From patchwork Mon Sep 5 07:05:50 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 602792 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44483ECAAD5 for ; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 07:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236829AbiIEHHm (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:07:42 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46176 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236081AbiIEHHI (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:07:08 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ED00F3DF20; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 00:06:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id 29so5011384edv.2; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date; bh=ihZUtskeoTpuApH7tthaVEzotoUCJZGGD3kpykVDMBg=; b=j+cAJ7TJAGo7DnDwa4UEJSLe+MJhcaUQUuA4NgHO7YMdqJBar/dY4vmpwrGhfOBFE6 7Ah3dTBNB5mStbsPgTHBXvsLrksiSatE4zgHnPwmaugitTgcqS+k3GYHfhS9zLR6S8MI 3RUn8RU+88DF6PgaS5iuWYSenqzZr+Nwyj0z40cl2jINZ+U+GHf6t8ij9BUJS0I2jbda zEzaoWcY7DLkv803G/xM9hMPbHWTzyoe3QygfGkph+LGuiz9rLMm+7g1PUpVOGVBVOif 99mAXusidHRUHpq7NWHr2CMsKPTCIRGxhGeaK4llNILm9RJaiQCyffCb1ywgP5eFoRwK HBuQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date; bh=ihZUtskeoTpuApH7tthaVEzotoUCJZGGD3kpykVDMBg=; b=0afyoRfi2eeNJHiLOnppY2pmOFV/bf1fi0jfb/2LAefyJLa4xpL0AQjjN2DtBgir8P rRDdJ2I2BvtKhyHRLnbnDcui7RJDdfHR/Bp6YnsFqFcfWwyBO5c9OSLiG3/fKnbQBckT y/b09MU1uNh5EoTJ17/nRWcZHwc7dS6v1MHISVXdYZ6sjN2nx/7F28iwCT0aAVVTiODH yev3slLPcj2bUjjsiVGcf8gY7WscrDBCpaJY7i8xjlcLylV2A+ApUe3dw3ONUSXj2qBx 4XLpyHipBC2LuV/9w6mp2GJ7Jyv2yLlKN0s4Ame9t/6nbjPpfT+s3MvJa9tMxMAGA2C1 7qag== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1c9gC1uzjgO6oSzylG6iGmYwHscLHZVu6ryRkrH7HxIww+YRx9 iBeZwMr3d/v9b30IMKTlw1A= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5vXaifAcenRXpkL6GAjOfCJtzCQekvHCGnPowAkGDzdtDshOvOBtROMAjA06lEi54Lp8dI/w== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:389:b0:44e:ea9:eb2c with SMTP id o9-20020a056402038900b0044e0ea9eb2cmr5883413edv.248.1662361598547; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:40ec:9f50:387:3cfb]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n27-20020a056402515b00b0043cf2e0ce1csm5882775edd.48.2022.09.05.00.06.36 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:37 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Salam Noureddine , Philip Paeps , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 14/26] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 10:05:50 +0300 Message-Id: <9d9e90a839544dfd5da8aac6eb4355eefbe273a1.1662361354.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is a parallel feature to tcp_md5sig.tcpm_ifindex support and allows applications to server multiple VRFs with a single socket. The ifindex argument must be the ifindex of a VRF device and must match exactly, keys with ifindex == 0 (outside of VRF) will not match for connections inside a VRF. Keys without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX will ignore ifindex and match both inside and outside VRF. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 11 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 72adb7a891ce..cbdea65e2b5d 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ expand over time by increasing the size of `struct tcp_authopt_key` and adding new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored + * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 9bc0f58a78cb..e450f7c30043 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 alg_id; /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ + int l3index; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 75107a7fd935..28be52f4e411 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -369,17 +369,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), }; /** @@ -423,10 +425,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * @addr: Key is only valid for this address * * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; + /** + * @ifindex: ifindex of vrf (l3mdev_master) interface + * + * If the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX flag is set then key only applies for + * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. + * + * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` + */ + int ifindex; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 4dc2fe541498..3704af8202eb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -264,10 +265,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, { if (info->send_id != key->send_id) return false; if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -333,10 +338,24 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *new) +{ + if (!old) + return true; + + /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ + if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) + return false; + if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * tcp_authopt_lookup_send - lookup key for sending * * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys * @addr_sk: Socket used for destination address lookup @@ -348,20 +367,29 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, const struct sock *addr_sk) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) + l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(addr_sk), + addr_sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) continue; - if (result && net_ratelimit()) - pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); - result = key; + if (better_key_match(result, key)) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); } return result; } @@ -507,20 +535,22 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; + int l3index = 0; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -571,10 +601,24 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) return -EINVAL; err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); if (err) return err; + /* check ifindex is valid (zero is always valid) */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX && opt.ifindex) { + struct net_device *dev; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), opt.ifindex); + if (dev && netif_is_l3_master(dev)) + l3index = dev->ifindex; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (!l3index) + return -EINVAL; + } + key_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; mutex_lock(&net->mutex); kref_init(&key_info->ref); @@ -590,10 +634,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + key_info->l3index = l3index; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); return 0; } @@ -1379,24 +1424,40 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, int recv_id, bool *anykey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; *anykey = false; /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + l3index = inet_sdif(skb) ? inet_iif(skb) : 0; + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + l3index = inet6_sdif(skb) ? inet6_iif(skb) : 0; + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "unexpected skb->protocol=%x", skb->protocol); + continue; + } + } + + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } *anykey = true; // If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) continue; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; - if (!result) + if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); }