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[218.221.221.41]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id ha11sm22375393pbd.17.2014.03.14.22.50.38 for (version=TLSv1.1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 14 Mar 2014 22:50:41 -0700 (PDT) From: AKASHI Takahiro To: wad@chromium.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, arndb@arndb.de Cc: dsaxena@linaro.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@linaro.org, AKASHI Takahiro Subject: [PATCH_v4 2/2] arm64: Add seccomp support Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 14:50:04 +0900 Message-Id: <1394862604-29105-3-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.2 In-Reply-To: <1394862604-29105-1-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> References: <1394705823-12465-1-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> <1394862604-29105-1-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-Removed-Original-Auth: Dkim didn't pass. X-Original-Sender: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org X-Original-Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 209.85.220.177 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of patch+caf_=patchwork-forward=linaro.org@linaro.org) smtp.mail=patch+caf_=patchwork-forward=linaro.org@linaro.org Precedence: list Mailing-list: list patchwork-forward@linaro.org; contact patchwork-forward+owners@linaro.org List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 836684582541 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe: , secure_computing() should always be called first in syscall_trace_enter(). If it returns non-zero, we should stop further handling. Then that system call may eventually fail, be trapped or the process itself be killed depending on loaded rules. In this case, syscall_trace_enter() returns a dedicated value in order to skip a normal syscall table lookup because a seccomp rule may have already overridden errno. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 7c1f8c7..d5167d6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config ARM64 select HARDIRQS_SW_RESEND select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE @@ -230,6 +231,19 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE source "mm/Kconfig" +config SECCOMP + bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + config XEN_DOM0 def_bool y depends on XEN diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c76fac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* + * arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define __NR_seccomp_read_32 __NR_compat_read +#define __NR_seccomp_write_32 __NR_compat_write +#define __NR_seccomp_exit_32 __NR_compat_exit +#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn +#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ + +#include + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h index 04f5d22..28bf882 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ * Compat syscall numbers used by the AArch64 kernel. */ #define __NR_compat_restart_syscall 0 +#define __NR_compat_exit 1 +#define __NR_compat_read 3 +#define __NR_compat_write 4 #define __NR_compat_sigreturn 119 #define __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn 173 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index f06ee35..6ef266a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -650,6 +650,10 @@ ENDPROC(el0_svc) __sys_trace: mov x0, sp bl syscall_trace_enter +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + cmp w0, #-EPERM // check seccomp result + b.eq ret_to_user // -EPERM means 'rejected' +#endif adr lr, __sys_trace_return // return address uxtw scno, w0 // syscall number (possibly new) mov x1, sp // pointer to regs diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index f9e1339..bb89fa3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1093,6 +1095,10 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { + if (secure_computing(regs->syscallno) == -1) + /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */ + return -EPERM; + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);