJSP7qnE3uGOZ3FoEVJEf 2vhAMziTm5UKgMSxpMRdWV6SOEIgKtJufrHQkCNxy9CHTP68TUY0RkzAOQZo1i8M/FIh di0U8n9EC0aF9tlW6M9+7f8dggzulGWWsjfC5ci30hgErz8dIpttwRRbQeJqWN+GYvb8 CA7bie0KUqYXL4Da0+nQ5KUNcMTnoQNJRS+Y9BQl9hMpH02mLrNmFTOzspl6L36sHmO/ SeHwo4T/fVmgvcE1w5ji25wPpTSBq+keLKtc42xRBdqzF+mdjeHlKME/42lh8zt6uiUV YAnw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531fWBX4+DvTE0qHe8J1jve3THRtzuSBqzucbyAYb2JlP/QIjU29 G1sokQwWMUiNit0NhgOjv1I= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyK2Bp9sVybIZRzoG3sRUgbLZOuqGZKPaPLtHoBOnzzkcTfjm9CN/x+4L7NqNXaH7weSkdN2w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:b2c7:: with SMTP id cf7mr6939110ejb.303.1638963499587; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.18 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 13/18] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:28 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is a parallel feature to tcp_md5sig.tcpm_ifindex support and allows applications to server multiple VRFs with a single socket. The ifindex argument must be the ifindex of a VRF device and must match exactly, keys with ifindex == 0 (outside of VRF) will not match for connections inside a VRF. Keys without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX will ignore ifindex and match both inside and outside VRF. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 11 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 020637265ce9..e57bc732f737 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 alg_id; /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ + int l3index; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index e02176390519..a7f5f918ed5a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -400,15 +400,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -450,10 +452,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * @addr: Key is only valid for this address * * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; + /** + * @ifindex: ifindex of vrf (l3mdev_master) interface + * + * If the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX flag is set then key only applies for + * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. + * + * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` + */ + int ifindex; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index a8950c9a7e84..b3fd12fcb948 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/net.h" #include #include #include #include @@ -214,10 +215,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, { if (info->send_id != key->send_id) return false; if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -281,26 +286,49 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *new) +{ + if (!old) + return true; + + /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ + if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) + return false; + if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) + return true; + + return false; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, int send_id) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; - if (result && net_ratelimit()) - pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); - result = key; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) + l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(addr_sk), + addr_sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } + if (better_key_match(result, key)) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); } return result; } @@ -564,18 +592,20 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; + int l3index = 0; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -622,10 +652,24 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) return -EINVAL; err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); if (err) return err; + /* check ifindex is valid (zero is always valid) */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX && opt.ifindex) { + struct net_device *dev; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), opt.ifindex); + if (dev && netif_is_l3_master(dev)) + l3index = dev->ifindex; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (!l3index) + return -EINVAL; + } + key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace. * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any. @@ -639,10 +683,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + key_info->l3index = l3index; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); return 0; } @@ -1427,21 +1472,37 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, int recv_id, bool *anykey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; *anykey = false; /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + l3index = inet_sdif(skb) ? inet_iif(skb) : 0; + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + l3index = inet6_sdif(skb) ? inet6_iif(skb) : 0; + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "unexpected skb->protocol=%x", skb->protocol); + continue; + } + } + + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } *anykey = true; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; - if (!result) + if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); } From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522608 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD8F5C4332F for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232918AbhLHLni (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57878 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232749AbhLHLm7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:59 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x534.google.com (mail-ed1-x534.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::534]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80B42C0698FC; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:22 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x534.google.com with SMTP id e3so7429687edu.4; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ywzuVgCinydpcSFZ+BFaxNNm0V4GRalVjewG4V+xb2I=; b=Cjya0TklOanEJiGEi/9HAcP4LpZULT7jnXFL5DX8g8MrQ1RIScRovSRD2ZBcx8iSL0 tteMRyn3VQfT7C97xpwoI4tKBEjTBXQfzKLodGmZEKRomhDJ0GzLF9qRDYZCGiVZU8NE vQLJQ/fZpysw3U1PbSZqKOpbhdbRBO8Cex8v8unUQcIouA6SLXxfMMCw0Q4G6MuJFTAU hoHfbY1abtESL/xl1giDpVLVQhtUvRV0gpvMRoAwBvCaomNqm3KgqFrFbh6vNu86hzuc FsuhUX91EYzQ4MEANXx2eHNnNTDqs4smQpa8BHfg15f1L+mkscy+sqSg11Ep0s2xIAtM y0zQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ywzuVgCinydpcSFZ+BFaxNNm0V4GRalVjewG4V+xb2I=; b=2QgL/gSNCCjawhlLCoLuXd5BCm3iuel4rsAyGloNWiKwMVZWE3quTHUODGKsFbiAih leegD3RgD8R9FRWn5+HEDaT3WFjVxh+e+++ncE32KZgGkZMeezlEiXNwaHG2IdoEB8yE Wf8Y1ChbebiZ7BkLNWvgCwljm2fpT1QwkBRq+OtyUp+2EjfeAgWSwgixZ7H0J24ccwu8 thgaJXvqwHJTrXv16ZoDFkcWAXsJLRetIVivnxmqRB14meCcHGgK61bC1etinG3Lj3/L 9YVWwZj7AwgAbDjJgRoqx449w4shnBtmB6GNb7MKDYuSMgfIHEn/aqZK0YQJIFnI083W 9k4A== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532KdjlcZUDE/MAQhu5/yx2jhhhqjcLLF5L41k3e+woG1U6wy2Jr h4UXh8pJOHEKkPKmBP3vXTk= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzhAYVaiE5zHwUtPZ3UmzUs6kg3ZmF51kVe7s7qnnPBM9JsQm0H3j6PaJ+8GgicGFKtou8DwQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:1d50:: with SMTP id dz16mr18563746edb.309.1638963501126; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.19 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:20 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 14/18] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:29 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add flags to allow marking individual keys and invalid for send or recv. Making keys assymetric this way is not mentioned in RFC5925 but RFC8177 requires that keys inside a keychain have independent "accept" and "send" lifetimes. Flag names are negative so that the default behavior is for keys to be valid for both send and recv. Setting both NOSEND and NORECV for a certain peer address can be used on a listen socket can be used to mean "TCP-AO is required from this peer but no keys are currently valid". Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index a7f5f918ed5a..ed27feb93b0e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -401,16 +401,20 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index b3fd12fcb948..946d598258b1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -311,10 +311,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_i int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) + continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { if (l3index < 0) @@ -593,11 +595,13 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1496,10 +1500,13 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, if (l3index != key->l3index) continue; } *anykey = true; + // If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) + continue; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522305 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D78EC4321E for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232740AbhLHLng (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:36 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57660 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232753AbhLHLm7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:59 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52e.google.com (mail-ed1-x52e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52e]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 39231C0698FD; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:24 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52e.google.com with SMTP id g14so7312430edb.8; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:24 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=WRLWa8lRaYgTnoCjf0MCIMJlWF3rpMYgtwIN9Z8LM1M=; b=eWiVFueOszF5uuwc8NXtDO5jeEUqecM6jiRT8TM7BBH/Czzfmdlhpexxhhqd3yRUDS 2HalnVoyBjgkdIwzgJZIRjtFjsGo4O5HyhAUyIEPW+UDOyD4B6rBfbFf8vzoJGUmvtSa vrLAIJbUGlrEmhAnYgH618y8OHkumZOMCqZPQMcJqwRiAk2NVI8odEc5X5zINlsLwAsP uzmYkOxxQMPJDr+56WwqINHznzz9KCbeVg5fVXu5s+R6Yh13iPUa+eY41SY1FEu01d0k Wyo2nEfu9yDGoL180yjmw8ShaegBI6vFkigi/gizBCw0o/yDYjRIslwFUdi1m5bt3oTs cWgg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=WRLWa8lRaYgTnoCjf0MCIMJlWF3rpMYgtwIN9Z8LM1M=; b=k9mwLpCLWeCjcy9mzqGsjgSywCpM5M2OgIff6sqqvdynqOVGq+ngv+20vBFFz6n4w5 G3WVKtJq9F5dt5NVl3dHJbgtzzjLVu5uGVQdiIVe8s9vDhdhARkLuFReMGOTCOi+4fZX Sw0PdMDVpV4tEdYc2t4is1jCyUU72KQB8hNKDUSuV3T4tqSPewIwATfffMfl9AV0lodq ZOu1JY+dokzY9B5OP8YZU4qn/n2o6zOuw5Hi4nAZpFa6yAFIl4EJebFGg6VQeI3/nddf kz+a8bIuCZ+nwLWC5gby0Z62Ob573evbbJui2kfNT6DBWE15UOE2bUiidmt7NBqqm5CC ocEQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533mzfgfcSOAsDpA9rO36iYEhGAA4tF5cb/aQFMm0Ir4f9DhbELb F8ri8W9OAzOXvJuTVqj+vyQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwr8rmdlj27hRPGAsQjoGELSadhS6i8HUm884Suw3+dYk9TiTfbmYbQWUsLZY4xr8WmDMzHlw== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:df9a:: with SMTP id b26mr18034715edy.107.1638963502765; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.21 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:22 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 15/18] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:30 +0200 Message-Id: <9ea8e4b68d98e22e0e7e818e64bbc86f73d46c1e.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This allows making a key apply to an addr/prefix instead of just the full addr. This is enabled through a custom flag, default behavior is still full address match. This is equivalent to TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX from TCP_MD5SIG and has the same use-cases. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 10 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index e57bc732f737..6c50395c0412 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ int l3index; + /** @prefix: Length of addr match (default full) */ + int prefixlen; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index ed27feb93b0e..b1063e1e1b9f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -403,18 +403,21 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN: Valid value in `tcp_authopt.prefixlen`, otherwise + * match full address length */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN = (1 << 6), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -465,10 +468,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. * * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` */ int ifindex; + /** + * @prefixlen: length of prefix to match + * + * Without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN flag this is ignored and a full + * address match is performed. + */ + int prefixlen; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 946d598258b1..5069bb80054e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,8 +1,13 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/in6.h" +#include "linux/inetdevice.h" #include "linux/net.h" +#include "linux/socket.h" +#include "linux/tcp.h" +#include "net/ipv6.h" #include #include #include #include @@ -219,10 +224,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && info->prefixlen != key->prefixlen) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -236,17 +245,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + u32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (iph->saddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) { struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&ip6h->saddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); } /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. */ @@ -262,16 +274,19 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) return false; if (keyaf == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + u32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) { struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); } return false; } @@ -296,10 +311,16 @@ static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authop /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) return false; if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) return true; + /* Full address match overrides match by prefixlen */ + if (!(new->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && (old->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + /* Longer prefixes are better matches */ + if (new->prefixlen > old->prefixlen) + return true; return false; } static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_info *info, @@ -596,20 +617,31 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) +static bool ipv6_addr_is_prefix(struct in6_addr *addr, int plen) +{ + struct in6_addr copy; + + ipv6_addr_prefix_copy(©, addr, plen); + + return !!memcmp(©, addr, sizeof(*addr)); +} + int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int l3index = 0; + int prefixlen; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -641,10 +673,36 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family) return -EINVAL; } + /* check prefixlen */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) { + prefixlen = opt.prefixlen; + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 32) + return -EINVAL; + if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&opt.addr)->sin_addr.s_addr & + ~inet_make_mask(prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 128) + return -EINVAL; + if (!ipv6_addr_is_prefix(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&opt.addr)->sin6_addr, + prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) + prefixlen = 32; + else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) + prefixlen = 128; + else + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); @@ -688,10 +746,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); key_info->l3index = l3index; + key_info->prefixlen = prefixlen; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); return 0; } From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522609 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3EB3DC433EF for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232835AbhLHLnf (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:35 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57880 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232757AbhLHLm7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:59 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x52d.google.com (mail-ed1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E24F5C061746; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:25 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id w1so7368891edc.6; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:25 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RVPT2+h1JMxni3JUffui8/RQgc3zJLoReDrrKPMolQw=; b=Y9VES6kVAajO2YukvLlA9DyY3xNj9FlpbNafOGMha8409a7Qq3Yup0H4JH2Zrl2eHj bNRnsZt3uSCQnReeW7260MH15gxIwTe7sKlU83FYkbpfWvoycwX9Va14Lm7EAIXJQPYU IdCoY2D9uH5tQZ6ctJbH7pmY0lZIYSC/ASBtJvd2yc2u8B6/CLeWVcNg0Ju9GtySzaP6 U3vkhKJ1BztXP4CzpBnkw5VJggSRqyWjit7O1jkJ85NGolri0N1oKM9UVy2x1USxYQ4s IIFBZGcixQGP9dBEj3+Mc8NnlZMQYp5+bJ/lizz9jZ/B1zMHrr83vEj+4C2ReHf6Lc63 5A7w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RVPT2+h1JMxni3JUffui8/RQgc3zJLoReDrrKPMolQw=; b=CJEgiX3OY3idQPpsYItcxh4IbEmaOcZxEk5rllatAm3JSP4Srn2ab4jX/J4uQhyhvw rWcfJuPew1n83tjEfCiUppj0QaIHicvXKqz/vDHf1HM2aka3LNI2+4PlTnevBI5XodId DNqRkvl+1sLqX5pHNiJqURflx10JTU+8F6DLj1yR22B8dfaQera5l/LA9MH90r4q8fVR ke/S2+Rl6bNTZIBJvd/6BclkZ6mUZ70ocGVKDixSSdSfo7hWWPet/j0xtmZu+v/wBMDj JZM/PVlcz4pNT+zCjhUs+KDmnbnptN1pXi4SKg1yjnH/xP7OZFSQ4ZXvNgTi0Ymb6aoG Xe9g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5326eQWOj1AYgbaO62tcf4yPuBWJnJyV1+4eO4qNKjaFy4/rurCw sVhjdYpQSZsPsjWXunff3q8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJye+pih97YuJGTbr+n4wXZbAcpr8J3iys2HHJt+y0QlUMC+bAMZBs6n/t+DYw4FCz9c/L8VRw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:fb17:: with SMTP id lz23mr6702930ejb.149.1638963504451; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.22 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:24 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 16/18] selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:31 +0200 Message-Id: <70cc6300b78d75fd36adb57b17e7208c2f0788f4.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is in preparation for reusing the same option for TCP-AO Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 50 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c index d9a6fd2cd9d3..3841e5fec7c7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c @@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ struct sock_args { const char *clientns; const char *serverns; const char *password; const char *client_pw; - /* prefix for MD5 password */ - const char *md5_prefix_str; + /* prefix for MD5/AO*/ + const char *key_addr_prefix_str; union { struct sockaddr_in v4; struct sockaddr_in6 v6; - } md5_prefix; - unsigned int prefix_len; + } key_addr; + unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len; /* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex; /* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev; @@ -264,16 +264,16 @@ static int tcp_md5sig(int sd, void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args int rc; md5sig.tcpm_keylen = keylen; memcpy(md5sig.tcpm_key, args->password, keylen); - if (args->prefix_len) { + if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { opt = TCP_MD5SIG_EXT; md5sig.tcpm_flags |= TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX; - md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->prefix_len; - addr = &args->md5_prefix; + md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + addr = &args->key_addr; } memcpy(&md5sig.tcpm_addr, addr, alen); if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >= 0) || args->bind_key_ifindex >= 1) { opt = TCP_MD5SIG_EXT; @@ -309,17 +309,17 @@ static int tcp_md5_remote(int sd, struct sock_args *args) int alen; switch (args->version) { case AF_INET: sin.sin_port = htons(args->port); - sin.sin_addr = args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + sin.sin_addr = args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; addr = &sin; alen = sizeof(sin); break; case AF_INET6: sin6.sin6_port = htons(args->port); - sin6.sin6_addr = args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + sin6.sin6_addr = args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; addr = &sin6; alen = sizeof(sin6); break; default: log_error("unknown address family\n"); @@ -705,11 +705,11 @@ enum addr_type { ADDR_TYPE_LOCAL, ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE, ADDR_TYPE_MCAST, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE, - ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX, + ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX, }; static int convert_addr(struct sock_args *args, const char *_str, enum addr_type atype) { @@ -745,32 +745,32 @@ static int convert_addr(struct sock_args *args, const char *_str, break; case ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE: desc = "expected remote"; addr = &args->expected_raddr; break; - case ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX: - desc = "md5 prefix"; + case ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX: + desc = "key addr prefix"; if (family == AF_INET) { - args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_family = AF_INET; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + args->key_addr.v4.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr = &args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; } else if (family == AF_INET6) { - args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + args->key_addr.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + addr = &args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; } else return 1; sep = strchr(str, '/'); if (sep) { *sep = '\0'; sep++; if (str_to_uint(sep, 1, pfx_len_max, - &args->prefix_len) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port\n"); + &args->key_addr_prefix_len) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid prefix\n"); return 1; } } else { - args->prefix_len = 0; + args->key_addr_prefix_len = 0; } break; default: log_error("unknown address type\n"); exit(1); @@ -835,13 +835,13 @@ static int validate_addresses(struct sock_args *args) if (args->remote_addr_str && convert_addr(args, args->remote_addr_str, ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE) < 0) return 1; - if (args->md5_prefix_str && - convert_addr(args, args->md5_prefix_str, - ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX) < 0) + if (args->key_addr_prefix_str && + convert_addr(args, args->key_addr_prefix_str, + ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX) < 0) return 1; if (args->expected_laddr_str && convert_addr(args, args->expected_laddr_str, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL)) @@ -2020,11 +2020,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) break; case 'X': args.client_pw = optarg; break; case 'm': - args.md5_prefix_str = optarg; + args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg; break; case 'S': args.use_setsockopt = 1; break; case 'f': @@ -2079,17 +2079,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) return 1; } } if (args.password && - ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.md5_prefix_str) || + ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.key_addr_prefix_str) || args.type != SOCK_STREAM)) { log_error("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n"); return 1; } - if (args.md5_prefix_str && !args.password) { + if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) { log_error("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n"); return 1; } if (iter == 0) { From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522306 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56591C43217 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231409AbhLHLne (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:34 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57666 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232744AbhLHLnA (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:00 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x531.google.com (mail-ed1-x531.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::531]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1242BC079797; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:31 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x531.google.com with SMTP id y12so7244707eda.12; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:31 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Z/6Jjle9VKxjdiEALibfU5pwCYQ5kKTnkqqezPzIfas=; b=oEVk5ce3KTsWNzZoP2/t13G0CqrChIjN7ryG0tRwI5Na5Qn0xlGfQVcV3IlNmpu6lx R+7+UbOY0MeF+56z6qYRPqtR3HrOE4r50Xe8zgKPBGEjQi8k8nzNO5ii22DzATz2e4Gq PTANAuLNeq3S264H6R8FyKXh43pS5+yyLhYp7GAOLH/bxFYmRbmHzmLl4h+p8PI8gjiT zIpHg+bsFHk5zYkmgB7/CXMc7UcKoHimrx+GQpTR/+DBvjQODxM1pK3B9FiXEtY+0AuF AJ7mcjkg/8ln765BJhbsCZANfFO4jjGCh23AHGZqnnYHYUwEJXP+uzm4wR2fazR6MqOq 17tw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Z/6Jjle9VKxjdiEALibfU5pwCYQ5kKTnkqqezPzIfas=; b=Vdyrgeaai+/C6TC+eTYJNajQWSDE91gRLjWrlVhGilLdcCWJJRPcdF+trvHqW70aEt fO++pg9D/TBFmuF7m3vjJ5pPESCPFWdWPhmSo1gPubVpucsy7fO/QuEwORmlcwvb2o0m 40MHBcRuxb3Trdjb5QqfuaJPHCq+UUV040o8AYnEm/82sgmipb4Qx4SAr1Ur2Cu7J0I8 2XWRfMLl/3gQ9/fKb4NRu4cFjLZxmgW3/YSXBPzKVJakQdzhf1FyTi8Uh2VgVAGou+TT CgnRQSz+j/ieh997S8JWqVQJjK7YnvCOrQYFq4MNB/96xujY3WWmFUO1XogcwaBLZpAW bw6w== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533d60QLJyT5QNG/c55EfHXn8++1DhSE9P1HdlRIX56NM/saP/xn 7s0Std4FdBWM7HEwjiNi++c= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzShdk89Bpgr3WBylG4KP/u+N9tcr8eFK4X0GXimP0LdeTKQ+zQz3vV+Z2I58gtecGwvgdOqA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:4bcf:: with SMTP id x15mr6937221ejv.273.1638963506144; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:26 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.24 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:25 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 17/18] selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:32 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add support for configuring TCP Authentication Option. Only a single key is supported with default options. Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c index 3841e5fec7c7..5fe7354c40cf 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c @@ -104,10 +104,12 @@ struct sock_args { } key_addr; unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len; /* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex; + const char *authopt_password; + /* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev; const char *expected_server_dev; int expected_ifindex; @@ -254,10 +256,54 @@ static int switch_ns(const char *ns) close(fd); return ret; } +static int tcp_set_authopt(int sd, struct sock_args *args) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key key; + int rc; + + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + strcpy((char *)key.key, args->authopt_password); + key.keylen = strlen(args->authopt_password); + key.alg = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96; + + if (args->key_addr_prefix_str) { + key.flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND; + switch (args->version) { + case AF_INET: + memcpy(&key.addr, &args->key_addr.v4, sizeof(args->key_addr.v4)); + break; + case AF_INET6: + memcpy(&key.addr, &args->key_addr.v6, sizeof(args->key_addr.v6)); + break; + default: + log_error("unknown address family\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { + key.flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN; + key.prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + } + } + + if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >= 0) || args->bind_key_ifindex >= 1) { + key.flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX; + key.ifindex = args->ifindex; + log_msg("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX set ifindex=%d\n", key.ifindex); + } else { + log_msg("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX off\n", key.ifindex); + } + + rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY, &key, sizeof(key)); + if (rc < 0) + log_err_errno("setsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY)"); + + return rc; +} + static int tcp_md5sig(int sd, void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args) { int keylen = strlen(args->password); struct tcp_md5sig md5sig = {}; int opt = TCP_MD5SIG; @@ -1541,10 +1587,15 @@ static int do_server(struct sock_args *args, int ipc_fd) if (args->password && tcp_md5_remote(lsd, args)) { close(lsd); goto err_exit; } + if (args->authopt_password && tcp_set_authopt(lsd, args)) { + close(lsd); + goto err_exit; + } + ipc_write(ipc_fd, 1); while (1) { log_msg("waiting for client connection.\n"); FD_ZERO(&rfds); FD_SET(lsd, &rfds); @@ -1663,10 +1714,13 @@ static int connectsock(void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args) goto out; if (args->password && tcp_md5sig(sd, addr, alen, args)) goto err; + if (args->authopt_password && tcp_set_authopt(sd, args)) + goto err; + if (args->bind_test_only) goto out; if (connect(sd, addr, alen) < 0) { if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { @@ -1852,11 +1906,11 @@ static int ipc_parent(int cpid, int fd, struct sock_args *args) wait(&status); return client_status; } -#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf" +#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:A:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf" #define OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1001 #define OPT_NO_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1002 static struct option long_opts[] = { {"force-bind-key-ifindex", 0, 0, OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX}, @@ -1897,14 +1951,15 @@ static void print_usage(char *prog) " -L len send random message of given length\n" " -n num number of times to send message\n" "\n" " -M password use MD5 sum protection\n" " -X password MD5 password for client mode\n" - " -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5 key\n" - " --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX off\n" - " --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX on\n" + " -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5/AO key\n" + " --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force disable binding key to ifindex\n" + " --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force enable binding key to ifindex\n" " (default: only if -I is passed)\n" + " -A password use RFC5925 TCP Authentication Option with password\n" "\n" " -g grp multicast group (e.g., 239.1.1.1)\n" " -i interactive mode (default is echo and terminate)\n" "\n" " -0 addr Expected local address\n" @@ -2022,10 +2077,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.client_pw = optarg; break; case 'm': args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg; break; + case 'A': + args.authopt_password = optarg; + break; case 'S': args.use_setsockopt = 1; break; case 'f': args.use_freebind = 1; @@ -2085,12 +2143,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.type != SOCK_STREAM)) { log_error("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n"); return 1; } - if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) { - log_error("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n"); + if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password && !args.authopt_password) { + log_error("Prefix range for authentication requires -M or -A\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (args.key_addr_prefix_len && args.authopt_password) { + log_error("TCP-AO does not support prefix match, only full address\n"); return 1; } if (iter == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid number of messages to send\n"); From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522307 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36D7EC433F5 for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232676AbhLHLnd (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:33 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57596 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232775AbhLHLnA (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:00 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94B8FC07E5C1; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:32 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id v1so7467204edx.2; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:32 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=va63/N8CYQSmLkQGhzY2hoE/p0MPavl2wkjpqBvYrRY=; b=kF7IgW785YxstHwbtnA4dOEnEW+K1MbxCrRk2Ns4UpyCKrb79XmMuE1MGl5tThmKUA XHKqLJuXWRXRd0rXTWLzvxveIm0aS5priRIDBLlzuNgxrsh+nbYArkRH8hSzJaHMrfWE S0ORT/OsOQBYleoOWw2G4QhKB2YhcPIHj+bDpX+PFmjiEZQYEOqwu2i37A6HoO5l7Bb+ h3T41E05a+QbEsI7Lt6HeoptD1JdSekDBYwD2FvuwIEOdYj2CeYDdl4DXD4dZ/GtGZTA 5R7bS44cEzNBALrgcg6zjAAKAHYjOc5pIjW9e5WQPpRKMjbFaWlT3AoYHBkS2Tni/ALC B/oA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=va63/N8CYQSmLkQGhzY2hoE/p0MPavl2wkjpqBvYrRY=; b=F3nJUAD3Pi2Xz4HpY36oBPjNq5Ay39xk47m9OKtXralO2E+psxzn1/74VUt80LIMu/ eigOL36Jz0PjsulVR/0Vwz0zu5ZW0ydUgV5goDLIVeJO8M0JzvZ00NdrP/tNlux3Tlf5 ZQK8ElEOeiJEqxCgW8koCAdWCqpFPAeb1Xwb5CdJmWfCx3oynk+y6A7gZ5D9R2vhxDTS mTT2gkzY8pu4qGqtxlpcLw4PfjSKuO4CZBr8o88TdOYTLzNl7K2opDtjqpFYw8qd0q1a 5gdfp90W423vLpjVvF9Nx2GV2YU/68O2PwJqTG2spNalh7cGAXEGeb9xWnSsnMk2L5D9 exQg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530PW/zAilEE1XNSOciIZgUeQ3ToKLWBxExBM0cCfnSnxdayVchL bGg5fGXm5XHPHaaqvYTW754= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx6aJZmM5GWY1yC6x8dDsBuVJ4QfZjtgxxoq88csbSXQgRn0a/SGf90hhYU9RvGN5DI8MWuUQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:2d0e:: with SMTP id gs14mr6831555ejc.249.1638963511090; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.29 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:30 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 18/18] selftests: net/fcnal: Initial tcp_authopt support Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:33 +0200 Message-Id: <718934913b81a01d2d2a9479ea4eb645234d7697.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Tests are mostly copied from tcp_md5 with minor changes. It covers VRF support but only based on binding multiple servers: not multiple keys bound to different interfaces. Also add a specific -t tcp_authopt to run only these tests specifically. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 298 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh index 32d5f7bc588e..e99b44f0ae5a 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh @@ -807,10 +807,301 @@ ipv4_ping() } ################################################################################ # IPv4 TCP +# +# TCP Authentication Option Tests +# + +# try to enable tcp_authopt sysctl +enable_tcp_authopt() +{ + if [[ -e /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt ]]; then + sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_authopt=1 + fi +} + +# check if tcp_authopt is compiled with a client-side bind test +has_tcp_authopt() +{ + run_cmd_nsb nettest -b -A ${MD5_PW} -r ${NSA_IP} +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Single address config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" + + # client in prefix + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Prefix config" + + # client in prefix, wrong password + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client uses wrong password" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client uses wrong password" + + # client outside of prefix + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout due to MD5 mismatch" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -c ${NSB_LO_IP} -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client address not in configured prefix" +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Simple correct config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default-VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default-VRF and VRF, client in default-VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default-VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default-VRF pw" + + test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0 +} + +test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0() +{ + # This particular test needs tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 for Global server to accept VRF connections + local old_tcp_l3mdev_accept + old_tcp_l3mdev_accept=$(get_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept) + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Global server, Key bound to ifindex=0 rejects VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key bound to ifindex=0 accepts non-VRF connection" + log_start + + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts non-VRF connection" + + # restore value + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept="$old_tcp_l3mdev_accept" +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default-VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default-VRF and VRF, client in default-VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default-VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default-VRF pw" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in def VRF and VRF, conn in def VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in dev VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with def VRF pw" +} + +only_tcp_authopt() +{ + log_section "TCP Authentication Option" + + setup + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 no VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 no VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf + + setup "yes" + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf +} + # # MD5 tests without VRF # ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf() { @@ -1192,10 +1483,11 @@ ipv4_tcp_novrf() show_hint "Should fail 'Connection refused'" run_cmd nettest -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv4_tcp_vrf() { local a @@ -1246,10 +1538,12 @@ ipv4_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" # run MD5 tests ipv4_tcp_md5 + # run AO tests + ipv6_tcp_md5_vrf # # enable VRF global server # log_subsection "VRF Global server enabled" @@ -2672,10 +2966,11 @@ ipv6_tcp_novrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" done ipv6_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv6_tcp_vrf() { local a @@ -2742,10 +3037,12 @@ ipv6_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" # run MD5 tests ipv6_tcp_md5 + # run AO tests + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf # # enable VRF global server # log_subsection "VRF Global server enabled" @@ -4102,10 +4399,11 @@ do ipv6_bind|bind6) ipv6_addr_bind;; ipv6_runtime) ipv6_runtime;; ipv6_netfilter) ipv6_netfilter;; use_cases) use_cases;; + tcp_authopt) only_tcp_authopt;; # setup namespaces and config, but do not run any tests setup) setup; exit 0;; vrf_setup) setup "yes"; exit 0;; esac