From patchwork Tue Nov 3 20:34:26 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 317191 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9246C388F9 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 20:46:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5F7622404 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 20:46:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1604436362; bh=CActLLvD+q74dzhnUMx7ltTT/sprag6VygVBUVQD3HI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=2rzcEb91zrycKervD4FoZxX/EA5bQhNKxjs6vnoe5+RCUcBtA7TGWBFpn07pH9BGp EKZZ8QQgpywebBwWN5p/pWXJ5pf1wvQyS3MriXtMvS1kaBUwGrnIqoxRrp056RD0dE iygeA5qb/VqLbAHOZKrXMAQNpvLGEKxMSd5PosKo= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730596AbgKCUqB (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Nov 2020 15:46:01 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:34866 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731125AbgKCUqA (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Nov 2020 15:46:00 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4BEFA22404; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 20:45:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1604436359; bh=CActLLvD+q74dzhnUMx7ltTT/sprag6VygVBUVQD3HI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=REigPqKFDuP+L2WCZyhnFHTAVeLK6WhvBkZJhfM5OBkEIkk0HMxAnVCbVC9fli3R+ 6krt8KW+DgWqHChDTt98ScPjrhh+gIOf4M9G1cYUM7KKLk2l7Aoy77OZZGNsViAzv4 HMWevrvtY1j/ibOpGBvMd8SrnxOU0XnDCDzP3re0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Mimi Zohar , Luis Chamberlain , Scott Branden Subject: [PATCH 5.9 215/391] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 21:34:26 +0100 Message-Id: <20201103203401.441677789@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20201103203348.153465465@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20201103203348.153465465@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Kees Cook commit c307459b9d1fcb8bbf3ea5a4162979532322ef77 upstream. FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how" should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs. Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer") Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)") Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain Acked-by: Scott Branden Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++--- fs/exec.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 1 - kernel/module.c | 2 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++---- 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c @@ -470,14 +470,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device int i, len; int rc = -ENOENT; char *path; - enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE; size_t msize = INT_MAX; void *buffer = NULL; /* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */ if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) { buffer = fw_priv->data; - id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER; msize = fw_priv->allocated_size; } @@ -501,7 +499,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, - &size, msize, id); + &size, msize, + READING_FIRMWARE); if (rc) { if (rc != -ENOENT) dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n", --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -955,6 +955,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, { loff_t i_size, pos; ssize_t bytes = 0; + void *allocated = NULL; int ret; if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0) @@ -978,8 +979,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, goto out; } - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) - *buf = vmalloc(i_size); + if (!*buf) + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size); if (!*buf) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -1008,7 +1009,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, out_free: if (ret < 0) { - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { + if (allocated) { vfree(*buf); *buf = NULL; } --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2861,7 +2861,6 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int); #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \ id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \ id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \ - id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \ id(MODULE, kernel-module) \ id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \ id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \ --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -4028,7 +4028,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, c { struct load_info info = { }; loff_t size; - void *hdr; + void *hdr = NULL; int err; err = may_init_module(); --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsig int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { - void *data; + void *data = NULL; loff_t size; int rc; key_perm_t perm; --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) { - void *data; + void *data = NULL; char *datap; loff_t size; int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -621,19 +621,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry * int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { /* - * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER - * * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two - * buffers? + * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address + * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check. */ return 0; } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,