From patchwork Tue Apr 12 06:27:46 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 560687 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB074C47087 for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 06:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1351362AbiDLG6Y (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 02:58:24 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48084 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1351737AbiDLGyS (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 02:54:18 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A125338D88; Mon, 11 Apr 2022 23:43:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 04E04B81B29; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 06:43:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4E161C385A6; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 06:43:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1649745826; bh=tghxGsbaqHcpP6pV6vKAw/1Th5K64SKUYwOYUvBJVKU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=TcIdFtMCD/xnMjQ5oaQ6ML0kRBpS+W0pNDlSTjWAZu3sD7Lwmq2NhhqF3lAHK9Jh2 b705FjosqfAh/5Zn/DomlVa66xpdI4VNKPBxPxU7KZYEDEBO6XIg4cHbPX4keKdGVN jZMfEBHL3+ffnZonb+Iz1mlmcIRB7oxM9QlrcGKY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jordy Zomer , Mike Snitzer , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 063/277] dm ioctl: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 08:27:46 +0200 Message-Id: <20220412062943.872540302@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412062942.022903016@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220412062942.022903016@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Jordy Zomer [ Upstream commit cd9c88da171a62c4b0f1c70e50c75845969fbc18 ] It appears like cmd could be a Spectre v1 gadget as it's supplied by a user and used as an array index. Prevent the contents of kernel memory from being leaked to userspace via speculative execution by using array_index_nospec. Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c index 21fe8652b095..901abd6dea41 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1788,6 +1789,7 @@ static ioctl_fn lookup_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, int *ioctl_flags) if (unlikely(cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(_ioctls))) return NULL; + cmd = array_index_nospec(cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(_ioctls)); *ioctl_flags = _ioctls[cmd].flags; return _ioctls[cmd].fn; }