From patchwork Thu Jan 14 15:19:03 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 363943 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 567C2C433DB for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 15:20:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C27B23B03 for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 15:20:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729412AbhANPT4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:19:56 -0500 Received: from smtp-bc0d.mail.infomaniak.ch ([45.157.188.13]:34033 "EHLO smtp-bc0d.mail.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729427AbhANPT4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:19:56 -0500 Received: from smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.5.36.107]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DGnz12R99zMqq1X; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:19:09 +0100 (CET) Received: from localhost (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4DGnz109Spzlppyw; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:19:09 +0100 (CET) From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: David Howells , David Woodhouse , Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , "David S . Miller" , Herbert Xu , James Morris , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Mimi Zohar , "Serge E . Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH v3 04/10] certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:19:03 +0100 Message-Id: <20210114151909.2344974-5-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.0 In-Reply-To: <20210114151909.2344974-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20210114151909.2344974-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org From: David Howells KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag. KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it. Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc(). We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually. Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed. Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring") cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Woodhouse Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: David Howells [mic@linux.microsoft.com: fix ima_mok_init()] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes since v2: * Cherry-pick rewritten v1 patch from https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2659836.1607940186@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ to rebase on v5.11-rc3 and fix ima_mok_init(). --- certs/blacklist.c | 2 +- include/linux/key.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +--- security/keys/key.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index a888b934a1cd..029471947838 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | - KEY_FLAG_KEEP, + KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring)) panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n"); diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 0f2e24f13c2b..eed3ce139a32 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, #define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */ #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */ #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010 /* allocating a user or user session keyring */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP 0x0020 /* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */ extern void key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c index 36cadadbfba4..5594dd38ab04 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c @@ -38,13 +38,11 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void) (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP, restriction, NULL); if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring)) panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring."); - - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); return 0; } device_initcall(ima_mok_init); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index ebe752b137aa..c45afdd1dfbb 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN; if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING; + if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP) + key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP; #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;