From patchwork Wed Mar 11 14:58:50 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: thermal-bot for Julien Panis X-Patchwork-Id: 229420 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44AB0C10F29 for ; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:59:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2897E20650 for ; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:58:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729584AbgCKO64 (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:58:56 -0400 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([193.142.43.55]:38596 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729309AbgCKO64 (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:58:56 -0400 Received: from [5.158.153.53] (helo=tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1jC2os-0002Ez-Pt; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:58:50 +0100 Received: from [127.0.1.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 598211C2209; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:58:50 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:58:50 -0000 From: "tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky" Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV Cc: Tom Lendacky , Borislav Petkov , Joerg Roedel , , x86 , LKML In-Reply-To: =?utf-8?q?=3C2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0=2E1582?= =?utf-8?q?645327=2Egit=2Ethomas=2Elendacky=40amd=2Ecom=3E?= References: =?utf-8?q?=3C2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0=2E15826?= =?utf-8?q?45327=2Egit=2Ethomas=2Elendacky=40amd=2Ecom=3E?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <158393873003.28353.16382331068625290742.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails X-Linutronix-Spam-Score: -1.0 X-Linutronix-Spam-Level: - X-Linutronix-Spam-Status: No , -1.0 points, 5.0 required, ALL_TRUSTED=-1, SHORTCIRCUIT=-0.0001 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 985e537a4082b4635754a57f4f95430790afee6a Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/985e537a4082b4635754a57f4f95430790afee6a Author: Tom Lendacky AuthorDate: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 18:35:57 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov CommitterDate: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:54:54 +01:00 x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV The dmidecode program fails to properly decode the SMBIOS data supplied by OVMF/UEFI when running in an SEV guest. The SMBIOS area, under SEV, is encrypted and resides in reserved memory that is marked as EFI runtime services data. As a result, when memremap() is attempted for the SMBIOS data, it can't be mapped as regular RAM (through try_ram_remap()) and, since the address isn't part of the iomem resources list, it isn't mapped encrypted through the fallback ioremap(). Add a new __ioremap_check_other() to deal with memory types like EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA which are not covered by the resource ranges. This allows any runtime services data which has been created encrypted, to be mapped encrypted too. [ bp: Move functionality to a separate function. ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel Tested-by: Joerg Roedel Cc: # 5.3 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0.1582645327.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com --- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 44e4beb..935a91e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -106,6 +106,19 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) return 0; } +/* + * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must + * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active. + */ +static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc) +{ + if (!sev_active()) + return; + + if (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA) + desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED; +} + static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg) { struct ioremap_desc *desc = arg; @@ -124,6 +137,9 @@ static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg) * To avoid multiple resource walks, this function walks resources marked as * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and looking for system RAM and/or a * resource described not as IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES). + * + * After that, deal with misc other ranges in __ioremap_check_other() which do + * not fall into the above category. */ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size, struct ioremap_desc *desc) @@ -135,6 +151,8 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size, memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ioremap_desc)); walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags); + + __ioremap_check_other(addr, desc); } /*