From patchwork Mon Feb 3 16:19:50 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 232214 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96D07C35249 for ; Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:30:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BF882080C for ; Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:30:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1580747402; bh=rOC8U+f1daTPhWJ4bxWs0HkmJ05pAb0NOy3PkAdNkRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=xilg1m6tRBA7aoOoqjRAU7V9FXegu7huZZ/fz3HYVksDiwVV7FM77QdmY4pTMU/gr eJjhriEKEfMDpPGPM+C1a658ZjAHtkZaJkYFi5MWDgiDPtF581H5oal+67kV7oBYP7 1VF+22pdXJZ7FbgRTQyKG7OPUo6PY24OWGn4NKpc= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729906AbgBCQaA (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Feb 2020 11:30:00 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42230 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729903AbgBCQaA (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Feb 2020 11:30:00 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [104.132.45.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1165C2051A; Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:29:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1580747399; bh=rOC8U+f1daTPhWJ4bxWs0HkmJ05pAb0NOy3PkAdNkRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yp6SVhCYkSOIf5E7j7468/Pbb8ISPEDa8xwK433Zmzui3+uHNINGUjb08mOXnM8Rw 8C2lrkI3ZjcJcUTwQUS1knOaMSnw9z83klPjZsxiJsrSVlYFo+neaUHsIZDQl2YqGS y2duRj1vlx3TPlpVUEczyt/u7u1CZvtzugHNSEMM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jouni Malinen , Johannes Berg , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 65/89] mac80211: Fix TKIP replay protection immediately after key setup Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:19:50 +0000 Message-Id: <20200203161925.006283716@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0 In-Reply-To: <20200203161916.847439465@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200203161916.847439465@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Jouni Malinen [ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ] TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame from the AP is received by the station. Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK). Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/mac80211/tkip.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/tkip.c b/net/mac80211/tkip.c index b3622823bad23..ebd66e8f46b3f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tkip.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.c @@ -266,9 +266,21 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, if ((keyid >> 6) != key->conf.keyidx) return TKIP_DECRYPT_INVALID_KEYIDX; - if (rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT && - (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 || - (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 && iv16 <= rx_ctx->iv16))) + /* Reject replays if the received TSC is smaller than or equal to the + * last received value in a valid message, but with an exception for + * the case where a new key has been set and no valid frame using that + * key has yet received and the local RSC was initialized to 0. This + * exception allows the very first frame sent by the transmitter to be + * accepted even if that transmitter were to use TSC 0 (IEEE 802.11 + * described TSC to be initialized to 1 whenever a new key is taken into + * use). + */ + if (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 || + (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 && + (iv16 < rx_ctx->iv16 || + (iv16 == rx_ctx->iv16 && + (rx_ctx->iv32 || rx_ctx->iv16 || + rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT))))) return TKIP_DECRYPT_REPLAY; if (only_iv) {