| Message ID | 20230313095008.1039689-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | media: dvb-usb: digitv: Fix null-ptr-deref in digitv_i2c_xfer() | expand |
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c index 2756815a780b..32134be16914 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c @@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ static int digitv_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,struct i2c_msg msg[],int num warn("more than 2 i2c messages at a time is not handled yet. TODO."); for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + if (msg[i].len < 1) { + i = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } /* write/read request */ if (i+1 < num && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) { if (digitv_ctrl_msg(d, USB_READ_COFDM, msg[i].buf[0], NULL, 0,
In digitv_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach digitv_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash. Similar commit: commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()") Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> --- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)