@@ -1311,6 +1311,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*get_tdp_max_page_level)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int max_level);
+ int (*handle_rmp_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ int level, u64 error_code);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
@@ -5105,6 +5105,18 @@ int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt);
+static int handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
+{
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+ int level;
+
+ if (unlikely(!kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk(vcpu, gpa, &pfn, &level)))
+ return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+ kvm_x86_ops.handle_rmp_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, pfn, level, error_code);
+ return RET_PF_RETRY;
+}
+
int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
void *insn, int insn_len)
{
@@ -5121,6 +5133,14 @@ int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
goto emulate;
}
+ if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK)) {
+ r = handle_rmp_page_fault(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, error_code);
+ if (r == RET_PF_RETRY)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return r;
+ }
+
if (r == RET_PF_INVALID) {
r = kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
lower_32_bits(error_code), false);
@@ -2924,3 +2924,60 @@ int sev_get_tdp_max_page_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int max_level)
return min_t(uint32_t, level, max_level);
}
+
+int snp_handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ int level, u64 error_code)
+{
+ int rlevel, rc = 0;
+ rmpentry_t *e;
+ bool private;
+ gfn_t gfn;
+
+ e = lookup_page_in_rmptable(pfn_to_page(pfn), &rlevel);
+ if (!e)
+ return 1;
+
+ private = !!(error_code & PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK);
+
+ /*
+ * See APM section 15.36.11 on how to handle the RMP fault for the large pages.
+ *
+ * npt rmp access action
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ * 4k 2M C=1 psmash
+ * x x C=1 if page is not private then add a new RMP entry
+ * x x C=0 if page is private then make it shared
+ * 2M 4k C=x zap
+ */
+ if ((error_code & PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK) ||
+ ((level == PG_LEVEL_4K) && (rlevel == PG_LEVEL_2M) && private)) {
+ rc = snp_rmptable_psmash(vcpu, pfn);
+ goto zap_gfn;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If it's a private access, and the page is not assigned in the RMP table, create a
+ * new private RMP entry.
+ */
+ if (!rmpentry_assigned(e) && private) {
+ rc = snp_make_page_private(vcpu, gpa, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ goto zap_gfn;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If it's a shared access, then make the page shared in the RMP table.
+ */
+ if (rmpentry_assigned(e) && !private)
+ rc = snp_make_page_shared(vcpu, gpa, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+zap_gfn:
+ /*
+ * Now that we have updated the RMP pagesize, zap the existing rmaps for
+ * large entry ranges so that nested page table gets rebuilt with the updated RMP
+ * pagesize.
+ */
+ gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa) & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(PG_LEVEL_2M) - 1);
+ kvm_zap_gfn_range(vcpu->kvm, gfn, gfn + 512);
+
+ return 0;
+}
@@ -4564,6 +4564,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
.get_tdp_max_page_level = sev_get_tdp_max_page_level,
+ .handle_rmp_page_fault = snp_handle_rmp_page_fault,
};
static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
@@ -637,6 +637,8 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void sev_snp_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
int sev_get_tdp_max_page_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int max_level);
+int snp_handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ int level, u64 error_code);
/* vmenter.S */
Follow the recommendation from APM2 section 15.36.10 and 15.36.11 to resolve the RMP violation encountered during the NPT table walk. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 20 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+)