From patchwork Wed Dec 9 19:28:31 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 340633 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1AFAC19425 for ; Wed, 9 Dec 2020 19:30:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A9FA23C90 for ; Wed, 9 Dec 2020 19:30:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728183AbgLITaC (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Dec 2020 14:30:02 -0500 Received: from smtp-bc0b.mail.infomaniak.ch ([45.157.188.11]:33279 "EHLO smtp-bc0b.mail.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387628AbgLIT35 (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Dec 2020 14:29:57 -0500 Received: from smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.5.36.107]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CrnCn6GtXzlhLPt; Wed, 9 Dec 2020 20:28:53 +0100 (CET) Received: from localhost (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4CrnCn3p1kzlppyn; Wed, 9 Dec 2020 20:28:53 +0100 (CET) From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: James Morris , Jann Horn , "Serge E . Hallyn" Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Al Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Anton Ivanov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Jeff Dike , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , Richard Weinberger , Shuah Khan , Vincent Dagonneau , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, =?utf-8?q?Mick?= =?utf-8?b?YcOrbCBTYWxhw7xu?= Subject: [PATCH v26 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 20:28:31 +0100 Message-Id: <20201209192839.1396820-5-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20201209192839.1396820-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20201209192839.1396820-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mickaël Salaün Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Jann Horn --- Changes since v25: * Rename function to landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(). Changes since v22: * Add Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Changes since v21: * Fix copyright dates. Changes since v14: * Constify variables. Changes since v13: * Make the ptrace restriction mandatory, like in the v10. * Remove the eBPF dependency. Previous changes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191104172146.30797-5-mic@digikod.net/ --- security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/ptrace.h | 14 +++++ security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 041ea242e627..f1d1eb72fa76 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \ - cred.o + cred.o ptrace.o diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f55b82446de2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" +#include "cred.h" +#include "ptrace.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/** + * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace + * + * @parent: Parent domain. + * @child: Potential child of @parent. + * + * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which + * means a subset of) the @child domain. + */ +static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, + const struct landlock_ruleset *const child) +{ + const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker; + + if (!parent) + return true; + if (!child) + return false; + for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) { + if (walker == parent->hierarchy) + /* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */ + return true; + } + /* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */ + return false; +} + +static bool task_is_scoped(const struct task_struct *const parent, + const struct task_struct *const child) +{ + bool is_scoped; + const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent, *dom_child; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dom_parent = landlock_get_task_domain(parent); + dom_child = landlock_get_task_domain(child); + is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_child); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return is_scoped; +} + +static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *const parent, + const struct task_struct *const child) +{ + /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ + if (!landlocked(parent)) + return 0; + if (task_is_scoped(parent, child)) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/** + * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access + * another + * + * @child: Process to be accessed. + * @mode: Mode of attachment. + * + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least + * the same rules. Else denied. + * + * Determines whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission + * granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child, + const unsigned int mode) +{ + return task_ptrace(current, child); +} + +/** + * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the + * current one + * + * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer. + * + * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same + * or more rules. Else denied. + * + * Determines whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current + * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) +{ + return task_ptrace(parent, current); +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.h b/security/landlock/ptrace.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..265b220ae3bf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H + +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void); + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index 8661112fb238..a5d6ef334991 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" +#include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { static int __init landlock_init(void) { landlock_add_cred_hooks(); + landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); pr_info("Up and running.\n"); return 0; }