diff mbox series

[v4.14,08/10] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well

Message ID 20210531203135.180427-9-johannes@sipsolutions.net
State Superseded
Headers show
Series [v4.14,01/10] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted | expand

Commit Message

Johannes Berg May 31, 2021, 8:31 p.m. UTC 
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

commit 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b upstream.

Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.

However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
that drivers might implement.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae050e015f6c92859dbe27@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c       | 12 ++++++++++++
 net/mac80211/sta_info.h |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index a00ec2ccb363..61fe65696e6e 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2048,6 +2048,7 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			 * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
 			 */
 			entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
+			entry->is_protected = true;
 			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
 			memcpy(entry->last_pn,
 			       rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
@@ -2060,6 +2061,9 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 				     sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
 				     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		} else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+			entry->is_protected = true;
+			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
 		}
 		return RX_QUEUED;
 	}
@@ -2101,6 +2105,14 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	} else if (entry->is_protected &&
+		   (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
+		    rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
+		/* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
+		 * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
+		 * lost cause anyway.
+		 */
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 	}
 
 	skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index 0447197c4a2b..f1d293f5678f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -415,7 +415,8 @@  struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
 	u16 extra_len;
 	u16 last_frag;
 	u8 rx_queue;
-	bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+	u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+	   is_protected:1;
 	u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
 	unsigned int key_color;
 };