diff mbox series

[v4.9,07/10] mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame

Message ID 20210531203021.180010-8-johannes@sipsolutions.net
State New
Headers show
Series [v4.9,01/10] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted | expand

Commit Message

Johannes Berg May 31, 2021, 8:30 p.m. UTC
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

commit bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 upstream.

As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check
on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last
received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in
this frame itself.

Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order
to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really
compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored
one.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.bfbc340ff071.Id0b690e581da7d03d76df90bb0e3fd55930bc8a0@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 11 +++++++++--
 net/mac80211/rx.c          |  5 ++---
 net/mac80211/wpa.c         | 12 ++++++++----
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 3c61b632dde4..21b35255ecc2 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -221,8 +221,15 @@  struct ieee80211_rx_data {
 	 */
 	int security_idx;
 
-	u32 tkip_iv32;
-	u16 tkip_iv16;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u32 iv32;
+			u16 iv16;
+		} tkip;
+		struct {
+			u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+		} ccm_gcm;
+	};
 };
 
 struct ieee80211_csa_settings {
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 7b9a5ad7ba7c..b1c017faa1ae 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2057,7 +2057,6 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	if (entry->check_sequential_pn) {
 		int i;
 		u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
-		int queue;
 
 		if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
@@ -2072,8 +2071,8 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			if (pn[i])
 				break;
 		}
-		queue = rx->security_idx;
-		rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue];
+
+		rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn;
 		if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index c0529c4b60f8..7819a2507d39 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@  ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
 update_iv:
 	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
-	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
-	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
 
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 
@@ -289,8 +289,8 @@  ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
 					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
 					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
-					  &rx->tkip_iv32,
-					  &rx->tkip_iv16);
+					  &rx->tkip.iv32,
+					  &rx->tkip.iv16);
 	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@  ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
 		}
 
 		memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 	}
 
 	/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
@@ -777,6 +779,8 @@  ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		}
 
 		memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 	}
 
 	/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */