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Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , "Vitaly Kuznetsov" , Jim Mattson , "Andy Lutomirski" , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Gonda , "Peter Zijlstra" , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , Michael Roth , Vlastimil Babka , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v8 30/40] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 09:43:22 -0600 Message-ID: <20211210154332.11526-31-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 9f3b083b-a4b9-4a07-372f-08d9bbf3f8d9 X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: DM6PR12MB4137:EE_ X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:9508; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17; CTRY:US; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:; IPV:CAL; SFV:NSPM; H:SATLEXMB03.amd.com; PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent; CAT:NONE; SFS:(4636009)(36840700001)(46966006)(40470700001)(426003)(186003)(83380400001)(4326008)(6666004)(70206006)(8936002)(508600001)(40460700001)(2906002)(82310400004)(86362001)(7416002)(26005)(16526019)(36756003)(7696005)(8676002)(70586007)(54906003)(81166007)(36860700001)(356005)(47076005)(5660300002)(336012)(44832011)(7406005)(110136005)(2616005)(1076003)(316002)(2101003)(36900700001); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 10 Dec 2021 15:44:37.5599 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 9f3b083b-a4b9-4a07-372f-08d9bbf3f8d9 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d; Ip=[165.204.84.17]; Helo=[SATLEXMB03.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN8NAM11FT034.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DM6PR12MB4137 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org From: Michael Roth The previously defined Confidential Computing blob is provided to the kernel via a setup_data structure or EFI config table entry. Currently these are both checked for by boot/compressed kernel to access the CPUID table address within it for use with SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement. To also enable SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement for the run-time kernel, similar early access to the CPUID table is needed early on while it's still using the identity-mapped page table set up by boot/compressed, where global pointers need to be accessed via fixup_pointer(). This isn't much of an issue for accessing setup_data, and the EFI config table helper code currently used in boot/compressed *could* be used in this case as well since they both rely on identity-mapping. However, it has some reliance on EFI helpers/string constants that would need to be accessed via fixup_pointer(), and fixing it up while making it shareable between boot/compressed and run-time kernel is fragile and introduces a good bit of uglyness. Instead, add a boot_params->cc_blob_address pointer that the boot/compressed kernel can initialize so that the run-time kernel can access the CC blob from there instead of re-scanning the EFI config table. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h index 981fe923a59f..53e9b0620d96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params) BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(hdr), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(e820_table), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(eddbuf), + BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(cc_blob_address), }; memset(&scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch)); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index 1ac5acca72ce..bea5cdcdf532 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ struct boot_params { __u32 ext_ramdisk_image; /* 0x0c0 */ __u32 ext_ramdisk_size; /* 0x0c4 */ __u32 ext_cmd_line_ptr; /* 0x0c8 */ - __u8 _pad4[116]; /* 0x0cc */ + __u8 _pad4[112]; /* 0x0cc */ + __u32 cc_blob_address; /* 0x13c */ struct edid_info edid_info; /* 0x140 */ struct efi_info efi_info; /* 0x1c0 */ __u32 alt_mem_k; /* 0x1e0 */