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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r28-v6si21059299pgk.263.2018.10.18.07.57.44; Thu, 18 Oct 2018 07:57:44 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@zx2c4.com header.s=mail header.b=GE4BHUHT; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=zx2c4.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728223AbeJRW7E (ORCPT + 2 others); Thu, 18 Oct 2018 18:59:04 -0400 Received: from frisell.zx2c4.com ([192.95.5.64]:46347 "EHLO frisell.zx2c4.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727998AbeJRW7D (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Oct 2018 18:59:03 -0400 Received: by frisell.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTP id 5763e585; Thu, 18 Oct 2018 14:55:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; h=from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; s=mail; bh=7i4ugBSZSHbhNe70a48oZXTQ5 Yo=; b=GE4BHUHTbUs1sEQh9Xk2dH28NyPxeXaArJbDdXP0qdPbTk9c11Qm/NLJa Z1+F27jd/zzWp0rI1rsFs9i3saG3Ac5PCoFH2Fz81cOV29VolF9s2Uf/5eLb/ChI DmOMtaLiLfUNQHrk43DbVMMOANSp7cewFmOlj2SqoVWdJzzt1Ut+5GcAkEXvC/cK vDzPndS2oAl2Kn1JvAG1aNYtZDy939PNdzT4NBA/5/ohVThqKuG1hCkIpKg48xmW TtuYKn97WJo984rI+6KrGTUTb9wghp1XNfx13WXlB6bsShTWMUQTmdeK1oRjXbDv 0ZNcf7fYPthLtASudOVTTY52invYw== Received: by frisell.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 0a0135ef (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Thu, 18 Oct 2018 14:55:38 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Jean-Philippe Aumasson , Andy Lutomirski , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH net-next v8 03/28] zinc: introduce minimal cryptography library Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 16:56:47 +0200 Message-Id: <20181018145712.7538-4-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20181018145712.7538-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20181018145712.7538-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Zinc stands for "Zinc Is Neat Crypto" or "Zinc as IN Crypto". It's also short, easy to type, and plays nicely with the recent trend of naming crypto libraries after elements. The guiding principle is "don't overdo it". It's less of a library and more of a directory tree for organizing well-curated direct implementations of cryptography primitives. Zinc is a new cryptography API that is much more minimal and lower-level than the current one. It intends to complement it and provide a basis upon which the current crypto API might build, as the provider of software implementations of cryptographic primitives. It is motivated by three primary observations in crypto API design: * Highly composable "cipher modes" and related abstractions from the 90s did not turn out to be as terrific an idea as hoped, leading to a host of API misuse problems. * Most programmers are afraid of crypto code, and so prefer to integrate it into libraries in a highly abstracted manner, so as to shield themselves from implementation details. Cryptographers, on the other hand, prefer simple direct implementations, which they're able to verify for high assurance and optimize in accordance with their expertise. * Overly abstracted and flexible cryptography APIs lead to a host of dangerous problems and performance issues. The kernel is in the business usually not of coming up with new uses of crypto, but rather implementing various constructions, which means it essentially needs a library of primitives, not a highly abstracted enterprise-ready pluggable system, with a few particular exceptions. This last observation has seen itself play out several times over and over again within the kernel: * The perennial move of actual primitives away from crypto/ and into lib/, so that users can actually call these functions directly with no overhead and without lots of allocations, function pointers, string specifier parsing, and general clunkiness. For example: sha256, chacha20, siphash, sha1, and so forth live in lib/ rather than in crypto/. Zinc intends to stop the cluttering of lib/ and introduce these direct primitives into their proper place, lib/zinc/. * An abundance of misuse bugs with the present crypto API that have been very unpleasant to clean up. * A hesitance to even use cryptography, because of the overhead and headaches involved in accessing the routines. Zinc goes in a rather different direction. Rather than providing a thoroughly designed and abstracted API, Zinc gives you simple functions, which implement some primitive, or some particular and specific construction of primitives. It is not dynamic in the least, though one could imagine implementing a complex dynamic dispatch mechanism (such as the current crypto API) on top of these basic functions. After all, dynamic dispatch is usually needed for applications with cipher agility, such as IPsec, dm-crypt, AF_ALG, and so forth, and the existing crypto API will continue to play that role. However, Zinc will provide a non- haphazard way of directly utilizing crypto routines in applications that do have neither the need nor desire for abstraction and dynamic dispatch. It also organizes the implementations in a simple, straight-forward, and direct manner, making it enjoyable and intuitive to work on. Rather than moving optimized assembly implementations into arch/, it keeps them all together in lib/zinc/, making it simple and obvious to compare and contrast what's happening. This is, notably, exactly what the lib/raid6/ tree does, and that seems to work out rather well. It's also the pattern of most successful crypto libraries. The architecture- specific glue-code is made a part of each translation unit, rather than being in a separate one, so that generic and architecture-optimized code are combined at compile-time, and incompatibility branches compiled out by the optimizer. All implementations have been extensively tested and fuzzed, and are selected for their quality, trustworthiness, and performance. Wherever possible and performant, formally verified implementations are used, such as those from HACL* [1] and Fiat-Crypto [2]. The routines also take special care to zero out secrets using memzero_explicit (and future work is planned to have gcc do this more reliably and performantly with compiler plugins). The performance of the selected implementations is state-of-the-art and unrivaled on a broad array of hardware, though of course we will continue to fine tune these to the hardware demands needed by kernel contributors. Each implementation also comes with extensive self-tests and crafted test vectors, pulled from various places such as Wycheproof [9]. Regularity of function signatures is important, so that users can easily "guess" the name of the function they want. Though, individual primitives are oftentimes not trivially interchangeable, having been designed for different things and requiring different parameters and semantics, and so the function signatures they provide will directly reflect the realities of the primitives' usages, rather than hiding it behind (inevitably leaky) abstractions. Also, in contrast to the current crypto API, Zinc functions can work on stack buffers, and can be called with different keys, without requiring allocations or locking. SIMD is used automatically when available, though some routines may benefit from either having their SIMD disabled for particular invocations, or to have the SIMD initialization calls amortized over several invocations of the function, and so Zinc utilizes function signatures enabling that in conjunction with the recently introduced simd_context_t. More generally, Zinc provides function signatures that allow just what is required by the various callers. This isn't to say that users of the functions will be permitted to pollute the function semantics with weird particular needs, but we are trying very hard not to overdo it, and that means looking carefully at what's actually necessary, and doing just that, and not much more than that. Remember: practicality and cleanliness rather than over-zealous infrastructure. Zinc provides also an opening for the best implementers in academia to contribute their time and effort to the kernel, by being sufficiently simple and inviting. In discussing this commit with some of the best and brightest over the last few years, there are many who are eager to devote rare talent and energy to this effort. Following the merging of this, I expect for the primitives that currently exist in lib/ to work their way into lib/zinc/, after intense scrutiny of each implementation, potentially replacing them with either formally-verified implementations, or better studied and faster state-of-the-art implementations. Also following the merging of this, I expect for the old crypto API implementations to be ported over to use Zinc for their software-based implementations. As Zinc is simply library code, its config options are un-menued, with the exception of CONFIG_ZINC_SELFTEST and CONFIG_ZINC_DEBUG, which enables various selftests and debugging conditions. [1] https://github.com/project-everest/hacl-star [2] https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto [3] https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html [4] https://cr.yp.to/chacha.html [5] https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf [6] https://cr.yp.to/mac.html [7] https://blake2.net/ [8] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8439 [9] https://github.com/google/wycheproof Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Samuel Neves Cc: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Greg KH Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org --- MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++ lib/Kconfig | 2 ++ lib/Makefile | 2 ++ lib/zinc/Kconfig | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/zinc/Makefile | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/zinc/Kconfig create mode 100644 lib/zinc/Makefile -- 2.19.1 diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 7f1399ac028e..c0d078d4dbd8 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -16230,6 +16230,14 @@ Q: https://patchwork.linuxtv.org/project/linux-media/list/ S: Maintained F: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zd1301_demod* +ZINC CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY +M: Jason A. Donenfeld +M: Samuel Neves +S: Maintained +F: lib/zinc/ +F: include/zinc/ +L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org + ZPOOL COMPRESSED PAGE STORAGE API M: Dan Streetman L: linux-mm@kvack.org diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index a3928d4438b5..3e6848269c66 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -485,6 +485,8 @@ config GLOB_SELFTEST module load) by a small amount, so you're welcome to play with it, but you probably don't need it. +source "lib/zinc/Kconfig" + # # Netlink attribute parsing support is select'ed if needed # diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index 423876446810..7a04d7ce95a6 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o +obj-y += zinc/ + obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ obj-$(CONFIG_PRIME_NUMBERS) += prime_numbers.o diff --git a/lib/zinc/Kconfig b/lib/zinc/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..90e066ea93a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/zinc/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +config ZINC_SELFTEST + bool "Zinc cryptography library self-tests" + help + This builds a series of self-tests for the Zinc crypto library, which + help diagnose any cryptographic algorithm implementation issues that + might be at the root cause of potential bugs. It also adds various + traps for incorrect usage. + + Unless you are optimizing for machines without much disk space or for + very slow machines, it is probably a good idea to say Y here, so that + any potential cryptographic bugs translate into easy bug reports + rather than long-lasting security issues. + +config ZINC_DEBUG + bool "Zinc cryptography library debugging" + help + This turns on a series of additional checks and debugging options + that are useful for developers but probably will not provide much + benefit to end users. + + Most people should say N here. + +config ZINC_ARCH_ARM + def_bool y + depends on ARM + +config ZINC_ARCH_ARM64 + def_bool y + depends on ARM64 + +config ZINC_ARCH_X86_64 + def_bool y + depends on X86_64 && !UML + +config ZINC_ARCH_MIPS + def_bool y + depends on MIPS && CPU_MIPS32_R2 && !64BIT + +config ZINC_ARCH_MIPS64 + def_bool y + depends on MIPS && 64BIT diff --git a/lib/zinc/Makefile b/lib/zinc/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a61c80d676cb --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/zinc/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +ccflags-y := -O2 +ccflags-y += -D'pr_fmt(fmt)="zinc: " fmt' +ccflags-$(CONFIG_ZINC_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG