From patchwork Tue Apr 5 07:32:29 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 556620 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E766AC43219 for ; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 12:16:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1382465AbiDEMPY (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:15:24 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56634 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242815AbiDEKfU (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 06:35:20 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7FDFE527DF; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 03:21:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1CE68616D7; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 10:21:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2C024C385A1; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 10:21:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1649154090; bh=aHVl+/EsQrR9neBjGG86Q9pePZdY475UvksKXzhKhz8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Gm+Ll8AGwp3hgLuUc+0/D+fVmfjEkR6St1QT2z+7P4/POcRdW+qMuVwxka6BPtHN3 ASf25ArvboCgdHBLxnNar6UImaZtf0rre4Ci7Z+mAtPiUJyotY6X6WsqoVR80x7Ylz mRqfeNQHuNBzGa0choEk8d0bUa/GYPRx7GYQJ8ZY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Richard Haines , Paul Moore , Sasha Levin , Demi Marie Obenour Subject: [PATCH 5.10 455/599] selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:32:29 +0200 Message-Id: <20220405070312.369797977@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220405070258.802373272@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220405070258.802373272@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Richard Haines [ Upstream commit 65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949 ] These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it. As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls. Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour Signed-off-by: Richard Haines [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 +++++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 63e61f2f1ad6..8c901ae05dd8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3647,6 +3647,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; + case FIOCLEX: + case FIONCLEX: + if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec()) + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); + break; + /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 2ec038efbb03..a9e572ca4fd9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC, __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index b89289f092c9..ebd64afe1def 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { "always_check_network", "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", - "genfs_seclabel_symlinks" + "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", + "ioctl_skip_cloexec" }; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 63ca6e79daeb..1521460a97d4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); +} + struct selinux_policy_convert_data; struct selinux_load_state {