From patchwork Mon May 16 19:36:40 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg KH X-Patchwork-Id: 573241 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20FA1C38A2E for ; Mon, 16 May 2022 20:13:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346747AbiEPUL4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 16:11:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51624 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1350993AbiEPUBy (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 16:01:54 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4655147561; Mon, 16 May 2022 12:56:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 070C2B81607; Mon, 16 May 2022 19:56:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 70504C385AA; Mon, 16 May 2022 19:56:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1652730981; bh=I5cs4rPMg6JZJCSn7sJ6TZVwO84ivOWm5OxLrZprd7k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ahwNEdnO3eRpO7hnldwjHKoPjQdMa/nrf6nCzbv8hZuP4wsIeGReAbEiV0kC92QeE qwWpt+UJgGKwHMPBRTiWsCGYWfBvtGq9clpvyC9yKveTbHncGwEgwik95bBLtgOvId 4ov3rM76E6OiKxb7xhRJmQ8p4QLux3UfvC1TLVPc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Moshe Kol , Yossi Gilad , Amit Klein , Eric Dumazet , Willy Tarreau , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.17 066/114] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 21:36:40 +0200 Message-Id: <20220516193627.387650809@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220516193625.489108457@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220516193625.489108457@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Willy Tarreau [ Upstream commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 ] Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation, and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds. Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers, database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few entries will be visited, like before. A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance difference from the previous value. Reported-by: Moshe Kol Reported-by: Yossi Gilad Reported-by: Amit Klein Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 48ca07853068..cc5f66328b47 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -726,11 +726,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this * property might be used by clever attacker. - * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, - * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and - * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though + * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really + * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel + * memory. */ -#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) static u32 *table_perturb;