@@ -788,6 +788,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
if (az6007_xfer_debug)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
addr, msgs[i].len);
+ if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
req = AZ6007_I2C_WR;
index = msgs[i].buf[0];
value = addr | (1 << 8);
@@ -802,6 +806,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
if (az6007_xfer_debug)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
addr, msgs[i].len);
+ if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
req = AZ6007_I2C_RD;
index = msgs[i].buf[0];
value = addr;
In az6007_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach az6007_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash. Similar commit: commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com> --- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)