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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a5si26927800pjv.80.2019.07.30.05.25.01; Tue, 30 Jul 2019 05:25:02 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=tspuXETv; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729993AbfG3MZA (ORCPT + 29 others); Tue, 30 Jul 2019 08:25:00 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f193.google.com ([209.85.215.193]:46451 "EHLO mail-pg1-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729661AbfG3MY7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Jul 2019 08:24:59 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f193.google.com with SMTP id k189so10940448pgk.13 for ; Tue, 30 Jul 2019 05:24:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=g3sbGqLJtyr+mK3noGyfsK8BUYQhIzhDi/FCoBAZUJY=; b=tspuXETvVlvH6QvNkv/zEzkktY7N5Gwz5LdVhXPiHKK6hvrdeOUkvi+xZTm+Wz4zug E10rhIjuIMoZ13PtQiClrJPyX+ZJsER+9Hk6Y8Yc2UD6LoW5c4rI6eUGFizc4kB0j+0k lf2o8W+06Vczc0Anprsv26FEQtDj2+sOJqYzK1wzfeFXLXSBfuxO1a5hbH9pQ73hivUS G+7cl6E/BQBzB/PVKNh3hTJinmIZjMaZdGsiIjgnjCMUxfA3k/K0E93J7/cnbmh88AAn JF0ciAjMMiWrwQ7UQ6RAMW0R1o9eFVw3SwhQ0a18NLhTmH+El37+pxbyV7PuOffGWqw7 M42Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=g3sbGqLJtyr+mK3noGyfsK8BUYQhIzhDi/FCoBAZUJY=; b=ca/NxBRawrRPZNl/xlQxxSvsX1R2UX87DRayRGQBdlDTvwmjMy7UpYIcrf3NKDNJV8 syqKt/usi7+m9fd58R1Z9yY8mB9ZnPqNri+BOu+ynCkzurPC1G3eIrCMWU9Do3R9MCoG 2gaki6l0/RO5d9Wqo/EwEIQMgYNUfSBYky9NNqekJQsIEiCgjd+x3idAMlbvenDq6VbX +ZIkZLONLLqQNVrs7Iz74CUm2ZU/tKn2i3VLUj4pZW0eeFCW3zRFCKFFWFJEXAOI9XT8 lSSlTSbMxftfA3hOB/Fj+QDJW+qpt1HemIjEQ3JX/bpZvWegCqo1NdvrOKccIe4ha/EZ lkWQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWMfO6sO1dl3oBXckga8RkCLx1F4CEtyanmAzbi40PZlZMT8klC TWn3PS22bAwgqZm1c0jMO6vomQ== X-Received: by 2002:a62:3445:: with SMTP id b66mr41769046pfa.246.1564489498605; Tue, 30 Jul 2019 05:24:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([45.114.72.197]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id v8sm54895462pgs.82.2019.07.30.05.24.49 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 30 Jul 2019 05:24:57 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2019 17:53:38 +0530 Message-Id: <1564489420-677-5-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1564489420-677-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1564489420-677-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 ++++++++ security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 6 files changed, 359 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c -- 2.7.4 diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 5559010..e0df5df 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; +#endif #define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab58ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +#include + +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" + +/* + * Get random data for symmetric key + * + * [out] memref[0] Random data + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 + +/* + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Plain key + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 + +/* + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob + * [out] memref[1] Plain key + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 + +/** + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. + * @ctx: TEE context handler. + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. + */ +struct trusted_key_private { + struct device *dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; + u32 session_id; + u32 data_rate; + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; +}; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index dd31343..0d5e37c 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs. + It also provides support for alternative TEE based Trusted keys + generation and sealing in case TPM isn't present. + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config ENCRYPTED_KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 6ecadfb..5fcf2ae 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o \ - trusted-tpm.o + trusted-tpm.o \ + trusted-tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..724a73c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; + +/* + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key + */ +static int tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "random key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; + } + + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); + + return ret; +} + +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) +{ + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); + int ret = 0, err = -ENODEV; + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); + + /* Open context with TEE driver */ + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) + return -ENODEV; + + /* Open session with hwrng Trusted App */ + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; + sess_arg.num_params = 0; + + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", + sess_arg.ret); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_ctx; + } + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_sess; + + pvt_data.dev = dev; + + return 0; + +out_sess: + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); +out_ctx: + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return err; +} + +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, + {} +}; + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); + +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + .bus = &tee_bus_type, + .probe = trusted_key_probe, + .remove = trusted_key_remove, + }, +}; + +static int __init init_tee_trusted(void) +{ + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +static void __exit cleanup_tee_trusted(void) +{ + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = init_tee_trusted, + .seal = tee_key_seal, + .unseal = tee_key_unseal, + .get_random = tee_get_random, + .cleanup = cleanup_tee_trusted, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_trusted_key_ops); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c index 8f00fde..a0a171f 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) &tpm_trusted_key_ops, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) + &tee_trusted_key_ops, +#endif }; static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops;