diff mbox series

[5.3,170/180] mm, memfd: fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings

Message ID 20191216174847.528262321@linuxfoundation.org
State Superseded
Headers show
Series None | expand

Commit Message

Greg KH Dec. 16, 2019, 5:50 p.m. UTC 
From: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com>


commit 05d351102dbe4e103d6bdac18b1122cd3cd04925 upstream.

F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE has unexpected behavior when used with MAP_PRIVATE:
A private mapping created after the memfd file that gets sealed with
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE loses the copy-on-write at fork behavior, meaning
children and parent share the same memory, even though the mapping is
private.

The reason for this is due to the code below:

  static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
  {
        struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));

        if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
                /*
                 * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when
                 * "future write" seal active.
                 */
                if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
                        return -EPERM;

                /*
                 * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED
                 * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert
                 * protections.
                 */
                vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
        }
        ...
  }

And for the mm to know if a mapping is copy-on-write:

  static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
  {
        return (flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE;
  }

The patch fixes the issue by making the mprotect revert protection
happen only for shared mappings.  For private mappings, using mprotect
will have no effect on the seal behavior.

The F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE feature was introduced in v5.1 so v5.3.x stable
kernels would need a backport.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow comment, per Christoph]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191107195355.80608-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Fixes: ab3948f58ff84 ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com>

Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>

Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 mm/shmem.c |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -2198,11 +2198,14 @@  static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file,
 			return -EPERM;
 
 		/*
-		 * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED
-		 * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert
-		 * protections.
+		 * Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as
+		 * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to
+		 * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared
+		 * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask
+		 * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable.
 		 */
-		vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
+		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
+			vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
 	}
 
 	file_accessed(file);