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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d5-v6si10435528plm.759.2018.02.22.03.18.30; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 03:18:30 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=I5xDtpPT; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753722AbeBVLS1 (ORCPT + 28 others); Thu, 22 Feb 2018 06:18:27 -0500 Received: from mail-pl0-f45.google.com ([209.85.160.45]:34765 "EHLO mail-pl0-f45.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753279AbeBVLSY (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Feb 2018 06:18:24 -0500 Received: by mail-pl0-f45.google.com with SMTP id u13so2714114plq.1 for ; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 03:18:24 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=ma7RJhmUms92d/uwfR6C+n1g1BkDemONondAoKos7+8=; b=I5xDtpPThbVcR5qEyXcj93tT+kTpfDUxMs+oPS6VmwQm1wZK2LibxoVnwn+ktYXD/p MGs7hUEGhc7Pu5rZweFyrt41vIjBWwe2JkkQKp4Ar7xdCOx1YkMHGCBZBcKCtTB2Ovky vFJDAvQfoKsuXksrbLfd/1CLWdOcFJ/dfRAcA= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=ma7RJhmUms92d/uwfR6C+n1g1BkDemONondAoKos7+8=; b=PWkNCbcIvoLb7I8fB5UtWswEQH+npjHztbBUmwPdL/m9dwJx6iPQ3R0Bk+3Y2vuCvX G71SADC7xihTX+ISJ6xGR3/g1qAVoYWflkAoFJXAmXqXRsWcrQEEIyx8lG9EjeXBkFEe D87IOrMyL5S6v62m8z3fcVOuW+m/mycLL/wN53ctjt4eE3xS3q+B8lNoeuErQPsUWHA6 QvEVQXBCiWP6dH6526tO/lxTKdrgzmcHRLjIDTDpoG8ak3FqzL4y5sDWYk58S1ea1fXt WbZCw3pYSZxj8IjfGLhVRzsLQi4ILuQclZZFubXUQJDRuy4nZXWif7AxOt8jmxE/uE6B pVkQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPDkARjrrnDeuXXGNEaPkGlStara6rmAJJ3f5qNgA7sU2JSUbZ+L rPn85RKCO7Q/FnTSoSnJlm7TIg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:bc02:: with SMTP id n2-v6mr6303155pls.52.1519298303923; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 03:18:23 -0800 (PST) Received: from linaro.org ([121.95.100.191]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id q14sm59027827pgt.53.2018.02.22.03.18.22 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 22 Feb 2018 03:18:22 -0800 (PST) From: AKASHI Takahiro To: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, akpm@linux-foundation.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, arnd@arndb.de, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, julien.thierry@arm.com Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, AKASHI Takahiro Subject: [PATCH v8 00/13] arm64: kexec: add kexec_file_load() support Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:17:19 +0900 Message-Id: <20180222111732.23051-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This is the eighth round of implementing kexec_file_load() support on arm64.[1] Most of the code is based on kexec-tools (along with some kernel code from x86, which also came from kexec-tools). This patch series enables us to * load the kernel by specifying its file descriptor, instead of user- filled buffer, at kexec_file_load() system call, and * optionally verify its signature at load time for trusted boot. Contrary to kexec_load() system call, as we discussed a long time ago, users may not be allowed to provide a device tree to the 2nd kernel explicitly, hence enforcing a dt blob of the first kernel to be re-used internally. To use kexec_file_load() system call, instead of kexec_load(), at kexec command, '-s' option must be specified. See [2] for a necessary patch for kexec-tools. To anaylize a generated crash dump file, use the latest master branch of crash utility[3] for v4.16-rc kernel. I always try to submit patches to fix any inconsistencies introduced in the latest kernel. Regarding a kernel image verification, a signature must be presented along with the binary itself. A signature is basically a hash value calculated against the whole binary data and encrypted by a key which will be authenticated by one of the system's trusted certificates. Any attempt to read and load a to-be-kexec-ed kernel image through a system call will be checked and blocked if the binary's hash value doesn't match its associated signature. There are two methods available now: 1. implementing arch-specific verification hook of kexec_file_load() 2. utilizing IMA(Integrity Measurement Architecture)[4] appraisal framework Before my v7, I believed that my patch only supports (1) but am now confident that (2) comes free if IMA is enabled and properly configured. (1) Arch-specific verification hook If CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, kexec_file_load() invokes an arch- defined (and hence file-format-specific) hook function to check for the validity of kernel binary. On x86, a signature is embedded into a PE file (Microsoft's format) header of binary. Since arm64's "Image" can also be seen as a PE file as far as CONFIG_EFI is enabled, we adopt this format for kernel signing. As in the case of UEFI applications, we can create a signed kernel image: $ sbsign --key ${KEY} --cert ${CERT} Image You may want to use certs/signing_key.pem, which is intended to be used for module sigining (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG), as ${KEY} and ${CERT} for test purpose. (2) IMA appraisal-based IMA was first introduced in linux in order to meet TCG (Trusted Computing Group) requirement that all the sensitive files be *measured* before reading/executing them to detect any untrusted changes/modification. Then appraisal feature, which allows us to ensure the integrity of files and even prevent them from reading/executing, was added later. Meanwhile, kexec_file_load() has been merged since v3.17 and evolved to enable IMA-appraisal type verification by the commit b804defe4297 ("kexec: replace call to copy_file_from_fd() with kernel version"). In this scheme, a signature will be stored in a extended file attribute, "security.ima" while a decryption key is hold in a dedicated keyring, ".ima" or "_ima". All the necessary process of verification is confined in a secure API, kernel_read_file_from_fd(), called by kexec_file_load(). Please note that powerpc is one of the two architectures now supporting KEXEC_FILE, and that it wishes to exntend IMA, where a signature may be appended to "vmlinux" file[5], like module signing, instead of using an extended file attribute. While IMA meant to be used with TPM (Trusted Platform Module) on secure platform, IMA is still usable without TPM. Here is an example procedure about how we can give it a try to run the feature using a self-signed root ca for demo/test purposes: 1) Generate needed keys and certificates, following "Generate trusted keys" section in README of ima-evm-utils[6]. 2) Build the kernel with the following kernel configurations, specifying "ima-local-ca.pem" for CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS: CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING CONFIG_IMA CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS Please note that CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not, actually should not be, enabled. 3) Sign(label) a kernel image binary to be kexec-ed on target filesystem: $ evmctl ima_sign --key /path/to/private_key.pem /your/Image 4) Add a command line parameter and boot the kernel: ima_appraise=enforce On live system, 5) Set a security policy: $ mount -t securityfs none /sys/kernel/security $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy 6) Add a key for ima: $ keyctl padd asymmetric my_ima_key %:.ima < /path/to/x509_ima.der (or evmctl import /path/to/x509_ima.der ) 7) Then try kexec as normal. Concerns(or future works): * Even if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, the 2nd kernel won't be placed at a randomized address. We will have to add some boot code similar to efi-stub to implement the randomization. for approach (1), * While big-endian kernel can support kernel signing, I'm not sure that Image can be recognized as in PE format because x86 standard only defines little-endian-based format. * vmlinux support [1] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/linux-aarch64.git branch:arm64/kexec_file [2] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/kexec-tools.git branch:arm64/kexec_file [3] http://github.com/crash-utility/crash.git [4] https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/ [5] http://lkml.iu.edu//hypermail/linux/kernel/1707.0/03669.html [6] https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils/ci/master/tree/ Changes in v8 (Feb 22, 2018) * introduce ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY so that arm64 will be able to skip purgatory * remove "ifdef CONFIG_X86_64" stuffs from a re-factored function, prepare_elf64_headers(), making its interface more generic (The original patch was split into two for easier reviews.) * modify cpu_soft_restart() so as to let the 2nd kernel jump into its entry code directly without requiring purgatory in case of kexec_file_load * remove CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT and introduce CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG, much similar to x86 but quite redundant for now. * In addition, update/modify dependencies of KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG Changes in v7 (Dec 4, 2017) * rebased to v4.15-rc2 * re-organize the patch set to separate KEXEC_FILE_VERIFY_SIG-related code from the others * revamp factored-out code in kernel/kexec_file.c due to the changes in original x86 code * redefine walk_sys_ram_res_rev() prototype due to change of callback type in the counterpart, walk_sys_ram_res() * make KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT defaut on if KEXEC_FILE selected Changes in v6 (Oct 24, 2017) * fix a for-loop bug in _kexec_kernel_image_probe() per Julien Changes in v5 (Oct 10, 2017) * fix kbuild errors around patch #3 per Julien's comments, * fix a bug in walk_system_ram_res_rev() with some cleanup * modify fdt_setprop_range() to use vmalloc() * modify fill_property() to use memset() Changes in v4 (Oct 2, 2017) * reinstate x86's arch_kexec_kernel_image_load() * rename weak arch_kexec_kernel_xxx() to _kexec_kernel_xxx() for better re-use * constify kexec_file_loaders[] Changes in v3 (Sep 15, 2017) * fix kbuild test error * factor out arch_kexec_kernel_*() & arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() * remove CONFIG_CRASH_CORE guard from kexec_file.c * add vmapped kernel region to vmcore for gdb backtracing (see prepare_elf64_headers()) * merge asm/kexec_file.h into asm/kexec.h * and some cleanups Changes in v2 (Sep 8, 2017) * move core-header-related functions from crash_core.c to kexec_file.c * drop hash-check code from purgatory * modify purgatory asm to remove arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add() * drop older kernel support * drop vmlinux support (at least, for this series) Patch #1 to #10 are essential part for KEXEC_FILE support (additionally allowing for IMA-based verification): Patch #1 to #6 are all preparatory patches on generic side. Patch #7 to #11 are to enable kexec_file_load on arm64. Patch #12 to #13 are for KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG (arch-specific verification) support AKASHI Takahiro (13): resource: add walk_system_ram_res_rev() kexec_file: make an use of purgatory optional kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions x86: kexec_file: factor out elf core header related functions kexec_file, x86: move re-factored code to generic side asm-generic: add kexec_file_load system call to unistd.h arm64: kexec_file: invoke the kernel without purgatory arm64: kexec_file: load initrd and device-tree arm64: kexec_file: add crash dump support arm64: kexec_file: add Image format support arm64: kexec_file: enable KEXEC_FILE config include: pe.h: remove message[] from mz header definition arm64: kexec_file: enable KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG for Image arch/arm64/Kconfig | 34 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h | 90 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu-reset.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 105 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 11 +- arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 401 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S | 3 +- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/kexec_elf_64.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec_file_64.c | 39 +-- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/kexec-bzimage64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 332 +++++------------------ arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 45 +--- include/linux/ioport.h | 3 + include/linux/kexec.h | 34 ++- include/linux/pe.h | 2 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +- kernel/kexec_file.c | 238 ++++++++++++++++- kernel/resource.c | 57 ++++ 23 files changed, 1046 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c -- 2.16.2