Message ID | 1515432758-26440-12-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com |
---|---|
State | Accepted |
Commit | aa6acde65e03186b5add8151e1ffe36c3c62639b |
Headers | show |
Series | arm64 kpti hardening and variant 2 workarounds | expand |
On 08/01/18 17:32, Will Deacon wrote: > Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing > and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. > > This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. > The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing > any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. > > Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Will, Marc, > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR > + { > + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), > + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, > + }, > + { > + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), > + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, > + }, > + { > + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), > + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, > + }, > + { > + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, > + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), > + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, > + }, > +#endif The introduction of multiple entries for the same capability breaks some assumptions in this_cpu_has_caps() and verify_local_cpu_features() as they all stop at the first entry matching the "capability" and could return wrong results. We need something like the following to make this work, should someone add duplicate feature entry or use this_cpu_has_caps() on one of the errata. ---8>--- arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability Sometimes a single capability could be listed multiple times with differing matches(), e.g, CPU errata for different MIDR versions. This breaks verify_local_cpu_feature() and this_cpu_has_cap() as we stop checking for a capability on a CPU with the first entry in the given table, which is not sufficient. Make sure we run the checks for all entries of the same capability. We do this by fixing __this_cpu_has_cap() to run through all the entries in the given table for a match and reuse it for verify_local_cpu_feature(). Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 862a417ca0e2..0c43447f7406 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -1120,6 +1120,26 @@ static void __init setup_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *hwcaps) cap_set_elf_hwcap(hwcaps); } +/* + * Check if the current CPU has a given feature capability. + * Should be called from non-preemptible context. + */ +static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap_array, + unsigned int cap) +{ + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps; + + if (WARN_ON(preemptible())) + return false; + + for (caps = cap_array; caps->desc; caps++) + if (caps->capability == cap && + caps->matches && + caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) + return true; + return false; +} + void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, const char *info) { @@ -1183,8 +1203,9 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) } static void -verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) +verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list) { + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = caps_list; for (; caps->matches; caps++) { if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability)) continue; @@ -1192,7 +1213,7 @@ verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) * If the new CPU misses an advertised feature, we cannot proceed * further, park the cpu. */ - if (!caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + if (!__this_cpu_has_cap(caps_list, caps->capability)) { pr_crit("CPU%d: missing feature: %s\n", smp_processor_id(), caps->desc); cpu_die_early(); @@ -1274,25 +1295,6 @@ static void __init mark_const_caps_ready(void) static_branch_enable(&arm64_const_caps_ready); } -/* - * Check if the current CPU has a given feature capability. - * Should be called from non-preemptible context. - */ -static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap_array, - unsigned int cap) -{ - const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps; - - if (WARN_ON(preemptible())) - return false; - - for (caps = cap_array; caps->desc; caps++) - if (caps->capability == cap && caps->matches) - return caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU); - - return false; -} - extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[]; bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap) -- 2.13.6
Hi Suzuki, On 09/01/18 16:12, Suzuki K Poulose wrote: > On 08/01/18 17:32, Will Deacon wrote: >> Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing >> and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. >> >> This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. >> The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing >> any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. >> >> Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> >> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> > > Will, Marc, > >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR >> + { >> + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, >> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), >> + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, >> + }, >> + { >> + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, >> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), >> + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, >> + }, >> + { >> + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, >> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), >> + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, >> + }, >> + { >> + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, >> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), >> + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, >> + }, >> +#endif > > The introduction of multiple entries for the same capability breaks > some assumptions in this_cpu_has_caps() and verify_local_cpu_features() > as they all stop at the first entry matching the "capability" and could > return wrong results. We need something like the following to make this > work, should someone add duplicate feature entry or use > this_cpu_has_caps() on one of the errata. > > ---8>--- > > arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability > > Sometimes a single capability could be listed multiple times with > differing matches(), e.g, CPU errata for different MIDR versions. > This breaks verify_local_cpu_feature() and this_cpu_has_cap() as > we stop checking for a capability on a CPU with the first > entry in the given table, which is not sufficient. Make sure we > run the checks for all entries of the same capability. We do > this by fixing __this_cpu_has_cap() to run through all the > entries in the given table for a match and reuse it for > verify_local_cpu_feature(). > > Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> > Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> > Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c > index 862a417ca0e2..0c43447f7406 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c > @@ -1120,6 +1120,26 @@ static void __init setup_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *hwcaps) > cap_set_elf_hwcap(hwcaps); > } > > +/* > + * Check if the current CPU has a given feature capability. > + * Should be called from non-preemptible context. > + */ > +static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap_array, > + unsigned int cap) > +{ > + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps; > + > + if (WARN_ON(preemptible())) > + return false; > + > + for (caps = cap_array; caps->desc; caps++) > + if (caps->capability == cap && > + caps->matches && > + caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, > const char *info) > { > @@ -1183,8 +1203,9 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) > } > > static void > -verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) > +verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list) > { > + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = caps_list; > for (; caps->matches; caps++) { > if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability)) > continue; > @@ -1192,7 +1213,7 @@ verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) > * If the new CPU misses an advertised feature, we cannot proceed > * further, park the cpu. > */ > - if (!caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { > + if (!__this_cpu_has_cap(caps_list, caps->capability)) { > pr_crit("CPU%d: missing feature: %s\n", > smp_processor_id(), caps->desc); > cpu_die_early(); > @@ -1274,25 +1295,6 @@ static void __init mark_const_caps_ready(void) > static_branch_enable(&arm64_const_caps_ready); > } > > -/* > - * Check if the current CPU has a given feature capability. > - * Should be called from non-preemptible context. > - */ > -static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap_array, > - unsigned int cap) > -{ > - const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps; > - > - if (WARN_ON(preemptible())) > - return false; > - > - for (caps = cap_array; caps->desc; caps++) > - if (caps->capability == cap && caps->matches) > - return caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU); > - > - return false; > -} > - > extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[]; > > bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap) > This looks sensible to me. Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> M. -- Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 04:12:18PM +0000, Suzuki K. Poulose wrote: > arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability > > Sometimes a single capability could be listed multiple times with > differing matches(), e.g, CPU errata for different MIDR versions. > This breaks verify_local_cpu_feature() and this_cpu_has_cap() as > we stop checking for a capability on a CPU with the first > entry in the given table, which is not sufficient. Make sure we > run the checks for all entries of the same capability. We do > this by fixing __this_cpu_has_cap() to run through all the > entries in the given table for a match and reuse it for > verify_local_cpu_feature(). > > Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> > Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> > Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) Applied. Thanks. -- Catalin
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index 06a931eb2673..dec95bd82e31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -53,3 +53,27 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) vectors __kvm_hyp_vector .endr ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18) + stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + mov x0, #0x84000000 + smc #0 + ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 18) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 16ea5c6f314e..cb0fb3796bb8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(void *__unused) DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM +extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[]; + static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) { @@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, spin_unlock(&bp_lock); } #else +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL + static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -118,6 +123,21 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); } + +#include <linux/psci.h> + +static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) +{ + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; + + if (psci_ops.get_version) + install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, + (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end); + + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ @@ -261,6 +281,28 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, +#endif { } };
Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) -- 2.1.4