| Message ID | 20240813152054.2445099-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [PULL,1/4] hw/misc/stm32l4x5_rcc: Add validation for MCOPRE and MCOSEL values | expand |
On 13/08/2024 17.20, Peter Maydell wrote: > Our current usage of MMU indexes when EL3 is AArch32 is confused. > Architecturally, when EL3 is AArch32, all Secure code runs under the > Secure PL1&0 translation regime: > * code at EL3, which might be Mon, or SVC, or any of the > other privileged modes (PL1) > * code at EL0 (Secure PL0) > > This is different from when EL3 is AArch64, in which case EL3 is its > own translation regime, and EL1 and EL0 (whether AArch32 or AArch64) > have their own regime. > > We claimed to be mapping Secure PL1 to our ARMMMUIdx_EL3, but didn't > do anything special about Secure PL0, which meant it used the same > ARMMMUIdx_EL10_0 that NonSecure PL0 does. This resulted in a bug > where arm_sctlr() incorrectly picked the NonSecure SCTLR as the > controlling register when in Secure PL0, which meant we were > spuriously generating alignment faults because we were looking at the > wrong SCTLR control bits. > > The use of ARMMMUIdx_EL3 for Secure PL1 also resulted in the bug that > we wouldn't honour the PAN bit for Secure PL1, because there's no > equivalent _PAN mmu index for it. > > We could fix this in one of two ways: > * The most straightforward is to add new MMU indexes EL30_0, > EL30_3, EL30_3_PAN to correspond to "Secure PL1&0 at PL0", > "Secure PL1&0 at PL1", and "Secure PL1&0 at PL1 with PAN". > This matches how we use indexes for the AArch64 regimes, and > preserves propirties like being able to determine the privilege > level from an MMU index without any other information. However > it would add two MMU indexes (we can share one with ARMMMUIdx_EL3), > and we are already using 14 of the 16 the core TLB code permits. > > * The more complicated approach is the one we take here. We use > the same MMU indexes (E10_0, E10_1, E10_1_PAN) for Secure PL1&0 > than we do for NonSecure PL1&0. This saves on MMU indexes, but > means we need to check in some places whether we're in the > Secure PL1&0 regime or not before we interpret an MMU index. > > The changes in this commit were created by auditing all the places > where we use specific ARMMMUIdx_ values, and checking whether they > needed to be changed to handle the new index value usage. Hi Peter, this commit caused a regression with one of the Avocado tests: AVOCADO_ALLOW_LARGE_STORAGE=1 avocado run tests/avocado/boot_linux_console.py:BootLinuxConsole.test_arm_bpim2u_openwrt_22_03_3 is failing now. It works still fine before this commit. Could you please have a look? Thanks, Thomas
On Fri, 25 Oct 2024 at 13:54, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> wrote: > > On 13/08/2024 17.20, Peter Maydell wrote: > > Our current usage of MMU indexes when EL3 is AArch32 is confused. > > Architecturally, when EL3 is AArch32, all Secure code runs under the > > Secure PL1&0 translation regime: > > * code at EL3, which might be Mon, or SVC, or any of the > > other privileged modes (PL1) > > * code at EL0 (Secure PL0) > > > > This is different from when EL3 is AArch64, in which case EL3 is its > > own translation regime, and EL1 and EL0 (whether AArch32 or AArch64) > > have their own regime. > > > > We claimed to be mapping Secure PL1 to our ARMMMUIdx_EL3, but didn't > > do anything special about Secure PL0, which meant it used the same > > ARMMMUIdx_EL10_0 that NonSecure PL0 does. This resulted in a bug > > where arm_sctlr() incorrectly picked the NonSecure SCTLR as the > > controlling register when in Secure PL0, which meant we were > > spuriously generating alignment faults because we were looking at the > > wrong SCTLR control bits. > > > > The use of ARMMMUIdx_EL3 for Secure PL1 also resulted in the bug that > > we wouldn't honour the PAN bit for Secure PL1, because there's no > > equivalent _PAN mmu index for it. > > > > We could fix this in one of two ways: > > * The most straightforward is to add new MMU indexes EL30_0, > > EL30_3, EL30_3_PAN to correspond to "Secure PL1&0 at PL0", > > "Secure PL1&0 at PL1", and "Secure PL1&0 at PL1 with PAN". > > This matches how we use indexes for the AArch64 regimes, and > > preserves propirties like being able to determine the privilege > > level from an MMU index without any other information. However > > it would add two MMU indexes (we can share one with ARMMMUIdx_EL3), > > and we are already using 14 of the 16 the core TLB code permits. > > > > * The more complicated approach is the one we take here. We use > > the same MMU indexes (E10_0, E10_1, E10_1_PAN) for Secure PL1&0 > > than we do for NonSecure PL1&0. This saves on MMU indexes, but > > means we need to check in some places whether we're in the > > Secure PL1&0 regime or not before we interpret an MMU index. > > > > The changes in this commit were created by auditing all the places > > where we use specific ARMMMUIdx_ values, and checking whether they > > needed to be changed to handle the new index value usage. > > Hi Peter, > > this commit caused a regression with one of the Avocado tests: > > AVOCADO_ALLOW_LARGE_STORAGE=1 avocado run > tests/avocado/boot_linux_console.py:BootLinuxConsole.test_arm_bpim2u_openwrt_22_03_3 > > is failing now. It works still fine before this commit. Could you please > have a look? Thanks for the report; I've investigated it. The cause of this specific failure is that regime_el() doesn't return the right answer when code is executing in the guest in Monitor mode. The effect is that because regime_el() returns 1, not 3, we look at the wrong banked registers and the page table walk fails when it should not. This is enough to fix: diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 203a2dae148..812487b9291 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static inline uint32_t regime_el(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3; + return arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env) ? 3 : 1; case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: However, while I was thinking about this I realised that there are some problems with the design change this commit is trying to do. The idea is that we now use the same MMU indexes for Secure PL1&0 as we do for NonSecure PL1&0. Small problem: That means we need to flush the TLBs at any point where the CPU state flips from one to the other. We already flush the TLB when SCR.NS is changed, but we don't flush the TLB when we take an exception from NS PL1&0 into Mon or when we return from Mon to NS PL1&0. Now we need to do that, so any time we call up into Mon and back we'll dump the TLBs, which is a bit sad. (Also we could skip flushing all these TLBs when NS changes.) Larger problem: the ATS12NS* address translate instructions allow Mon code (which is Secure) to do a stage 1+2 page table walk for NS. I thought this was OK because do_ats_write() does a page table walk which doesn't use the TLBs, so because it can pass both the MMU index and also an ARMSecuritySpace argument we can tell the table walk that we want NS stage1+2, not S. But that means that all the code within the ptw that needs to find e.g. the regime EL cannot do so only with an mmu_idx -- all these functions like regime_sctlr(), regime_el(), etc would need to pass both an mmu_idx and the security_space, so they can tell whether this is a translation regime controlled by EL1 or EL3 (and so whether to look at SCTLR.S or SCTLR.NS, etc). So now I'm wondering if this merge was a good idea after all. Should we do all that replumbing required, or should we instead revert this and take the "straightforward" approach described in the commit message above of adding some extra MMU indexes? (I suspect that this commit is likely also the cause of https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2588 ) -- PMM
On 10/28/24 13:24, Peter Maydell wrote: > On Fri, 25 Oct 2024 at 13:54, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> wrote: >> >> On 13/08/2024 17.20, Peter Maydell wrote: >>> Our current usage of MMU indexes when EL3 is AArch32 is confused. >>> Architecturally, when EL3 is AArch32, all Secure code runs under the >>> Secure PL1&0 translation regime: >>> * code at EL3, which might be Mon, or SVC, or any of the >>> other privileged modes (PL1) >>> * code at EL0 (Secure PL0) >>> >>> This is different from when EL3 is AArch64, in which case EL3 is its >>> own translation regime, and EL1 and EL0 (whether AArch32 or AArch64) >>> have their own regime. >>> >>> We claimed to be mapping Secure PL1 to our ARMMMUIdx_EL3, but didn't >>> do anything special about Secure PL0, which meant it used the same >>> ARMMMUIdx_EL10_0 that NonSecure PL0 does. This resulted in a bug >>> where arm_sctlr() incorrectly picked the NonSecure SCTLR as the >>> controlling register when in Secure PL0, which meant we were >>> spuriously generating alignment faults because we were looking at the >>> wrong SCTLR control bits. >>> >>> The use of ARMMMUIdx_EL3 for Secure PL1 also resulted in the bug that >>> we wouldn't honour the PAN bit for Secure PL1, because there's no >>> equivalent _PAN mmu index for it. >>> >>> We could fix this in one of two ways: >>> * The most straightforward is to add new MMU indexes EL30_0, >>> EL30_3, EL30_3_PAN to correspond to "Secure PL1&0 at PL0", >>> "Secure PL1&0 at PL1", and "Secure PL1&0 at PL1 with PAN". >>> This matches how we use indexes for the AArch64 regimes, and >>> preserves propirties like being able to determine the privilege >>> level from an MMU index without any other information. However >>> it would add two MMU indexes (we can share one with ARMMMUIdx_EL3), >>> and we are already using 14 of the 16 the core TLB code permits. >>> >>> * The more complicated approach is the one we take here. We use >>> the same MMU indexes (E10_0, E10_1, E10_1_PAN) for Secure PL1&0 >>> than we do for NonSecure PL1&0. This saves on MMU indexes, but >>> means we need to check in some places whether we're in the >>> Secure PL1&0 regime or not before we interpret an MMU index. >>> >>> The changes in this commit were created by auditing all the places >>> where we use specific ARMMMUIdx_ values, and checking whether they >>> needed to be changed to handle the new index value usage. >> >> Hi Peter, >> >> this commit caused a regression with one of the Avocado tests: >> >> AVOCADO_ALLOW_LARGE_STORAGE=1 avocado run >> tests/avocado/boot_linux_console.py:BootLinuxConsole.test_arm_bpim2u_openwrt_22_03_3 >> >> is failing now. It works still fine before this commit. Could you please >> have a look? > > Thanks for the report; I've investigated it. The cause of this specific > failure is that regime_el() doesn't return the right answer when code > is executing in the guest in Monitor mode. The effect is that because > regime_el() returns 1, not 3, we look at the wrong banked registers > and the page table walk fails when it should not. This is enough to fix: > > diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h > index 203a2dae148..812487b9291 100644 > --- a/target/arm/internals.h > +++ b/target/arm/internals.h > @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static inline uint32_t regime_el(CPUARMState *env, > ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) > case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: > case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: > case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: > - return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3; > + return arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env) ? 3 : 1; > case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: > case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: > case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: > > However, while I was thinking about this I realised that there > are some problems with the design change this commit is trying > to do. The idea is that we now use the same MMU indexes for > Secure PL1&0 as we do for NonSecure PL1&0. > > Small problem: > That means we need to flush the TLBs at any point where the CPU > state flips from one to the other. We already flush the TLB when > SCR.NS is changed, but we don't flush the TLB when we take an > exception from NS PL1&0 into Mon or when we return from Mon to > NS PL1&0. Now we need to do that, so any time we call up into > Mon and back we'll dump the TLBs, which is a bit sad. > (Also we could skip flushing all these TLBs when NS changes.) > > Larger problem: > the ATS12NS* address translate instructions allow Mon code > (which is Secure) to do a stage 1+2 page table walk for NS. > I thought this was OK because do_ats_write() does a page > table walk which doesn't use the TLBs, so because it can > pass both the MMU index and also an ARMSecuritySpace argument > we can tell the table walk that we want NS stage1+2, not S. > But that means that all the code within the ptw that needs > to find e.g. the regime EL cannot do so only with an > mmu_idx -- all these functions like regime_sctlr(), regime_el(), > etc would need to pass both an mmu_idx and the security_space, > so they can tell whether this is a translation regime > controlled by EL1 or EL3 (and so whether to look at SCTLR.S > or SCTLR.NS, etc). > > So now I'm wondering if this merge was a good idea after all. > Should we do all that replumbing required, or should we > instead revert this and take the "straightforward" approach > described in the commit message above of adding some extra > MMU indexes? It might be easier to add the extra mmu indexes. We'll have to re-use ARMMMUIdx_E3 for EL30_3, I think, because we only have 2 mmu_idx left available. r~ > > (I suspect that this commit is likely also the cause of > https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2588 ) > > -- PMM
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index 216774f5d3a..9a3fd595621 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -2784,8 +2784,7 @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync); * + NonSecure PL1 & 0 stage 1 * + NonSecure PL1 & 0 stage 2 * + NonSecure PL2 - * + Secure PL0 - * + Secure PL1 + * + Secure PL1 & 0 * (reminder: for 32 bit EL3, Secure PL1 is *EL3*, not EL1.) * * For QEMU, an mmu_idx is not quite the same as a translation regime because: @@ -2803,37 +2802,39 @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync); * The only use of stage 2 translations is either as part of an s1+2 * lookup or when loading the descriptors during a stage 1 page table walk, * and in both those cases we don't use the TLB. - * 4. we can also safely fold together the "32 bit EL3" and "64 bit EL3" - * translation regimes, because they map reasonably well to each other - * and they can't both be active at the same time. - * 5. we want to be able to use the TLB for accesses done as part of a + * 4. we want to be able to use the TLB for accesses done as part of a * stage1 page table walk, rather than having to walk the stage2 page * table over and over. - * 6. we need separate EL1/EL2 mmu_idx for handling the Privileged Access + * 5. we need separate EL1/EL2 mmu_idx for handling the Privileged Access * Never (PAN) bit within PSTATE. - * 7. we fold together most secure and non-secure regimes for A-profile, + * 6. we fold together most secure and non-secure regimes for A-profile, * because there are no banked system registers for aarch64, so the * process of switching between secure and non-secure is * already heavyweight. - * 8. we cannot fold together Stage 2 Secure and Stage 2 NonSecure, + * 7. we cannot fold together Stage 2 Secure and Stage 2 NonSecure, * because both are in use simultaneously for Secure EL2. * * This gives us the following list of cases: * - * EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL0) - * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL1) - * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN + * EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (or AArch32 PL0 PL1&0 stage 1+2) + * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (or AArch32 PL1 PL1&0 stage 1+2) + * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN (or AArch32 PL1 PL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN) * EL0 EL2&0 * EL2 EL2&0 * EL2 EL2&0 +PAN * EL2 (aka NS PL2) - * EL3 (aka S PL1) + * EL3 (not used when EL3 is AArch32) * Stage2 Secure * Stage2 NonSecure * plus one TLB per Physical address space: S, NS, Realm, Root * * for a total of 14 different mmu_idx. * + * Note that when EL3 is AArch32, the usage is potentially confusing + * because the MMU indexes are named for their AArch64 use, so code + * using the ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 might be at EL3, not EL1. This is because + * Secure PL1 is always at EL3. + * * R profile CPUs have an MPU, but can use the same set of MMU indexes * as A profile. They only need to distinguish EL0 and EL1 (and * EL2 for cores like the Cortex-R52). @@ -3126,6 +3127,10 @@ FIELD(TBFLAG_A32, NS, 10, 1) * This requires an SME trap from AArch32 mode when using NEON. */ FIELD(TBFLAG_A32, SME_TRAP_NONSTREAMING, 11, 1) +/* + * Indicates whether we are in the Secure PL1&0 translation regime + */ +FIELD(TBFLAG_A32, S_PL1_0, 12, 1) /* * Bit usage when in AArch32 state, for M-profile only. diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 757b1fae925..203a2dae148 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -275,6 +275,20 @@ FIELD(CNTHCTL, CNTPMASK, 19, 1) #define M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC 0xf /* NS executing in S&NSC memory */ #define M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT 0xe /* SecureFault INVTRAN, INVEP or AUVIOL */ +/** + * arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(): Return true if in Secure PL1&0 regime + * + * Return true if the CPU is in the Secure PL1&0 translation regime. + * This requires that EL3 exists and is AArch32 and we are currently + * Secure. If this is the case then the ARMMMUIdx_E10* apply and + * mean we are in EL3, not EL1. + */ +static inline bool arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(CPUARMState *env) +{ + return arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL3) && + !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) && arm_is_secure(env); +} + /** * raise_exception: Raise the specified exception. * Raise a guest exception with the specified value, syndrome register @@ -808,7 +822,12 @@ static inline ARMMMUIdx core_to_aa64_mmu_idx(int mmu_idx) return mmu_idx | ARM_MMU_IDX_A; } -int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx); +/** + * Return the exception level we're running at if our current MMU index + * is @mmu_idx. @s_pl1_0 should be true if this is the AArch32 + * Secure PL1&0 translation regime. + */ +int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool s_pl1_0); /* Return the MMU index for a v7M CPU in the specified security state */ ARMMMUIdx arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secstate); @@ -903,11 +922,11 @@ static inline uint32_t regime_el(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) return 3; case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: - return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3; - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: + return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3; case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/translate.h b/target/arm/tcg/translate.h index 01c217f4a45..3f0e9ceaa39 100644 --- a/target/arm/tcg/translate.h +++ b/target/arm/tcg/translate.h @@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ typedef struct DisasContext { uint8_t gm_blocksize; /* True if the current insn_start has been updated. */ bool insn_start_updated; + /* True if this is the AArch32 Secure PL1&0 translation regime */ + bool s_pl1_0; /* Bottom two bits of XScale c15_cpar coprocessor access control reg */ int c15_cpar; /* Offset from VNCR_EL2 when FEAT_NV2 redirects this reg to memory */ diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index 8fb4b474e83..0a582c1cd3b 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -3700,7 +3700,7 @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value, */ format64 = arm_s1_regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx); - if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2)) { + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2) && !arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env)) { if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN) { @@ -3774,13 +3774,11 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) case 0: /* stage 1 current state PL1: ATS1CPR, ATS1CPW, ATS1CPRP, ATS1CPWP */ switch (el) { - case 3: - mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E3; - break; case 2: g_assert(ss != ARMSS_Secure); /* ARMv8.4-SecEL2 is 64-bit only */ /* fall through */ case 1: + case 3: if (ri->crm == 9 && arm_pan_enabled(env)) { mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN; } else { @@ -11861,8 +11859,11 @@ void arm_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs) uint64_t arm_sctlr(CPUARMState *env, int el) { - /* Only EL0 needs to be adjusted for EL1&0 or EL2&0. */ - if (el == 0) { + if (arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env)) { + /* In Secure PL1&0 SCTLR_S is always controlling */ + el = 3; + } else if (el == 0) { + /* Only EL0 needs to be adjusted for EL1&0 or EL2&0. */ ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = arm_mmu_idx_el(env, 0); el = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 ? 2 : 1; } @@ -12522,8 +12523,12 @@ int fp_exception_el(CPUARMState *env, int cur_el) return 0; } -/* Return the exception level we're running at if this is our mmu_idx */ -int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) +/* + * Return the exception level we're running at if this is our mmu_idx. + * s_pl1_0 should be true if this is the AArch32 Secure PL1&0 translation + * regime. + */ +int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool s_pl1_0) { if (mmu_idx & ARM_MMU_IDX_M) { return mmu_idx & ARM_MMU_IDX_M_PRIV; @@ -12535,7 +12540,7 @@ int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) return 0; case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: - return 1; + return s_pl1_0 ? 3 : 1; case ARMMMUIdx_E2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: @@ -12573,6 +12578,15 @@ ARMMMUIdx arm_mmu_idx_el(CPUARMState *env, int el) idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; } break; + case 3: + /* + * AArch64 EL3 has its own translation regime; AArch32 EL3 + * uses the Secure PL1&0 translation regime. + */ + if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) { + return ARMMMUIdx_E3; + } + /* fall through */ case 1: if (arm_pan_enabled(env)) { idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN; @@ -12592,8 +12606,6 @@ ARMMMUIdx arm_mmu_idx_el(CPUARMState *env, int el) idx = ARMMMUIdx_E2; } break; - case 3: - return ARMMMUIdx_E3; default: g_assert_not_reached(); } diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 4476b32ff50..278004661bf 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -3576,7 +3576,11 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E2: - ss = arm_security_space_below_el3(env); + if (arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env)) { + ss = ARMSS_Secure; + } else { + ss = arm_security_space_below_el3(env); + } break; case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: /* diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c b/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c index f03977b4b00..bab7822ef66 100644 --- a/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c +++ b/target/arm/tcg/hflags.c @@ -198,6 +198,10 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a32(CPUARMState *env, int fp_el, DP_TBFLAG_A32(flags, SME_TRAP_NONSTREAMING, 1); } + if (arm_aa32_secure_pl1_0(env)) { + DP_TBFLAG_A32(flags, S_PL1_0, 1); + } + return rebuild_hflags_common_32(env, fp_el, mmu_idx, flags); } diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/translate-a64.c b/target/arm/tcg/translate-a64.c index bc2d64e8835..4684e7eb6ea 100644 --- a/target/arm/tcg/translate-a64.c +++ b/target/arm/tcg/translate-a64.c @@ -11979,7 +11979,7 @@ static void aarch64_tr_init_disas_context(DisasContextBase *dcbase, dc->tbii = EX_TBFLAG_A64(tb_flags, TBII); dc->tbid = EX_TBFLAG_A64(tb_flags, TBID); dc->tcma = EX_TBFLAG_A64(tb_flags, TCMA); - dc->current_el = arm_mmu_idx_to_el(dc->mmu_idx); + dc->current_el = arm_mmu_idx_to_el(dc->mmu_idx, false); #if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY) dc->user = (dc->current_el == 0); #endif diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/translate.c b/target/arm/tcg/translate.c index c5bc691d92b..e2748ff2bb8 100644 --- a/target/arm/tcg/translate.c +++ b/target/arm/tcg/translate.c @@ -7546,10 +7546,6 @@ static void arm_tr_init_disas_context(DisasContextBase *dcbase, CPUState *cs) core_mmu_idx = EX_TBFLAG_ANY(tb_flags, MMUIDX); dc->mmu_idx = core_to_arm_mmu_idx(env, core_mmu_idx); - dc->current_el = arm_mmu_idx_to_el(dc->mmu_idx); -#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY) - dc->user = (dc->current_el == 0); -#endif dc->fp_excp_el = EX_TBFLAG_ANY(tb_flags, FPEXC_EL); dc->align_mem = EX_TBFLAG_ANY(tb_flags, ALIGN_MEM); dc->pstate_il = EX_TBFLAG_ANY(tb_flags, PSTATE__IL); @@ -7580,7 +7576,12 @@ static void arm_tr_init_disas_context(DisasContextBase *dcbase, CPUState *cs) } dc->sme_trap_nonstreaming = EX_TBFLAG_A32(tb_flags, SME_TRAP_NONSTREAMING); + dc->s_pl1_0 = EX_TBFLAG_A32(tb_flags, S_PL1_0); } + dc->current_el = arm_mmu_idx_to_el(dc->mmu_idx, dc->s_pl1_0); +#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY) + dc->user = (dc->current_el == 0); +#endif dc->lse2 = false; /* applies only to aarch64 */ dc->cp_regs = cpu->cp_regs; dc->features = env->features;