From patchwork Fri Jan 20 14:43:54 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Gregory Price X-Patchwork-Id: 644846 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8F83C27C7C for ; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 14:45:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230522AbjATOpP (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jan 2023 09:45:15 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50706 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231154AbjATOpM (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jan 2023 09:45:12 -0500 Received: from mail-il1-x143.google.com (mail-il1-x143.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::143]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AC817D0D8D; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 06:44:43 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-il1-x143.google.com with SMTP id u8so2770748ilq.13; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 06:44:43 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=Y4L1pQ0JM1hC2pJHglk8l3j+fJVDjADjEl6sXRJ77Xs=; b=WkrvGr7UQb8Qru2B3v0x5Ay72pxJQYUv6DeKNen0IezGFgdRcayY42tSeeLpsB6fo4 wO7PVmqxDKlhNMhpgMySgtT1W6mI9atfP+o9jBZAT7PaYq+MSCcfaAEG+zBtEh+ZK8hS 3NqgsPJ2mp+amhb7fLnp1b3zL5Sbe1aRATddLqf5BZC5178EYZ63cy9uqm807y0c2jke S/mlNesYvJIVnkw71blPkNHQRKcc/CMEyJu+k+ddVwWEY1SAiwbfihJ3bYareLGkjlwN 1sCSLzLnDdtFlmSF9XtqklE/F9i7iZtTolT466tH1PVc/iuct47xdg2XycyYknKpAly7 uLSw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Y4L1pQ0JM1hC2pJHglk8l3j+fJVDjADjEl6sXRJ77Xs=; b=sZxxJJaFyZO4HJrj2fLR79xvkMnauDrTMK4nUAGuunZezgO3+8SeEOJKlN/J9e1BdZ euRLF8vo+vicw7yBbfYRsaYf0CQEUDZi2vYb3PCvAC4kMjETYo+Ki2lCmb/K7xLNzSK/ 0CsXnJAEJg8lzH+VMUaZid+IrSI9ondcX1DjH/CHlDohf+Auhx8vj0ibrB+hDZjDyXro VNUVJwHpaoXNeNxbDQ1YJ9Wuz0XMtj0kFjHhwvWSJ3P6OfgfrE+C254MpjuaX9UbVL9L iwueU4EWbR+3Rh20pBppYRmdJ1azy2+qtExgztQCpPAoBYqHZ62639Vcbg1Ezn37+V2N iv6A== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2kpWj2GSNNWtrBuTmRD5TmkObAH4udwF3YJHv2cBPjlOzqT6p8qf j/WRXeNH9AKcpJpii3diRq1En2NZC/ux X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXuTVKrotbzpNTgVhUT8ksOkhPVRLjQ2O1iU40UyKuopiGYvDqMz06qyac7d/RCk3MpXgtiG/A== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6e02:1544:b0:30e:f4d0:c092 with SMTP id j4-20020a056e02154400b0030ef4d0c092mr21505925ilu.3.1674225851136; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 06:44:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from fedora.mshome.net ([104.184.156.161]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id p185-20020a0229c2000000b003a7c47efde0sm1513852jap.11.2023.01.20.06.44.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 20 Jan 2023 06:44:10 -0800 (PST) From: Gregory Price X-Google-Original-From: Gregory Price To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, krisman@collabora.com, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com, corbet@lwn.net, shuah@kernel.org, Gregory Price Subject: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace,syscall_user_dispatch: Implement Syscall User Dispatch Suspension Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 09:43:54 -0500 Message-Id: <20230120144356.40717-2-gregory.price@memverge.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.0 In-Reply-To: <20230120144356.40717-1-gregory.price@memverge.com> References: <20230120144356.40717-1-gregory.price@memverge.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Adds PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH to ptrace options, and modify Syscall User Dispatch to suspend interception when enabled. This is modeled after the SUSPEND_SECCOMP feature, which suspends SECCOMP interposition. Without doing this, software like CRIU will inject system calls into a process and be intercepted by Syscall User Dispatch, either causing a crash (due to blocked signals) or the delivery of those signals to a ptracer (not the intended behavior). Since Syscall User Dispatch is not a privileged feature, a check for permissions is not required, however attempting to set this option when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE it not supported should be disallowed, as its intended use is checkpoint/resume. Signed-off-by: Gregory Price Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 6 +++++- kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 5 +++++ kernel/ptrace.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index eaaef3ffec22..461ae5c99d57 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) +#define PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH \ + (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h index 195ae64a8c87..ba9e3f19a22c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h @@ -146,9 +146,13 @@ struct ptrace_rseq_configuration { /* eventless options */ #define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20) #define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21) +#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH (1 << 22) #define PTRACE_O_MASK (\ - 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) + 0x000000ff | \ + PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | \ + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP | \ + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH) #include diff --git a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c index 0b6379adff6b..b5ec75164805 100644 --- a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c +++ b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ bool syscall_user_dispatch(struct pt_regs *regs) struct syscall_user_dispatch *sd = ¤t->syscall_dispatch; char state; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && + unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) + return false; + if (likely(instruction_pointer(regs) - sd->offset < sd->len)) return false; diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 54482193e1ed..99467ba5f55b 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) return -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH) && + (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTART))) + return -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))