| Message ID | 20210203112837.203732-1-daniele.alessandrelli@linux.intel.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key() | expand |
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 11:28:37AM +0000, Daniele Alessandrelli wrote: > From: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com> > > The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never > checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf' > parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed > length is less than the encoded length. > > Add a check to prevent that. > > Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com> > --- > crypto/ecdh_helper.c | 3 +++ > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) Patch applied. Thanks. -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c index 66fcb2ea8154..fca63b559f65 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c +++ b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH) return -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(len < secret.len)) + return -EINVAL; + ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id)); ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size)); if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))