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Mon, 26 Aug 2024 22:43:54 GMT Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by phxpaimrmta01.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 418a5rmr46-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Aug 2024 22:43:54 +0000 Received: from phxpaimrmta01.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (phxpaimrmta01.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 47QMfn2f026154; Mon, 26 Aug 2024 22:43:53 GMT Received: from localhost.us.oracle.com (bur-virt-x6-2-100.us.oracle.com [10.153.92.40]) by phxpaimrmta01.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 418a5rmr1s-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Aug 2024 22:43:52 +0000 From: Ross Philipson To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 15:38:34 -0700 Message-Id: <20240826223835.3928819-20-ross.philipson@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.3 In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> References: <20240826223835.3928819-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1039,Hydra:6.0.680,FMLib:17.12.28.16 definitions=2024-08-26_16,2024-08-26_01,2024-05-17_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 spamscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2407110000 definitions=main-2408260174 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: j8Hfu8NOuuJfesZbHXelI0h7T-K9wWwD X-Proofpoint-GUID: j8Hfu8NOuuJfesZbHXelI0h7T-K9wWwD From: "Daniel P. Smith" The Secure Launch platform module is a late init module. During the init call, the TPM event log is read and measurements taken in the early boot stub code are located. These measurements are extended into the TPM PCRs using the mainline TPM kernel driver. The platform module also registers the securityfs nodes to allow access to TXT register fields on Intel along with the fetching of and writing events to the late launch TPM log. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith Signed-off-by: garnetgrimm Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson --- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c | 509 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 510 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index a18a8239bde5..6028903d6661 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += tls.o obj-y += step.o obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT) += tboot.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += slaunch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += slmodule.o obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API) += i8237.o obj-y += stacktrace.o obj-y += cpu/ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..46a8f86ea061 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Secure Launch late validation/setup, securityfs exposure and finalization. + * + * Copyright (c) 2024 Apertus Solutions, LLC + * Copyright (c) 2024 Assured Information Security, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Oracle and/or its affiliates. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * The macro DECLARE_TXT_PUB_READ_U is used to read values from the TXT + * public registers as unsigned values. + */ +#define DECLARE_TXT_PUB_READ_U(size, fmt, msg_size) \ +static ssize_t txt_pub_read_u##size(unsigned int offset, \ + loff_t *read_offset, \ + size_t read_len, \ + char __user *buf) \ +{ \ + char msg_buffer[msg_size]; \ + u##size reg_value = 0; \ + void __iomem *txt; \ + \ + txt = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, \ + TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE); \ + if (!txt) \ + return -EFAULT; \ + memcpy_fromio(®_value, txt + offset, sizeof(u##size)); \ + iounmap(txt); \ + snprintf(msg_buffer, msg_size, fmt, reg_value); \ + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, read_len, read_offset, \ + &msg_buffer, msg_size); \ +} + +DECLARE_TXT_PUB_READ_U(8, "%#04x\n", 6); +DECLARE_TXT_PUB_READ_U(32, "%#010x\n", 12); +DECLARE_TXT_PUB_READ_U(64, "%#018llx\n", 20); + +#define DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(reg_name, reg_offset, reg_size) \ +static ssize_t txt_##reg_name##_read(struct file *flip, \ + char __user *buf, size_t read_len, loff_t *read_offset) \ +{ \ + return txt_pub_read_u##reg_size(reg_offset, read_offset, \ + read_len, buf); \ +} \ +static const struct file_operations reg_name##_ops = { \ + .read = txt_##reg_name##_read, \ +} + +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(sts, TXT_CR_STS, 64); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(ests, TXT_CR_ESTS, 8); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(errorcode, TXT_CR_ERRORCODE, 32); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(didvid, TXT_CR_DIDVID, 64); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(e2sts, TXT_CR_E2STS, 64); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(ver_emif, TXT_CR_VER_EMIF, 32); +DECLARE_TXT_FOPS(scratchpad, TXT_CR_SCRATCHPAD, 64); + +/* + * Securityfs exposure + */ +struct memfile { + char *name; + void *addr; + size_t size; +}; + +static struct memfile sl_evtlog = {"eventlog", NULL, 0}; +static void *txt_heap; +static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element *evtlog21; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sl_evt_log_mutex); + +static ssize_t sl_evtlog_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *pos) +{ + ssize_t size; + + if (!sl_evtlog.addr) + return 0; + + mutex_lock(&sl_evt_log_mutex); + size = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, pos, sl_evtlog.addr, + sl_evtlog.size); + mutex_unlock(&sl_evt_log_mutex); + + return size; +} + +static ssize_t sl_evtlog_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + ssize_t result; + char *data; + + if (!sl_evtlog.addr) + return 0; + + /* No partial writes. */ + result = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + data = memdup_user(buf, datalen); + if (IS_ERR(data)) { + result = PTR_ERR(data); + goto out; + } + + mutex_lock(&sl_evt_log_mutex); + if (evtlog21) + result = tpm2_log_event(evtlog21, sl_evtlog.addr, + sl_evtlog.size, datalen, data); + else + result = tpm_log_event(sl_evtlog.addr, sl_evtlog.size, + datalen, data); + mutex_unlock(&sl_evt_log_mutex); + + kfree(data); +out: + return result; +} + +static const struct file_operations sl_evtlog_ops = { + .read = sl_evtlog_read, + .write = sl_evtlog_write, + .llseek = default_llseek, +}; + +struct sfs_file { + const char *name; + const struct file_operations *fops; +}; + +#define SL_TXT_ENTRY_COUNT 7 +static const struct sfs_file sl_txt_files[] = { + { "sts", &sts_ops }, + { "ests", &ests_ops }, + { "errorcode", &errorcode_ops }, + { "didvid", &didvid_ops }, + { "ver_emif", &ver_emif_ops }, + { "scratchpad", &scratchpad_ops }, + { "e2sts", &e2sts_ops } +}; + +/* sysfs file handles */ +static struct dentry *slaunch_dir; +static struct dentry *event_file; +static struct dentry *txt_dir; +static struct dentry *txt_entries[SL_TXT_ENTRY_COUNT]; + +static long slaunch_expose_securityfs(void) +{ + long ret = 0; + int i; + + slaunch_dir = securityfs_create_dir("slaunch", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(slaunch_dir)) + return PTR_ERR(slaunch_dir); + + if (slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT) { + txt_dir = securityfs_create_dir("txt", slaunch_dir); + if (IS_ERR(txt_dir)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(txt_dir); + goto remove_slaunch; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sl_txt_files); i++) { + txt_entries[i] = securityfs_create_file( + sl_txt_files[i].name, 0440, + txt_dir, NULL, + sl_txt_files[i].fops); + if (IS_ERR(txt_entries[i])) { + ret = PTR_ERR(txt_entries[i]); + goto remove_files; + } + } + } + + if (sl_evtlog.addr) { + event_file = securityfs_create_file(sl_evtlog.name, 0440, + slaunch_dir, NULL, + &sl_evtlog_ops); + if (IS_ERR(event_file)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(event_file); + goto remove_files; + } + } + + return 0; + +remove_files: + if (slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT) { + while (--i >= 0) + securityfs_remove(txt_entries[i]); + securityfs_remove(txt_dir); + } + +remove_slaunch: + securityfs_remove(slaunch_dir); + + return ret; +} + +static void slaunch_teardown_securityfs(void) +{ + int i; + + securityfs_remove(event_file); + if (sl_evtlog.addr) { + memunmap(sl_evtlog.addr); + sl_evtlog.addr = NULL; + } + sl_evtlog.size = 0; + + if (slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sl_txt_files); i++) + securityfs_remove(txt_entries[i]); + + securityfs_remove(txt_dir); + + if (txt_heap) { + memunmap(txt_heap); + txt_heap = NULL; + } + } + + securityfs_remove(slaunch_dir); +} + +static void slaunch_intel_evtlog(void __iomem *txt) +{ + struct slr_entry_log_info *log_info; + struct txt_os_mle_data *params; + struct slr_table *slrt; + void *os_sinit_data; + u64 base, size; + + memcpy_fromio(&base, txt + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE, sizeof(base)); + memcpy_fromio(&size, txt + TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE, sizeof(size)); + + /* now map TXT heap */ + txt_heap = memremap(base, size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!txt_heap) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to memremap TXT heap\n", + SL_ERROR_HEAP_MAP); + + params = (struct txt_os_mle_data *)txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap); + + /* Get the SLRT and remap it */ + slrt = memremap(params->slrt, sizeof(*slrt), MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!slrt) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to memremap SLR Table\n", + SL_ERROR_SLRT_MAP); + size = slrt->size; + memunmap(slrt); + + slrt = memremap(params->slrt, size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!slrt) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to memremap SLR Table\n", + SL_ERROR_SLRT_MAP); + + log_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_LOG_INFO); + if (!log_info) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to memremap SLR Table\n", + SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY); + + sl_evtlog.size = log_info->size; + sl_evtlog.addr = memremap(log_info->addr, log_info->size, + MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!sl_evtlog.addr) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to memremap TPM event log\n", + SL_ERROR_EVENTLOG_MAP); + + memunmap(slrt); + + /* Determine if this is TPM 1.2 or 2.0 event log */ + if (memcmp(sl_evtlog.addr + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event), + TCG_SPECID_SIG, sizeof(TCG_SPECID_SIG))) + return; /* looks like it is not 2.0 */ + + /* For TPM 2.0 logs, the extended heap element must be located */ + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap); + + evtlog21 = tpm2_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data); + + /* + * If this fails, things are in really bad shape. Any attempt to write + * events to the log will fail. + */ + if (!evtlog21) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error failed to find TPM20 event log element\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_INVALID_LOG20); +} + +static void slaunch_tpm2_extend_event(struct tpm_chip *tpm, void __iomem *txt, + struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event) +{ + u16 *alg_id_field = (u16 *)((u8 *)event + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head)); + struct tpm_digest *digests; + u8 *dptr; + u32 i, j; + int ret; + + digests = kcalloc(tpm->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digests) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Failed to allocate array of digests\n", + SL_ERROR_GENERIC); + + for (i = 0; i < tpm->nr_allocated_banks; i++) + digests[i].alg_id = tpm->allocated_banks[i].alg_id; + + /* Early SL code ensured there was a max count of 2 digests */ + for (i = 0; i < event->count; i++) { + dptr = (u8 *)alg_id_field + sizeof(u16); + + for (j = 0; j < tpm->nr_allocated_banks; j++) { + if (digests[j].alg_id != *alg_id_field) + continue; + + switch (digests[j].alg_id) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + memcpy(&digests[j].digest[0], dptr, + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + alg_id_field = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_id_field + + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16)); + break; + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + memcpy(&digests[j].digest[0], dptr, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + alg_id_field = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_id_field + + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16)); + break; + default: + break; + } + } + } + + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(tpm, event->pcr_idx, digests); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Error extending TPM20 PCR, result: %d\n", ret); + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Failed to extend TPM20 PCR\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_EXTEND); + } + + kfree(digests); +} + +static void slaunch_tpm2_extend(struct tpm_chip *tpm, void __iomem *txt) +{ + struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header; + struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event; + int start = 0, end = 0, size; + + event_header = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)(sl_evtlog.addr + + evtlog21->first_record_offset); + + /* Skip first TPM 1.2 event to get to first TPM 2.0 event */ + event = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)((u8 *)event_header + + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + + event_header->event_size); + + while ((void *)event < sl_evtlog.addr + evtlog21->next_record_offset) { + size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header, false); + if (!size) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "TPM20 invalid event in event log\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_INVALID_EVENT); + + /* + * Marker events indicate where the Secure Launch early stub + * started and ended adding post launch events. + */ + if (event->event_type == TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END) { + end = 1; + break; + } else if (event->event_type == TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START) { + start = 1; + goto next; + } + + if (start) + slaunch_tpm2_extend_event(tpm, txt, event); + +next: + event = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)((u8 *)event + size); + } + + if (!start || !end) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Missing start or end events for extending TPM20 PCRs\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_EXTEND); +} + +static void slaunch_tpm_extend(struct tpm_chip *tpm, void __iomem *txt) +{ + struct tpm_event_log_header *event_header; + struct tcg_pcr_event *event; + struct tpm_digest digest; + int start = 0, end = 0; + int size, ret; + + event_header = (struct tpm_event_log_header *)sl_evtlog.addr; + event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)((u8 *)event_header + + sizeof(struct tpm_event_log_header)); + + while ((void *)event < sl_evtlog.addr + event_header->next_event_offset) { + size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + event->event_size; + + /* + * Marker events indicate where the Secure Launch early stub + * started and ended adding post launch events. + */ + if (event->event_type == TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END) { + end = 1; + break; + } else if (event->event_type == TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START) { + start = 1; + goto next; + } + + if (start) { + memset(&digest.digest[0], 0, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + digest.alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; + memcpy(&digest.digest[0], &event->digest[0], + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(tpm, event->pcr_idx, &digest); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Error extending TPM12 PCR, result: %d\n", ret); + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Failed to extend TPM12 PCR\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_EXTEND); + } + } + +next: + event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)((u8 *)event + size); + } + + if (!start || !end) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Missing start or end events for extending TPM12 PCRs\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_EXTEND); +} + +static void slaunch_pcr_extend(void __iomem *txt) +{ + struct tpm_chip *tpm; + + tpm = tpm_default_chip(); + if (!tpm) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Could not get default TPM chip\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_INIT); + + if (!tpm_chip_set_default_locality(tpm, 2)) + slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Could not set TPM chip locality 2\n", + SL_ERROR_TPM_INIT); + + if (evtlog21) + slaunch_tpm2_extend(tpm, txt); + else + slaunch_tpm_extend(tpm, txt); + + tpm_chip_set_default_locality(tpm, 0); +} + +static int __init slaunch_module_init(void) +{ + void __iomem *txt; + + /* Check to see if Secure Launch happened */ + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) != + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) + return 0; + + txt = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!txt) + panic("Error ioremap of TXT priv registers\n"); + + /* Only Intel TXT is supported at this point */ + slaunch_intel_evtlog(txt); + slaunch_pcr_extend(txt); + iounmap(txt); + + return slaunch_expose_securityfs(); +} + +static void __exit slaunch_module_exit(void) +{ + slaunch_teardown_securityfs(); +} + +late_initcall(slaunch_module_init); +__exitcall(slaunch_module_exit);