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[34.145.126.213]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id d2e1a72fcca58-703fd394e95sm9533812b3a.56.2024.06.11.16.14.12 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 11 Jun 2024 16:14:12 -0700 (PDT) From: jeffxu@chromium.org To: rdunlap@infradead.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, cyphar@cyphar.com, david@readahead.eu, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jeffxu@chromium.org, jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, pobrn@protonmail.com, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 0/1] mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 23:14:07 +0000 Message-ID: <20240611231409.3899809-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2.505.gda0bf45e8d-goog Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Jeff Xu When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was introduced, there was one big mistake: it didn't have proper documentation. This led to a lot of confusion, especially about whether or not memfd created with the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is sealable. Before MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, memfd had to explicitly set MFD_ALLOW_SEALING to be sealable, so it's a fair question. As one might have noticed, unlike other flags in memfd_create, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is actually a combination of multiple flags. The idea is to make it easier to use memfd in the most common way, which is NOEXEC + F_SEAL_EXEC + MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. This works with sysctl vm.noexec to help existing applications move to a more secure way of using memfd. Proposals have been made to put MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL non-sealable, unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is set, to be consistent with other flags [1] [2], Those are based on the viewpoint that each flag is an atomic unit, which is a reasonable assumption. However, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was designed with the intent of promoting the most secure method of using memfd, therefore a combination of multiple functionalities into one bit. Furthermore, the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL has been added for more than one year, and multiple applications and distributions have backported and utilized it. Altering ABI now presents a degree of risk and may lead to disruption. MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is a new flag, and applications must change their code to use it. There is no backward compatibility problem. When sysctl vm.noexec == 1 or 2, applications that don't set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL or MFD_EXEC will get MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL memfd. And old-application might break, that is by-design, in such a system vm.noexec = 0 shall be used. Also no backward compatibility problem. I propose to include this documentation patch to assist in clarifying the semantics of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, thereby preventing any potential future confusion. This patch supersede previous patch which is trying different direction [3], and please remove [2] from mm-unstable branch when applying this patch. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to David Rheinsberg and Barnabás Pőcze for initiating the discussion on the topic of sealability. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@readahead.eu/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240513191544.94754-1-pobrn@protonmail.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240524033933.135049-1-jeffxu@google.com/ v3: Additional Randy Dunlap' comments. v2: Update according to Randy Dunlap' comments. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240611034903.3456796-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240607203543.2151433-1-jeffxu@google.com/ Jeff Xu (1): mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst