From patchwork Tue Aug 23 22:25:18 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Evan Green X-Patchwork-Id: 599636 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3C67C32793 for ; Tue, 23 Aug 2022 22:26:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233897AbiHWW0f (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Aug 2022 18:26:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53274 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233878AbiHWW0G (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Aug 2022 18:26:06 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-x635.google.com (mail-pl1-x635.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::635]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 74C3F883D2 for ; Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:26:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x635.google.com with SMTP id jm11so14037641plb.13 for ; Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:26:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=WIOol7YbT4z3LRgf9Kpb9QMDaKLDbVhOqJugQnw6+ko=; b=ZXgKtPx0JfYsDQTu5hMi3HUEndF0L04/qeujoXTgzSgG2Xl7sh33ko8V7cdEjo1nVC bYmutAMToTWucYQKv0lOFSPmp+LC1f40+S9h9MjVXXNIGJDEor8aYn+ZEBJpXWEHv/C3 ZSrQts009grCuGapxCYN89LaAE72xoit+1Y9I= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=WIOol7YbT4z3LRgf9Kpb9QMDaKLDbVhOqJugQnw6+ko=; b=FYCb4K6Z7lXc7GI+RzGJrZzhoEzDbJoZTCakp3pnd0NYt7wSq91ELZH1STXkYSiKX9 KPTvo3u5sc1GhKC2+MQNbRkmtd9/j+Q9jVvbQLD4wv1Q5mUc9YzEzpPEznptL9bK4LWi K9SuKvLCkmXvatJZ9GoOcF9H709y5au9x8+t41KA8y47Gp3AFHQo786GliXVeyP0QO75 Y1R5r4mWXDZ9fabC1a7hLVRAm/3C/DcZO5FbzWK/kC0P8Xp+QxMd06M/qky7buCjkUom aP1BIUURc7W7Smc+OIGQv5dmUOG3w5y3ZWjkctTD/QU6EGiqmbNsZqL+aXyrUvrt4HO+ CZNQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1F64z+8WtHu5LGJ6ik/T2ITMvAY5OE7OGJfRjEThyy8HKx7Ev0 LhgGV2nJIZ+hJTBokiNEHqeWiA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR6txvcbCAEYZHTxlQ0dngpEzx0AFF5OSLln0IKFXrEGog3tbioXmlkM1G9kM0VxALwzRGjyOQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:7602:b0:172:a064:4a2f with SMTP id k2-20020a170902760200b00172a0644a2fmr25874719pll.56.1661293560871; Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:26:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from evgreen-glaptop.lan ([98.45.66.167]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f76-20020a62384f000000b0052f20d70845sm11256292pfa.150.2022.08.23.15.25.59 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:26:00 -0700 (PDT) From: Evan Green To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: gwendal@chromium.org, Eric Biggers , Matthew Garrett , jarkko@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Pavel Machek , apronin@chromium.org, dlunev@google.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com, Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Evan Green , Jason Gunthorpe , Peter Huewe Subject: [PATCH v2 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:25:18 -0700 Message-Id: <20220823152108.v2.2.I9ded8c8caad27403e9284dfc78ad6cbd845bc98d@changeid> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.0 In-Reply-To: <20220823222526.1524851-1-evgreen@chromium.org> References: <20220823222526.1524851-1-evgreen@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org From: Matthew Garrett Under certain circumstances it might be desirable to enable the creation of TPM-backed secrets that are only accessible to the kernel. In an ideal world this could be achieved by using TPM localities, but these don't appear to be available on consumer systems. An alternative is to simply block userland from modifying one of the resettable PCRs, leaving it available to the kernel. If the kernel ensures that no userland can access the TPM while it is carrying out work, it can reset PCR 23, extend it to an arbitrary value, create or load a secret, and then reset the PCR again. Even if userland somehow obtains the sealed material, it will be unable to unseal it since PCR 23 will never be in the appropriate state. From: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Evan Green --- Matthew's original version of this patch is at: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096491/ Changes in v2: - Fixed sparse warnings drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 +++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 927088b2c3d3f2..4483b61a428b11 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -211,4 +211,14 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE. source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig" + +config TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR + bool "Restrict userland access to PCR 23" + depends on TCG_TPM + help + If set, block userland from extending or resetting PCR 23. This + allows it to be restricted to in-kernel use, preventing userland + from being able to make use of data sealed to the TPM by the kernel. + This is required for secure hibernation support, but should be left + disabled if any userland may require access to PCR23. endif # TCG_TPM diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index dc4c0a0a512903..7a4e618c7d1942 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -198,6 +198,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, priv->response_read = false; *off = 0; + if (priv->chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + ret = tpm2_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); + else + ret = tpm1_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); + + if (ret) + goto out; + /* * If in nonblocking mode schedule an async job to send * the command return the size. diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index a80b341d38eb8c..077c3ca0a127ba 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type); unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal); int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip); +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, + const void *buf, size_t bufsiz); int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc); int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space, unsigned int buf_size); void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space); @@ -244,4 +246,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm_dev_common_init(void); void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR +#define TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR 23 + +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); +#else +static inline int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, + size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, + size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index 8ec743dec26544..318e75ae42fb85 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -845,3 +845,38 @@ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) return 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) +{ + struct tpm_header *header = (struct tpm_header *)buffer; + char len, offset; + __be32 *pcr; + int pos; + + switch (be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal)) { + case TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND: + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + pcr = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + if (be32_to_cpu(*pcr) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) + return -EPERM; + break; + case TPM_ORD_PCR_RESET: + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1)) + return -EINVAL; + len = buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + len)) + return -EINVAL; + offset = TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR/3; + if (len < offset) + break; + pos = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + offset; + if (buffer[pos] & (1 << (TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR - 2 * offset))) + return -EPERM; + break; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 69126a6770386e..dbf7f5552c6782 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -821,3 +821,25 @@ int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc) return -1; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) +{ + int cc = tpm_find_and_validate_cc(chip, NULL, buffer, size); + __be32 *handle; + + switch (cc) { + case TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND: + case TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET: + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + + handle = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + if (be32_to_cpu(*handle) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) + return -EPERM; + break; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c index ffb35f0154c16c..6f51cd92c6400f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd) return 0; } -static int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, const void *cmd, size_t len) {