From patchwork Mon May 16 19:36:04 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg KH X-Patchwork-Id: 573277 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 157F9C4332F for ; Mon, 16 May 2022 20:08:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230526AbiEPUHy (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 16:07:54 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48852 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349854AbiEPUAd (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 16:00:33 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C945144A20; Mon, 16 May 2022 12:54:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E3111B81616; Mon, 16 May 2022 19:54:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 229C1C34100; Mon, 16 May 2022 19:54:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1652730871; bh=cuKichH73sDTAWETAXC1JTIM2p/rWmO8HVY3pasalVI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gaNtxX+J1dXgFwEqhKlvrr8FbbGa1j9DEEtGoEX+b/mp0Fi63kWXQV0uWmyqpwP92 DtT8/pNh6XiGSLVWlgQTJxUSduy8HXgbWbOyfyoKJIKR/Wm4eel5QwGEFKhpBG7aAq rZouUw/VGmq+Jjpe6CbI38ihfUM5lcO+vugviFcY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kalesh Singh , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , Christian Brauner , Suren Baghdasaryan , Hridya Valsaraju , Jann Horn , Andrew Morton , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.17 030/114] procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 21:36:04 +0200 Message-Id: <20220516193626.355918780@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220516193625.489108457@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220516193625.489108457@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Kalesh Singh [ Upstream commit 1927e498aee1757b3df755a194cbfc5cc0f2b663 ] The file permissions on the fdinfo dir from were changed from S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR to S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, and a PTRACE_MODE_READ check was added for opening the fdinfo files [1]. However, the ptrace permission check was not added to the directory, allowing anyone to get the open FD numbers by reading the fdinfo directory. Add the missing ptrace permission check for opening the fdinfo directory. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-1-kaleshsingh@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210713162008.1056986-1-kaleshsingh@google.com Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Hridya Valsaraju Cc: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/proc/fd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 172c86270b31..913bef0d2a36 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) { bool allowed = false; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -86,6 +86,16 @@ static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!allowed) return -EACCES; + return 0; +} + +static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); + + if (ret) + return ret; + return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); } @@ -348,12 +358,23 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } +static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + return 0; +} + const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { + .open = proc_open_fdinfo, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, .llseek = generic_file_llseek,