| Message ID | 20211228153826.448805-2-Jason@zx2c4.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | None | expand |
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b003e266a499..95aac486177e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { + if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2;
If the bootloader supplies sufficient material and crng_reseed() is called very early on, but not too early that wqs aren't available yet, then we might transition to crng_init==2 before rand_initialize()'s call to crng_initialize_primary() made. Then, when crng_initialize_primary() is called, if we're trusting the CPU's RDRAND instructions, we'll needlessly reinitialize the RNG and emit a message about it. This is mostly harmless, as numa_crng_init() will allocate and then free what it just allocated, and excessive calls to invalidate_batched_entropy() aren't so harmful. But it is funky and the extra message is confusing, so avoid the re-initialization all together by checking for crng_init < 2 in crng_initialize_primary(), just as we already do in crng_reseed(). Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)