From patchwork Wed Dec 8 11:37:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 522654 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0742EC4167D for ; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 11:40:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232942AbhLHLni (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:43:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57662 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231559AbhLHLm7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Dec 2021 06:42:59 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 017BFC0698E3; Wed, 8 Dec 2021 03:38:21 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id e3so7429347edu.4; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:20 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yw3fTZf8XX+3QBd+JmTUy72JwQy6opSFVeOafl9MHOw=; b=gPO0hj/HtWlhV/Ot5NuhMTZPsnYAHaee8JvFqMeZIME7DcDaIfrx71c3gD5NLKhA25 J/16LTFgQnbvJTH0WgwnBHaE8e08nc6wwsukHUV4OBx2Jykpu3kvbQWeEMCESewKG77y u6COj2SHOUTFlWPfyw2a39Sm7SUGurj5kObFDQlW+UsTPkCDlPwwyk3Ip5LBRMvejLcP eonImO8Qfs21J9T5sJFShLsrrir/7+lGdj7aW2NKGP01WHr96fIggLbp/qtniMRljrUe KVPHhbruDK0h9Lzu0O8uzbotN1IATcncQqtLESEkoThwV2n/qMJN0zkZQvP/hVW/JBn2 XlYQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=yw3fTZf8XX+3QBd+JmTUy72JwQy6opSFVeOafl9MHOw=; b=NVn0/MEM/1karWe4GdPflxDdi/kluRrKHZBw6z4h30cLYFJSP7qnE3uGOZ3FoEVJEf 2vhAMziTm5UKgMSxpMRdWV6SOEIgKtJufrHQkCNxy9CHTP68TUY0RkzAOQZo1i8M/FIh di0U8n9EC0aF9tlW6M9+7f8dggzulGWWsjfC5ci30hgErz8dIpttwRRbQeJqWN+GYvb8 CA7bie0KUqYXL4Da0+nQ5KUNcMTnoQNJRS+Y9BQl9hMpH02mLrNmFTOzspl6L36sHmO/ SeHwo4T/fVmgvcE1w5ji25wPpTSBq+keLKtc42xRBdqzF+mdjeHlKME/42lh8zt6uiUV YAnw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531fWBX4+DvTE0qHe8J1jve3THRtzuSBqzucbyAYb2JlP/QIjU29 G1sokQwWMUiNit0NhgOjv1I= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyK2Bp9sVybIZRzoG3sRUgbLZOuqGZKPaPLtHoBOnzzkcTfjm9CN/x+4L7NqNXaH7weSkdN2w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:b2c7:: with SMTP id cf7mr6939110ejb.303.1638963499587; Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:3c9f:e05b:4dff:43ba]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11sm1883810edz.53.2021.12.08.03.38.18 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Dec 2021 03:38:19 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 13/18] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:37:28 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org This is a parallel feature to tcp_md5sig.tcpm_ifindex support and allows applications to server multiple VRFs with a single socket. The ifindex argument must be the ifindex of a VRF device and must match exactly, keys with ifindex == 0 (outside of VRF) will not match for connections inside a VRF. Keys without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX will ignore ifindex and match both inside and outside VRF. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 11 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 020637265ce9..e57bc732f737 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 alg_id; /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ + int l3index; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index e02176390519..a7f5f918ed5a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -400,15 +400,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -450,10 +452,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * @addr: Key is only valid for this address * * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; + /** + * @ifindex: ifindex of vrf (l3mdev_master) interface + * + * If the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX flag is set then key only applies for + * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. + * + * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` + */ + int ifindex; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index a8950c9a7e84..b3fd12fcb948 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/net.h" #include #include #include #include @@ -214,10 +215,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, { if (info->send_id != key->send_id) return false; if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -281,26 +286,49 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *new) +{ + if (!old) + return true; + + /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ + if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) + return false; + if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) + return true; + + return false; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, int send_id) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; - if (result && net_ratelimit()) - pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); - result = key; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) + l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(addr_sk), + addr_sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } + if (better_key_match(result, key)) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); } return result; } @@ -564,18 +592,20 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; + int l3index = 0; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -622,10 +652,24 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) return -EINVAL; err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); if (err) return err; + /* check ifindex is valid (zero is always valid) */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX && opt.ifindex) { + struct net_device *dev; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), opt.ifindex); + if (dev && netif_is_l3_master(dev)) + l3index = dev->ifindex; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (!l3index) + return -EINVAL; + } + key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace. * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any. @@ -639,10 +683,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + key_info->l3index = l3index; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head); return 0; } @@ -1427,21 +1472,37 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, int recv_id, bool *anykey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; *anykey = false; /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &info->head, node, 0) { if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + l3index = inet_sdif(skb) ? inet_iif(skb) : 0; + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + l3index = inet6_sdif(skb) ? inet6_iif(skb) : 0; + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "unexpected skb->protocol=%x", skb->protocol); + continue; + } + } + + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } *anykey = true; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; - if (!result) + if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); }