diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index f3179c67010b..b2e01de4db39 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -67,63 +67,19 @@
  * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output
  * --------------------------------------
  *
- * The primary kernel interface is
+ * The primary kernel interfaces are:
  *
  *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
- *
- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
- * and place it in the requested buffer.  This is equivalent to a
- * read from /dev/urandom.
- *
- * For less critical applications, there are the functions:
- *
  *	u32 get_random_u32()
  *	u64 get_random_u64()
  *	unsigned int get_random_int()
  *	unsigned long get_random_long()
  *
- * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
- * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much.  These are recommended
- * for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in
- * the kernel*.
- *
- * Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do
- * "anti-backtracking".  If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g.
- * by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int()
- * return values.  But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway,
- * this is not a problem.
- *
- * It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as
- * network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict
- * outputs 0 or n+1.  The only concern is an attacker who breaks into
- * the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as
- * often as the get_random_bytes() one.
- *
- * get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after
- * they are erased from the kernel.  For example, any key that will
- * be wrapped and stored encrypted.  And session encryption keys: we'd
- * like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased,
- * the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext.
- *
- * But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address
- * space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other
- * applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in
- * plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family
- * is just fine.
- *
- * Consider ASLR.  We want to keep the address space secret from an
- * outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address
- * space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more.  And it's
- * stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying
- * about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int()
- * CRNG is silly.
- *
- * Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int().
- * In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine.  Here, knowledge
- * of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject
- * packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the
- * key is stored with the object being protected.  Once it goes away,
- * we no longer care if anyone knows the key.
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to a
+ * read from /dev/urandom. The get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}() family
+ * of functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
+ * because they do a bit of buffering.
  *
  * prandom_u32()
  * -------------
@@ -300,20 +256,6 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
 
-struct crng_state {
-	u32 state[16];
-	unsigned long init_time;
-	spinlock_t lock;
-};
-
-static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
-	.state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA,
-	.state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3,
-	.state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY,
-	.state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K,
-};
-
 /*
  * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
  *		1 --> Initialized
@@ -325,9 +267,6 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
 static int crng_init = 0;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -470,7 +409,30 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
  *
  *********************************************************************/
 
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
+enum {
+	CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ,
+	CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE
+};
+
+static struct {
+	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+	unsigned long birth;
+	unsigned long generation;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+} base_crng = {
+	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
+};
+
+struct crng {
+	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned long generation;
+	local_lock_t lock;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
+	.generation = ULONG_MAX,
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
+};
 
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
 
@@ -487,22 +449,22 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 	u8 *p;
 	size_t ret = 0;
 
-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
 		return 0;
 	if (crng_init != 0) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
+	p = base_crng.key;
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
+		p[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *cp;
 		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
 	}
 	if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		crng_init = 1;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 	if (crng_init == 1)
 		pr_notice("fast init done\n");
 	return ret;
@@ -527,14 +489,14 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	static u8 lfsr = 1;
 	u8 tmp;
-	unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
+	unsigned int i, max = sizeof(base_crng.key);
 	const u8 *src_buf = cp;
-	u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
+	u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key;
 
-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
 		return 0;
 	if (crng_init != 0) {
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (len > max)
@@ -545,38 +507,48 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 		lfsr >>= 1;
 		if (tmp & 1)
 			lfsr ^= 0xE1;
-		tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
-		dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
+		tmp = dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)];
+		dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
 		lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 	return 1;
 }
 
 static void crng_reseed(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int i, entropy_count;
-	union {
-		u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		u32 key[8];
-	} buf;
+	int entropy_count;
+	unsigned long next_gen;
+	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
 
+	/* First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool,
+	 * and then we drain all of it. Only then can we extract a new key.
+	 */
 	do {
 		entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
 		if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
 			return;
 	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
-	extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
+	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
 	wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
 	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
-	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
-	WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	/* We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
+	 * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
+	 * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
+	 * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+	memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+	next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+		++next_gen;
+	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+	base_crng.birth = jiffies;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+	memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
+
 	if (crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		crng_init = 2;
@@ -597,77 +569,139 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+/*
+ * The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from
+ * <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>. It generates a ChaCha
+ * block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that
+ * key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the
+ * user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of
+ * random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than
+ * 32.
+ */
+static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+				  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
+				  u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
 {
-	unsigned long flags, init_time;
+	u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	if (crng_ready()) {
-		init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time);
-		if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
-			crng_reseed();
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-	chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out);
-	if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0)
-		primary_crng.state[13]++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
+
+	chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+	memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+	memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+	chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
+
+	memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+	memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
+	memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
 }
 
 /*
- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
+ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
+ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
+ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
  */
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
+			    u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	u32 *s, *d;
-	int i;
+	struct crng *crng;
+
+	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
 
-	used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32));
-	if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		used = 0;
+	/* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
+	 * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
+	 * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
+	 * this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) {
+		bool ready;
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		ready = crng_ready();
+		if (!ready)
+			crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+					      random_data, random_data_len);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+		if (!ready)
+			return;
 	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
-	s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
-	d = &primary_crng.state[4];
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		*d++ ^= *s++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+
+	/* If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which
+	 * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)))
+		crng_reseed();
+
+	local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags);
+	crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
+
+	/* If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
+	 * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
+	 * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
+	 * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
+		spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+		crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+				      crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
+		crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
+		spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
+	}
+
+	/* Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
+	 * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
+	 * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
+	 * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
+	 * should wind up here immediately.
+	 */
+	crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags);
 }
 
-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
-	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
+	bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
+	ssize_t ret = 0, len;
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+	u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (!nbytes)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	nbytes -= len;
+	buf += len;
+	ret += len;
 
 	while (nbytes) {
 		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
-			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-				if (ret == 0)
-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			if (signal_pending(current))
 				break;
-			}
 			schedule();
 		}
 
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
+		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+			++chacha_state[13];
+
+		len = min_t(ssize_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		nbytes -= i;
-		buf += i;
-		ret += i;
+		nbytes -= len;
+		buf += len;
+		ret += len;
 	}
-	crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
-
-	/* Wipe data just written to memory */
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+	memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -976,23 +1010,36 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void
  */
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	ssize_t len;
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
-	while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		extract_crng(buf);
-		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (!nbytes)
+		return;
+
+	len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
+	nbytes -= len;
+	buf += len;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+			memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+			++chacha_state[13];
 		nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 
-	if (nbytes > 0) {
-		extract_crng(tmp);
-		memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
-	} else
-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 }
 
 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
@@ -1223,13 +1270,12 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
 	mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
 	mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
 
-	extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
+	extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
 	if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		crng_init = 2;
 		pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
 	}
-	primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 
 	if (ratelimit_disable) {
 		urandom_warning.interval = 0;
@@ -1261,7 +1307,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	int ret;
 
 	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6);
-	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
+	ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
 	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1577,8 +1623,14 @@ static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 struct batched_entropy {
 	union {
-		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
-		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+		/* We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
+		 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full
+		 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase
+		 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the
+		 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.
+		 */
+		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))];
+		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
 	};
 	local_lock_t lock;
 	unsigned int position;
@@ -1587,14 +1639,13 @@ struct batched_entropy {
 
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
- * point prior.
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock)
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+	.position = UINT_MAX
 };
 
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -1611,21 +1662,24 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
 
 	next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 ||
+	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) ||
 	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
+		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
 		batch->position = 0;
 		batch->generation = next_gen;
 	}
 
-	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
+	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position];
+	batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0;
+	++batch->position;
 	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock)
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+	.position = UINT_MAX
 };
 
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
@@ -1642,14 +1696,16 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
 
 	next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 ||
+	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) ||
 	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
+		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
 		batch->position = 0;
 		batch->generation = next_gen;
 	}
 
-	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
+	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position];
+	batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0;
+	++batch->position;
 	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
