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[v2,4.19,12/19] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper

Message ID 20210528103810.22025-13-ovidiu.panait@windriver.com
State New
Headers show
Series bpf: fix verifier selftests, add CVE-2021-29155, CVE-2021-33200 fixes | expand

Commit Message

Ovidiu Panait May 28, 2021, 10:38 a.m. UTC 
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 upstream.

Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
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Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 473b59126f61..faa2a4c3467d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2911,6 +2911,41 @@  static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+	 */
+	if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (dst_reg->type) {
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+				       dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -3118,23 +3153,8 @@  static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 
-	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
-	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
-	 */
-	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
-		if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
-		    check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
-			return -EACCES;
-		} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
-			   check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
-					      dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
-	}
+	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+		return -EACCES;
 
 	return 0;
 }