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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id q11si13692944pjb.84.2019.07.23.10.59.24; Tue, 23 Jul 2019 10:59:24 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b=H5geBT1j; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2391274AbfGWR7V (ORCPT + 29 others); Tue, 23 Jul 2019 13:59:21 -0400 Received: from mail-qk1-f202.google.com ([209.85.222.202]:44503 "EHLO mail-qk1-f202.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2391236AbfGWR7N (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jul 2019 13:59:13 -0400 Received: by mail-qk1-f202.google.com with SMTP id c207so37035211qkb.11 for ; Tue, 23 Jul 2019 10:59:13 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=mEM9r2TrIcyS5QiUJ5WsI/WGUVLPWWhwkAU6Ibh3jIs=; b=H5geBT1j+ubrLFlbrsinXfwZ0W5BQqUsTQ4IaRG81Ui2ZwtPz7y/KxLSObtE6WVnKG iLhrcnu/dA6uvy2xcSWRBGEgliAGFYmCJj9eOifU6l6F5s22JsTp5wdsL4S09QNfUDVI UCiPujniwnzgr9cWOZtf0O60DfpKFiDJD1smf/WyvtqTOs+e49rV01Sy+tA1kalRfOYC 3saGMlUnkEYHG4EJGY2ZRToPTiWHH99XVusCT8uRMBFt4SPd2rqEw8UO4qGVRomxdtCq F9yP/y3PSBYaBJ+MgdczyCl0HRVmy2j6uCXJDxaojhfskG3cHHnyJgYo5kA7+x/3sY0a e1vw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=mEM9r2TrIcyS5QiUJ5WsI/WGUVLPWWhwkAU6Ibh3jIs=; b=d7WXwu2WaPnMtvI+MhukNEndBASi/At3FigjT5tHT0u+uBbgGfbIMcS7NKb/WJIo4a zsnsKph2q3ovOEcfCBn0K2ECW5FtzY/cmFNXVVIiyVhTiLuravoBD09w1PdM0QyB46Pa UJv1sSMyn2IjE930hPSG/xf98z/N5D6TjjVq+D/Bwz3s/VLk17qAaQKwm2aHJpZcKG4a 8w1YzqChwNskw2OwqSWbOa8VgCJeHNz7p4WZ42EIW+i6DQUBcs/P/pNfeCCYeQUqZXA/ bjedC91WSsYZCsT5skBnAXEyFiFSZUUhtRfJKloD2+1HePcznCOa1UjtzJwXbKBW+L/p khzw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVhhCq6jBMuzq4TTQDeZsHHgLmQeLfRLZ513pRzXMzu3p6Ofi0Q SRDxLYkKQHN7xkRuoI8K0O0rhF2YBu/3hRpR X-Received: by 2002:a0c:8705:: with SMTP id 5mr54401806qvh.32.1563904752366; Tue, 23 Jul 2019 10:59:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 19:58:39 +0200 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <1c05651c53f90d07e98ee4973c2786ccf315db12.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.709.g102302147b-goog Subject: [PATCH v19 02/15] arm64: Introduce prctl() options to control the tagged user addresses ABI From: Andrey Konovalov To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas , Vincenzo Frascino , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Andrew Morton , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Kees Cook , Yishai Hadas , Felix Kuehling , Alexander Deucher , Christian Koenig , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Jens Wiklander , Alex Williamson , Leon Romanovsky , Luc Van Oostenryck , Dave Martin , Khalid Aziz , enh , Jason Gunthorpe , Christoph Hellwig , Dmitry Vyukov , Kostya Serebryany , Evgeniy Stepanov , Lee Smith , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Robin Murphy , Kevin Brodsky , Szabolcs Nagy , Andrey Konovalov Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Catalin Marinas It is not desirable to relax the ABI to allow tagged user addresses into the kernel indiscriminately. This patch introduces a prctl() interface for enabling or disabling the tagged ABI with a global sysctl control for preventing applications from enabling the relaxed ABI (meant for testing user-space prctl() return error checking without reconfiguring the kernel). The ABI properties are inherited by threads of the same application and fork()'ed children but cleared on execve(). A Kconfig option allows the overall disabling of the relaxed ABI. The PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL will be expanded in the future to handle MTE-specific settings like imprecise vs precise exceptions. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 ++ kernel/sys.c | 12 +++++ 7 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.22.0.709.g102302147b-goog Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 3adcec05b1f6..5d254178b9ca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1110,6 +1110,15 @@ config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily. +config ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + bool "Enable the tagged user addresses syscall ABI" + default y + help + When this option is enabled, user applications can opt in to a + relaxed ABI via prctl() allowing tagged addresses to be passed + to system calls as pointer arguments. For details, see + Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.txt. + menuconfig COMPAT bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index fd5b1a4efc70..ee86070a28d4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -296,6 +296,14 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void); /* PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS prctl */ #define PAC_RESET_KEYS(tsk, arg) ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(tsk, arg) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI +/* PR_{SET,GET}_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL prctl */ +long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(unsigned long arg); +long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(void); +#define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg) set_tagged_addr_ctrl(arg) +#define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() get_tagged_addr_ctrl() +#endif + /* * For CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK * diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 180b34ec5965..012238d8e58d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define TIF_SVE 23 /* Scalable Vector Extension in use */ #define TIF_SVE_VL_INHERIT 24 /* Inherit sve_vl_onexec across exec */ #define TIF_SSBD 25 /* Wants SSB mitigation */ +#define TIF_TAGGED_ADDR 26 /* Allow tagged user addresses */ #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index a138e3b4f717..097d6bfac0b7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si { unsigned long ret, limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit; - addr = untagged_addr(addr); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI) && + test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)) + addr = untagged_addr(addr); __chk_user_ptr(addr); asm volatile( diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 6a869d9f304f..ef06a303bda0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -307,11 +309,18 @@ static void tls_thread_flush(void) } } +static void flush_tagged_addr_state(void) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI)) + clear_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR); +} + void flush_thread(void) { fpsimd_flush_thread(); tls_thread_flush(); flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(current); + flush_tagged_addr_state(); } void release_thread(struct task_struct *dead_task) @@ -541,3 +550,67 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) ptrauth_thread_init_user(current); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI +/* + * Control the relaxed ABI allowing tagged user addresses into the kernel. + */ +static unsigned int tagged_addr_prctl_allowed = 1; + +long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(unsigned long arg) +{ + if (!tagged_addr_prctl_allowed) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_compat_task()) + return -EINVAL; + if (arg & ~PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE) + return -EINVAL; + + update_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR, arg & PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE); + + return 0; +} + +long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(void) +{ + if (!tagged_addr_prctl_allowed) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_compat_task()) + return -EINVAL; + + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)) + return PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Global sysctl to disable the tagged user addresses support. This control + * only prevents the tagged address ABI enabling via prctl() and does not + * disable it for tasks that already opted in to the relaxed ABI. + */ +static int zero; +static int one = 1; + +static struct ctl_table tagged_addr_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "tagged_addr", + .mode = 0644, + .data = &tagged_addr_prctl_allowed, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { } +}; + +static int __init tagged_addr_init(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl("abi", tagged_addr_sysctl_table)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +core_initcall(tagged_addr_init); +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index 094bb03b9cc2..2e927b3e9d6c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -229,4 +229,9 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_PAC_APDBKEY (1UL << 3) # define PR_PAC_APGAKEY (1UL << 4) +/* Tagged user address controls for arm64 */ +#define PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 55 +#define PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 56 +# define PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE (1UL << 0) + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 2969304c29fe..c6c4d5358bd3 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) #endif +#ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL +# define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) +#endif +#ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL +# define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) +#endif /* * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for @@ -2492,6 +2498,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, return -EINVAL; error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2); break; + case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: + error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2); + break; + case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: + error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(); + break; default: error = -EINVAL; break;