From patchwork Mon Aug 17 15:11:32 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 266062 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82AEFC433E1 for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:09:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6389E20738 for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:09:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1597691374; bh=YDax2OX2p4v22GlvBNRFuW6w724dSBt5Jqzdo602esg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=04ZcVoZX0j22izn1xkGbMr3uY7eOmLHed7q29qCEXRCmX5mUOTzlYNkigQAGpsJEv utCMmP+L1doSKofAo34w79yBUIUbq0U/vcO0CGPM5xY0TxZu6QRQIzBUnl2Zi/qRAP q4ljS8YSMnKXEOEc8sX733bw3D3+JNlv+nSmCiYg= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2391964AbgHQTJ3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Aug 2020 15:09:29 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52424 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387530AbgHQPmW (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Aug 2020 11:42:22 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7E5B522D01; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 15:42:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1597678942; bh=YDax2OX2p4v22GlvBNRFuW6w724dSBt5Jqzdo602esg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=V0WngQBEphhB0+3uk0rVxHVexKnL/Qtxq9q9ktz/pyFZGxpPAQU3xl6pGVdp6uE7q EFFXFuNUOEo3j/NXdhmQr/Z5vdSNXtHjG8RMlzFzwE/An8iGSaRtfK0BS+UT1d+JB8 YVHe8agVd7V8d7PS1UVQg3feRQuxvf/SeHx2AEF8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks , Jarkko Sakkinen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.7 042/393] tpm: Require that all digests are present in TCG_PCR_EVENT2 structures Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:11:32 +0200 Message-Id: <20200817143821.643020135@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200817143819.579311991@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200817143819.579311991@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Tyler Hicks [ Upstream commit 7f3d176f5f7e3f0477bf82df0f600fcddcdcc4e4 ] Require that the TCG_PCR_EVENT2.digests.count value strictly matches the value of TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms in the event field of the TCG_PCClientPCREvent event log header. Also require that TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms is non-zero. The TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification section 9.1 (Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 1.04) states: For each Hash algorithm enumerated in the TCG_PCClientPCREvent entry, there SHALL be a corresponding digest in all TCG_PCR_EVENT2 structures. Note: This includes EV_NO_ACTION events which do not extend the PCR. Section 9.4.5.1 provides this description of TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms: The number of Hash algorithms in the digestSizes field. This field MUST be set to a value of 0x01 or greater. Enforce these restrictions, as required by the above specification, in order to better identify and ignore invalid sequences of bytes at the end of an otherwise valid TPM2 event log. Firmware doesn't always have the means necessary to inform the kernel of the actual event log size so the kernel's event log parsing code should be stringent when parsing the event log for resiliency against firmware bugs. This is true, for example, when firmware passes the event log to the kernel via a reserved memory region described in device tree. POWER and some ARM systems use the "linux,sml-base" and "linux,sml-size" device tree properties to describe the memory region used to pass the event log from firmware to the kernel. Unfortunately, the "linux,sml-size" property describes the size of the entire reserved memory region rather than the size of the event long within the memory region and the event log format does not include information describing the size of the event log. tpm_read_log_of(), in drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/of.c, is where the "linux,sml-size" property is used. At the end of that function, log->bios_event_log_end is pointing at the end of the reserved memory region. That's typically 0x10000 bytes offset from "linux,sml-base", depending on what's defined in the device tree source. The firmware event log only fills a portion of those 0x10000 bytes and the rest of the memory region should be zeroed out by firmware. Even in the case of a properly zeroed bytes in the remainder of the memory region, the only thing allowing the kernel's event log parser to detect the end of the event log is the following conditional in __calc_tpm2_event_size(): if (event_type == 0 && event_field->event_size == 0) size = 0; If that wasn't there, __calc_tpm2_event_size() would think that a 16 byte sequence of zeroes, following an otherwise valid event log, was a valid event. However, problems can occur if a single bit is set in the offset corresponding to either the TCG_PCR_EVENT2.eventType or TCG_PCR_EVENT2.eventSize fields, after the last valid event log entry. This could confuse the parser into thinking that an additional entry is present in the event log and exposing this invalid entry to userspace in the /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements file. Such problems have been seen if firmware does not fully zero the memory region upon a warm reboot. This patch significantly raises the bar on how difficult it is for stale/invalid memory to confuse the kernel's event log parser but there's still, ultimately, a reliance on firmware to properly initialize the remainder of the memory region reserved for the event log as the parser cannot be expected to detect a stale but otherwise properly formatted firmware event log entry. Fixes: fd5c78694f3f ("tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h index 96d36b7a13440..6f1d1b7f8b429 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -211,9 +211,16 @@ static inline int __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event, efispecid = (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)event_header->event; - /* Check if event is malformed. */ + /* + * Perform validation of the event in order to identify malformed + * events. This function may be asked to parse arbitrary byte sequences + * immediately following a valid event log. The caller expects this + * function to recognize that the byte sequence is not a valid event + * and to return an event size of 0. + */ if (memcmp(efispecid->signature, TCG_SPECID_SIG, - sizeof(TCG_SPECID_SIG)) || count > efispecid->num_algs) { + sizeof(TCG_SPECID_SIG)) || + !efispecid->num_algs || count != efispecid->num_algs) { size = 0; goto out; }