@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143,
TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144,
TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145,
+ TPM2_CC_CERTIFYCREATION = 0x014A,
TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E,
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
@@ -600,6 +600,69 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * tpm2_certify_creation() - execute a TPM2_CertifyCreation command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @blob_handle: the loaded TPM handle of the key
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success
+ * -EINVAL on tpm error status
+ * < 0 error from tpm_send or tpm_buf_init
+ */
+static int tpm2_certify_creation(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ u32 blob_handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_header *head;
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CERTIFYCREATION);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Use TPM_RH_NULL for signHandle */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0x40000007);
+
+ /* Object handle */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
+
+ /* Auth */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+ /* Qualifying data */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+ /* Creation data hash */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->creation_hash_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->creation_hash,
+ payload->creation_hash_len);
+
+ /* signature scheme */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+
+ /* creation ticket */
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->tk, payload->tk_len);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "certifying creation data");
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+
+ if (head->return_code != 0)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
*
@@ -625,8 +688,15 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
- tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+ if (rc)
+ goto flush;
+
+ if (payload->creation_len)
+ rc = tpm2_certify_creation(chip, payload, blob_handle);
+
+flush:
+ tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
out:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
If a loaded key contains creation data, ask the TPM to verify that creation data. This allows users like encrypted hibernate to know that the loaded and parsed creation data has not been tampered with. Partially-sourced-from: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> --- Source material for this change is at: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-pm/patch/20210220013255.1083202-9-matthewgarrett@google.com/ include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)