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Tue, 26 Jan 2021 17:02:23 +0000 Received: by smtp409.mail.gq1.yahoo.com (VZM Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 8a206ee65e60eda6fcd8c0233148fc12; Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:52:17 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v24 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 08:40:53 -0800 Message-Id: <20210126164108.1958-11-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 In-Reply-To: <20210126164108.1958-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20210126164108.1958-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++-- kernel/audit.c | 16 +++----- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 56 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 ++++-- 10 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 5fb8555ce166..1a15e9e19e22 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2697,20 +2697,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority = task_nice(current); if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { - u32 secid; struct lsmblob blob; size_t added_size; - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid); - /* - * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will - * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init - * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob - * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(), - * which means that the one expected by - * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid); + security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob); ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); if (ret) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 20a47bd3930b..9fc245c1f739 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1160,9 +1160,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 72f6672a445e..e70bbd6b91c4 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2139,19 +2139,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - if (!sid) + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob)) return 0; - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid. - * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted - * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) @@ -2359,6 +2352,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || @@ -2369,7 +2363,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0]; } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index e27424216159..9e73a7961665 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { @@ -1361,8 +1360,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_isset) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); result = security_audit_rule_match( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b3ad40787740..62e2e6de5486 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -471,7 +471,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -668,17 +667,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_isset) { if (need_sid) { - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob); need_sid = 0; } - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob - * to sid. This is temporary until - * security_task_getsecid() is converted to - * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in - * this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, @@ -2426,12 +2417,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2447,6 +2441,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsmblob blob; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2458,7 +2453,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2479,7 +2476,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 0e5d03c228e7..93240432427f 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1564,11 +1564,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsmblob blob; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid); + struct lsmblob blob; + + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8361941ee0a1..afcf715de585 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -70,14 +70,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) */ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, - IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func, + mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, + NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f87cb29329e9..175a79076569 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -388,12 +388,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -419,9 +420,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsmblob blob; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -429,9 +430,10 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); - action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + /* scaffolding */ + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ @@ -468,10 +470,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; @@ -492,10 +496,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -659,7 +664,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -679,8 +684,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -709,7 +715,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -722,9 +728,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, + size, MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -839,7 +846,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, } hash = {}; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!ima_policy_flag) return; @@ -859,9 +866,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding */ + action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + 0, func, &pcr, &template, keyring); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 197f69780783..3f0a3aedad19 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1845,10 +1845,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);