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([10.237.72.28]) by orviesa002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 28 Oct 2024 09:11:11 -0700 From: Alexander Shishkin To: Andy Lutomirski , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Ard Biesheuvel , "Paul E. McKenney" , Josh Poimboeuf , Xiongwei Song , Xin Li , "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" , Brijesh Singh , Michael Roth , Tony Luck , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Alexey Kardashevskiy Cc: Jonathan Corbet , Alexander Shishkin , Sohil Mehta , Ingo Molnar , Pawan Gupta , Daniel Sneddon , Kai Huang , Sandipan Das , Breno Leitao , Rick Edgecombe , Alexei Starovoitov , Hou Tao , Juergen Gross , Vegard Nossum , Kees Cook , Eric Biggers , Jason Gunthorpe , "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" , Andrew Morton , Luis Chamberlain , Yuntao Wang , Rasmus Villemoes , Christophe Leroy , Tejun Heo , Changbin Du , Huang Shijie , Geert Uytterhoeven , Namhyung Kim , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 18:07:57 +0200 Message-ID: <20241028160917.1380714-10-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2 In-Reply-To: <20241028160917.1380714-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> References: <20241028160917.1380714-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Sohil Mehta The legacy vsyscall page is mapped at a fixed address in the kernel address range 0xffffffffff600000-0xffffffffff601000. Prior to LASS being introduced, a legacy vsyscall page access from userspace would always generate a page fault. The kernel emulates the execute (XONLY) accesses in the page fault handler and returns back to userspace with the appropriate register values. Since LASS intercepts these accesses before the paging structures are traversed it generates a general protection fault instead of a page fault. The #GP fault doesn't provide much information in terms of the error code. So, use the faulting RIP which is preserved in the user registers to emulate the vsyscall access without going through complex instruction decoding. Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 11 ++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index e89d7d83a594..97608883b4b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ * soon be no new userspace code that will ever use a vsyscall. * * The code in this file emulates vsyscalls when notified of a page - * fault to a vsyscall address. + * fault or a general protection fault to a vsyscall address. */ #include @@ -276,6 +276,15 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall_pf(unsigned long error_code, struct pt_regs *regs, return __emulate_vsyscall(regs, address); } +bool emulate_vsyscall_gp(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* Emulate only if the RIP points to the vsyscall address */ + if (!is_vsyscall_vaddr(regs->ip)) + return false; + + return __emulate_vsyscall(regs, regs->ip); +} + /* * A pseudo VMA to allow ptrace access for the vsyscall page. This only * covers the 64bit vsyscall page now. 32bit has a real VMA now and does diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h index 214977f4fa11..4eb8d3673223 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ extern void set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root); */ extern bool emulate_vsyscall_pf(unsigned long error_code, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address); +extern bool emulate_vsyscall_gp(struct pt_regs *regs); #else static inline void map_vsyscall(void) {} static inline bool emulate_vsyscall_pf(unsigned long error_code, @@ -23,6 +24,11 @@ static inline bool emulate_vsyscall_pf(unsigned long error_code, { return false; } + +static inline bool emulate_vsyscall_gp(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + return false; +} #endif /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index b26a7aba0b2d..bae635cc6971 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include @@ -718,6 +719,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && fixup_umip_exception(regs)) goto exit; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS) && emulate_vsyscall_gp(regs)) + goto exit; + gp_user_force_sig_segv(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, desc); goto exit; }