@@ -282,11 +282,23 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
#define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
#endif
+/* Allow wrapping arithmetic within an annotated function. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
+# define __signed_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("signed-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+# define __signed_wrap
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP
+# define __unsigned_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+# define __unsigned_wrap
+#endif
+
/* Section for code which can't be instrumented at all */
#define __noinstr_section(section) \
noinline notrace __attribute((__section__(section))) \
__no_kcsan __no_sanitize_address __no_profile __no_sanitize_coverage \
- __no_sanitize_memory
+ __no_sanitize_memory __signed_wrap __unsigned_wrap
#define noinstr __noinstr_section(".noinstr.text")
@@ -116,6 +116,25 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control
flow reaching an expected-to-be-unreachable position.
+config UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
+ bool "Perform checking for signed arithmetic wrap-around"
+ default UBSAN
+ depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow which checks
+ for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with signed integers.
+
+config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP
+ bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic wrap-around"
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
+ depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang
+ depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks
+ for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This
+ currently causes x86 to fail to boot.
+
config UBSAN_BOOL
bool "Perform checking for non-boolean values used as boolean"
default UBSAN
@@ -11,6 +11,51 @@ typedef void(*test_ubsan_fp)(void);
#config, IS_ENABLED(config) ? "y" : "n"); \
} while (0)
+static void test_ubsan_add_overflow(void)
+{
+ volatile int val = INT_MAX;
+ volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+ val += 2;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+ uval += 2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_sub_overflow(void)
+{
+ volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+ volatile unsigned int uval = 0;
+ volatile int val2 = 2;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+ val -= val2;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+ uval -= val2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_mul_overflow(void)
+{
+ volatile int val = INT_MAX / 2;
+ volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX / 2;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+ val *= 3;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+ uval *= 3;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_negate_overflow(void)
+{
+ volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+
+ UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+ val = -val;
+}
+
static void test_ubsan_divrem_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = 16;
@@ -90,6 +135,10 @@ static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access(void)
}
static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = {
+ test_ubsan_add_overflow,
+ test_ubsan_sub_overflow,
+ test_ubsan_mul_overflow,
+ test_ubsan_negate_overflow,
test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_load_invalid_value,
@@ -222,6 +222,74 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
check_panic_on_warn("UBSAN");
}
+static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
+ void *rhs, char op)
+{
+
+ struct type_descriptor *type = data->type;
+ char lhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+ char rhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+
+ if (suppress_report(&data->location))
+ return;
+
+ ubsan_prologue(&data->location, type_is_signed(type) ?
+ "signed-integer-overflow" :
+ "unsigned-integer-overflow");
+
+ val_to_string(lhs_val_str, sizeof(lhs_val_str), type, lhs);
+ val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), type, rhs);
+ pr_err("%s %c %s cannot be represented in type %s\n",
+ lhs_val_str,
+ op,
+ rhs_val_str,
+ type->type_name);
+
+ ubsan_epilogue();
+}
+
+void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(void *data,
+ void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+
+ handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '+');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_add_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(void *data,
+ void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+ handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '-');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_sub_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(void *data,
+ void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+ handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '*');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(void *_data, void *old_val)
+{
+ struct overflow_data *data = _data;
+ char old_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+
+ if (suppress_report(&data->location))
+ return;
+
+ ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "negation-overflow");
+
+ val_to_string(old_val_str, sizeof(old_val_str), data->type, old_val);
+
+ pr_err("negation of %s cannot be represented in type %s:\n",
+ old_val_str, data->type->type_name);
+
+ ubsan_epilogue();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow);
+
+
void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs)
{
struct overflow_data *data = _data;
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ typedef s64 s_max;
typedef u64 u_max;
#endif
+void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(void *_data, void *old_val);
void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, void *ptr);
void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(void *_data, void *ptr);
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS) += -fsanitize=local-bounds
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT) += -fsanitize=shift
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO) += -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE) += -fsanitize=unreachable
+ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP) += -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow
+ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP) += -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL) += -fsanitize=bool
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM) += -fsanitize=enum
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) += $(call cc-option,-fsanitize-trap=undefined,-fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error)
Effectively revert commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks"), to allow the kernel to be built with the "overflow" sanitizers again. This gives developers a chance to experiment[1][2][3] with the instrumentation again, while compilers adjust their sanitizers to deal with the impact of -fno-strict-oveflow (i.e. moving from "overflow" checking to "wrap-around" checking). Notably, the naming of the options is adjusted to use the name "WRAP" instead of "OVERFLOW". In the strictest sense, arithmetic "overflow" happens when a result exceeds the storage of the type, and is considered by the C standard and compilers to be undefined behavior for signed and pointer types (without -fno-strict-overflow). Unsigned arithmetic overflow is defined as always wrapping around. Because the kernel is built with -fno-strict-overflow, signed and pointer arithmetic is defined to always wrap around instead of "overflowing" (which could either be elided due to being undefined behavior or would wrap around, which led to very weird bugs in the kernel). So, the config options are added back as CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP and CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP. Since the kernel has several places that explicitly depend on wrap-around behavior (e.g. counters, atomics, crypto, etc), also introduce the __signed_wrap and __unsigned_wrap function attributes for annotating functions where wrapping is expected and should not be instrumented. This will allow us to distinguish in the kernel between intentional and unintentional cases of arithmetic wrap-around. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [2] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [3] Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Cc: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/compiler_types.h | 14 ++++++- lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 19 ++++++++++ lib/test_ubsan.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/ubsan.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/ubsan.h | 4 ++ scripts/Makefile.ubsan | 2 + 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)