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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 207si3772109pfu.258.2019.06.13.08.34.21; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:34:21 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=qXrt3EVT; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732193AbfFMPeU (ORCPT + 25 others); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 11:34:20 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-f194.google.com ([209.85.210.194]:41721 "EHLO mail-pf1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728217AbfFMKcj (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:32:39 -0400 Received: by mail-pf1-f194.google.com with SMTP id m30so11056958pff.8 for ; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:32:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=BG6KAi08hN8hMpB1R8APRtbarxqkieDJBwiiKnKxNvA=; b=qXrt3EVTApU5PvFn4bX//ulUNLUoEPsUKJqd/tEwgQrVBEW7kK6cIqJbHvlbz0ZwZw yXkdyYL78AAok2TZ4dUIK02ownxUUArBRRhlZFyofgOaJ5Ab0Xqmfb61n4o8y6gNLDFA 9uq1ElY6ote0C9kIBMHRPLdLqbL7XZUgXPfzQaKaRLdAe00jHCagKg7cvHL/ECbtjyr6 O5B0MYJenVXtiZPFm2DIsWKMKQpoYDyi9ooepPfnJACg1HGlqLmyY9jYOmIbj1SFpKWo dR9tq4Slzc5DwWnZCRZ6ifEeYJDQNLKZ6Ip3CeXwhTQgjdCNZQuDE2Nn0S6CbrO9y+l0 tWpA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=BG6KAi08hN8hMpB1R8APRtbarxqkieDJBwiiKnKxNvA=; b=R7Z70t4yCM8C/Ev0Dq024ETZyt9hZSplvg1V0KXP5jJ6Ey/s1c5R1nu03Q1yXe0ots jRg7MOzaFXKcHhIRsqi847S7TjPPFbMXfWxBvQVk9EvJCvOXt6pop4DagfJgG4bKltQm ErDFpAzA51YEAfqhLM0WncNJwlwvgrH6vzAYeJWW9Z2a1dMqA0kYc6mCZiZG4YgMWIK9 LDThjizA5q8f98j+Y7J3+Ta7ahxz+4XyGRv8xqVQJ/uU3mNqe/d+CNeWEsm/Ah1eDxAp sZ8fN3HXFSVLJ3+W/bZ3Tbc2vmeQ+R96mM02Jn/zj4qbrfmKwDRfoyZoZiBYBPlaRCri +niw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUrcufRYHuSSMKKGA54gnrys37NgQ6LlT7hapBAi82HwScUOry9 SqurUlVXLUBKfoQbcbRnSOu8Aw== X-Received: by 2002:a62:ee17:: with SMTP id e23mr94599955pfi.130.1560421958641; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:32:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.196.234.139]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a12sm2265078pgq.0.2019.06.13.03.32.26 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:32:37 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:00:32 +0530 Message-Id: <1560421833-27414-7-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Provide documentation for usage of TEE based Trusted Keys via existing user-space "keyctl" utility. Also, document various use-cases. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg --- Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst -- 2.7.4 diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef03745 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +====================== +TEE based Trusted Keys +====================== + +TEE based Trusted Keys provides an alternative approach for providing Trusted +Keys in case TPM chip isn't present. + +Trusted Keys use a TEE service/device both to generate and to seal the keys. +Keys are sealed under a hardware unique key in the TEE, and only unsealed by +the TEE. + +For more information about TEE, refer to ``Documentation/tee.txt``. + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys are always +in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + +Examples of trusted key and its usage as 'master' key for encrypted key usage: + +More details about encrypted keys can be found here: +``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 754414669 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + 827385718 --alswrv 0 65534 keyring: _uid_ses.0 + 274124851 --alswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0 + 754414669 --als-rv 0 0 \_ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 754414669 + 15676790697861b422175596ae001c2f505cea2c6f3ebbc5fb08eeb1f343a07e + + $ keyctl pipe 754414669 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 491638700 + + $ keyctl print 491638700 + 15676790697861b422175596ae001c2f505cea2c6f3ebbc5fb08eeb1f343a07e + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +TEE based trusted key provides security that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem and tied to particular hardware. + +Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + +option 1: omitting 'format':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 608915065 + +option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u + 608915065 + + $ keyctl print 608915065 + default trusted:kmk 32 f380ac588a925f488d5be007cf23e4c900b8b652ab62241c8 + ed54906189b6659d139d619d4b51752a2645537b11fd44673f13154a65b3f595d5fb2131 + 2fe45529ea0407c644ea4026f2a1a75661f2c9b66 + + $ keyctl pipe 608915065 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + default trusted:kmk 32 f380ac588a925f488d5be007cf23e4c900b8b652ab62241c8 + ed54906189b6659d139d619d4b51752a2645537b11fd44673f13154a65b3f595d5fb2131 + 2fe45529ea0407c644ea4026f2a1a75661f2c9b66 + +Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption +are anticipated. In particular the 'ecryptfs' encrypted keys format can be used +to mount an eCryptfs filesystem. More details about the usage can be found in +the file ``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``. + +Another format 'enc32' can be used to support encrypted keys with payload size +of 32 bytes.