@@ -225,18 +225,22 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
+ TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION = 0x0176,
TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B,
TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E,
+ TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F,
TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182,
TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185,
TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186,
+ TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST = 0x0189,
TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191,
TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */
};
enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
+ TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007,
TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009,
};
@@ -125,6 +125,118 @@ static int swsusp_enc_dec(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, char *buf,
return ret;
}
+static int tpm_setup_policy(struct tpm_chip *chip, int *session_handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_header *head;
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ char nonce[32] = {0x00};
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS,
+ TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Decrypt key */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
+
+ /* Auth entity */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
+
+ /* Nonce - blank is fine here */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(nonce));
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+
+ /* Encrypted secret - empty */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+ /* Policy type - session */
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0x01);
+
+ /* Encryption type - NULL */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+
+ /* Hash type - SHA256 */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+
+ rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+
+ if (be32_to_cpu(head->length) != sizeof(struct tpm_header) +
+ sizeof(int) + sizeof(u16) + sizeof(nonce)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *session_handle = be32_to_cpu(*(int *)&buf.data[10]);
+ memcpy(nonce, &buf.data[16], sizeof(nonce));
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, *session_handle);
+
+ /* PCR digest - read from the PCR, we'll verify creation data later */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+ /* One PCR */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
+
+ /* SHA256 banks */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+
+ /* Select PCR 23 */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0x03000080);
+
+ rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tpm_policy_get_digest(struct tpm_chip *chip, int handle,
+ char *digest)
+{
+ struct tpm_header *head;
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+
+ rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ if (be32_to_cpu(head->length) != sizeof(struct tpm_header) +
+ sizeof(u16) + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(digest, &buf.data[12], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+out:
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int tpm_certify_creationdata(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload)
{
@@ -182,11 +294,14 @@ int swsusp_encrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct trusted_key_payload *payload;
struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL;
+ char policy[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ char *policydigest = NULL;
struct tpm_chip *chip;
struct key *key;
+ int session_handle;
int ret, i;
-
- char *keyinfo = "new\t32\tkeyhandle=0x81000001\tcreationpcrs=0x00800000";
+ char *keyinfo = NULL;
+ char *keytemplate = "new\t32\tkeyhandle=0x81000001\tcreationpcrs=0x00800000\tpolicydigest=%s";
chip = tpm_default_chip();
@@ -213,10 +328,35 @@ int swsusp_encrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
memcpy(&digests[i], &digest, sizeof(digest));
}
+ policydigest = kmalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!policydigest) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto reset;
+ }
+
ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests);
if (ret != 0)
goto reset;
+ ret = tpm_setup_policy(chip, &session_handle);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto reset;
+
+ ret = tpm_policy_get_digest(chip, session_handle, policy);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto reset;
+
+ bin2hex(policydigest, policy, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ policydigest[64] = '\0';
+
+ keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, policydigest);
+ if (!keyinfo) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto reset;
+ }
+
key = key_alloc(&key_type_trusted, "swsusp", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL);
@@ -228,6 +368,7 @@ int swsusp_encrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, keyinfo, strlen(keyinfo) + 1, NULL,
NULL);
+
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -244,6 +385,8 @@ int swsusp_encrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
key_revoke(key);
key_put(key);
reset:
+ kfree(keyinfo);
+ kfree(policydigest);
kfree(digests);
tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23);
return ret;
@@ -252,13 +395,14 @@ int swsusp_encrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
int swsusp_decrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- char *keytemplate = "load\t%s\tkeyhandle=0x81000001";
+ char *keytemplate = "load\t%s\tkeyhandle=0x81000001\tpolicyhandle=0x%x";
struct trusted_key_payload *payload;
struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL;
char certhash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
char *blobstring = NULL;
char *keyinfo = NULL;
struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ int session_handle;
struct key *key;
int i, ret;
@@ -291,15 +435,22 @@ int swsusp_decrypt_digest(struct swsusp_header *header)
if (ret != 0)
goto reset;
- blobstring = kmalloc(header->blob_len * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ret = tpm_setup_policy(chip, &session_handle);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto reset;
+
+ blobstring = kmalloc(header->blob_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!blobstring) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto reset;
}
bin2hex(blobstring, header->blob, header->blob_len);
+ blobstring[header->blob_len * 2] = '\0';
- keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blobstring);
+ keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blobstring,
+ session_handle);
if (!keyinfo) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto reset;
The key blob is not secret, and by default the TPM will happily unseal it regardless of system state. We can protect against that by sealing the secret with a PCR policy - if the current PCR state doesn't match, the TPM will refuse to release the secret. For now let's just seal it to PCR 23. In the long term we may want a more flexible policy around this, such as including PCR 7. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> --- include/linux/tpm.h | 4 ++ kernel/power/tpm.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)