diff mbox series

[v2,11/21] stack-protector: test compiler capability in Kconfig and drop AUTO mode

Message ID 1522128575-5326-12-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
State Superseded
Headers show
Series kconfig: move compiler capability tests to Kconfig | expand

Commit Message

Masahiro Yamada March 27, 2018, 5:29 a.m. UTC 
Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig.

If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu
is automatically hidden.  If _STRONG is not supported, it will fall
back to _REGULAR.  If _REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled.
This means, _AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of
Kconfig, hence removed.

I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols.  The use of
'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config
would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to
disable as many features as possible.

X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports the
option, but generates broken code.  I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR
to test this.  I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh
to make it work correctly.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

---

Changes in v2:
  - Describe $(cc-option ...) directly in depends on context

 Makefile                                  | 93 ++-----------------------------
 arch/Kconfig                              | 29 +++-------
 arch/x86/Kconfig                          |  8 ++-
 scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh |  7 +--
 scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh |  5 --
 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

Comments

Kees Cook March 28, 2018, 11:18 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 10:29 PM, Masahiro Yamada
<yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:
> Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig.

>

> If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu

> is automatically hidden.  If _STRONG is not supported, it will fall

> back to _REGULAR.  If _REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled.

> This means, _AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of

> Kconfig, hence removed.

>

> I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols.  The use of

> 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config

> would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to

> disable as many features as possible.

>

> X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports the

> option, but generates broken code.  I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR

> to test this.  I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh

> to make it work correctly.

>

> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>


This looks really good. Notes below...

> ---

>

> Changes in v2:

>   - Describe $(cc-option ...) directly in depends on context

>

>  Makefile                                  | 93 ++-----------------------------

>  arch/Kconfig                              | 29 +++-------

>  arch/x86/Kconfig                          |  8 ++-

>  scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh |  7 +--

>  scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh |  5 --

>  5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)

>

> diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile

> index 5c395ed..5cadffa 100644

> --- a/Makefile

> +++ b/Makefile

> @@ -675,55 +675,11 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)

>  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})

>  endif

>

> -# This selects the stack protector compiler flag. Testing it is delayed

> -# until after .config has been reprocessed, in the prepare-compiler-check

> -# target.

> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO

> -  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong,$(call cc-option,-fstack-protector))

> -  stackp-name := AUTO

> -else

> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR

> -  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector

> -  stackp-name := REGULAR

> -else

> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG

> -  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector-strong

> -  stackp-name := STRONG

> -else

> -  # If either there is no stack protector for this architecture or

> -  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is selected, we're done, and $(stackp-name)

> -  # is empty, skipping all remaining stack protector tests.

> -  #

> -  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.

> -  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)

> -endif

> -endif

> -endif

> -# Find arch-specific stack protector compiler sanity-checking script.

> -ifdef stackp-name

> -ifneq ($(stackp-flag),)

> -  stackp-path := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-$(SRCARCH)_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh

> -  stackp-check := $(wildcard $(stackp-path))

> -  # If the wildcard test matches a test script, run it to check functionality.

> -  ifdef stackp-check

> -    ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(stackp-check) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)

> -      stackp-broken := y

> -    endif

> -  endif

> -  ifndef stackp-broken

> -    # If the stack protector is functional, enable code that depends on it.

> -    KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

> -    # Either we've already detected the flag (for AUTO) or we'll fail the

> -    # build in the prepare-compiler-check rule (for specific flag).

> -    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)

> -  else

> -    # We have to make sure stack protector is unconditionally disabled if

> -    # the compiler is broken (in case we're going to continue the build in

> -    # AUTO mode).


Let's keep this comment (slightly rewritten) since the reason for
setting this flag isn't obvious.

> -    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)

> -  endif

> -endif

> -endif

> +stackp-flags-y                                 := -fno-stack-protector


This is a (minor?) regression in my testing. Making this unconditional
may break for a compiler built without stack-protector. It should be
rare, but it's technically possible. Perhaps:

stackp-flags-y := ($call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)

> +stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)       := -fstack-protector

> +stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG)        := -fstack-protector-strong

> +

> +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y)

> [...]

> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig

> index 8e0d665..b42378d 100644

> --- a/arch/Kconfig

> +++ b/arch/Kconfig

> @@ -535,13 +535,13 @@ config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

>         bool

>         help

>           An arch should select this symbol if:

> -         - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option


Please leave this note: it's still valid. An arch must still have
compiler support for this to be sensible.

>           - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)

> [...]


Otherwise, this tests well for me. Nicely done!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Masahiro Yamada April 9, 2018, 8:54 a.m. UTC | #2 
2018-03-28 20:18 GMT+09:00 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:
> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 10:29 PM, Masahiro Yamada

> <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:

>> Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig.

>>

>> If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu

>> is automatically hidden.  If _STRONG is not supported, it will fall

>> back to _REGULAR.  If _REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled.

>> This means, _AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of

>> Kconfig, hence removed.

>>

>> I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols.  The use of

>> 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config

>> would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to

>> disable as many features as possible.

>>

>> X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports the

>> option, but generates broken code.  I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR

>> to test this.  I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh

>> to make it work correctly.

>>

>> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

>

> This looks really good. Notes below...

>

>> ---

>>

>> Changes in v2:

>>   - Describe $(cc-option ...) directly in depends on context

>>

>>  Makefile                                  | 93 ++-----------------------------

>>  arch/Kconfig                              | 29 +++-------

>>  arch/x86/Kconfig                          |  8 ++-

>>  scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh |  7 +--

>>  scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh |  5 --

>>  5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)

>>

>> diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile

>> index 5c395ed..5cadffa 100644

>> --- a/Makefile

>> +++ b/Makefile

>> @@ -675,55 +675,11 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)

>>  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})

>>  endif

>>

>> -# This selects the stack protector compiler flag. Testing it is delayed

>> -# until after .config has been reprocessed, in the prepare-compiler-check

>> -# target.

>> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO

>> -  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong,$(call cc-option,-fstack-protector))

>> -  stackp-name := AUTO

>> -else

>> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR

>> -  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector

>> -  stackp-name := REGULAR

>> -else

>> -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG

>> -  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector-strong

>> -  stackp-name := STRONG

>> -else

>> -  # If either there is no stack protector for this architecture or

>> -  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is selected, we're done, and $(stackp-name)

>> -  # is empty, skipping all remaining stack protector tests.

>> -  #

>> -  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.

>> -  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)

>> -endif

>> -endif

>> -endif

>> -# Find arch-specific stack protector compiler sanity-checking script.

>> -ifdef stackp-name

>> -ifneq ($(stackp-flag),)

>> -  stackp-path := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-$(SRCARCH)_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh

>> -  stackp-check := $(wildcard $(stackp-path))

>> -  # If the wildcard test matches a test script, run it to check functionality.

>> -  ifdef stackp-check

>> -    ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(stackp-check) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)

>> -      stackp-broken := y

>> -    endif

>> -  endif

>> -  ifndef stackp-broken

>> -    # If the stack protector is functional, enable code that depends on it.

>> -    KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

>> -    # Either we've already detected the flag (for AUTO) or we'll fail the

>> -    # build in the prepare-compiler-check rule (for specific flag).

>> -    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)

>> -  else

>> -    # We have to make sure stack protector is unconditionally disabled if

>> -    # the compiler is broken (in case we're going to continue the build in

>> -    # AUTO mode).

>

> Let's keep this comment (slightly rewritten) since the reason for

> setting this flag isn't obvious.


Will move this to help of arch/x86/Kconfig


>> -    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)

>> -  endif

>> -endif

>> -endif

>> +stackp-flags-y                                 := -fno-stack-protector

>

> This is a (minor?) regression in my testing. Making this unconditional

> may break for a compiler built without stack-protector. It should be

> rare, but it's technically possible. Perhaps:

>

> stackp-flags-y := ($call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)


Will add CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE


>> +stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)       := -fstack-protector

>> +stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG)        := -fstack-protector-strong

>> +

>> +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y)

>> [...]

>> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig

>> index 8e0d665..b42378d 100644

>> --- a/arch/Kconfig

>> +++ b/arch/Kconfig

>> @@ -535,13 +535,13 @@ config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

>>         bool

>>         help

>>           An arch should select this symbol if:

>> -         - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option

>

> Please leave this note: it's still valid. An arch must still have

> compiler support for this to be sensible.

>


No.

"its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option"
is tested by $(cc-option -fstack-protector)

ARCH does not need to know the GCC support level.




>>           - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)


-- 
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada
Kees Cook April 9, 2018, 3:04 p.m. UTC | #3 
On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Masahiro Yamada
<yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:
> 2018-03-28 20:18 GMT+09:00 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:

>> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 10:29 PM, Masahiro Yamada

>> <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:

>>> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig

>>> index 8e0d665..b42378d 100644

>>> --- a/arch/Kconfig

>>> +++ b/arch/Kconfig

>>> @@ -535,13 +535,13 @@ config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

>>>         bool

>>>         help

>>>           An arch should select this symbol if:

>>> -         - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option

>>

>> Please leave this note: it's still valid. An arch must still have

>> compiler support for this to be sensible.

>>

>

> No.

>

> "its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option"

> is tested by $(cc-option -fstack-protector)

>

> ARCH does not need to know the GCC support level.


That's not correct: if you enable stack protector for a kernel
architecture that doesn't having it enabled, it's unlikely for the
resulting kernel to boot. An architecture must handle the changes that
the compiler introduces when adding -fstack-protector (for example,
having the stack protector canary value defined, having the failure
function defined, handling context switches changing canaries, etc).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Masahiro Yamada April 10, 2018, 3:15 a.m. UTC | #4 
2018-04-10 0:04 GMT+09:00 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Masahiro Yamada

> <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:

>> 2018-03-28 20:18 GMT+09:00 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:

>>> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 10:29 PM, Masahiro Yamada

>>> <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> wrote:

>>>> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig

>>>> index 8e0d665..b42378d 100644

>>>> --- a/arch/Kconfig

>>>> +++ b/arch/Kconfig

>>>> @@ -535,13 +535,13 @@ config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR

>>>>         bool

>>>>         help

>>>>           An arch should select this symbol if:

>>>> -         - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option

>>>

>>> Please leave this note: it's still valid. An arch must still have

>>> compiler support for this to be sensible.

>>>

>>

>> No.

>>

>> "its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option"

>> is tested by $(cc-option -fstack-protector)

>>

>> ARCH does not need to know the GCC support level.

>

> That's not correct: if you enable stack protector for a kernel

> architecture that doesn't having it enabled, it's unlikely for the

> resulting kernel to boot. An architecture must handle the changes that

> the compiler introduces when adding -fstack-protector (for example,

> having the stack protector canary value defined, having the failure

> function defined, handling context switches changing canaries, etc).

>




It is still hard to understand this.


When we "its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option",
we have two meanings

[1] the stack protector feature is implemented in GCC source code.

[2] -fstack-protector is recognized as a valid option in the GCC being used.
    This can be tested by $(cc-option -fstack-protector)

I guess you were talking about [1], where as I [2].
Is this correct?


Does [2] happen only after [1] happens?
Or, are they independent?

If there is a case where GCC recognizes -fstack-protector,
but not implemented?


For x86, there are cases where the option is recognized but not working.
That's why we have
scripts/gcc-x86_{32,64}-has-stack-protector.sh

Generally, if GCC accepts -fstack-protector as a valid option,
we expect "it is working".

I wonder why we need additional information about the compiler
even after $(cc-option -fstack-protector) succeeds.


This is just a matter of comment.

Can you clarify your problem?




> resulting kernel to boot. An architecture must handle the changes that

> the compiler introduces when adding -fstack-protector (for example,

> having the stack protector canary value defined, having the failure

> function defined, handling context switches changing canaries, etc).

>


All of these are talking about the kernel side implementation.
So, it is included in the following comment I am still keeping.

  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)



-- 
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 5c395ed..5cadffa 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -675,55 +675,11 @@  ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})
 endif
 
-# This selects the stack protector compiler flag. Testing it is delayed
-# until after .config has been reprocessed, in the prepare-compiler-check
-# target.
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
-  stackp-flag := $(call cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong,$(call cc-option,-fstack-protector))
-  stackp-name := AUTO
-else
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
-  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector
-  stackp-name := REGULAR
-else
-ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
-  stackp-flag := -fstack-protector-strong
-  stackp-name := STRONG
-else
-  # If either there is no stack protector for this architecture or
-  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is selected, we're done, and $(stackp-name)
-  # is empty, skipping all remaining stack protector tests.
-  #
-  # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
-endif
-endif
-endif
-# Find arch-specific stack protector compiler sanity-checking script.
-ifdef stackp-name
-ifneq ($(stackp-flag),)
-  stackp-path := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-$(SRCARCH)_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh
-  stackp-check := $(wildcard $(stackp-path))
-  # If the wildcard test matches a test script, run it to check functionality.
-  ifdef stackp-check
-    ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(stackp-check) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
-      stackp-broken := y
-    endif
-  endif
-  ifndef stackp-broken
-    # If the stack protector is functional, enable code that depends on it.
-    KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-    # Either we've already detected the flag (for AUTO) or we'll fail the
-    # build in the prepare-compiler-check rule (for specific flag).
-    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
-  else
-    # We have to make sure stack protector is unconditionally disabled if
-    # the compiler is broken (in case we're going to continue the build in
-    # AUTO mode).
-    KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
-  endif
-endif
-endif
+stackp-flags-y					:= -fno-stack-protector
+stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)	:= -fstack-protector
+stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG)	:= -fstack-protector-strong
+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y)
 
 ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
@@ -1092,7 +1048,7 @@  endif
 # prepare2 creates a makefile if using a separate output directory.
 # From this point forward, .config has been reprocessed, so any rules
 # that need to depend on updated CONFIG_* values can be checked here.
-prepare2: prepare3 prepare-compiler-check outputmakefile asm-generic
+prepare2: prepare3 outputmakefile asm-generic
 
 prepare1: prepare2 $(version_h) $(autoksyms_h) include/generated/utsrelease.h \
                    include/config/auto.conf
@@ -1118,43 +1074,6 @@  uapi-asm-generic:
 PHONY += prepare-objtool
 prepare-objtool: $(objtool_target)
 
-# Check for CONFIG flags that require compiler support. Abort the build
-# after .config has been processed, but before the kernel build starts.
-#
-# For security-sensitive CONFIG options, we don't want to fallback and/or
-# silently change which compiler flags will be used, since that leads to
-# producing kernels with different security feature characteristics
-# depending on the compiler used. (For example, "But I selected
-# CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG! Why did it build with _REGULAR?!")
-PHONY += prepare-compiler-check
-prepare-compiler-check: FORCE
-# Make sure compiler supports requested stack protector flag.
-ifdef stackp-name
-  # Warn about CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO having found no option.
-  ifeq ($(stackp-flag),)
-	@echo CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_$(stackp-name): \
-		  Compiler does not support any known stack-protector >&2
-  else
-  # Fail if specifically requested stack protector is missing.
-  ifeq ($(call cc-option, $(stackp-flag)),)
-	@echo Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_$(stackp-name): \
-		  $(stackp-flag) not supported by compiler >&2 && exit 1
-  endif
-  endif
-endif
-# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stack-protector support. If a
-# specific stack-protector was requested, fail the build, otherwise warn.
-ifdef stackp-broken
-  ifeq ($(stackp-name),AUTO)
-	@echo CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_$(stackp-name): \
-                  $(stackp-flag) available but compiler is broken: disabling >&2
-  else
-	@echo Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_$(stackp-name): \
-                  $(stackp-flag) available but compiler is broken >&2 && exit 1
-  endif
-endif
-	@:
-
 # Generate some files
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 8e0d665..b42378d 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -535,13 +535,13 @@  config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	bool
 	help
 	  An arch should select this symbol if:
-	  - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
 	  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
 
-choice
-	prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
+config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
 	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-	default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
+	depends on $(cc-option -fstack-protector)
+	default y
 	help
 	  This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
 	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@  choice
 	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
 	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
-	bool "None"
-	help
-	  Disable "stack-protector" GCC feature.
-
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
-	bool "Regular"
-	help
 	  Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they
 	  have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack.
 
@@ -570,7 +562,10 @@  config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
 	  by about 0.3%.
 
 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
-	bool "Strong"
+	bool "Strong Stack Protector"
+	depends on CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	depends on $(cc-option -fstack-protector-strong)
+	default y
 	help
 	  Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any
 	  of the following conditions:
@@ -588,14 +583,6 @@  config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
 	  about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
 	  size by about 2%.
 
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
-	bool "Automatic"
-	help
-	  If the compiler supports it, the best available stack-protector
-	  option will be chosen.
-
-endchoice
-
 config LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 986fb0a..946bd9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@  config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK		if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
-	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR		if CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
 	select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING		if X86_64
@@ -340,6 +340,12 @@  config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	default 2
 
 source "init/Kconfig"
+
+config CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool
+	default $(success $srctree/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh $CC) if 64BIT
+	default $(success $srctree/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh $CC)
+
 source "kernel/Kconfig.freezer"
 
 menu "Processor type and features"
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh
index 6b2aeef..f5c1194 100755
--- a/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh
+++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh
@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@ 
 #!/bin/sh
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $* -S -x c -c -O0 -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs"
-if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then
-	echo y
-else
-	echo n
-fi
+echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $* -S -x c -c -m32 -O0 -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs"
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh
index 4a48bdc..3755af0 100755
--- a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh
+++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh
@@ -2,8 +2,3 @@ 
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
 echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $* -S -x c -c -O0 -mcmodel=kernel -fno-PIE -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs"
-if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then
-	echo y
-else
-	echo n
-fi