| Message ID | 20200618160458.1579-10-roberto.sassu@huawei.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | None | expand |
On Thu, 2020-06-18 at 18:04 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in > ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next > iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling > crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Verification of the boot_aggregate will fail, but yes this should be fixed. This patch and the next should be moved up front to the beginning of the patch set. Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> thanks, Mimi
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 220b14920c37..47897fbae6c6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -829,6 +829,8 @@ static int ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest, u16 alg_id, /* now accumulate with current aggregate */ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest, crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm)); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; } if (!rc) crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)