From patchwork Fri May 23 04:39:11 2025 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 892295 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0621221572; Fri, 23 May 2025 04:39:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747975179; cv=none; b=ry6tpHG3NABxqyzvPLQ/NJ6RI+y8mINZlDhH24LWTAlw1wy6qSy2gSOk8pCavrAVAaPkC+0sXv6MzmLz6N0yrAcGeKExQI9gxUEWUjV9+iuAXGjL/aEVbNgNUXn7TGBYNUXphZWzMjxjhQ7m62D0+dvOUdUFDoNPogPyxOcu1uI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747975179; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9AkAkSKl9S4JaL8v+O2hS6MFbAfqao2mTLxrmw6SRmE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=bCM9Q0O8bJhCmW7ySAcZ2AHbBbE6HkoQQd768tTbGmOHzGdMjEhvbV/BjJid+2UEgnA2WQ1QuQgW5yMXrfgM/tawZYmw2ooynA66G6V+j/4FFpU0B+oSIp8eynDJs+lvBhJ8CnZ/xoOQEIyyM0TSbROYTItnBwNeQk6FN9yJtzY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=BwShGNjl; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="BwShGNjl" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 628DBC4CEE9; Fri, 23 May 2025 04:39:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1747975178; bh=9AkAkSKl9S4JaL8v+O2hS6MFbAfqao2mTLxrmw6SRmE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BwShGNjlDVKDb99dus3C4Aw4MVpsaV7mbXYwh1hIrC7DuKXYqlAVmVavm1HNkRlVn 4L159ccVT45fGrMrmEAaS88OmwMFBAJT8P2982HyEO03BkNFQtXtfwKe+orPtkU+Ga 37Hqm+/OQcBQNnpKkRHit/KURAflGfh4+pSUclAFlcSq/3KPARUDTEA0xlOp7CLlzg g3411DfatJJnzdtaUgvh6oXocfd8GAcp+Vk3PZHxDqx/9M6pju9btX39GIj+dM1/LG 1+/hUplsEg18ecK2d+QVLsB2r3LvQmNVULZjeYg7GjN9lKRJ0PY0kt7FyfHLrcTbgQ ST0I1fmxAThHQ== From: Kees Cook To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Kees Cook , Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig , Marco Elver , Andrey Konovalov , Andrey Ryabinin , Ard Biesheuvel , Masahiro Yamada , Nathan Chancellor , Nicolas Schier , Nick Desaulniers , Bill Wendling , Justin Stitt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev Subject: [PATCH v2 01/14] stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 21:39:11 -0700 Message-Id: <20250523043935.2009972-1-kees@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20250523043251.it.550-kees@kernel.org> References: <20250523043251.it.550-kees@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=36006; i=kees@kernel.org; h=from:subject; bh=9AkAkSKl9S4JaL8v+O2hS6MFbAfqao2mTLxrmw6SRmE=; b=owGbwMvMwCVmps19z/KJym7G02pJDBn6v78bHbjqUCS/yZI1lJddPPsgl+Gs+Yd+zn2bvOBo+ 9zgHfccOkpZGMS4GGTFFFmC7NzjXDzetoe7z1WEmcPKBDKEgYtTACZi08Twz775WYHCrfbrKh63 bJpXGamk7NBMUTx1UO4483tJHp/1Bxh+s96ak5Lkmvj6g0dF6Yvt3k8/tc/kiGf13+I3P9Lf3Wc 6NwA= X-Developer-Key: i=kees@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=A5C3F68F229DD60F723E6E138972F4DFDC6DC026 In preparation for adding Clang sanitizer coverage stack depth tracking that can support stack depth callbacks: - Add the new top-level CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE option which will be implemented either with the stackleak GCC plugin, or with the Clang stack depth callback support. - Rename CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK as needed to CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE, but keep it for anything specific to the GCC plugin itself. - Rename all exposed "STACKLEAK" names and files to "KSTACK_ERASE" (named for what it does rather than what it protects against), but leave as many of the internals alone as possible to avoid even more churn. While here, also split "prev_lowest_stack" into CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS, since that's the only place it is referenced from. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: --- arch/Kconfig | 4 +-- arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- security/Kconfig.hardening | 36 ++++++++++--------- arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile | 2 +- arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile | 2 +- arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 8 ++--- drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/Makefile | 10 +++--- lib/Makefile | 2 +- scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 6 ++-- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 4 +-- Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst | 2 +- Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 2 +- .../zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 +-- include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} | 18 +++++----- include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++- arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- .../lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} | 26 +++++++------- fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++-- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} | 18 +++++----- tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config | 2 +- MAINTAINERS | 4 +-- 36 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) rename include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} (85%) rename drivers/misc/lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (89%) rename kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (90%) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index a3308a220f86..4d1908f6f084 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -630,11 +630,11 @@ config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG If unsure, say N. -config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK +config HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE bool help An architecture should select this if it has the code which - fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON + fills the used part of the kernel stack with the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON value before returning from system calls. config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 3072731fe09c..cb0b2e2211ca 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ config ARM select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN + select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU select HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT - select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if ARM_LPAE diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 55fc331af337..e2a9e013b6a9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN if EXPERT select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB + select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index fbca724302ab..31792e0e0bf6 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ config RISCV select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if MMU && 64BIT select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if MMU && 64BIT select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if MMU && 64BIT + select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !XIP_KERNEL select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB_QXFER_PKT select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if 64BIT && MMU diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index 0c16dc443e2f..a8e74ed8e3cc 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -176,10 +176,10 @@ config S390 select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN select HAVE_ARCH_KMSAN select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE + select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY - select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 340e5468980e..bc3708cad46b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -204,13 +204,13 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KMSAN if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB + select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if MMU && COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES if MMU && COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST - select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index fd1238753cad..125b35e2ef0f 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ choice endchoice -config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +config KSTACK_ERASE bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE depends on GCC_PLUGINS - depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK help This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving @@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it. +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + def_bool KSTACK_ERASE + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + help This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ @@ -117,37 +121,37 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between builds. -config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE - int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" +config KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by KSTACK_ERASE" default 100 range 0 4096 - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + depends on KSTACK_ERASE help - The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking + The KSTACK_ERASE option instruments the kernel code for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. If unsure, leave the default value 100. -config STACKLEAK_METRICS - bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +config KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS + bool "Show KSTACK_ERASE metrics in the /proc file system" + depends on KSTACK_ERASE depends on PROC_FS help - If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in - the /proc file system. In particular, /proc//stack_depth + If this is set, KSTACK_ERASE metrics for every task are available + in the /proc file system. In particular, /proc//stack_depth shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it - can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for - your workloads. + can be useful for estimating the KSTACK_ERASE performance impact + for your workloads. -config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +config KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + depends on KSTACK_ERASE help This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. + CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE. config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default" diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile index d61369b1eabe..f9075edfd773 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ OBJS = HEAD = head.o OBJS += misc.o decompress.o -CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) +CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_UNCOMPRESS),y) OBJS += debug.o AFLAGS_head.o += -DDEBUG diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile index 4d11a8c29181..f440bf57b1a5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Copyright 2022 Google LLC KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \ - -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \ + -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \ $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) \ $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \ -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile index a76522d63c3e..0b0a68b663d4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ asflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS ccflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__DISABLE_TRACE_MMIO__ ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector \ -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ - $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) + $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) hostprogs := gen-hyprel HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/include diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile index 81d69d45c06c..7dd15be69c90 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # This file was copied from arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile. KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \ - -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \ + -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \ $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \ -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \ -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h \ diff --git a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile index fb9c917c9b45..240592e3f5c2 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=medany -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING +PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector -g0 # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile index ebdfd7b84feb..e0a607a14e7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=small -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -g0 PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fpic -fvisibility=hidden -PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING +PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index 6a0152858a2a..cdba14dde7d5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86) += -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -std=gnu11 \ # arm64 uses the full KBUILD_CFLAGS so it's necessary to explicitly # disable the stackleak plugin -cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \ +cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += -fpie $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \ -fno-unwind-tables -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) += -DEFI_HAVE_STRLEN -DEFI_HAVE_STRNLEN \ -DEFI_HAVE_MEMCHR -DEFI_HAVE_STRRCHR \ -DEFI_HAVE_STRCMP -fno-builtin -fpic \ $(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base) \ - $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) + $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV) += -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax \ - $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH) += -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) + $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) +cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH) += -fpie $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile index 39468bd27b85..03ebe33185f9 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += perms.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += refcount.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += rodata_objcopy.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += usercopy.o -lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += stackleak.o +lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += kstack_erase.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += cfi.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += fortify.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_PPC_64S_HASH_MMU) += powerpc.o diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 32e80dd626af..e4f01f1d4d0c 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -139,11 +139,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) += watch_queue.o obj-$(CONFIG_RESOURCE_KUNIT_TEST) += resource_kunit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST) += sysctl-test.o -CFLAGS_stackleak.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o -KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n +CFLAGS_kstack_erase.o += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) +obj-$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) += kstack_erase.o +KASAN_SANITIZE_kstack_erase.o := n +KCSAN_SANITIZE_kstack_erase.o := n +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kstack_erase.o := n obj-$(CONFIG_SCF_TORTURE_TEST) += scftorture.o diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index c38582f187dd..632e69d25feb 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n -CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) +CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins index 435ab3f0ec44..28b8867c4e84 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins @@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \ += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \ - += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE) + += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE) gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \ += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-arch=$(SRCARCH) gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) \ += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable + DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable endif -export DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN +export DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE # All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to # filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index dd49a89a62d3..19224eeac1c2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ stack_erasing ============= This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end -of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``. +of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``. That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. @@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary. = ==================================================================== -0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated. +0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS are not updated. 1 Kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls. = ==================================================================== diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst index f2db178b353f..a6cf05d51bd8 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst @@ -176,5 +176,5 @@ Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is correct as KASAN disables KASLR. -For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the STACKLEAK_POISON value in the last 2MB +For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON value in the last 2MB hole: ffffffffffff4111 diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst index 910668e665cb..a32ca23c21b0 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Memory poisoning When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a -syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a +syscall return (``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``), wipe heap memory on a free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks. diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst index 3c8a68b1e1be..93de9cee5c1a 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ KALLSYSM，则会直接打印原始地址。 -------- 在释放内存时，最好对内存内容进行清除处理，以防止攻击者重用内存中以前 -的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK）, +的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE）, 在释放堆内容是清除其内容。这有助于防止许多未初始化变量攻击、堆栈内容 泄露、堆内容泄露以及使用后释放攻击（user-after-free）。 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index d83236b96f22..94519688b007 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with .endm .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS call stackleak_erase POP_REGS @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE call stackleak_erase #endif .endm diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h similarity index 85% rename from include/linux/stackleak.h rename to include/linux/kstack_erase.h index 3be2cb564710..4e432eefa4d0 100644 --- a/include/linux/stackleak.h +++ b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef _LINUX_STACKLEAK_H -#define _LINUX_STACKLEAK_H +#ifndef _LINUX_KSTACK_ERASE_H +#define _LINUX_KSTACK_ERASE_H #include #include @@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ * Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the * virtual memory map for your platform. */ -#define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF -#define STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH 128 +#define KSTACK_ERASE_POISON -0xBEEF +#define KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH 128 -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE #include #include @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ stackleak_task_high_bound(const struct task_struct *tsk) static __always_inline unsigned long stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high) { - const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); + const unsigned int depth = KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); unsigned int poison_count = 0; unsigned long poison_high = high; unsigned long sp = high; @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high) while (sp > low && poison_count < depth) { sp -= sizeof(unsigned long); - if (*(unsigned long *)sp == STACKLEAK_POISON) { + if (*(unsigned long *)sp == KSTACK_ERASE_POISON) { poison_count++; } else { poison_count = 0; @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high) static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { t->lowest_stack = stackleak_task_low_bound(t); -# ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +# ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack; # endif } @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void); asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void); void __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void); -#else /* !CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK */ +#else /* !CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE */ static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { } #endif diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 8c60a42f9d00..9051d9484393 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1606,8 +1606,10 @@ struct task_struct { /* Used by BPF for per-TASK xdp storage */ struct bpf_net_context *bpf_net_context; -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE unsigned long lowest_stack; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS unsigned long prev_lowest_stack; #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S index f379c852dcb7..88336a1292bb 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ no_work_pending: ct_user_enter save = 0 -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE bl stackleak_erase_on_task_stack #endif restore_user_regs fast = 0, offset = 0 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 5ae2a34b50bd..67331437b2aa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(ret_to_user) ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // re-check for single-step enable_step_tsk x19, x2 -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE bl stackleak_erase_on_task_stack #endif kernel_exit 0 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index af514614404a..49e2344007c8 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception) #endif bnez s0, 1f -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE call stackleak_erase_on_task_stack #endif diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S index 0f00f4b06d51..75b0fbb236d0 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ _LPP_OFFSET = __LC_LPP #endif .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE -#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE brasl %r14,stackleak_erase_on_task_stack #endif .endm diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c similarity index 89% rename from drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c rename to drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c index f1d022160913..4fd9b0bfb874 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * This code tests that the current task stack is properly erased (filled - * with STACKLEAK_POISON). + * with KSTACK_ERASE_POISON). * * Authors: * Alexander Popov @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ */ #include "lkdtm.h" -#include +#include -#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) +#if defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) /* * Check that stackleak tracks the lowest stack pointer and erases the stack * below this as expected. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void) while (poison_low > task_stack_low) { poison_low -= sizeof(unsigned long); - if (*(unsigned long *)poison_low == STACKLEAK_POISON) + if (*(unsigned long *)poison_low == KSTACK_ERASE_POISON) continue; instrumentation_begin(); @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void) } instrumentation_begin(); - pr_info("stackleak stack usage:\n" + pr_info("kstack erase stack usage:\n" " high offset: %lu bytes\n" " current: %lu bytes\n" " lowest: %lu bytes\n" @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void) instrumentation_end(); } -static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) +static void lkdtm_KSTACK_ERASE(void) { unsigned long flags; @@ -129,19 +129,19 @@ static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) check_stackleak_irqoff(); local_irq_restore(flags); } -#else /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */ -static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) +#else /* defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) */ +static void lkdtm_KSTACK_ERASE(void) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK)) { - pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)\n"); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE)) { + pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=n)\n"); } else { - pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)\n"); + pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE=n)\n"); } } -#endif /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */ +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) */ static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { - CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ERASING), + CRASHTYPE(KSTACK_ERASE), }; struct crashtype_category stackleak_crashtypes = { diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c667702dc69b..be34612af8b6 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3291,7 +3291,7 @@ static int proc_pid_ksm_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, } #endif /* CONFIG_KSM */ -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -3304,7 +3304,7 @@ static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, prev_depth, depth); return 0; } -#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS */ /* * Thread groups @@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH ONE("patch_state", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_patch_state), #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS ONE("stack_depth", S_IRUGO, proc_stack_depth), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1ee8eb11f38b..1ec66911f6f6 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/kstack_erase.c similarity index 90% rename from kernel/stackleak.c rename to kernel/kstack_erase.c index bb65321761b4..201b846f8345 100644 --- a/kernel/stackleak.c +++ b/kernel/kstack_erase.c @@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ * * Author: Alexander Popov * - * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can + * KSTACK_ERASE reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. */ -#include +#include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE #include #include #include @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init); #define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) #else #define skip_erasing() false -#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ #ifndef __stackleak_poison static __always_inline void __stackleak_poison(unsigned long erase_low, @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack) erase_low = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, current->lowest_stack); -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low; #endif @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack) else erase_high = task_stack_high; - __stackleak_poison(erase_low, erase_high, STACKLEAK_POISON); + __stackleak_poison(erase_low, erase_high, KSTACK_ERASE_POISON); /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */ current->lowest_stack = task_stack_high; @@ -161,11 +161,11 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void) unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer; /* - * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than - * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in + * Having CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than + * KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that. */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH); + BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH); /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index b21b12ec88d9..31088a138bc9 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = { "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1", "__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds", "__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value", - /* STACKLEAK */ + /* KSTACK_ERASE */ "stackleak_track_stack", /* TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING */ "ftrace_likely_update", diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config index 7afe05e8c4d7..bd09fdaf53e0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ CONFIG_LKDTM=y CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y -CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y +CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 79a8e2c73908..9f76b329fdb3 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9971,8 +9971,6 @@ L: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening F: Documentation/kbuild/gcc-plugins.rst -F: include/linux/stackleak.h -F: kernel/stackleak.c F: scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins F: scripts/gcc-plugins/ @@ -13060,10 +13058,12 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/har F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count F: arch/*/configs/hardening.config +F: include/linux/kstack_erase.h F: include/linux/overflow.h F: include/linux/randomize_kstack.h F: include/linux/ucopysize.h F: kernel/configs/hardening.config +F: kernel/kstack_erase.c F: lib/tests/randstruct_kunit.c F: lib/tests/usercopy_kunit.c F: mm/usercopy.c