diff mbox

[v2] crypto: algapi - make crypto_xor() and crypto_inc() alignment agnostic

Message ID 1486050988-20407-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Ard Biesheuvel Feb. 2, 2017, 3:56 p.m. UTC 
Instead of unconditionally forcing 4 byte alignment for all generic
chaining modes that rely on crypto_xor() or crypto_inc() (which may
result in unnecessary copying of data when the underlying hardware
can perform unaligned accesses efficiently), make those functions
deal with unaligned input explicitly, but only if the Kconfig symbol
HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS is set. This will allow us to drop
the alignmasks from the CBC, CMAC, CTR, CTS, PCBC and SEQIV drivers.

For crypto_inc(), this simply involves making the 4-byte stride
conditional on HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS being set, given that
it typically operates on 16 byte buffers.

For crypto_xor(), an algorithm is implemented that simply runs through
the input using the largest strides possible if unaligned accesses are
allowed. If they are not, an optimal sequence of memory accesses is
emitted that takes the relative alignment of the input buffers into
account, e.g., if the relative misalignment of dst and src is 4 bytes,
the entire xor operation will be completed using 4 byte loads and stores
(modulo unaligned bits at the start and end). Note that all expressions
involving misalign are simply eliminated by the compiler when
HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS is defined.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

---

I have greatly simplified the code, but it should still emit an optimal
sequence of loads and stores depending on the misalignment.

 crypto/algapi.c | 65 +++++++++++++++-----
 crypto/cbc.c    |  3 -
 crypto/cmac.c   |  3 +-
 crypto/ctr.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/cts.c    |  3 -
 crypto/pcbc.c   |  3 -
 crypto/seqiv.c  |  2 -
 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

Comments

Eric Biggers Feb. 4, 2017, 9:20 p.m. UTC | #1 
Hi Ard,

On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 03:56:28PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> +	const int size = sizeof(unsigned long);

> +	int delta = ((unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src) & (size - 1);

> +	int misalign = 0;

> +

> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && delta) {

> +		misalign = 1 << __ffs(delta);

> +

> +		/*

> +		 * If we care about alignment, process as many bytes as

> +		 * needed to advance dst and src to values whose alignments

> +		 * equal their relative misalignment. This will allow us to

> +		 * process the remainder of the input using optimal strides.

> +		 */

> +		while (((unsigned long)dst & (misalign - 1)) && len > 0) {

> +			*dst++ ^= *src++;

> +			len--;

> +		}

> +	}

>  

> +	while (len >= size && !misalign) {

> +		*(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;

> +		dst += size;

> +		src += size;

> +		len -= size;

> +	}

>  


Unfortunately this is still broken, for two different reasons.  First, if the
pointers have the same relative misalignment, then 'delta' and 'misalign' will
be set to 0 and long accesses will be used, even though the pointers may
actually be misaligned, e.g. 0x80000001 and 0x90000001.  Second, if the pointers
have a relative misalignent that is not a power-of-2, then 'misalign' will be
set to the wrong value.  For example, with delta=3, it's actually only safe to
do byte accesses, but the code will set misalign=2 and do u16 accesses.

I kind of liked the version with put_unaligned/get_unaligned (and it seems to
perform okay on MIPS, though not on ARM which is probably more important).  But
if the various cases with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS are going to
be handled/optimized I think they will just need to be separated out, maybe
something like this:

void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int len)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
	unsigned long delta;

	if (((unsigned long)dst | (unsigned long)src | len) %
	    sizeof(unsigned long) == 0) {
		/* fast path: everything is aligned, including len */
		while (len >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
			*(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;
			dst += sizeof(unsigned long);
			src += sizeof(unsigned long);
			len -= sizeof(unsigned long);
		}
		return;
	}

	/* handle relative misalignment */
	delta = (unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src;
	if (delta % sizeof(unsigned long)) {

		/* 1-byte relative misalignment: do byte accesses */
		if (delta & 1) {
			while (len--)
				*dst++ ^= *src++;
			return;
		}

		/* 2-byte relative misalignment: do u16 accesses */
		if ((delta & 2) || sizeof(unsigned long) == 4) {
			if ((unsigned long)dst % 2 && len) {
				*dst++ ^= *src++;
				len--;
			}
			while (len >= 2) {
				*(u16 *)dst ^= *(u16 *)src;
				dst += 2, src += 2, len -= 2;
			}
			if (len)
				*dst ^= *src;
			return;
		}

		/* 4-byte relative misalignment: do u32 accesses */
		while ((unsigned long)dst % 4 && len) {
			*dst++ ^= *src++;
			len--;
		}
		while (len >= 4) {
			*(u32 *)dst ^= *(u32 *)src;
			dst += 4, src += 4, len -= 4;
		}
		while (len--)
			*dst++ ^= *src++;
		return;
	}

	/* handle absolute misalignment */
	while ((unsigned long)dst % sizeof(unsigned long) && len) {
		*dst++ ^= *src++;
		len--;
	}
#endif /* !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */

	while (len >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
		*(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;
		dst += sizeof(unsigned long);
		src += sizeof(unsigned long);
		len -= sizeof(unsigned long);
	}

	while (len--)
		*dst++ ^= *src++;
}
Eric Biggers Feb. 4, 2017, 9:27 p.m. UTC | #2 
On Sat, Feb 04, 2017 at 01:20:38PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Unfortunately this is still broken, for two different reasons.  First, if the

> pointers have the same relative misalignment, then 'delta' and 'misalign' will

> be set to 0 and long accesses will be used, even though the pointers may

> actually be misaligned, e.g. 0x80000001 and 0x90000001.  Second, if the pointers

> have a relative misalignent that is not a power-of-2, then 'misalign' will be

> set to the wrong value.  For example, with delta=3, it's actually only safe to

> do byte accesses, but the code will set misalign=2 and do u16 accesses.

> 


Correction: for the second issue I think I mixed up ffs and fls, so that part of
the code was right.  But it may still be a good idea to separate out the
different cases.

Eric
Ard Biesheuvel Feb. 4, 2017, 9:49 p.m. UTC | #3 
On 4 February 2017 at 21:20, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Ard,

>

> On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 03:56:28PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:

>> +     const int size = sizeof(unsigned long);

>> +     int delta = ((unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src) & (size - 1);

>> +     int misalign = 0;

>> +

>> +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && delta) {

>> +             misalign = 1 << __ffs(delta);

>> +

>> +             /*

>> +              * If we care about alignment, process as many bytes as

>> +              * needed to advance dst and src to values whose alignments

>> +              * equal their relative misalignment. This will allow us to

>> +              * process the remainder of the input using optimal strides.

>> +              */

>> +             while (((unsigned long)dst & (misalign - 1)) && len > 0) {

>> +                     *dst++ ^= *src++;

>> +                     len--;

>> +             }

>> +     }

>>

>> +     while (len >= size && !misalign) {

>> +             *(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;

>> +             dst += size;

>> +             src += size;

>> +             len -= size;

>> +     }

>>

>

> Unfortunately this is still broken, for two different reasons.  First, if the

> pointers have the same relative misalignment, then 'delta' and 'misalign' will

> be set to 0 and long accesses will be used, even though the pointers may

> actually be misaligned, e.g. 0x80000001 and 0x90000001.


In this case, the initial loop should run 7 times, but it obviously does not :-(

>  Second, if the pointers

> have a relative misalignent that is not a power-of-2, then 'misalign' will be

> set to the wrong value.  For example, with delta=3, it's actually only safe to

> do byte accesses, but the code will set misalign=2 and do u16 accesses.

>


As you realised, delta == 3 results in misalign == 1, which I think
does the right thing (module the initial loop which is incorrect)

> I kind of liked the version with put_unaligned/get_unaligned (and it seems to

> perform okay on MIPS, though not on ARM which is probably more important).


The reason I don't like the _unaligned() accessors is because they
take the performance hit regardless of whether the pointer is aligned
or not.

>  But

> if the various cases with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS are going to

> be handled/optimized I think they will just need to be separated out, maybe

> something like this:

>

> void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int len)

> {

> #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS

>         unsigned long delta;

>

>         if (((unsigned long)dst | (unsigned long)src | len) %

>             sizeof(unsigned long) == 0) {

>                 /* fast path: everything is aligned, including len */

>                 while (len >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {

>                         *(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;

>                         dst += sizeof(unsigned long);

>                         src += sizeof(unsigned long);

>                         len -= sizeof(unsigned long);

>                 }

>                 return;

>         }

>

>         /* handle relative misalignment */

>         delta = (unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src;

>         if (delta % sizeof(unsigned long)) {

>

>                 /* 1-byte relative misalignment: do byte accesses */

>                 if (delta & 1) {

>                         while (len--)

>                                 *dst++ ^= *src++;

>                         return;

>                 }

>

>                 /* 2-byte relative misalignment: do u16 accesses */

>                 if ((delta & 2) || sizeof(unsigned long) == 4) {

>                         if ((unsigned long)dst % 2 && len) {

>                                 *dst++ ^= *src++;

>                                 len--;

>                         }

>                         while (len >= 2) {

>                                 *(u16 *)dst ^= *(u16 *)src;

>                                 dst += 2, src += 2, len -= 2;

>                         }

>                         if (len)

>                                 *dst ^= *src;

>                         return;

>                 }

>

>                 /* 4-byte relative misalignment: do u32 accesses */

>                 while ((unsigned long)dst % 4 && len) {

>                         *dst++ ^= *src++;

>                         len--;

>                 }

>                 while (len >= 4) {

>                         *(u32 *)dst ^= *(u32 *)src;

>                         dst += 4, src += 4, len -= 4;

>                 }

>                 while (len--)

>                         *dst++ ^= *src++;

>                 return;

>         }

>

>         /* handle absolute misalignment */

>         while ((unsigned long)dst % sizeof(unsigned long) && len) {

>                 *dst++ ^= *src++;

>                 len--;

>         }

> #endif /* !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */

>

>         while (len >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {

>                 *(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;

>                 dst += sizeof(unsigned long);

>                 src += sizeof(unsigned long);

>                 len -= sizeof(unsigned long);

>         }

>

>         while (len--)

>                 *dst++ ^= *src++;

> }
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index df939b54b09f..e05ed1c5f5d1 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -961,32 +961,63 @@  void crypto_inc(u8 *a, unsigned int size)
 	__be32 *b = (__be32 *)(a + size);
 	u32 c;
 
-	for (; size >= 4; size -= 4) {
-		c = be32_to_cpu(*--b) + 1;
-		*b = cpu_to_be32(c);
-		if (c)
-			return;
-	}
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ||
+	    !((unsigned long)b & (__alignof__(*b) - 1)))
+		for (; size >= 4; size -= 4) {
+			c = be32_to_cpu(*--b) + 1;
+			*b = cpu_to_be32(c);
+			if (c)
+				return;
+		}
 
 	crypto_inc_byte(a, size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_inc);
 
-static inline void crypto_xor_byte(u8 *a, const u8 *b, unsigned int size)
+void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int len)
 {
-	for (; size; size--)
-		*a++ ^= *b++;
-}
+	const int size = sizeof(unsigned long);
+	int delta = ((unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src) & (size - 1);
+	int misalign = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && delta) {
+		misalign = 1 << __ffs(delta);
+
+		/*
+		 * If we care about alignment, process as many bytes as
+		 * needed to advance dst and src to values whose alignments
+		 * equal their relative misalignment. This will allow us to
+		 * process the remainder of the input using optimal strides.
+		 */
+		while (((unsigned long)dst & (misalign - 1)) && len > 0) {
+			*dst++ ^= *src++;
+			len--;
+		}
+	}
 
-void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int size)
-{
-	u32 *a = (u32 *)dst;
-	u32 *b = (u32 *)src;
+	while (len >= size && !misalign) {
+		*(unsigned long *)dst ^= *(unsigned long *)src;
+		dst += size;
+		src += size;
+		len -= size;
+	}
 
-	for (; size >= 4; size -= 4)
-		*a++ ^= *b++;
+	while (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && len >= 4 && !(misalign & 3)) {
+		*(u32 *)dst ^= *(u32 *)src;
+		dst += 4;
+		src += 4;
+		len -= 4;
+	}
+
+	while (len >= 2 && !(misalign & 1)) {
+		*(u16 *)dst ^= *(u16 *)src;
+		dst += 2;
+		src += 2;
+		len -= 2;
+	}
 
-	crypto_xor_byte((u8 *)a, (u8 *)b, size);
+	while (len--)
+		*dst++ ^= *src++;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xor);
 
diff --git a/crypto/cbc.c b/crypto/cbc.c
index 68f751a41a84..bc160a3186dc 100644
--- a/crypto/cbc.c
+++ b/crypto/cbc.c
@@ -145,9 +145,6 @@  static int crypto_cbc_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
 
-	/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */
-	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
-
 	inst->alg.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
 	inst->alg.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
diff --git a/crypto/cmac.c b/crypto/cmac.c
index 04080dca8f0c..16301f52858c 100644
--- a/crypto/cmac.c
+++ b/crypto/cmac.c
@@ -260,8 +260,7 @@  static int cmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free_inst;
 
-	/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */
-	alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask | (__alignof__(u32) - 1);
+	alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alignmask;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
diff --git a/crypto/ctr.c b/crypto/ctr.c
index a9a7a44f2783..a4f4a8983169 100644
--- a/crypto/ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/ctr.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@  static struct crypto_instance *crypto_ctr_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER;
 	inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
 	inst->alg.cra_blocksize = 1;
-	inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask | (__alignof__(u32) - 1);
+	inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
 	inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type;
 
 	inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
diff --git a/crypto/cts.c b/crypto/cts.c
index a1335d6c35fb..243f591dc409 100644
--- a/crypto/cts.c
+++ b/crypto/cts.c
@@ -374,9 +374,6 @@  static int crypto_cts_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->base.cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask;
 
-	/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */
-	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
-
 	inst->alg.ivsize = alg->base.cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.chunksize = crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(alg);
 	inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg);
diff --git a/crypto/pcbc.c b/crypto/pcbc.c
index 11d248673ad4..29dd2b4a3b85 100644
--- a/crypto/pcbc.c
+++ b/crypto/pcbc.c
@@ -260,9 +260,6 @@  static int crypto_pcbc_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
 
-	/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */
-	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
-
 	inst->alg.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
 	inst->alg.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c
index c7049231861f..570b7d1aa0ca 100644
--- a/crypto/seqiv.c
+++ b/crypto/seqiv.c
@@ -153,8 +153,6 @@  static int seqiv_aead_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	if (IS_ERR(inst))
 		return PTR_ERR(inst);
 
-	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
-
 	spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
 	alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);