| Message ID | 20201031195809.377983-1-ebiggers@kernel.org |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [4.4] f2fs crypto: avoid unneeded memory allocation in ->readdir | expand |
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 12:58:09PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> > > commit e06f86e61d7a67fe6e826010f57aa39c674f4b1b upstream. > [This backport fixes a regression in 4.4-stable caused by commit > 11a6e8f89521 ("f2fs: check memory boundary by insane namelen"), which > depended on this missing commit. This bad backport broke f2fs > encryption because it moved the incrementing of 'bit_pos' to earlier in > f2fs_fill_dentries() without accounting for it being used in the > encrypted dir case. This caused readdir() on encrypted directories to > start failing. Tested with 'kvm-xfstests -c f2fs -g encrypt'.] > > When decrypting dirents in ->readdir, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr won't > change content of original encrypted dirent, we don't need to allocate > additional buffer for storing mirror of it, so get rid of it. > > Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > fs/f2fs/dir.c | 7 ------- > 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) Now queued up, thanks. greg k-h
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c index e2ff0eb16f89c..c1130914d6ed7 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c @@ -820,15 +820,8 @@ bool f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_context *ctx, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *d, int save_len = fstr->len; int ret; - de_name.name = kmalloc(de_name.len, GFP_NOFS); - if (!de_name.name) - return false; - - memcpy(de_name.name, d->filename[bit_pos], de_name.len); - ret = f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr(d->inode, &de->hash_code, &de_name, fstr); - kfree(de_name.name); if (ret < 0) return true;